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This thesis investigates how the political thought of Augustine of Hippo 
was understood and modified by Carolingian-era writers to serve their own 
distinctive purposes. The research concentrates on Alcuin of York and Hincmar of 
Reims, advisers to Charlemagne and Charles the Bald, respectively. The analysis 
focuses on Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s discussions of empire, rulership and the moral 
conduct of political agents, in the course of which both made extensive use of 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei, though each came away with a substantially different 
understanding of its message. By applying a philological-historical approach, this 
thesis offers a deeper reading that views their texts as political discourses defined 
by content and language; it also explains why Augustine, despite being understood 
in such different ways, remained an author that Carolingian writers found useful to 
think with. 
Methodological problems are outlined in the Introduction. Chapter One 
contains an analysis of selected concepts of Augustinian thought, chosen both for 
their prominence in the De civitate Dei and relevance to the Carolingian material. 
Chapter Two explores the range of Augustinian influences in Alcuin’s Epistolae, 
with emphasis on political thought. Chapter Three studies the impact of Augustine 
on Hincmar’s Epistolae, Expositiones ad Carolum Regem and De regis persona, 
with a focus on political ethics. The Conclusion contextualises the findings on 
Augustinian influence from the previous chapters and attempts to show more 
clearly why Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s versions of Augustinian thought are so 
different. In particular, it considers the differences between Augustine’s, Alcuin’s 
and Hincmar’s understandings of ‘church’ and ‘state’ and the distinctive ways in 
which each of them interpreted the relationship between religion and political 
power. A comparison of Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s uses of Augustine sheds light on 





List of Abbreviations          5 
Note on the Text          6 
Acknowledgements          7 
 
INTRODUCTION        12 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Augustine of Hippo        37 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Alcuin of York        98 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Hincmar of Reims        189 
 
CONCLUSION 
Contextualisation of the Findings on Augustinian Influence  331 
 
Bibliography         346 
 
  5 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
JThS Journal of Theological Studies 
LLT-A Library of Latin Texts - Series A 
MGH 
 
     AN Poet. Lat. 
     Capit. 
     Capit. N. S. 
     Conc. 
     Epp. 
     Fontes iuris 
     SS rer. Germ. 
     SS rer. Merov. 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Series Latina by Jacques-Paul 
Migne 217 vols. 1844-1855 + 4 index-vols. 1862-1865 
Antiquitates Poetae Latini aevi Carolini 
Capitularia regum Francorum 
Capitularia regum Francorum Nova Series 
Concilia 
Epistolae (in Quart) 
Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui in usum scholarum separatim editi 
Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi 
Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum 
PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina by Jacques-Paul Migne 
217 vols. 1844-1855 + 4 index-vols. 1862-1865 
 
  6 
Note on the Text 
 
 
The thesis refers to many primary sources, most of which are in Latin. 
Citations in the main text from Latin (or, occasionally, Greek) material are given in 
English translation, which is my own unless otherwise indicated. The original text 
is given in the footnotes. Wherever I draw significantly on primary sources without 
quoting them in the body of the text, I provide the excerpts in the footnotes, in the 
original language. Paragraph breaks in all quotations correspond to the original text 
(as rendered in the editions I adhere to).




After graduating from the University of Basel in 2010, I decided to embark 
on a Ph.D. in England at King’s College London. Since I proposed the subject of 
this thesis to Professor Peter Heather and Dr Alice Rio, I could, of course, foresee 
reasons for enjoyment. However, I could hardly imagine that Augustine of Hippo, 
Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Reims – three authors similar in prolificacy but 
fundamentally different in their understanding of ecclesiastical and secular power – 
would become so enmeshed with my professional and personal life. I am very glad 
that Peter Heather and Alice Rio both had enough faith to accept my proposal from 
abroad, and that I had enough initiative to make it. 
In reaching the final stage of my Ph.D., I feel fraught, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, with the sense of an end. More than a feeling of achievement, 
though, the completion of this project carries (for me) the redolence of memories 
from the past few years – and, somewhat more painfully, the whiff of possibilities, 
of opportunities that did not materialise. But perhaps in the latter lie this project’s 
promises for the future: its invitation to look forward to new paths in this very same 
or related research; to believe in refreshed encounters with people never met or not 
deeply enough understood. In many ways it was the people this Ph.D. brought into 
my life that made the whole experience meaningful to me. 
 Many have contributed to this research. I am grateful to King’s College 
London for providing the infrastructure for completing such a formidable task. 
Back in Switzerland, vielen Dank to the Swiss National Science Foundation 
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(SNSF), for awarding me with a Doc.Mobility fellowship and for supporting this 
project; vielen Dank also to the librarians at the Universitätsbibliothek Basel who 
never failed to assist me. 
Several people, at various stages, have read and commented on many drafts, 
and each of them has also enriched this experience in other ways. Thanks to 
Professor Julia Crick for chairing the upgrade panel, for identifying weaknesses 
and options for improvement in my abstract and draft chapter on Alcuin, for 
encouraging my enthusiasm for palaeography through her teaching and, last but not 
least, for encouraging me to deliver my paper at Revealing Records V; to Daniel 
Hadas for teaching me Latin, for his kind assistance with my translations of Latin 
passages from Alcuin and Augustine, for his constructive criticism during my 
upgrade and afterwards, in my abstract and draft chapters on Alcuin and Augustine; 
to Dr Carsten Schmieder for providing me with a second opinion on an intricate 
passage in Hincmar’s Expositiones ad Carolum Regem; to Dr Hazel Johannessen 
for her advice on the work of Eusebius of Caesarea; to Hilary Davies (Royal 
Literary Fund Fellow), for proofreading my entire upgrade material; and to Sarah 
Sharp for her excellent proofreading work in the conclusion and the chapters on 
Alcuin and Hincmar (including the translations from the Latin sources). My 
deepest gratitude above all, of course, to Peter Heather and Alice Rio: for their 
continuous support throughout this project; for their mixture of rigorous pickiness 
and sensible pragmatism; and for the comments of encouragement they never 
forgot to scatter alongside their criticisms in any of my drafts. 
To other people I owe a lot also for helping me to develop my research 
skills, which have contributed to the progress of my Ph.D. In Switzerland, thanks to 
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Professor Achatz von Müller (University of Basel), for being my thesis supervisor 
and examiner for the lic. phil. degree and for encouraging me to devote myself to 
the history of political thought by running a seminar on Political Theories from 
Augustine to Machiavelli. In London, thanks to Professors Edith Hall and Roland 
Mayer (Department of Classics), for welcoming me to their MA course on 
Hellenistic Poetry, for piquing my interest in mythology and deepening my 
knowledge of ancient Greek literature, translation and interpretation; to Dr 
Alessandra Bucossi (Department of Classics), for bearing my presence at her MA 
course on Greek Palaeography & Textual Criticism; to Dr Charalambos Dendrinos 
(Royal Holloway), for allowing me to participate in his highly engaging Working 
Seminar on Editing Byzantine Texts at the Warburg; and, finally, to both Dr Nicola 
Devlin and Dr Fiona Haarer (Department of Classics), for teaching me in rigorous 
courses the basics of ancient Greek. At the Modern Language Centre, I am highly 
indebted to Silvia Colaiacomo and Paolo Nelli who have taught me throughout my 
doctoral studies at KCL: I feel fortunate to have sat in many of their language 
classes and to have shared a tiny bit of their great passion for the Italian language, 
literature and culture. Thanks also to Dr Francesca Vella for initiating an 
Italian/German language tandem and for being a true friend. 
My closest companions from the University of London, historical and other, 
have been invaluable sources of support, and the importance of their contribution to 
the development of this thesis is obscured only by the value of their friendship. 
Thanks, then, to Sohail Nazir, for his inspiring verbosity, and for ‘feeling German’ 
when it comes to sharing doubts and troubles; and to Albertine Fox, for her 
unswerving positivity, and for partaking in my doubts about academic negativity. A 
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special thanks to Dr Victoria Győri: for proofreading much of these pages, for 
finding the right words at the right moment and for her thoughtful advice, calls and 
texts at moments of despair. 
Other friends, in Switzerland and London, have been with me all along this 
Ph.D. Thanks to Anna Niklaus, for sharing much of my Swiss education, and for 
remaining my dear friend even as our paths took different directions. Thanks to Dr. 
phil. des. Kathrin Pavic, for her presence and continuing trust in the development 
of my research; to Andrew Habofanoe Mpeqa, for his faith, and for being a model 
of strength in the face of difficulties; and to Helen Swallow, for her human ‘grace’, 
and Evangelia Gioldasi for her ‘Greek’ humour, at emotional low points. 
 My debt to two people whose human qualities have shaped my work as well 
as my life significantly during my Ph.D. will not be expressed enough in the next 
few lines. Franziska Herzog and Dr. phil. Martin Kaiser both had the courage, 
insight, patience and dedication needed to push me in the right direction. Words 
fall short of expressing how decisive the brilliance of Martin Kaiser has been in 
leading me to where and what I am today. His curiosity for every aspect of human 
life and his trusting commitment to the moral values scholarly work can pursue 
were plenty of reasons, way back four years ago, for me to embark on a Ph.D. in 
late antique and early medieval history. His enthusiasm for and engagement with 
classical and patristic ancient Greek and Latin texts he studied for so many years of 
his life did the rest. I have benefited, in each of my chapters, from his unique gift 
for language and literary analysis. The results that, after various ebbs and flows, we 
– together – achieved remain among the dearest memories I keep with me. 
  11 
 Finally, my family – my parents and sister, and all my grandparents 
(watching over from above, I hope) – are those whose presence I have never 
doubted and know for sure will be long-lasting whatever paths, shapes and paces 
our lives will take. They have been with me in every moment of joy and sorrow, 
and stood back quietly – the most difficult thing of all – when asked not to ask. 
They have, being relatively familiar with the topic of my research, never failed to 
encourage me, often in rather touching ways: by cutting out newspaper articles and 
recording radio broadcasts and documentaries. I hope one day my two homes will 
feel less parted, and those who are dearest to me – only removed, I am sure of that, 
in geographical terms – will have a chance to meet.






Augustine’s De civitate Dei would seem, at first sight, an unpromising 
starting-point for rulers of ‘states’1 in search of ideological support, since – strictly 
and theoretically speaking – it ultimately predicts failure, whatever their earthly 
endeavours may be. Nevertheless, Charlemagne’s imperial plan for a Carolingian 
‘state’ and ‘church’2 as well as his cultural reform have tempted some historians to 
propose that his scheme involved the realisation of Augustine’s civitas Dei.3 After 
all, Einhard maintains in his Vita Karoli Magni that the emperor particularly 
enjoyed listening to Augustine’s text De civitate Dei.4 However, although it may 
have become standard practice in medieval scholarship to relate the Carolingian 
empire to Augustine’s civitas Dei, a comprehensive investigation of how Augustine 
was perceived in the Carolingian period and of those parts of Augustinian thinking 
which had the greatest impact on Carolingian ideas of ‘state’, rulership and 
Christian ethics, is still outstanding. This is the aim of my research. Since it is not 
possible in a doctoral thesis to look for Augustinian influence in the entire 
                                                
1 The use of the modern term ‘state’ in scholarship concerned with the Early Middle Ages is 
problematic in various ways. See Pohl 2006, pp. 9-38. A more detailed treatment of my use of the 
concept of ‘state’ in my research can be found in this chapter under ‘State’ and ‘Church’. 
2 A more detailed treatment of my use of the concept of ‘church’ in my research can be found in this 
chapter under ‘State’ and ‘Church’. 
3 See Dempf 1973; Arquillière 1934; Ganshof 1949; Patzelt/Vogel 1965; Steinen 1967. 
4 V.Kar. 24, p. 29. 
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Carolingian source material, I have decided to focus on two highly influential 
authors of the Carolingian imperial period: Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Reims. 
The thesis will explore the thinking and motives behind Alcuin and Hincmar’s use 
of Augustinian thought in their attempts to consolidate the empire and legitimate 
Carolingian rule – and to what extent these authors used it. This research, broadly 
speaking, will look into how Augustinian ideas were understood, taken on and 
modified by Alcuin and Hincmar to serve the purposes of the Carolingian imperial 
dynasty. 
My research is particularly important since no extensive study has been 
undertaken on the reception of Augustinian thought in the Carolingian era since the 
work of H.-X. Arquillière.5 Arquillière illustrated how a certain form of political 
thought6 inspired by Augustine (notably by his De civitate Dei) developed in 
Merovingian times, when kingship gradually began to be seen as subservient to the 
‘church’.7 The term Arquillière uses for this particular political theory, diffused for 
example through the works of Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville, is 
Augustinisme politique (“political Augustinianism”). N. H. Baynes’ research on the 
political ideas in the De civitate Dei, published two years later, does not advance 
Arquillière’s research.8 However, Baynes confirms that medieval authors, by 
concentrating on certain statements in isolation rather than in context, did derive 
                                                
5 See Arquillière 1934. 
6 In line with The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, I will distinguish 
between “political thought” and “political theory” in my research. Both categories involve people 
who do the thinking. “Political thought”, the broader of the two concepts, will be used with 
reference to general, unsystematic reflection on things political. “Political theory” will be used in 
regard to a specific framework of thought that “[...] represents direct, systematic reflection on things 
political [...]” Rowe 2010, pp. 1-3. 
7 Arquillière 1934, pp. 151f. 
8 Baynes 1936. 
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political doctrine from this work.9 Before Arquillière, German scholarship (e.g. 
Dempf 1973; first published in 1929) had already suggested (without, however, 
producing sufficient evidence) that in the Carolingian period the Augustinian 
concept of the civitas Dei served as a model for the Carolingian ‘state’.10 After 
Arquillière, the Belgian historian F. L. Ganshof (1949) indicated that some French 
scholars (e.g. A. Kleinclausz, L. Halphen and L. Levillain) understood 
Charlemagne’s empire as “a kind of prefiguration on earth of the city of God”.11 
Ganshof himself insisted that Charlemagne and his advisers (particularly Alcuin) 
had attempted “to realise the ‘Augustinian’ conception of the city of God”.12 E. 
Patzelt and C. Vogel13 (1965) and W. von den Steinen14 (1967) also associated the 
Carolingian empire with Augustine’s civitas Dei. While J. M. Wallace-Hadrill 
(1975; first published in 1965)15, F. Dvornik (1966)16 and H. H. Anton (1968)17 
endorsed Arquillière’s thesis concerning the development of Augustinisme 
politique in the Middle Ages, M. J. Wilks (1967)18 attempted to invalidate it. 
                                                
9 Ibid., pp. 3, 15-16. 
10 Dempf 1973, p. 134. 
11 Ganshof 1949, p. 9. 
12 Ibid., p. 26f. 
13 Patzelt/Vogel 1965, p. 17. 
14 Steinen 1967, p. 17. 
15 According to Wallace-Hadrill, the Carolingian ‘state’ is a community united by unanimitas and 
defined by a mutual interest in Christian peace. The consensus among its members, Wallace-Hadrill 
argues, is evocative of Augustine’s idea of the ‘state’. Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 188-189. The 
Carolingian ‘state’ is to be understood in the sense of Augustinisme politique: “[...] Natural Law has 
become absorbed in supranatural justice, the Law of the State in that of the Church.” Ibid., p. 192. 
16 Dvornik 1966, p. 849. A discussion of Dvornik’s support for Arquillière’s Augustinisme politique 
can be found in Chapter One under III. Concepts of Augustinian Political Thought, ‘Iustitia’ and 
‘Pax’. 
17 Anton’s analysis of ninth-century “mirrors for princes” is based on a study of the sources (e.g. 
Augustine, Gregory the Great, Isidore, Pseudo-Cyprian) used by the Carolingian authors. Anton 
1968, pp. 47-74. An examination of different sub-genres of ninth-century “mirrors for princes” 
follows an investigation of Alcuin’s eighth-century discourse of admonition. Ibid., chapters II and 
III. Anton shows that Hincmar’s work largely follows in the tradition of the “konziliare 
Fürstenspiegel”, which developed a doctrine of the person and the office on the basis of Augustine 
and Gelasius. Ibid., pp. 225, 286ff., 290-293, 352-356. In Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio 
ministerio Anton sees a culmination of Arquillière’s Augustinisme politique. Ibid., pp. 230-231. 
18 Wilks 1967. 
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However, Wilks is unsuccessful since his argument compels him to assume that 
Augustine conceived a full realisation of iustitia in a Christian setting.19 Despite the 
endorsement of Arquillière’s study by Wallace-Hadrill, Dvornik and Anton, the 
question of Augustinian influence on Carolingian political thought and political 
ethics has not been at the forefront of recent historical research. R. A. Markus 
(1970) largely uses the phrase Augustinisme politique “[...] in a very different sense 
from that given it by Arquillière [...]”, namely “[...] to mean the political theory 
implied in Augustine’s theology of the saeculum”.20 J. Boler (1978), in his article 
that demonstrates how Augustine had no political theory at all, merely touches 
upon Augustinisme politique and admits that its propagandists “[...] cannot be 
accused of a wholesale fabrication”.21 While J. van Oort (1991) agrees with 
Arquillière when stating that “medieval life was modelled to a great extent after the 
City of God, but [that] this occurred through a radical metamorphosis”, he makes it 
clear that, in his study, “[...] no more attention will be devoted to this remarkable 
historical development”.22 What is more, neither the British historian D. A. 
Bullough, in his studies of Alcuin and Carolingian history23, nor the German 
historian and philosopher K. Flasch, a specialist on Augustine24, provide anything 
more than rough outlines of Augustine’s influence on Carolingian thought. J. L. 
Nelson similarly did not do more than hint at Augustinian influence in her research 
on rituals of inauguration.25 
                                                
19 Ibid., pp. 489-493, 499. 
20 Markus 1970, p. 168. 
21 Boler 1978, pp. 83, 87, 90. Boler bases his argument on Markus. 
22 Oort van 1991, p. 92. 
23 See Bullough 1991; 1999; 2003; 2004. 
24 See Flasch 2003; 2008. 
25 Nelson 1994, p. 56; see Nelson 1996b). 
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The two scholars Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Reims will be examined 
here because they were preeminent advisers to the rulers of the first and third 
generation: Charlemagne and Charles the Bald. My selection resulted from the 
facts, firstly that they were the most prolific advisers who enjoyed significant 
influence with their respective kings, and secondly that both made use of 
Augustinian ideas directly and for their own distinct purposes. They also differ 
substantially in their style of advice and understanding of ecclesiastical and secular 
power, so that a comparison of the ways in which they made use of Augustinian 
thought will also shed light on the differences between Charlemagne’s reign and 
the more conflict-ridden reign of his grandson. The conditions under Charlemagne 
and Charles the Bald were not the same.26 Charlemagne, who expanded the 
Frankish territory to the North, South and East, faced the challenges of 
Christianising different conquered peoples and of consolidating the Christian faith 
in these regions by (re-)founding ‘churches’, dioceses and ecclesiastical provinces 
(on the basis of the late Roman order).27 Charlemagne was effective in his military 
campaigns and cultural reform28, and it was an advantage for him that he could 
govern Francia without any co-rulers for forty-two years.29 He had no rivals in his 
family – his younger brother Carloman I died in 771.30 There was time for 
Charlemagne to establish himself as a powerful sole ruler before acquiring the 
imperial title. 
                                                
26 See Story 2005; McKitterick 2008; Nelson 1992. 
27 For further reading on Charlemagne’s reform of the Frankish ‘church’ see De Jong 2005, pp. 103-
135; McKitterick 1977, pp. 1-44 on the legislation for reform, pp. 45-79 on the episcopal statutes; 
Christie 2005, pp. 167-180 on the restoration of the ecclesiastical heritage of Rome. 
28 The expansion of learning, the dissemination of the Christian religion and Biblical and other texts 
are covered in McKitterick 2005, pp. 151-166. 
29 A recent biographical account of Charlemagne is Hägermann 2006. On the representation of 
Charlemagne in Carolingian texts see also Nelson 2005, pp. 22-37. 
30 Ibid., p. 28. 
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In the generation of Charles the Bald, by contrast, there were intense 
rivalries.31 Rival Carolingians strove to win royal resources, and, throughout his 
reign, Charles the Bald coexisted with brothers and nephews in separate 
territories.32 He reigned for thirty-seven years and was emperor only in the last two 
years of his reign. Charles the Bald was in a much less secure political position.33 
Like Charlemagne, he did not have the institutional means fully to exploit the 
resources within his realm; unlike Charlemagne, he was no longer able to perform 
as many plundering raids in order to satisfy the nobility (who formed the army).34 
Instead, Charles the Bald exploited the ‘church’s’ wealth to a degree previous 
Carolingian rulers had not needed to assay.35 After Charlemagne, the relationship 
between the ‘church’ and the ‘state’ began to be renegotiated. As my research will 
demonstrate, Hincmar – in contrast to Alcuin – voiced criticism with regard to the 




My research will be divided into three chapters (excluding the Introduction 
and the Conclusion). In order to distinguish between Augustinian and non-
Augustinian elements in the Carolingian materials, an introductory treatment of 
essential questions relating to Augustine, his late work the De civitate Dei and the 
                                                
31 The best full account of Charles the Bald is Nelson 1992. See in particular pp. 71-74. 
32 On the rivalries during the years 840-843 see ibid., pp. 105-131; for the years 850-858 see ibid., 
pp. 160-189. 
33 See the treatment by Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 125-128. The workings of politics at the centre 
and the participation of the aristocracy, whose power was based on local landlordship, are illustrated 
in Nelson 1992, pp. 41-65. 
34 On the economic situation see Nelson 1992, pp. 21ff. 
35 Ibid., pp. 61-66; Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 126-127. 
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Christianised Roman empire of the fourth and fifth centuries will be required. 
Furthermore, it will be necessary to determine the meaning Augustine attributes to 
worldly rule, rulership and politically organised communities in general. How 
Augustine defines and evaluates temporal ‘states’ (particularly the Roman ‘state’) 
will be analysed, as well as the sort of relationship he depicts between rulers and 
God in the De civitate Dei. This introductory part will constitute Chapter One and 
will lay out themes and concepts of Augustinian thinking that are relevant to an 
examination of Carolingian material. It will consist largely of survey work and will 
form the basis upon which Carolingian political reflections can subsequently be 
scrutinised – ideas that, while echoing Augustine in many respects, were arguably 
derived from propositions and demands fundamentally different to his own. 
The research itself will concentrate on the two high-flying Carolingian 
political advisers Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Reims. A separate chapter will be 
devoted to each author. In each chapter, different texts composed by these authors 
will be analysed in light of Augustine’s possible influence. The analyses of Alcuin 
and Hincmar’s material will engage with ideas about empire and the moral conduct 
of the political agents involved. They will ask questions largely with reference to 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei. 
The subject of Chapter Two on Alcuin of York will be political thought, 
with an emphasis on the notions of kingship/imperial authority, and on the value of 
ruling power within the context of God’s providential plan. The question of the 
salvific meaning Alcuin attributes to the Carolingian realm, as compared with that 
which Augustine assigns to earlier supreme worldly ‘states’ (such as the Christian 
Roman empire), will feature in this discussion. Alcuin’s Epistolae will provide the 
INTRODUCTION 
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main source material. The decision to pay particular attention to Alcuin’s 
correspondence is based on the proposition that the letters written to Charlemagne 
and his descendants or to his closest friends (e.g. Arn, Bishop of Salzburg, and 
Angilbert, Abbot of Saint-Riquier) not only reveal the nature of Alcuin’s political 
thinking, but also the manner in which he communicated the thoughts he 
considered important for the strengthening and legitimating of Carolingian rule to 
his peers. The epistles show much more clearly than any of his other treatises the 
way in which Alcuin actually went about convincing Charlemagne and the 
surrounding community how to implement his political scheme. The procedure for 
selecting the epistles treated in my research was as follows: after reading the entire 
collection of Alcuin’s Epistolae in the Electronic Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, I selected the letters in which Alcuin expresses his political ideas. These 
did not only include letters to the ruler. I have looked for any letters which contain 
statements about the ruler’s influence on political and religious affairs, which 
legitimate the ruler’s authority, or which deal with important events (such as 
coronations or events involving Pope Leo III). I have cross-checked using the word 
search on the eMGH and entered key words used by Alcuin in political contexts, in 
order to verify that no other significant epistles are overlooked. Finally, I have 
drawn on secondary literature for confirmation and to facilitate contextualisation. 
Chapter Three on Hincmar of Reims will look at his Epistolae, his 
Expositiones ad Carolum Regem and his De regis persona et regio ministerio. 
While the Epistolae will be examined for any kind of explicit references to 
Augustine, a leading theme in the latter two pieces will be advice either on how to 
lead a Christian life according to certain moral principles, or on how to rule in 
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consideration of Christian political ethics. The work Expositiones ad Carolum 
Regem consists of three legal opinions composed for the Synod of Pîtres in 868. 
Since it reflects Hincmar’s opinion on a legal dispute in which he supports his 
nephew by defending the ‘church’ property against Charles the Bald’s claim, the 
text is first and foremost concerned with political morality and ethics. Hincmar’s 
De regis persona et regio ministerio belongs to the tradition of so-called “mirrors 
for princes”, medieval treatises for the instruction of Christian rulers.36 The premise 
of this investigation will be that political ethics were useful for instilling a sense of 
common mission for the secular power, and so formed an important part of 
Carolingian political thought.37 
Hincmar lived under a ‘state’ which relied heavily for its effectiveness on 
persuading an existing landed elite that it was worthwhile to participate in a 
common, empire-wide project. The late Roman empire of which Augustine was a 
part, and which he was critically assessing in his writings, had by contrast a much 
more formal and professionalised ‘state’ apparatus that was based on tradition. 
Augustine and his Carolingian-era readers, however, all shared a common opinion 
that secular politics and political success were fundamentally moral issues, which 
demanded adherence to stringent moral standards. The reason behind this thinking 
was that political success is granted by God alone.38 The elements of Augustine’s 
moral values that were most often picked out by, and which found most resonance 
with his ninth-century readers, will reveal much about continuities between late 
antique and Carolingian political thought, as well as about the precise nature of the 
                                                
36 See Stone 2012. 
37 Nelson 1986, pp. 170-171; Nelson 1994, pp. 66-69; Nelson 1996a), p. 97; Nelson 1996b), pp. 
115-120. 
38 Nelson 1994, p. 58. 
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displacement involved in using his writings in order to speak to a fundamentally 
different political situation. 
 The Conclusion will bring together the findings on Augustinian influence 
produced in Chapter Two on Alcuin and Chapter Three on Hincmar, and will 
situate them in a broader context. That is to say that full consideration will be given 
to the differences between Augustine’s and Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s ideas of 
‘church’ and ‘state’ in light of the altered political situation. 
 
‘State’ and ‘Church’ 
 
 Augustine himself promoted a particular relationship between the ‘state’ 
and the ‘church’.39 He recognised the imperfect worldly ‘state’ as an instrument of 
power for missionary purposes40, and hence saw a functional relationship between 
‘state’ and ‘church’.41 Especially in his correspondence (e.g. epist. 48 ad 
Vincentium from 408), Augustine approved of laws and government regulations for 
religious affairs, particularly when they concerned pagans and schismatics (e.g. 
Donatists) or when they supported the development of the ‘church’.42 Several 
passages in the De civitate Dei which defend the Christian religion provide 
                                                
39 Flasch 2003, pp. 391, 393. 
40 On Augustine’s “infamous theological justification of force” see Campenhausen von 1964, pp. 
238-240. 
41 Flasch 2003, pp. 164, 391-393. This is confirmed by R. Dodaro, who writes that, with the reign of 
Emperor Constantine I “[...] and continuing into the early Middle Ages, the governing structures of 
the Christian church and of the Roman Empire developed closer relationships, even while retaining 
their separate identities.” Dodaro 1999, p. 176. See also Markus 1988, p. 86; Baynes 1936, pp. 14-
15. 
42 Dvornik 1966, pp. 842-843; Dodaro 1999, pp. 180-181. On Augustine and religious coercion 
under Theodosius I and his successors see Markus 1988, pp. 113-115. 
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evidence that Augustine was in favour of the imperial repression of pagan cults.43 
However, in purely abstract terms, Augustine regarded the ‘state’ as a worldly 
system of power separate from the ‘church’.44 ‘State’ and ‘church’ referred to two 
distinct spheres. According to Augustine, the ‘church’s’ superior role was not to be 
understood in a worldly sense:45 the ‘church’ has an immortal soul and an eternal 
mission, which the ‘state’ evidently lacks.46 In this sense, the Augustinian ‘church’ 
cannot be compared to an earthly system of rule on account of its timelessness, and 
it lacks a correspondlingly clear hierarchical structure.47 Flasch and M. De Jong 
note that Augustine’s ‘church’ is more a community than a hierarchically 
structured body.48 The Carolingian ‘church’ too aspired to constant expansion, 
which was achieved by secular means.49 Since Late Antiquity the ‘church’ had 
become more powerful and wealthy. Another difference lay in the scope of the 
later ‘church’ councils: the late Roman councils had been more wide-ranging.50 The 
                                                
43 At one point Augustine says that people who object to being forced to convert to Christianity are 
unreasonable and ungrateful. Civ. II 28, p. 94. He also mocks the pagans by declaring that they 
would be happier in life if criticism of the Christian religion were prohibited by law – except that 
they would of course fail to recognise their good fortune. Civ. V 26, pp. 241-242. Such statements 
reveal that Augustine tackled the difficulty of reducing the strongly divergent concepts of love of 
neighbour and affirmation of force to a common denominator by dressing force up as necessary 
rigour for the benefit of the people. Flasch 2003, pp. 164ff. 
44 Ibid., p. 391; Dempf 1973, p. 134. 
45 Flasch 2003, p. 391; Baynes 1936, p. 15. 
46 Flasch 2003, p. 392. Markus, for example, speaks of “[...] an ‘otherworldly’ Church [...]” when 
referring to the ‘church’ in this abstract sense. Markus 1970, p. 133. 
47 Flasch 2003, pp. 386-388. 
48 Ibid., p. 388; De Jong 2009b), p. 242. 
49 This is well reflected by the Saxon War, which lasted from 772 until 804 and was, at least 
according to Einhard, Charlemagne’s longest and most strenuous battle. V.Kar. 7, p. 9; Büttner 
1965, p. 467; Fleckenstein 1990, p. 32. In the war between 791 and 803/811 against the Avars, who 
continuously invaded Upper Italy and Bavaria, Charlemagne conducted forced baptisms between 
795 and 796. Fleckenstein 1990, pp. 48-50; Büttner 1965, pp. 476, 479; V. Kar. 13, pp. 15-16. 
50 Morrison 1985, p. 14. On the African ‘church’ synods during Augustine’s episcopate see Dodaro 
1999, p. 180. Episcopal councils at Carthage mediated the African ‘church’s’ relations with imperial 
authorities. The councils enabled the African bishops to negotiate directly with the imperial court at 
Ravenna and to take a united stance on legislation favourable to the African ‘church’. Ibid., p. 180. 
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Carolingian ‘church’ councils, however, were less interlinked with other regions 
and merely involved bishops from the same kingdom.51 
It is clear that the ‘church’ as it features in my research is a concept that was 
subject to change over the period of time covered by my investigation (roughly 
from the fourth to the ninth century). It is not possible to provide a single and firm 
definition of ‘church’ that would cater to the broad spectrum of meanings that this 
concept implies. I have decided to use ‘church’ (enclosed in single quotation 
marks) consistently in my research. ‘Church’ may refer to a general Christian 
spiritual power or to a distinct Christian institution with a distinct sphere of action. 
What ‘church’ always presupposes is a contrast to the ‘state’. 
The ‘state’ itself can take many forms, and in a pre-modern context it would 
be difficult to imagine two ‘states’ more dissimilar than the late Roman empire and 
the Carolingian empire: the Carolingian ‘state’ did not have a standing army, or a 
full-time bureaucracy, or standard forms of delegation of political powers, or such 
a complex system of taxation as had made the late Roman empire so powerful an 
entity. Carolingian rulers had a different hand to play with, which made them by 
definition more dependent on consensus.52 One could claim that in terms of 
structures and forms of government, the Carolingian ‘state’ had a shape closer to 
that of Augustine’s ‘church’ than to his ‘state’, and that it operated not unlike a 
                                                
51 Carolingian rulers convoked ‘church’ councils. As in Augustine’s day, the structures of the 
Carolingian imperial ‘church’ readily allowed merging with secular structures. Morrison 1985, pp. 
3-52; see also Cameron 1991. It should be noted, however, that bishops in particular assumed these 
secular functions. See Rapp 2005. 
52 See Nelson 1996b). 
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‘church’ council. Carolingian rulers seem to have consciously made this 
connection.53 
This rather minimalist reading of the Carolingian ‘state’ apparatus is a 
recent historiographical phenomenon. The traditional European scholarship on 
Carolingian history from the first half of the twentieth century was led by French 
and German scholars who examined Carolingian politics and society from an angle 
that focused on formal, institutional and constitutional elements. Their reading of 
Carolingian politics was idealised. French/Belgian historians until Ganshof put 
forward a maximalist view of Carolingian administrative structures; German 
scholars also studied representations of rulership and power as descriptive rather 
than aspirational. While they focused more on political symbolism, they saw the 
political community as a near theocracy. This perception was still current 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s and is visible in the works of P. E. Schramm54 and 
W. Ullmann55. 
However, historians’ treatment of the Carolingian ‘state’ has shifted since 
the 1970s. The historiographical debate in Britain revolves around the research of 
three medievalists. The work of R. McKitterick is based on palaeographical and 
manuscript studies as a foundation for the study of Carolingian politics, culture and 
society. This is, for example, apparent in her contributions on Carolingian law.56 
McKitterick attempts to establish how different pieces of written law were used by 
                                                
53 For instance, ‘church’ councils held in the Carolingian empire could very well be integrated in 
legislation. The Admonitio generalis, for example, drew more material from canon law than from 
any other source. The decisions of the Council of Frankfurt (794), whose subjects of negotiation 
were drawn up in fifty-six chapters that discuss theological, political and legal matters, were 
summarised in a capitulary. 
54 See Schramm 1983. 
55 See Ullmann 1969; 1974. 
56 McKitterick 1980, pp. 13-27. 
INTRODUCTION 
 25 
the Carolingians, and to illuminate their implementation of legislation by looking at 
particular manuscripts in relation to a family of manuscripts. Formal aspects of the 
manuscript are scrutinised. It is possible to see how Carolingian law books were 
put together and used by this method. However, a description of how this written 
law was brought outside the court and practised is missing: since every surviving 
manuscript can in some sense be seen as a success story, using these as a starting 
point leads her to adopt an optimistic stance on the Carolingian ‘state’ as a smooth-
running operation, which is reminiscent of the more traditional, German 
approach.57 P. Wormald also published significant work on law.58 He, by contrast, 
saw Carolingian law-making very much in an ideological context. Wormald 
examined law in connection with rituals and symbolism, which he tried to set 
within a European frame of reference. In Wormald’s view written law was a 
product of aspiration. His argument clashes with that of McKitterick who says that 
for Carolingian rulers the main goal of law making must have been the capacity to 
judge every man in the kingdom “according to the law peculiar to the particular 
national group to which he belonged”.59 Nelson’s research stands out by posing a 
different set of questions: she attempts to shed light on the place of politics, law 
and society in a wider context. She is concerned with the question of how, in the 
course of Carolingian rule, written documents exposed and portrayed the dynamics 
of politics, law and society. Nelson’s findings on political thought and community 
                                                
57 E.g. Beumann 1967; McKitterick 2004, p. 114. 
58 See Wormald 1977; 1999. 
59 McKitterick 1980, p. 14. 
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owe much more to anthropology. Her work emphasises the fact that, in order to 
conduct politics in a successful manner, consensus had to be created.60 
The shift in the historians’ interpretation of the concept of ‘state’ is partly 
the result of the emphasis on interdisciplinarity. Anthropological findings that 
concern small- or no-‘state’ societies have influenced historians’ methods. This 
more recent scholarship argues that even institutionally weak ‘states’ can still be 
‘states’. Accordingly, more dynamic questions, such as how politics actually 
happened as a process, are called for on the part of the researcher.61 
All the terminology for different types of politically organised communities 
that is examined in my source material is in Latin. The key terms to be discussed 
are: regnum, imperium, res publica, civitas and societas. Markus asserts that “the 
terms in which Augustine came to formulate his views on politically organised 
society” are “roughly what we should nowadays call the ‘state’”.62 In particular, he 
translates res publica as “state”.63 J. Dunbabin says that regnum, res publica and 
civitas “could, but need not, denote that combination of a precise territorial area 
with a form of political organisation which ‘state’ implies for us.”64 R. Martin reads 
the famous political passage on regna in chapter 4 of Book IV of the De civitate 
Dei65 as relating to the “imperial state” in general, which he sees as representative 
of the civitas terrena.66 Although regnum more specifically denotes “kingdom” and 
imperium denotes “empire”, I will follow the views of both Dunbabin and Martin 
                                                
60 See in particular Nelson 1986; 1994; 1996a); 1996b). 
61 On the perceptions of the ‘state’ in recent historical scholarship see the debate between R. Davies 
and S. Reynolds. Davies 2003; Reynolds 2003. 
62 Markus 1970, p. 209. 
63 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
64 Dunbabin 1988, p. 479. 
65 Civ. IV 4, pp. 112-113. 
66 Martin 1972, pp. 195, 204-206. 
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and define “state” to be a suitable, broader translation of regnum and imperium. 
“Society” and “association” are relatively appropriate renderings of societas and 
will therefore be used in this way. For these reasons, I consider it justified to use 
the English word ‘state’ (enclosed in single quotation marks) for the Latin terms 
that designate different types of politically organised communities. Wherever I 
examine a particular Latin term comprehensively, my translation will be based on a 
more detailed analysis. 
Political thought as studied in the old constitutional style, i.e. rather 
detached from Carolingian society as a political community, has been left behind 
by this new historical scholarship. Augustine has not yet found a place in the more 
recent picture of Carolingian political relations. This is the main intended 
contribution of my thesis: to relate Augustine to the more recent research on 
Carolingian political ideas, and to see what he had to offer readers and political 
thinkers of that period, now that the political context they were working in has been 




The method I propose for dealing with the source material in my research 
may be justified on two different grounds: one is related to the subject matter of the 
thesis itself and is explained by its very nature, the other one is rather a matter of 
my personal preference for a certain method of investigation. 
The first one may be explained in the following way: the present study is 
not concerned with the political history of the Carolingian era in and of itself, but 
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with the manner in which Augustinian political thought and political ethics took 
shape in the Carolingian empire. This means that the research should at least to a 
minimum extent take account of the history of ideas between 400 and 800 and 
acknowledge the fact that these Augustinian ideas had been passed down in written 
Latin for 350 years before reaching the Carolingians. It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to choose an approach that is sensitive to the language and the etymology 
of concepts, in other words, a philological-historical approach. Furthermore, my 
thesis is concerned with texts written in an empire that had Christianity as its ‘state’ 
religion, and, at the same time, with the early Christian thought of a preeminent 
Church Father. This implies that in all the texts under investigation Christian 
doctrine plays an essential role. Since, according to Scriptures67, the “word” (λόγος) 
is divine, Christian texts from the very beginning placed particular emphasis on the 
meaning and origin of words. This is another reason why semantic and 
etymological aspects should not be ignored when discussing the sources. 
Moreover, when early medieval commentators read Augustine, they were not 
simply reading Augustine’s words – theirs was a ‘thick’ reading of the text, imbued 
with connections to concepts, terms, expressions and figures familiar to them from 
Biblical, patristic and exegetical writings. This makes an intertextual method 
indispensable to any attempt to understand how the Carolingians interpreted 
Augustine’s words, and what they thought were his main concerns. 
Secondly, I take personal inspiration for part of the method applied from the 
synthetic-historical analysis undertaken by E. Auerbach in his Mimesis (German: 
1946; English: 1953) and Literatursprache und Publikum in der Lateinischen 
                                                
67 See the opening of the Gospel of John. Jn 1:1. 
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Spätantike und im Mittelalter (German: 1958; English: 1965). Auerbach was first 
and foremost a philologist and contributed significantly to the investigation of how 
Christianity influenced literary word formation in the Middle Ages. In addition to 
his philological concerns, he was very much interested in the history of the 
development of Western European ideas. 
As far as the methodology chosen in my research is concerned, I will 
approach the source material in two different ways: I will first look for explicit 
evidence and then for implicit evidence of Augustinian influence on Alcuin and 
Hincmar in separate chapters. To search the sources and locate these direct and 
indirect references to Augustine, I have mainly used the (Electronic) Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica as well as the Patrologia Latina database. 
The general procedure for the first approach will be to find various kinds of 
explicit references to Augustine. These will include the mentioning of his name, 
citation and quotation. The following questions will be asked with regard to the 
direct evidence thus located: how often is Augustine named, cited or quoted? 
Where in a text (beginning/middle/end)? Concerning what topic? For what 
purpose? Which Augustinian works does the author cite? From which Augustinian 
works does he quote? How precise are his citations and quotations? How does 
Alcuin or Hincmar incorporate Augustine into his reasoning by direct quotation? 
The aim of this method will be to discern whether there is a qualitative or 
quantitative difference in these Carolingian sources between explicit references to 
Augustine or his works and explicit references to other Church Fathers or patristic 
sources. The answer will reveal to what extent the author in fact used Augustinian 
thought directly and which aspects of Augustinian thinking struck him particularly. 
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I will examine direct references to see what the Augustine corpus looked like to the 
Carolingians, that is in order to discover which of his works were available to 
them. It is to be expected that the two Carolingian authors draw on Augustine 
directly to some extent for the purposes of instruction and solving dogmatic 
questions. This means that citations and quotations from works such as De 
trinitate, De doctrina christiana, De catechizandis rudibus, Enchiridion and Sermo 
Ioannis Evangelii should occur relatively often. 
The second approach will explore the implicit evidence of Augustinian 
influence at two different levels: the level of content and the formal level of the 
Carolingian texts. I will examine the implicit evidence besides the explicit evidence 
to see a much wider range of Augustinian influence in Alcuin and Hincmar’s texts. 
At the level of the content I will look for correlations and differences 
between Augustinian and Carolingian political ideas and political ethics (as 
explained above in the outline of the content of the chapters on Alcuin and 
Hincmar). The content analysis will shed light on which features of Augustinian 
thought (as manifested in the De civitate Dei) the two Carolingian authors 
embraced most. 
The formal analysis of the Carolingian sources will be concerned with 
indirect references to Augustine in the author’s language. The primary source of 
inspiration for determining the method to be applied in the formal analysis is the 
type of historical philology developed by Auerbach, that is, one that strives to 
develop a synthesis. The technique Auerbach expounds in his Literatursprache und 
Publikum in der Lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter seeks to find key 
elements in the sources that are worth investigating because they help explain 
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coherences between texts.68 It is a simple philological approach with a strong focus 
on the interpretation of selected textual passages. It involves linguistic comparison 
(in terms of terminology, grammar, rhetoric or style) between passages relevant to 
the subject of the research. In my formal analysis I will adopt a strategy similar to 
the one Auerbach implemented when working on French Classicism in 1930.69 
Auerbach, by observing the new, distinctive and forward-looking spirit of the 
social class that emerged as an audience for literary works in the seventeenth 
century, came across the unique expression of la cour et la ville, which had been 
used by contemporaries to refer to the society under discussion. By collecting 
thematically related textual passages that contained this or similar expressions and 
by interpreting them with regard to their contexts, it was possible for Auerbach to 
give an exact definition of this concept and, secondly, to come closer to drawing a 
comprehensive picture of this literary audience.70 Auerbach proposes this method 
as an alternative modus operandi in cases where existing modern categories fail to 
help a researcher to devise a concrete plan for approaching a particular problem 
he/she has located in a certain historical context.71 I believe that his approach is 
particularly fruitful for two reasons: firstly, it compels the researcher to establish 
early in his/her work what can be identified as being characteristic within the 
source material. Secondly, it does not impose external theoretical frameworks on 
the text, but looks for what is characteristic in the material itself. 
My own procedure will be to collect passages relevant to the subject matter 
and examine them for recurrent concepts, terms, expressions and figures. I will 
                                                
68 Auerbach 1958, pp. 18-21. 
69 Ibid., p. 19. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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then interpret these elements with regard to the various contexts in which they 
occur; this will enable me to define them. The benefit I am hoping to derive from 
this method is to come closer to understanding the meaning of the text in the 
historical context under investigation. Thus, the formal analysis is intended to serve 
as a complement to the content analysis. It will represent a particular challenge, 
since – unlike Auerbach’s study on French Classicism (which examined the 
language coined by contemporaries) – it involves the process of evaluating the 
meaning of these elements as understood by Augustine and the two Carolingian 
authors as well as of assessing the relation between Augustinian thought and 
Carolingian thought under Charlemagne and Charles the Bald. 
More precisely, what I will do in the Carolingian sources is focus on 
concepts that I can show72 in Chapter One of my thesis to be particularly 
characteristic of Augustine and prominent in the De civitate Dei. Hence, the point 
of departure of this analysis will be to attempt to define the original Augustinian 
meaning of the selected linguistic elements (as established in part by modern 
scholarship73). The process of defining what Augustine seems to have meant will 
require a critical examination of Augustine’s work De civitate Dei, undertaken in 
Chapter One on Augustinian thought. In a second step, it will be determined what 
meaning these elements acquire in the Carolingian texts. The concepts, terms, 
expressions and figures to be treated will include, among others, the political terms 
civitas Dei, populus Christianus, imperium Christianum, regna terrarum, 
imperare/imperium and gentes/gentilitas; the expressions dilatare, subicere, 
subdere and subiugare/iugum, as well as the concepts of dispensatio, pax, 
                                                
72 My argument is partly based on existing studies. AL vols. 1-4, 1/2 1986-2013. 
73 See ibid. 
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iustus/iustitia, felix/felicitas, beatus/beatitudo, misericors/misericordia and 
humilis/humilitas. Moreover, I will study the representation of the following 
figures in relation to Charlemagne and Charles the Bald: the Old Testament kings 
David and Solomon and the Christian Roman emperors Constantine I and 
Theodosius I. My selection of these elements will follow a close study of 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei and the texts of the Carolingian authors under 
consideration. It will involve reading for meaning (with regard to political thought 
and ethics), for terminology, for expressions and phrases, as well as for clusters of 
terms. I will discuss concepts I found extremely often in contexts where Augustine, 
Alcuin and Hincmar reflect on the worldly ‘state’, secular power and political 
ethics. The relevance of these elements to Augustine74 and the Carolingians75 has 
also to some extent been confirmed by other scholars. The questions asked will be 
the following: are there any parallels to Augustine in linguistic terms? If the 
Carolingian author avails himself of Augustinian elements, how does his meaning 
correspond to or differ from that of the original Augustine? Is the Augustinian 
language and terminology the author uses given a new political meaning? In other 
words, does the author imitate the Augustinian political discourse linguistically, but 
at the same time have his own political agenda? If yes, what is its nature? In order 
to perceive relations between Augustine and the Carolingians at an additional level, 
I will examine the form as well as the content of their writings. The influence of 
Augustinian ideas will emerge as much more pervasive in Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s 
material. As a result, it will be possible to read the sources as political discourses 
                                                
74 See ibid. 
75 For imperium and gentes see Bullough 1999; McKitterick 2004. For imperium Christianum and 
populus Christianus see Ganshof 1949. For iustitia and pax, which are elements of the doctrine of 
Augustinisme politique, see Arquillière 1934. 
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defined by content and language. I will be able to discern not only whether the 
Carolingians’ political statements contain Augustinian elements, but also whether 
they are imitating Augustine in his language. It can then be explored whether 
Alcuin and Hincmar are using this language in Augustine’s sense or with a shift in 
meaning, and whether they are using it to make a political statement conformed to 
Augustinian thought or not. The answers will contribute to solving the main 
research questions of whether the Carolingian texts were in any way influenced by 
Augustine and of how Augustinian elements were understood, taken on and 
modified by the authors under examination to serve the Carolingian imperial 
dynasty. 
 Q. Skinner, in his reflections on the relevance of language in methodology 
and the history of ideas and political thought, echoes what Auerbach expressed and 
formulated half a century ago: the importance of the contextualisation of texts for 
understanding their original purpose and functioning.76 Skinner draws on J. L. 
Austin (a philosopher of language and deviser of the “illocutionary act” in the 
influential work How to Do Things With Words77) and his colleague J. R. Searle78, 
stating that he had recourse to the theory of speech acts in order to appeal for “a 
more historically-minded approach to the history of ideas”79. Skinner then 
highlights two dimensions of language: the dimension of meaning and the 
dimension of linguistic action.80 His point is that any author (even more so political 
writers and rhetoricians), in choosing certain words, pursues a certain purpose and, 
                                                
76 Skinner 2013, pp. 1-7. 
77 See Austin 1976. 
78 Skinner 2013, p. 2. 




hence, performs an action.81 Skinner, likewise, emphasises the relationship between 
language and power, and refers to the fact that, particularly in political discourse, 
the power of words is exploited in order to shape the social world and engage in 
exercises of social control.82 More generally, Skinner calls attention to the 
importance of considering aspects such as performativity (the process by which 
semiotic expression in language produces results or real consequences in extra-
semiotic reality) and intertextuality (how a text’s meaning is shaped by another 
text) when approaching sources and trying to establish the original meaning and 
motive of texts under investigation.83 By including an introductory chapter (Chapter 
One) on Augustinian thought in the De civitate Dei before two complementary 
research chapters (Chapter Two and Chapter Three) concerned with Augustinian 
influence on Carolingian political thought and political ethics, I am hoping to let 
the texts speak to one another. In both Chapter Two and Chapter Three I will 
concentrate on epistles as a genre and will first focus on explicit references to 
Augustine. I will deliberately start out with a sample letter sent to the respective 
rulers (Charlemagne and Charles the Bald). In each case it will be shown in what 
manner and with what objective Augustine is formally represented and integrated 
into the author’s reasoning, while references will be made to other letters (in order 
to establish correspondences in structure). Only afterwards will a content analysis 
and a formal analysis of epistles and other source material follow. 
 Having read Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s texts and looked at what is particular 
about the direct and indirect references to Augustine, it should eventually be asked 
                                                
81 Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
82 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
83 Ibid., p. vii. 
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why some Augustinian ideas are understood differently by the Carolingian authors 
and serve a different purpose. This will allow me to broaden my line of 
questioning; having started out from Augustine’s writings seen in a late Roman 
context, and given a close reading of Alcuin and Hincmar, so I will end by 
expanding the focus again, to recontextualise the Augustinianism of which Alcuin 
and Hincmar availed themselves as a body of ideas relevant to the Carolingian 
condition. This will be done to an extent for each author separately in each chapter 
(since Alcuin and Hincmar operated in distinct political contexts), and will then be 
summarised in the Conclusion of my thesis. The Conclusion will reconsider the 
differences between Augustine’s, Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s notions of ‘church’ and 
‘state’ in light of the changed political situations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Augustine of Hippo 
 
 
This chapter provides an introductory overview of fundamental questions 
that relate to Augustine of Hippo, to his late work the De civitate Dei, and to the 
Christianised Roman empire of the fourth and early fifth centuries. It will set the 
groundwork for a focused and systematic identification of Augustinian political 
ideas and political ethics in the Carolingian materials, and will present the themes 
and concepts of Augustinian thinking that will guide the analysis of Carolingian 
texts. One question that arises, considering Augustine’s place in time and his 
occupation as an early Christian writer, is: what are the main influences on 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei? Other questions more specifically concerned with the 
political ideas and ethics inherent in the De civitate Dei are: what meaning does 
Augustine attribute to worldly rule and rulership? How does Augustine define and 
evaluate politically organised communities? An examination of prominent concepts 
from the De civitate Dei – which I have selected on the basis of their relevance to 













The Latin Father Augustine lived at a time when changes were being made 
to the administrative, social and cultural structures of the Roman empire.84 
Although this transformation varied from region to region, it affected the empire 
everywhere and reshaped the society of Western Europe.85 One facet of this 
transformation between the third and the fifth centuries is related to the settlement 
of Germanic invaders in Roman provinces from the last quarter of the fourth 
century onward.86 This movement is, despite its significance for the development of 
the De civitate Dei87, perhaps less relevant to the conceptual questions the chapter 
aims to address. What is important, however, is, first, that the settlement of 
Germanic peoples in the West resulted in a political fragmentation and brought 
about a cultural separation between the Germanic West and the imperial East.88 
Second, a blending of Roman with Germanic elements took place in the West, and 
“a shared Latin, ecclesiastical culture [...]”89 emerged. A more relevant facet of the 
transformation is the revolution in the Christian ‘church’s’ mode of existence since 
the beginning of the official establishment of Christianity under Emperor 
                                                
84 Markus 1988, p. 83. 
85 Ibid., pp. 83, 87. 
86 Ibid., pp. 87-89; King 1988, pp. 123-153. 
87 Oort van 1991, pp. 57-62, 86-87; Markus 1988, pp. 104ff.; Baynes 1936, p. 3. 
88 Markus 1988, p. 88; King 1988, pp. 123ff. However, R. A. Markus notes that “contacts, 
influences and, especially, a shared antique cultural heritage restricted the extent to which the two 
worlds came to diverge.” Markus 1988, p. 88. 
89 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Constantine I.90 It was the Christian writers of the time who were the main actors 
involved in reconciling Christian ideas about the nature of man’s existence in 
politically organised communities with this change in the ‘church’s’ status.91 
Scholars are now largely agreed that these writers were not systematic philosophers 
in regard to their political thought.92 Their personalities combined irreconcilable 
features and tensions, “[...] often unresolved, sometimes unrecognised”93, and their 
works did not give full consideration to the implications of the political ideas they 
contained.94 In this chapter it will become clearer to what extent Augustine was one 
of them. It must be noted, however, that it is not pertinent to my research to 
determine the influence of each of the different strands of thought at work in the 
execution of the De civitate Dei – and it is doubtful whether this can be ascertained 
at all. Therefore, I will merely address those elements of influence that have the 




Augustine, born to a Christian mother and a pagan father in the Numidian 
town of Thagaste in 354, received a traditional education that was marked by “the 
                                                
90 Ibid., pp. 83-87. 
91 Ibid., pp. 87, 91ff. 
92 Markus 1970, pp. 63-64; Markus 1988, p. 91; Chadwick 1988, p. 20; Oort van 1991, p. 104; 
Baynes 1936, pp. 3, 15-16. In view of the above, employing a phrase such as “political thought” at 
all in research concerned with the reception of Augustine’s De civitate Dei in Carolingian texts may 
seem somewhat problematic. However, on the basis of the explanation provided in the Introduction 
under Research Question, I consider it acceptable under certain circumstances to resort to this 
expression for convenience. 
93 Markus 1988, p. 91. 
94 On Augustine see Boler 1978, pp. 90-91. On the composition of the De civitate Dei see also Oort 
van 1991, pp. 74-77. 
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conservative, strongly literary and rhetorically oriented culture [...]”95 of Late 
Antiquity.96 During the various stages of his life, Augustine’s lifestyle, beliefs, 
occupations and responsibilities changed, and his writings were influenced by 
various strands of thought.97 After a period of attachment to Manichaeism98 and 
years of experience as a teacher of rhetoric (which earned him the official chair of 
rhetoric in Milan)99, Augustine first turned towards Academic Scepticism, and then 
experienced his conversion to Christianity via neo-Platonic Christianity and the 
sermons of Bishop Ambrose of Milan.100 The conversion brought about a change in 
lifestyle: Augustine resigned from his public office in 386, and retired to 
Cassiciacum.101 Augustine developed his conception of monastic life102 and then 
became a presbyter at Hippo Regius in 391.103 His life changed again when he 
replaced Valerius as Bishop of Hippo Regius:104 during his episcopate (395/396-
                                                
95 Markus 1988, p. 89. Roman education rested on the Hellenistic legacy. Ibid. Due to the fact that 
the Christian ‘church’ had never conceived a system of education of its own since Constantine I’s 
conversion in 312, this Roman education was adopted in Christian circles. Markus explains that the 
Roman culture of the fourth century “[...] was the common property of educated Romans, whether 
pagan or Christian.” Ibid., p. 85. See also Oort van 1991, pp. 22-23. 
96 On Augustine’s life see ibid., pp. 18-57. A comprehensive biographical account is provided by 
Brown 1979. 
97 The point is well made by Markus 1988, p. 103. 
98 During the period from 373 to 382 Augustine had been a follower of Manichaeism at the level of 
auditor (“hearer”). Barnes 1992, p. 7. J. van Oort argues that the “hearer”-status should not be 
underestimated, since it involved adhering to strict rules and assuming important responsibilities. 
Oort van 1991, pp. 34ff., 44. Oort’s research underlines the contribution of Manichaean thought 
(besides Tyconius) to Augustine’s later doctrine of the two civitates. Ibid., pp. 8ff., 274f. 
99 Augustine taught rhetoric in Carthage before leaving Africa in 383. He assumed a position as a 
teacher of rhetoric in Rome and then moved to Milan in 384. Barnes 1992, p. 7. Augustine was not 
involved in writing for and about the same Christian emperor over a long period of time. However, 
he got a glimpse of what it was like to work as a rhetorician and panegyrist for the imperial court. 
As his Confessiones demonstrate, the job did not appeal to him at all. MacCormack 1981, pp. 1ff. 
100 The years in Milan (384-387) were crucial to the development of Augustine’s later theology and 
his conversion. Augustine was baptised by Ambrose on Easter night in 387. On the contributions of 
neo-Platonism and Ambrose towards Augustine’s alignment with the ‘church’ see Oort van 1991, 
pp. 48-55. 
101 Ibid., pp. 48, 55; Markus 1970, pp. xv-xvi. 
102 The debate on the authenticity of Augustine’s work on monasticism is reflected in Leyser 2012, 
pp. 460-464. 
103 Oort van 1991, p. 55; Markus 1970, pp. xv-xvi. 
104 Oort van 1991, p. 55. 
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430), Augustine was part of an intricate network of institutional relationships with 
imperial and provincial authorities who held responsibilities in the political and 
military sphere.105 Overall, an intellectual development from a Greco-Roman to a 
Judaeo-Christian perspective via neo-Platonism and St. Paul can be traced.106 
  
Movements and Persons 
  
Augustine was occupied with the composition of the De civitate Dei from 
412/413 to 426/427.107 Scholarship refers to the work as an apology108, written in 
response to heathen Romans who blamed the sack of Rome by Alaric I in 410 on 
the official establishment of Christianity in place of the traditional pagan cults.109 
                                                
105 Markus 1970, p. 57; Flasch 2003, pp. 164, 391-393. Oort’s overview of Augustine’s life and 
spiritual development does not fully cover the period of his episcopate. Oort van 1991, p. 55. A 
broad, fact-based account of Augustine’s official duties as Bishop of Hippo Regius is provided by 
Dodaro 1999, pp. 176-184. 
106 Augustine’s earlier, Platonic interpretation of Christianity involved the all-embracing concept of 
ordo (“order”), which allowed him to assume a social order accessible to reason that had its place 
within the cosmic order. A thorough reading of St. Paul in the years leading up to 400, however, 
shook Augustine’s vision of an ordered rationality of the world. The understanding of original sin 
and its implications for human life led him to the idea which he would eventually formulate in the 
De civitate Dei: that a perfect harmony in the order of this world is not attainable through the rule of 
wise men who are dedicated to the Christian God. Markus 1970, pp. ixff., 72ff.; Markus 1988, pp. 
108-111. 
107 N. H. Baynes, in particular, highlights the fact that the work, which was written within a 
substantial period of time, was published in parts and could not be corrected after completion. 
Baynes 1936, p. 3. On the composition and characteristics of the De civitate Dei as well as the 
author’s motivation see Oort van 1991, pp. 57-92; Markus 1970, pp. xi-xiii, xvii, 47, 84ff.; Markus 
1988, pp. 104-108; Baynes 1936, pp. 1-6. 
108 See Markus 1970, p. 1. Oort also rightly observes that “the City of God is an apology” and that 
“this character of the work appears to be evident to everyone”. Oort van 1991, p. 166. Already in 
earlier scholarship before 1900 the De civitate Dei was regarded as an apologetic work. Ibid., pp. 
164ff. See also Baynes 1936, pp. 3-5. On the thetic and catechetical aspects of the De civitate Dei 
see Oort van 1991, pp. 169-196. However, Oort’s overall argument is, as often, unassertive and 
contradictory, as he writes: “Generally speaking the first part [of the De civitate Dei] is mainly 
apologetic, the second thetic. However, there are also many apologetic passages in the second part, 
while in the first ten books a number of thetic expositions can be indicated.” Ibid., p. 76. 
109 Markus 1970, p. 47; Markus 1988, pp. 104-108; Baynes 1936, pp. 1-6. Although Oort refers to 
the barbarian raids as the immediate incentive for the work, he convincingly draws on existing 
scholarship (e.g. Brown) and Augustinian texts to confirm that the De civitate Dei is not the after-
effect of any one specific event and would have been written even without the fall of Rome. Oort 
van 1991, pp. 57-62, 86-87. Markus mentions two other important motivations for writing: first, in 
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The De civitate Dei is both a reflection of an intellectual development and “[...] a 
compendium [...], a major work in which previous thought has matured and settled 
down.”110 
In the later fourth and the early fifth centuries two traditions of Western 
Christian political thought coexisted.111 An earlier Christian tradition was shaped by 
“[...] the imagery of exile running through Old and New Testaments, rabbinic and 
patristic writings [...]” and “[...] needed re-interpreting in a society governed by 
Christian emperors and officials [...]”.112 A later tradition emerged as a “[...] 
Christian response to the conversion of Constantine and to the progressive 
Christianisation of the Roman Empire [...]”.113 Broadly speaking, among Christian 
writers with an interest in politically organised communities two different 
orientations existed: the apocalyptic and the Eusebian.114 The ancient apocalyptic 
attitude of hostility to the empire perceived the ‘church’ as a persecuted body, 
encircled by an alien world. Representatives of this movement were Donatist 
theologians in Africa and ascetics in Syria. They stood within the ancient tradition 
of Christian thought. At the opposite extreme were the followers of Eusebius of 
                                                                                                                                  
the De civitate Dei Augustine addresses, inter alia, heathen imperial officials and defines politically 
organised communities in a manner that would prove the Christians’ unreserved allegiance to the 
Roman empire. Markus 1970, pp. xi-xiii; see also Chadwick 1988, pp. 19-20. Second, the work is 
unmistakably an attack on Roman imperialism, lust for domination and “pride” (superbia). Markus 
1970, pp. xvii-xx. 
110 Oort van 1991, p. 88. The question of whether early medieval readers were able to distinguish 
between the early and the late work of Augustine is raised by Leyser 2012, p. 452. 
111 Markus 1988, p. 92. 
112 Ibid., pp. 86-87. On the public influence and responsibilities of bishops see Dodaro 1999, pp. 
176-184. An overview of Augustine’s use of the Old and New Testaments is given by Oort van 
1991, pp. 312-322. In summary, Oort says: “[...] we should realize that when Augustine referred to 
biblical passages in the framework of his concept of the two cities, he took them indiscriminately 
from the New and the Old Testament, but much more often from the latter.” Ibid., p. 312. 
113 Markus 1988, p. 92. 
114 The following summary of the two opposed directions, and of Augustine’s own view, based on 
Tyconius, is taken from Markus 1970, pp. 49-50, 55-56, 76-77; Chadwick 1988, pp. 19-20; Oort 
van 1991, pp. 154-163, 254-275; Baynes 1936, p. 5. 
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Caesarea115, who saw the reign of Constantine I as a fulfilment of what God had 
conceived in Christ and the Augustus: the uniting of the world under a single 
Christian order, empire and ruler, whose monarchy on earth mirrored that of God 
in heaven. Augustine supported neither of these two approaches. He took a critical 
stance on human society, while at the same time urging the Christian community 
not to disregard questions relating to worldly affairs, rule and rulership. Markus 
and Oort agree that the Donatist theologian Tyconius was probably Augustine’s 
main source for this approach. After Tyconius, it is the gnostic religion of 
Manichaeism that has been most frequently named as the source of the doctrine of 
the two civitates, and hence as a major influence on Augustine’s De civitate Dei.116 
Manichaeism, named after its founder Mani, is based on the primordial and 
inextinguishable dualism of the spiritual world of light and the material world of 
darkness. However, despite the fact that Augustine’s dualism of good and evil is 
lasting, extending to the end of world history, it is not primordial. Only the good 
has existed from the beginning, when God created a world destined to fall apart 
permanently into His realm and that of Satan. Other scholars have also referred to 
Plato, Philo, neo-Platonism and the Stoa as elements of influence on the De civitate 
Dei.117 Ambrose is one of the mediators of these philosophical conceptions.118 
Ambrose re-interpreted Ciceronian Stoicism (e.g. from the De officiis) for a 
Christian public in his work on Christian morality, the De officiis ministrorum.119 
He adopted Cicero’s key statement that, of the cardinal virtues, iustitia (“justice”) 
                                                
115 In the De civitate Dei Augustine uses Eusebian thought as well, though in a much more 
intellectual sense, drawing on Eusebius’ Chronicon via Jerome. Markus 1970, p. 6. 
116 Manichaeism and its influence on Augustine’s De civitate Dei, as summarised below, is treated 
extensively by Oort van 1991, pp. 8-15; 199-234. 
117 Ibid., pp. 10ff. 
118 Ibid. 
119 On this discussion see Markus 1988, pp. 97ff. 
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is the bond of society, as well as Cicero’s maxim that “the foundation of justice is 
faith (fides)”.120 He then changed the meaning of fides from a Ciceronian “good 
faith” into a Christian “trust in Christ”. 
  
Marcus Tullius Cicero 
  
 In the following discussion, the republican philosopher and politician 
Cicero will be singled out and studied in relation to Augustinian political 
conceptions as they occur in the De civitate Dei. He is crucial to this study, as he 
stood at the beginning of the Latin tradition, shaped Roman political thinking121, 
and his thought had a significant bearing on the De civitate Dei through his De re 
publica122. Cicero deeply influenced Augustine’s reasoning, terminology and 
rhetorical mode of expression123, as well as his political discourse and his 
reflections on morality within politically organised communities. Cicero will 
remain an important point of reference throughout this research. 
 Cicero had an excellent command of the Greek language; there was hardly 
any Latin literature for him to build on.124 He still relied on the support of Greek 
                                                
120 Cicero’s definition of iustitia (“justice”) is treated in detail in Atkins 2013, pp. 202ff. 
121 Schofield 1999, pp. 178, 180, 193. 
122 The dialogue De re publica was published shortly after completion in 51 BC. A great part of the 
work was lost throughout the Middle Ages (except for a section from Book VI, which was known 
through a commentary by Macrobius who lived during the fourth/early fifth century). As a result, 
later references to Cicero’s text, in particular the quotations and summaries by Lactantius and 
Augustine, became relevant. In other words, the influence of the De re publica on thought after 
Augustine was merely indirect. It was not until 1819/1820 that a third of the total work was 
rediscovered in fragmentary condition. Ibid., p. 193; Atkins 2010, p. 490. 
123 Oort van 1991, pp. 22-23, 90-91; Markus 1970, pp. 58-59, 64-65. According to S. G. 
MacCormack, the panegyrists of the fourth century particularly used Cicero’s linguistic style. 
Augustine himself was acquainted with Cicero’s language through his rhetorical training and 
teaching. MacCormack 1981, pp. 1-2, 5. 
124 Quintus Ennius was before Cicero. 
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literature in the formulation of his political ideas.125 Cicero’s notion of the origin of 
the ‘state’, expounded in Books I and II of the De re publica, were developed from 
the Greek historian Polybius.126 Like him, Cicero set forth a consideration of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the three dominant systems of government: 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.127 In Book II, however, Cicero enhances the 
argument of Polybius by saying that it is incorrect to credit the success of the 
Roman citizens to the Roman constitution and to good fortune.128 Rather, the 
history of the Romans shows that the key element in their rise was from the first 
the wisdom and moral superiority of individuals.129 This enhanced argument shaped 
Roman political thinking considerably and, as will become apparent, played a 
crucial role in Christian Carolingian political thought too. Cicero’s reasoning is that 
                                                
125 Although Cicero’s writings are strongly shaped by Plato, Aristotle and Hellenistic philosophy 
(Atkins 2013, pp. 7-8, 17ff., 61ff., 81-85, 85-96, 189ff.), there has been a debate as regards the 
discrimination between Greek, Roman and, more specifically, his own (Ciceronian) thought. M. 
Schofield, in his analysis of Cicero’s definition of res publica as res populi, first maintains that in 
the dialogue Cicero’s definition operates “[...] as a criterion of legitimacy”. Schofield 1999, p. 178. 
Second, he asserts that “[...] this interest in discriminating between set-ups on grounds of legitimacy 
is a distinctively Roman and Ciceronian input into the theory of Rep., not one inherited from 
whatever Greek models Cicero was using.” Ibid. His claims are generally well argued. However, 
there is perhaps one aspect in which his argument could be more precise. Schofield reformulates his 
two claims again in the text. Ibid., pp. 179, 180, 189. Nevertheless, what is missing above all is a 
clear distinction between what, according to Schofield, is “Roman” and what is “Ciceronian” about 
the concern for the legitimacy of government(s) in the De re publica. Schofield says “[...] Cicero 
effectively creates an entirely new theory, cast in a legal vocabulary which has no parallel in Greek 
generally or in Greek political philosophy in particular. Its legal inspiration makes it a distinctively 
Roman contribution to political thought.” Ibid., p. 189. Later on he writes “[...] Cicero’s treatment 
of res publica has a quite different structure from Platonic and Aristotelian political philosophy, 
despite his debts to them. What makes the difference is the conceptual framework of Roman law, 
for it is Roman law which enables questions to be formulated about the rights a free people has to 
own, lend, transfer or place in trust powers conceived on the model of property.” Ibid., p. 193. It 
remains unclear whether it is Cicero who permits a preoccupation with the problem of legitimacy, 
or Roman law. 
126 Ibid., p. 183; Dvornik 1966, p. 469. T. Wiedemann observes that Greek writers were generally 
more interested in the Roman political system and in constitutional analysis than Latin authors. 
Wiedemann 2010, p. 526. Wiedemann agrees with J. Procopé who writes: “Attempts to explain 
Rome in terms of Greek constitutional theory were of limited use.” Procopé 1988, p. 29. 
127 On the role of these systems of government for Cicero’s definition of res publica as res populi 
see Schofield 1999, pp. 185-187, 189. The function of the Senate in Cicero’s constitutional scheme 
and Cicero’s justification of aristocratic rule within the framework of popular sovereignty are 
discussed in ibid., pp. 190-193. See also Atkins 2013, pp. 80-104; Dvornik 1966, p. 469. 




it was his forefathers in Rome who realised Plato’s principles of the best ‘state’ 
founded on eternal justice.130 Cicero saw himself as an adherent of the New 
Academy; he adopted Platonic ideas but tended towards Scepticism.131 He looked at 
philosophy as a communicative tool that helped to understand problems more 
thoroughly. As a philosopher, Cicero thought of himself as a Stoic or Epicurean. 
His way of assessing the pros and cons of every subject matter was exceptional.132 
Even the cardinal virtues, rooted in Stoic philosophy, as well as other constituents 
of the Stoic doctrine of virtue which were traditionally seen as vices (such as the 
concept of misericors/misericordia), were re-evaluated by Cicero.133 This stream of 
thought reaches Augustine and extends beyond him to include the Carolingians. 
Cicero’s idea that individual Roman citizens were responsible for the Roman 
success is authentically reproduced by Augustine, who, when discussing the 
decline of Roman power, refers both to Cicero and to Sallust.134 As far as Cicero’s 
model of social organisation is concerned, the influence of Aristotle’s maxim, 
                                                
130 Atkins 2013, p. 82. 
131 Atkins 2010, pp. 498, 503-504. 
132 Ibid., pp. 503-504. 
133 AL vol. 4, 1/2 2010-2013, pp. 34-35. 
134 Civ. II 21, pp. 79-80, V 12, pp. 215-217, V 18, pp. 227-228. This is a theme that runs through 
Roman historical writing. Schofield comments on Cicero’s reflections on Roman politics: “As so 
often in Roman writers, the focus is moral rather than constitutional: in this case the loss of a 
common experience and commitment which shaped and stiffened character.” Schofield 1999, p. 
181. Wiedemann confirms that creating theoretical premises or frameworks for politics was not a 
Roman characteristic. Wiedemann 2010, p. 517. The Romans judged their system “[...] not with 
reference to a constitution or constitutional ideal, but with reference to the exempla provided by its 
greatest player”. Ibid., p. 521. This is evident in Livy. Ibid., pp. 522-524. While Sallust drew on 
Posidonius when expounding the idea that the fall of Carthage determined the collapse of Roman 
political morality, he added other explanatory factors (e.g. luxury) that he regarded as crucial to the 
moral decline. Ibid., p. 527. Tacitus, the last significant historian of the Roman empire, was 
influenced by Sallust. Ibid., p. 528. His works too were concerned with morality and idealised 
republican virtues (in the Germania Tacitus highlighted certain values and noble principles of the 
Germanic peoples that were similar to the old Roman virtues). The imperial lives of Suetonius, too, 
although part of a different genre (biography), “contain no explicit theorizing about imperial 
power”. Ibid., pp. 530-531. Augustine himself uses exempla from both the pagan Roman Republic 
and the Christian empire. See Civ. II 29, V 15, and, above all, Civ. V 25, 26 on the Christian Roman 
emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I. See also Markus 1970, pp. 57ff. 
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“man is by nature a political animal”, can be recognised.135 In Cicero’s De re 
publica, Scipio makes the following claim: 
 
‘Consequently,’ says Africanus, ‘a ‘state’ is the affair of a people; 
however, a people is not any crowd of human beings united in any sort of 
way, but a crowd of great number associated in a consensus with respect to 
justice and welfare for the community. But its primary cause of assembling 
is not so much helplessness as a certain uniting of men as if produced by 
nature. [...]’136 
 
It is evident that for Cicero too justice is fundamental to the orderly organisation of 
the ‘state’.137 The above statement is the starting point for Augustine’s discussion of 
the definition of the ‘state’ in the De civitate Dei and his adjustment of Cicero’s 
political ideas for his own Christian argument. 
The quotation from the De re publica contains Cicero’s definitions of 
“people” and “state”. Cicero insists that a “state” is only the “affair” (res) of a 
people if someone governs it justly – be it a king, a few aristocrats or the people 
collectively. Otherwise this body cannot be called a “state”.138 Cicero deplores the 
Romans’ loss of moral values over the years139 and argues for the legitimacy of 
                                                
135 Martin 1972, p. 216; Dvornik 1966, p. 468. On the impact of Hellenistic, Aristotelian and 
Platonic political philosophy on Cicero see Schofield 1999, pp. 183-184. Aristotle’s maxim is 
adopted by Augustine. Markus 1988, pp. 109-110; Baynes 1936, p. 16. 
136 ‘Est igitur’ inquit Africanus ‘res publica res populi; populus autem non omnis hominum coetus 
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensus et utilitatis communione 
sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas, quam naturalis quaedam 
hominum quasi congregatio. [...]’ Rep. I 39, p. 28; see also Civ. II 21, p. 81. On Cicero’s definition 
of res publica see also Atkins 2013, pp. 129-131. 
137 Ibid., pp. 144-152; Dvornik 1966, p. 468. 
138 Civ. II 21, p. 81. 
139 Ibid., pp. 79, 81-82. 
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certain people being in power and ruling over other members of the ‘state’.140 
Cicero illustrates the argument with a series of connected allegories, proceeding 
from God, who, being the supreme commander, rules over man, to the human spirit 
that is in charge of the human body, and finally to reason, which controls human 
desires as well as other evil stirrings of the soul to the benefit of men.141 
Augustine builds on Cicero’s example and argues that true justice in a 
‘state’ can only be achieved if God is the commander of all people; the human 
spirit is in charge of the human body, and reason controls human desires and other 
evil stirrings of the soul.142 Accepting Cicero’s principle that justice is a 
prerequisite for a ‘state’, Augustine holds that the Roman power is not and has 
never been a ‘state’.143 This first description of the ‘state’ in the De civitate Dei 
may be understood as being rooted in divine law.144 Augustine then acknowledges 
that, seen from another angle, the Roman power is nevertheless some kind of 
‘state’.145 He therefore develops a more appropriate definition for such an earthly 
                                                
140 Ibid., pp. 80-81, XIX 21, pp. 390-391. Ambrose too integrated this discussion into his Christian 
moral system. Markus 1988, pp. 96-98. 
141 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391. 
142 On Augustine’s translation of the classical Ciceronian definition of the res publica into Christian 
terms see also Markus 1970, pp. 64-67. 
143 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391, XIX 23, p. 399. 
144 A conclusive explanation of how Augustine develops two antithetical Christian notions of nature 
and natural law on the basis of Cicero’s twofold conception of natural law is provided by M. J. 
Wilks: Cicero, who regards justice as a quality of nature and “[...] inherent in natural law [...]”, 
distinguishes between rational natural law and non-rational/unreasoning natural law, which 
correlate with the categories of civilised and brute creatures, respectively. Drawing on St. Paul’s 
idea of the right-willing and wrong-willing selves in man, Augustine adopts a conception of nature 
and natural law in a non-divine sense alongside the Roman proposition of natura, id est, Deus, 
which suggests that “[...] the truly natural [is] the divine, because it [is] divinity which [gives] things 
their real nature.” Nature or natural law in a divine sense relates to “[...] man in his pristine 
perfection [...]”, while nature or natural law in a non-divine sense is associated with the “[...] 
corrupted man [...]” after the Fall. Wilks 1967, pp. 495-497. Above, I follow Dvornik’s terminology 
of “natural law” and “divine law” for “nature and natural law in a non-divine sense” and “nature 
and natural law in a divine sense”. Dvornik 1966, p. 845. See also Markus 1988, p. 111; Markus 
1970, pp. 47ff., 84-98, 208f. A more detailed discussion of Cicero’s conception of “natural law” can 
be found in Atkins 2013, pp. 155-187; Atkins 2010, pp. 499-500. 
145 Civ. II 21, p. 83. 
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community in order to make his own statement about the difference between divine 
and earthly rule.146 This second description of the ‘state’ may be seen as being 
based on natural law. Augustine keeps Cicero’s interpretation of a “state” (res 
publica) as the “affair of a people” (res populi)147 but corrects his definition of 
“people”: he writes that “a people is a rational union of a crowd associated in a 
concordant communion over things that it loves” (populus est coetus multitudinis 
rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus).148 In other words, 
according to Augustine, a “people” is not “associated in a consensus with respect to 
justice”149, but united by a mutual interest in whatever is loved. In this respect, the 
Roman community is indeed a “people”, since it does not matter what the shared 
interest is that builds its common ground. Accordingly, the “affair” of the Roman 
people is their “affair” and hence their “state”.150 Augustine adds that, in the same 
way as the Romans, other earthly communities – such as the Athenians and other 
Greeks, the Egyptians and the Babylonians – are a “people” who own a “state”; 
however, each of these he calls a civitas impiorum (“state of the impious”).151 Since 
                                                
146 Civ. XIX 24. 
147 Ibid., p. 400. 
148 Ibid., p. 400, ll. 6-7. 
149 Civ. II 21, p. 81. 
150 Civ. XIX 24, p. 400. 
151 Ibid. I agree with R. Martin that Augustine here highlights the decline the Roman ‘state’ has 
undergone since the antique Roman Republic. Ibid., p. 400, ll. 16-22. However, Martin speaks of a 
general, “[...] obvious preference [...]” on the part of Augustine “[...] for the antique Roman republic 
[...]” Martin 1972, p. 208. I do not approve of this reading, because the fact that Augustine 
concludes the chapter by ranking the Romans with other peoples (i.e. the Athenians, other Greeks, 
the Egyptians and Babylonians) as one of the civitates impiorum takes away the worth of his 
previous endorsement. Civ. XIX 24, p. 400, ll. 25-p. 401, ll. 1-3. The Romans are placed at the same 
level as the other named peoples for the reason that they are heathen and do not accept the Christian 
God as their highest authority. This logic inevitably dictates the superiority of Christian politically 
organised communities over heathen ones and the moral superiority of the Christian Roman empire 
over the pagan Roman Republic. The moral superiority of Christian ‘states’ over all other politically 
organised communities is confirmed at Civ. V 19, p. 230, ll. 21-24. Nevertheless, I agree with 
Markus that Augustine does not assume any turning-point in Roman history with the 
Christianisation of the Roman empire. Markus 1970, pp. 56ff. Wilks, moreover, says that Augustine 
“[...] tended to remain aloof from the Roman empire even in its Christian form [...]” Wilks 1967, p. 
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their members do not all obey God and acknowledge Him as their supreme 
commander, these ‘states’, he argues, lack true justice.152 In Book IV153 Augustine 
addresses the poor ethical basis of regna (here: “autocratic states”) in general by 
comparing them with latrocinia (“bands of robbers”). 
  
II. Augustine’s Stance on Worldly Rule and His Assessment of 
Politically Organised Communities 
  
 This section will seek to determine what worldly rule means to Augustine in 
the work De civitate Dei. The investigation will treat questions such as: how 
critical was Augustine of worldly rulership? To what extent was such a criticism a 
viable political stance in Augustine’s time? Dvornik notes that a number of 
medieval theologians (e.g. Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville) and modern 
scholars alike have deduced from the De civitate Dei that Augustine, due to his 
spiritualisation of concepts such as “justice”, “peace” and “virtue”, and his 
criticism of the pagan Roman ‘state’, took an utterly negative stance towards 
worldly rulership.154 Dvornik maintains, however, that such authors were oblivious 
of Augustine’s acknowledgment of the idea of a ‘state’ as being built on natural 
                                                                                                                                  
490. However, he then argues that Augustine saw the quality of the heathen Romans’ virtues as 
spoilt by the lack of iustitia – a concept that could only be brought to fruition within a Christian 
community. Ibid., pp. 491-493. The result is that still a very high moral value is attached to the 
Christian ‘state’, which is not demonstrably attributable to the De civitate Dei. 
152 Civ. XIX 24, pp. 400-401. 
153 Civ. IV 4, pp. 150-151. 
154 Dvornik 1966, pp. 844-850. J. Boler and Martin, for instance, argue along these lines. Boler 
claims that “[...] Augustine thinks that government is a necessary evil. That alone would be enough 
to put him in opposition to “classical” theories that take the political life as the form of full human 
development.” Boler 1978, p. 93. Martin concludes that “[...] Augustine rejected the classical 
idealization of the state; this is far more central than how he stood on Cicero’s definition. There is a 
gulf of radical discontinuity between Augustine and classical politics.” Martin 1972, p. 216. 
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law.155 My findings from this study of Augustine will suggest that his judgment on 
worldly rulership is not at all free from ambiguity in the De civitate Dei. A tension 
in the author’s argument will be revealed: a conflict between approval of the 
supreme worldly power of Christian and (to a limited extent) pagan rulers and 
harsh criticism towards any form of worldly social organisation, government and 
power.156 This conflict is best visible in Augustine’s assessment of politically 
organised communities. It is this elaborate evaluation of different historically 
significant worldly ‘states’ that appears to be most characteristic of Augustine’s 
political reflections in the De civitate Dei. In a unique manner Augustine integrates 
polytheistic and monotheistic, heathen and Christian ‘states’ into God’s plan and 
provides a comprehensive picture. The conflict that unfolds in the De civitate Dei 
expresses Augustine’s dilemma between being drawn to determine more precisely 
the idea of a Christian worldly ‘state’ and at the same time negating everything that 
is temporal and imperfect. 
 Having examined Augustine’s criticism of Cicero’s definition of “state”, the 
question arises whether he recognised any worldly ‘states’ worthy of the name. 
Book IV157, taken in isolation, already provides a clear negative response. There, 
Augustine observes: “In the absence of justice, what are realms, therefore, but big 
bands of robbers? For what are bands of robbers themselves but small realms?”158 
                                                
155 Dvornik 1966, pp. 844-850. 
156 This is in line with Boler who declares: “[...] the fact is that he [Augustine] did not offer 
Christians any hope for or encouragement towards establishing a political program for the 
betterment of man. 
Perhaps this conflict of tendencies in Augustine’s attitudes cannot be resolved.” Boler 1978, pp. 90-
91. 
157 Civ. IV 4. 
158 Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi 
parva regna? Ibid., p. 150, ll. 19-20. 
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Since, according to Augustine’s conclusion in Book XIX159, all worldly ‘states’ are 
unjust, there are apparently none that deserve a better title than latrocinia (“bands 
of robbers”). However, the question may be rephrased, and one may ask whether, 
according to Augustine’s judgment, some worldly ‘states’ are superior to others 
from a moral point of view. Following Augustine’s new definition of “people” in 
Book XIX, he indeed affirms that people or ‘states’ may be judged according to the 
things they love as a community. Thus, a people or ‘state’ is the more virtuous, the 
more honourable the matter is that they value in common.160 This shows that a 
classification of worldly ‘states’ according to moral standards is only possible for 
Augustine because he recognises a definition of the “state” based on natural law 
alongside the other definition based on divine law. That Augustine makes a 
correction of his first definition of “state” in order to be able to rank some worldly 
‘states’ higher than others is expressive of the conflict between an acknowledgment 
and a denial of worldly power that runs through his work. 
K. Jaspers wrote about Augustine: 
 
Nothing is easier than to find contradictions in Augustine. We take them as 
features of his greatness. [...] He makes us aware of the provocative 
question: Is there a point, a limit, where we are bound to encounter 
contradiction? And of the answer: Yes, wherever moved by the source of 
being and the unconditional will within us, we seek to communicate 
                                                
159 Civ. XIX 24. 
160 Ibid., p. 400. However, what the highest social and political ambition is that a ‘state’ can 




ourselves in thought, that is to say, in words. In this realm, freedom from 
contradiction would be existential death and the end of thinking itself.161 
 
H. Arendt agreed with Jaspers’ claim that a system cannot be forced on 
Augustine’s views. This is manifested in her Ph.D. thesis on Augustine’s use of the 
concept of “love”, where, in order to gain insight into the existential origins of his 
ideas, she made an effort to reveal the discrepancies and inconsistencies inherent in 
Augustinian thought. She has shown that the question about “love” and the 
relevance of the concept of “neighbour” is doubly posed and doubly answered by 
Augustine. This, Arendt declared, is due to the fact that for Augustine there are two 
ways of explaining humanity’s origin: firstly, Augustine inquires about the being of 
man as an individual. In this inquiry the question about being is identical with the 
question of where this being comes from or what its source is. The answer is that 
God is the source of each and every individual. The individual then becomes 
decisive for neighbourly “love” as the focus of concern for the other’s salvation. 
However, no consideration is given to the other person in his capacity as our 
neighbour if he is not in the same world with us and happens not to believe in the 
same God. Secondly, when Augustine asks about the origin of the human race, the 
answer, as distinct from the self-sameness of God, is that the origin lies in the 
common ancestor of us all. Analogous to this, man is seen in the first sense as 
isolated and coming by chance into the world viewed as a desert. In this second 
sense, man is seen as belonging to mankind and to this world by generation.162 It 
has become evident that, depending on how humanity’s origin is explained, the 
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rationale for “love” for the neighbour changes. If God is seen as the source of each 
and every individual, the individual’s deeds of charity are done not for the sake of 
the neighbour, but for the sake of God, i.e. because the individual loves God and 
seeks to connect with God. Conversely, if humanity’s origin is traced to a common 
ancestor, the deeds of charity are done because, on the grounds of kinship, the 
neighbour is part of the same, human race. It is clear that to Augustine, under the 
precondition that God is the source of each and every individual, deeds of charity 
on the grounds of kinship cannot legitimately be called “love”. The first sense 
presented by Arendt reflects the divine dimension of the concept of “love”, while 
the second sense reflects its existential or natural dimension. 
An analogy can be found when examining the manner in which Augustine 
explains the concept of ‘state’ in the De civitate Dei. According to Augustine, not 
only two “loves” but also two “states” (civitates) emerged from the first man, 
Adam.163 Augustine affirms: 
 
Accordingly, two loves have brought forth two ‘states’, the love for 
oneself up to the contempt of God indeed the earthly [‘state’], the love for 
God up to the contempt of oneself, however, the heavenly [‘state’].164 
 
Here, too, Augustine has two ways of explaining what a ‘state’ is, depending on 
whether God or the common human ancestor is seen as the origin of the human 
race. If God is the origin, the definition is as follows (in line with Cicero): “a crowd 
                                                
163 Civ. XII 28, pp. 555-556, XIV 28, pp. 56-57. On Augustine’s re-definition of the res publica in 
terms of the “loves” of its members and on his theory of “love” see also Markus 1970, pp. 66-71; 
Markus 1988, pp. 105-108; Martin 1972, pp. 202, 209ff.; Baynes 1936, pp. 16-17. 
164 Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, 
caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Civ. XIV 28, p. 56, ll. 24-26. 
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of human beings associated in a consensus with respect to justice”.165 This justice, 
to Augustine, is only achievable if all members of the ‘state’, including its ruler, 
place themselves completely under the authority of God. If the common human 
ancestor is the origin, the appropriate definition reads: “a rational union of a crowd 
associated in a concordant communion over things that it loves”.166 Augustine adds 
that a worldly ‘state’ is superior to another if the matter it commonly loves is more 
honourable from a moral point of view. Again, it is clear that to Augustine, if 
justice, which can only be achieved on condition that all members of the ‘state’ 
plus its ruler place themselves fully under the authority of God, is taken as the 
precondition for a ‘state’, no worldly community could possibly pass for a ‘state’. 
 In the De civitate Dei Augustine looks at worldly ‘states’ from an 
eschatological point of view: all worldly ‘states’ are planned and controlled by the 
Christian God. His will and his scheme are known to him alone and impenetrable 
to the people in this world.167 God awards both good and evil people with 
rulership168, which reflects the existence of morally superior and inferior ‘states’. 
Why a ‘state’ has certain properties and not others and why worldly power is 
granted to a certain person remains obscure. Yet Augustine maintains that worldly 
power is given to good and evil people without distinction in order that true 
Christians may question such temporal privileges.169 
Augustine’s assessment of worldly ‘states’ can be gleaned from the first 
books of the De civitate Dei about the Roman and other secular powers, their moral 
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for God. See Schofield 2010, pp. 668-671. 





standards and the relationship between power and justice (particularly Books IV 
and V), and from the last books concerned with the genesis, growth and interaction 
of the spiritual ‘states’ civitas Dei and civitas terrena (mainly Books XV, XVIII 
and XIX). In general and without regard to the great complexity of Augustine’s 
representation, the manner in which the earthly powers are laid out in these books 
suggests that there is a certain hierarchy of ‘states’. 
According to this hierarchy, the ‘state’ of the monotheistic Jewish nation is 
ranked at the bottom. Of course, this is a simplified rendition of Augustine’s 
general judgment on the Jewish people. Augustine was well aware that the Jews 
were the first receivers of salvation (since Abraham): God established the Old 
Covenant with His people, the people of Israel.170 In other words, in salvation 
history the Jews play a much more important role than, for example, the heathens. 
Augustine’s thinking behind ranking the Jews below the heathens in his evaluation 
of worldly ‘states’ must have simply been the following: the heathens who 
converted to Christianity are in a better position than the Jews, who have not 
become Christians. Augustine, especially in Book IV of the De civitate Dei, praises 
the Jews for being the only people who did not initially worship demons and 
sacrifice to false gods, but served the one God.171 In order to indicate to the people 
on earth that all earthly goods lie in His hands, He gave power to His people, freed 
them from the Egyptians in miraculous ways and let them spread, prosper and win 
wars.172 Unfortunately, Augustine points out, the Jewish ‘state’ only lasted as long 
as it maintained the right form of belief. He rebukes them by saying that, had the 
                                                
170 See Rom, 1-2 Cor, Gal. 
171 Civ. IV 34, p. 189, V 12, p. 211. 
172 Civ. IV 34, pp. 188-189, XVIII 20, pp. 281-282. 
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Jews not turned away from the one God and worshipped tin gods and foreign 
idols173, and had they not in the end brought about Christ’s death174, their ancient 
realm, as prosperous as it once was, would have been preserved.175 Instead, he 
explains, the Jews are now deprived of their homeland and live scattered all over 
the world.176 Their destiny, he claims, is in agreement with divine providence. The 
fate of the Jews fits into God’s plan in so far as, by their dispersal, the divine 
prophecies of the coming Messiah contained in the books of the Jews are made 
known to the whole world, and the growth of the ‘church’ of Christ on earth is 
launched.177 
Other worldly ‘states’ founded before the Romans are rated higher than the 
Jews in terms of moral standards. Among others, Augustine mentions the 
Egyptians178, the Persians179 and, following the Roman historians Varro180 and 
Sallust, the Sicyonians, the Athenians and the Latins181. However, Augustine argues 
that these appear rather small and unimportant next to two large, supreme and 
historically more significant ‘states’. For divine providence has decreed that there 
are two superior temporal realms, namely the pagan ‘states’ of the Assyrians and 
                                                
173 Civ. IV 34, pp. 188-189. 
174 Ibid., p. 189. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Civ. XVIII 46, pp. 328-329, 47, p. 331. 
178 Civ. XIX 24, p. 400. 
179 Civ. V 21, p. 233. 
180 Varro is an important reference in the De civitate Dei. His work Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum 
is known primarily via Augustine who uses it in the De civitate Dei as a focus of his critique of 
pagan theology in Books VI and VII. Varro’s De philosophia provides a record of all conceivable 
positions in ethics (amounting to 288 positions). Augustine has recourse to Varro in Book XIX of 
the De civitate Dei where he proves that only the Christian response to the question of the supreme 
good is feasible. Schofield 2010, p. 666; see also Oort van 1991, pp. 65-72. 
181 Civ. XVIII 2, pp. 257-258. 
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the Romans.182 Augustine presents the polytheistic Assyrians in the East as the 
typos (“pre-image”) and the polytheistic/pre-Christian Romans in the West as the 
antitypos (“counter-image”).183 Both ‘states’ are noteworthy and meaningful 
because they are two large and, in their own way, good184 worldly ‘states’ which 
parallel the civitas Dei.185 Their function for Christianity is that, due to their 
longevity, size and influence, they were able over a long period of time to secure 
peace among the earthly community, which is often divided by enmity and war.186 
What is more, the citizens of these worldly ‘states’ are to be taken as an example 
by the citizens of the civitas Dei.187 In one instance, Augustine, inspired by the 
Bible, uses Babylon as a pars pro toto name for any supreme worldly ‘state’ whose 
peace can provide stability to the civitas Dei.188 Several other passages demonstrate 
how important safeguarding peace on earth is to Augustine and that, according to 
him, Christianity cannot prosper without peace.189 The significance of these two 
superior temporal realms within the context of God’s providential plan is as 
follows: the Assyrian empire as the typos is relevant for events appertaining to the 
Old Testament. Augustine indicates that first Abraham was born in the Assyrian 
‘state’ and then his and Sarah’s long-awaited heir Isaac, who himself had the twins 
                                                
182 Civ. XVIII 2, pp. 256-259, 22, p. 284, 27, p. 292, V 13, p. 217, 21, pp. 232-233, IV 6-7, pp. 152-
154. Augustine defines the two supreme powers as follows: “[...] Babylonia, quasi prima Roma 
[...]” and “[...] Roma quasi secunda Babylonia [...]” Civ. XVIII 2, p. 258, ll. 22-26. Elsewhere he 
specifies: “[...] condita est civitas Roma velut altera Babylon et velut prioris filia Babylonis [...]” 
Civ. XVIII 22, p. 284, ll. 4-5. See also Oort van 1991, p. 71 (note 307). By Assyria Augustine 
means Babylonia prima, hence his alternate use of Assyria and Babylonia. Ibid., p. 71. 
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187 Civ. V 16, p. 221, 17, pp. 222-223, 18, pp. 227-228. 
188 Civ. XIX 26, p. 402. A more detailed account of Augustine’s reflections on pax (“peace”) can be 
found in Markus 1970, pp. xi-xx; Markus 1988, pp. 110-111. 
189 Civ. XV 4, p. 63, 6, p. 66, XVIII 22, p. 284. 
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Esau and Jacob together with his wife Rebecca.190 The Roman empire as the 
antitypos must then be relevant for the New Testament. Augustine explains that, 
because of the virtues of the early Romans during the Roman Republic (Sallust), 
God allowed Christ to be born under their rule.191 In some places in the De civitate 
Dei the Roman ‘state’ clearly appears as the greater and more powerful of the 
two.192 However, it must be pointed out that already in chapter 2 of Book XVIII the 
author specifies that his illustration of the civitas terrena as running parallel to the 
civitas Dei will, because of the density of available historical sources, concentrate 
first and foremost on the Roman power.193 Augustine, indeed, praises the Romans 
for having initially possessed the exceptional virtues and skills for which God 
rewarded them194, granting them laws and a ‘state’ of immense proportions, which 
would vanquish the great evils among the subordinate races and bring peace to the 
entire world for a very long time.195 Yet other passages in the De civitate Dei 
include not only praises but also highly sarcastic remarks about the Romans’ 
achievements.196 These are good examples of the tension within the author’s 
argument and indicate that the text is unresolved as to whether the Romans’ 
success is to be praised to some extent or condemned altogether. In comparison 
with the Assyrians, Augustine believes that the Romans faced the bigger challenge 
                                                
190 Civ. XVIII 2, p. 257, 3, pp. 259-260. 
191 Augustine writes about the Assyrians and the Romans: “[...] ac per hoc per ea tempora isti velut 
fontes prophetiae pariter eruperunt, quando regnum defecit Assyrium coepitque Romanum; ut 
scilicet, quem ad modum regni Assyriorum primo tempore extitit Abraham, cui promissiones 
apertissimae fierent in eius semine benedictionis omnium gentium, ita occidentalis Babylonis 
exordio, qua fuerat Christus imperante venturus, in quo implerentur illa promissa, ora prophetarum 
non solum loquentium, verum etiam scribentium in tantae rei futurae testimonium solverentur.” Civ. 
XVIII 27, p. 292, ll. 4-13. 
192 Civ. V 13, p. 217, XVIII 22, p. 284. 
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and did the better job in terms of the military subjection of other races. According 
to him, the Romans had to deal with much more powerful enemies who were better 
organised in their defence than the enemies of the Assyrians had been.197 All in all, 
Augustine concludes that, because of the virtues of the early Romans during the 
Roman Republic (Sallust), the heathen Romans were superior to the Jews in moral 
behaviour, and hence were rewarded by God by being given the important task of 
defeating the Jews, who did not recognise Christ.198 In addition, the pagan ‘state’ of 
the Romans had the honour of having had Christ live under its rule.199 
The approach of Eusebius was not structured to the same extent as that of 
Augustine by the opposition between the eschatologically relevant, supreme 
worldly powers of the Assyrians and the Romans – the Assyrian ‘state’ as the 
oriental typos meaningful to the Old Testament (birth of Abraham200) and the 
Roman ‘state’ as the occidental antitypos critical to the New Testament (birth of 
Christ201). For Eusebius, the Roman empire was mainly crucial for having had a 
facilitating role in the spread of Christianity and perhaps even a sort of joint 
mission.202 For him, the fact that Christ was born soon after the reign of Augustus 
was part of God’s plan. The empire, by bringing peace among previously warring 
nations, accelerated the spread of the Gospel. The Assyrians as a worldly ‘state’ 
relevant for events in the Old Testament seem not to come into his field of vision at 
all. In relation to the idea of the breaking up of the Jewish kingdom as a sign of the 
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coming Messiah, moreover, which was given great prominence by Eusebius203, 
Augustine goes further by bringing in the Romans and explaining that they are 
morally superior to the Jews, who did not acknowledge Christ, and thus were in a 
position to defeat them and have Christ under their rule.204 Eusebius, like 
Augustine, mentioned the collapse of the Jewish nation as a portent of the coming 
Messiah. However, when discussing the fate of the Jewish nation, Eusebius did not 
involve the heathen Romans in this manner by juxtaposing their moral behaviour. 
Eusebius did judge worldly power, but his judgment focused on the rulers alone 
and depended on their success and changing stance on Christianity.205 The 
comparative analysis of pagan and Christian ‘states’ in terms of moral standards is 
a distinctive feature of Augustinian political thought. 
 At the top of the pyramid of worldly ‘states’, according to Augustine, are 
the Christian ‘states’. The Christian Roman empire and emperors are much less 
criticised than the pagan Roman ‘state’: in fact they are mainly praised. Regarding 
the Christian emperors in general, Augustine declares: 
 
For we do not call some Christian emperors happy for the reason that they 
have either ruled longer or have left behind ruling sons after a peaceful 
death, or that they have subdued enemies of the ‘state’ or been able both to 
provide against and oppress hostile citizens who were rising up against 
them. 
Even some worshippers of demons have deserved to receive these and 
other favours or comforts in this miserable life, those who do not belong to 
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the realm of God to which these [Christian emperors] belong; and this has 
been done by the forbearance of He Himself, lest those who believed in 
him desired these things from him as the highest goods. 
No – rather we call them happy if they rule justly, if they do not elevate 
themselves among flatterers who do obeisance and debase themselves to 
the allegiances of those who humble themselves too much, and are mindful 
that they are human beings; [we call them happy] if they make their power 
the maid-servant of His majesty for the veneration of God, extended to the 
highest degree; if they fear, love and worship God; if they love that realm 
more, where they do not fear having co-heirs; if they avenge in a more 
measured manner, forgive easily; if they exert the same revenge for the 
necessity of governing and protecting the ‘state’, not for grudges of 
hostilities which should be set aside; if they exercise the same indulgence 
not to let injustice go unpunished, but for the hope of correction; if they – 
since they are mostly compelled to decide harshly – compensate by the 
mildness of forbearance and the abundance of favours; if luxury is 
restrained by them, although it could be more unrestrained; if they prefer 
ruling over their vicious desires than ruling over any tribes; and if they do 
all these things not because of any zeal for worthless glory, but because of 
their love for eternal happiness; if they do not fail to offer their true God 
the sacrifice of humility and compassion as well as prayer for their sins. 
Such Christian emperors we call happy now because of hope, [and] 
hereafter when they in fact will be [happy], when what we expect will 
have come to pass.206 
                                                
206 Neque enim nos christianos quosdam imperatores ideo felices dicimus, quia vel diutius 
imperarunt vel imperantes filios morte placida reliquerunt, vel hostes rei publicae domuerunt vel 
inimicos cives adversus se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere potuerunt. 
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In this passage as well as in the last paragraph of chapter 19 of Book V207, proof 
can be found that Augustine sees emperors – including Christian emperors – as 
subordinate to God. However, in spite of this evidence, these lines (and the last two 
chapters of Book V of the De civitate Dei on the Christian Roman emperors 
Constantine I and Theodosius I208) unmistakably disclose that Augustine still holds 
a certain admiration for temporal gifts and greatness. The extraordinary luck and 
achievements of both of these rulers in particular inclines him to think of Christian 
emperors as particularly felices (“happy”), although he draws attention to the fact 
that there were also less “happy” Christian emperors.209 
 Augustine remarks that the Emperor Constantine I was exceptionally 
talented and reigned for a long time (306-337), including as sole ruler (324-337).210 
He emerged victorious from wars and was always successful in subduing tyrants.211 
Notably, Augustine mentions Constantine I’s old age and his peaceful, natural 
                                                                                                                                  
Haec et alia vitae huius aerumnosae vel munera vel solacia quidam etiam cultores daemonum 
accipere meruerunt, qui non pertinent ad regnum Dei, quo pertinent isti; et hoc ipsius misericordia 
factum est, ne ab illo ista qui in eum crederent velut summa bona desiderarent. 
Sed felices eos dicimus, si iuste imperant, si inter linguas sublimiter honorantium et obsequia nimis 
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cultum maxime dilatandum maiestati eius famulam faciunt; si Deum timent diligunt colunt; si plus 
amant illud regnum, ubi non timent habere consortes; si tardius vindicant, facile ignoscunt; si 
eandem vindictam pro necessitate regendae tuendae que rei publicae, non pro saturandis 
inimicitiarum odiis exerunt; si eandem veniam non ad inpunitatem iniquitatis, sed ad spem 
correctionis indulgent; si, quod aspere coguntur plerumque decernere, misericordiae lenitate et 
beneficiorum largitate compensant; si luxuria tanto eis est castigatior, quanto posset esse liberior; si 
malunt cupiditatibus pravis quam quibuslibet gentibus imperare et si haec omnia faciunt non propter 
ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter caritatem felicitatis aeternae; si pro suis peccatis humilitatis et 
miserationis et orationis sacrificium Deo suo vero immolare non neglegunt. 
Tales christianos imperatores dicimus esse felices interim spe, postea re ipsa futuros, cum id quod 
expectamus advenerit. Civ. V 24, p. 236, l. 27-p. 237, l. 26. 
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death, which seem to be particularly precious gifts to him.212 In Augustine’s view, 
Constantine I’s greatest achievement was the creation of a Christian capital city, 
Constantinopolis (inaugurated in 330) as the Christian equivalent of the heathen 
Rome or as the “Christian Rome”.213 
 Emperor Theodosius I – emperor in the East from 379 onwards and sole 
ruler from 394 to 395 – is praised in the De civitate Dei above all for his piety, 
humility and charity.214 He, Augustine relates, accommodated Valentinian II, the 
orphaned little brother of the Western Emperor Gratian, who was murdered by the 
Western usurper Magnus Maximus in 383 in his part of the empire, avenged the 
murder of Gratian by eliminating Magnus Maximus in 388, and returned to him his 
share.215 In a battle at the Frigidus River in 394 Theodosius I also destroyed the 
pagan tyrant Eugenius, who, after the death of Valentinian II in 392, was 
illegitimately made Roman emperor in the West on Valentinian’s behalf.216 After 
having received a Christian prophecy of victory, Augustine writes, Theodosius I 
was so confirmed in his Christian faith that he defeated the powerful enemy mainly 
by prayer.217 Augustine first and foremost praises Theodosius I’s strong Christian 
belief, his strict prohibitions on heathen practices218 and his contributions to the 
consolidation of the Christian ‘church’ on earth.219 Considerable emphasis is placed 
on the emperor’s humility due to his willingness to forgive and repent after having 
                                                
212 To a certain extent, Augustine’s representation generates the understanding that such gifts are a 
sign of divine favour. Civ. V 25, p. 238. 
213 Ibid. On the foundation, significance and symbolic value of Constantinopolis see Stephenson 
2010, pp. 190-211; Nicol 1988, pp. 53-54; Dam van 2014, pp. 83-94. 
214 On Theodosius see Markus 1988, pp. 103ff.; Errington 2006, pp. 212-259. 
215 Civ. V 26, pp. 238-239. 
216 Ibid., p. 239. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid., pp. 239-240. 
219 Ibid. See also Markus 1988, pp. 103-104, 113-114. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 65 
punished the Thessalonians excessively for committing a crime. The group of 
bishops to which Ambrose belonged, and which prompted the emperor’s noble 
gesture of penitence, is mentioned. Augustine expands on this incident when he 
maintains: 
 
But what was more admirable than his [Theodosius I’s] religious humility, 
when, by the protest of some who adhered to him, he was urged to take 
vengeance for the very grave crime of the Thessalonians, for which he had 
already promised indulgence since the bishops interfered, and corrected by 
the ecclesiastical instruction thus exercised penitence, so that the people 
praying for him shed more tears when seeing the imperial sublimity 
prostrated, than it feared the imperial sublimity enraged when sinning? 
He carried these good deeds – as well as others like it, which would be 
tedious to recount – with him out of this temporal society of any high 
quality and human sublimity; the reward for which deeds is eternal 
happiness, whose giver is God to the truly pious alone.220 
 
Two virtues, considered by Augustine as essentials of Christian rulership, 
can be found in chapters 24 and 26 of Book V of the De civitate Dei:221 
misericordia (“forbearance”) and humilitas (“humility”). Augustine lays down that 
the “happy kings” should counterbalance their usually strict judgment by 
                                                
220 Quid autem fuit eius religiosa humilitate mirabilius, quando in thessalonicensium gravissimum 
scelus, cui iam episcopis intercedentibus promiserat indulgentiam, tumultu quorundam, qui ei 
cohaerebant, vindicare compulsus est et ecclesiastica cohercitus disciplina sic egit paenitentiam, ut 
imperatoriam celsitudinem pro illo populus orans magis fleret videndo prostratam, quam peccando 
timeret iratam? 
Haec ille secum et si qua similia, quae commemorare longum est, bona opera tulit ex isto temporali 
vapore cuiuslibet culminis et sublimitatis humanae; quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, 
cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Civ. V 26, p. 240, ll. 16-27. 
221 Civ. V 24, pp. 236-237, Civ. V 26, pp. 238-242. 
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“forbearance”, and should not fail to offer God the sacrifice of “humility” for their 
sins. The concept of misericors/misericordia is, according to the Latin Stoic 
tradition, the equivalent of the Greek noun ἔλεος.222 Stoic philosophers such as 
Seneca regarded clementia as a minor and misericordia as a major vitium. They 
saw misericordia as an emotion distinguished from reasoning or knowledge and 
hence condemned it as irrational. Cicero, by contrast, celebrated Caesar’s 
misericordia as one of the ruler’s most noble attributes. Early Christian 
philosophers, including Augustine, of course understood misericordia as a virtue. 
However, the concept was more often used with reference to God whose 
misericordia forgives the people’s sins. With reference to the Christians, 
misericordia was believed to manifest itself in the people’s compassionate actions 
and alms for the poor.223 In the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. misericordia Drecoll 
affirms that the distiction between misericordia and iustitia or iudicium is 
integrated in Augustine’s vocabulary.224 Augustine takes the juxtaposition of 
misericordia and iustitia in Gn 24,49 and 47,29sq. as the earliest evidence for this 
fundamental distinction. God is at the same time the deus ultionum (“God of 
vengeance”) (see Ps 93,1) and the fons misericordiarum (“fountain of 
forbearance”). Furthermore, Augustine contrasts the iustitia punientis (“justice of 
the punishing”) with the misericordia liberantis (“forbearance of the freeing”) (lib. 
arb. 3,55; c. Adim. 7). Drecoll notes that Augustine depicts misericordia and 
iustitia or iudicium as two essential aspects of the image of God, and thus accuses 
the Manichaeans of eliminating the aspect of iudicium from the conception of God 
                                                
222 AL vol. 4, 1/2 2010-2013, p. 34. 
223 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
224 Ibid., p. 38. 
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(Ps 100,1).225 In the De civitate Dei Augustine picks up Cicero’s reflections on 
misericordia. A prominent passage in chapter 5 of Book IX defends Cicero’s 
argument on misericordia against traditional Stoic belief.226 In the Augustinus-
Lexikon s.v. humilitas227 it is stated that according to Augustine humilitas is a 
typical feature of Christianity: in contrast to Christian writers before Augustine, 
who conferred a certain importance on the ethics of the pagans, he is eager to 
present humilitas as a characteristic element of Christian ethics. It is further 
mentioned that Augustine particularly insists on the humilitas of rulers. In his 
Sermones (69,2) he stresses that without humilitas greatness is not conceivable: 
“Do you want to be great, so start in the smallest.”228 The clearest evidence of 
Augustine’s linking of humilitas with Christian rulership is in chapter 26 of Book 
V, where Augustine alludes to the submission of Emperor Theodosius I to Bishop 
Ambrose. 
 The analysis of different temporal ‘states’ in the De civitate Dei has firstly 
revealed that, according to the author, there are more and less virtuous worldly 
‘states’, of which, however, none is perfect in the sense that it would succeed in 
placing itself fully under God’s authority (as demanded in chapters 21 and 23 of 
Book XIX229). Secondly, it has become evident that Augustine also sees temporal 
gifts and greatness as meaningful. This has been shown to be particularly the case 
as far as the successes of the Christian Roman emperors Constantine I and 
Theodosius I are concerned, and, to some extent, also with respect to the skills of 
the heathen Romans. Augustine’s acknowledgment of temporal gifts and greatness 
                                                
225 Ibid. 
226 Civ. IX 5, pp. 374-376. 
227 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, pp. 448, 451, 453. 
228 Magnus esse vis, a minimo incipe. 
229 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391, XIX 23, p. 399. 
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reflects his dilemma between approval of worldly rulership and supreme power on 
the one hand and harsh criticism towards any form of worldly government on the 
other. The last paragraph of chapter 19 in Book V230 is probably most expressive of 
Augustine’s rating of heathen and Christian worldly ‘states’: here, the author 
explicitly asserts that, according to the standards of a certain kind of worldly 
‘state’, the heathen Romans had indeed a good ‘state’, which was of use to the 
earthly community. Yet, nuancing what he says, Augustine claims that a human 
being without true faith in the Christian religion can never be genuinely virtuous. 
Such limited virtue, however, is in Augustine’s eyes still better than no virtue at all 
(the Jews lost theirs by abandoning the one God and killing Christ). He concludes 
that it is the greatest bliss for the condition of human beings on earth if people who 
have been granted a strong belief in Christianity, and hence true virtue and a calling 
for ruling over nations, come to power.231 These are the Christian emperors. The 
last two chapters of Book V of the De civitate Dei232 deal with the two preeminent 
Christian Roman emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I. In these chapters 
Augustine clearly praises both emperors. However, it must be said that Augustine’s 
praise is not general, as it is the case in panegyric233, but that it is rather particular, 
                                                
230 Civ. V 19, p. 230. 
231 Ibid., p. 230, ll. 21-24. This passage invalidates the following statement by Martin: “It is 
important [...] to note that Augustine nowhere makes an explicit distinction between heathen and 
Christian states [...]. This fact in itself and his obvious preference for the antique Roman republic 
[...] make it difficult to see how the Christianized State interpretation has come to have the 
credibility that it has in recent scholarship.” Martin 1972, p. 208. 
232 Civ. V 25, 26. 
233 Eusebius may serve as an example. Of course, very few speeches by Eusebius actually survive. 
There are mainly the Tricennial Orations and arguably the Vita Constantini which have some 
panegyrical elements. For instance, the first oration in the Tricennial Orations, the De laudibus 
Constantini, does offer some specific praise of Constantine I, but also offers very general remarks. 
In particular, it offers general remarks about tyrants and bad rulers, rather than good rulers, but it 
does contrast them with good rulers, using that to shed some light on what makes a good ruler. (It is 
worth adding that the traditional Tricennial Oration is actually two separate speeches – at least that 
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since it focuses on very specific merits of these emperors.234 The emperors’ 
achievements in the promotion of the Christian faith – in the case of Theodosius I 
the destruction of images of heathen Gods, the ban on the ancient cult of the gods 
and of Arianism in the East, as well as his humility and willingness to repent and 
forgive – are mentioned.235 Augustine’s account of the emperors’ qualities and 
achievements recognises deeds for which there is irrefutable historical evidence. It 
seems that the author is, within reasonable limits, trying to find virtues which he 
can legitimately attribute to Constantine I and Theodosius I. Even though 
Augustine’s evaluation of their rule is positive overall, he chooses a formulation 
that gives the reader scope for deciding about how to judge worldly Christian 
rulership. He ends the record of Theodosius I’s accomplishments by writing: “[...] 
the reward for which deeds is eternal happiness, whose giver is God to the truly 
pious alone.”236 Neither here nor anywhere else in the De civitate Dei is it stated 
that a Christian Roman emperor will, according to Augustine, be rewarded with 
eternal happiness. Augustine’s opinion on the status of Christian rulers is not 
explicitly expressed. It is only natural that Augustine, writing as a bishop at a time 
when Christians were still aware of the preceding centuries of persecution, should 
praise some particular achievements of contemporary emperors where they 
contributed to the strengthening of the Christian faith. 
                                                                                                                                  
is the current consensus.) For further reading see the translation and commentary by H. A. Drake (In 
Praise of Constantine) as well as the Life of Constantine. 
234 This is reflected in Markus 1970, pp. 51ff, 72. However, on p. 55 Markus argues that Augustine 
saw the Roman empire as “theologically neutral”, which I think is an exaggerated rendering of 
Augustine’s sober appraisal of the Theodosian establishment of Christianity. See also Markus’ 
discussion in Markus 1988, pp. 103-108. 
235 A recent biographical account of Theodosius I is provided by H. Leppin. See Leppin 2003, pp. 
76, 115-127, 165-167, 230. 
236 [...] quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Civ. V 
26, p. 240, ll. 26-27. 
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Moreover, it is obvious that from the moment a ruler adopts a certain 
doctrine, its adherents are less likely to judge him unfavourably. That the continued 
existence of the earthly ‘church’ as the ‘state’ religion, and the spread of the correct 
Christian doctrine under the protection of the government (i.e. the ‘state’s’ ruler), 
were important to Augustine, is plain for a number of reasons. Throughout his life 
as a Christian, Augustine had always been very rigorous in combating what, 
according to him, was heresy. To Augustine heresy was a real problem of the 
earthly ‘church’ as an institution. He was well aware of the fact that worldly 
powers were always to some extent involved when decisions regarding questions 
of faith were to be made. This explains Augustine’s praise of the Christian Roman 
emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I for certain specific actions in support of 
the Christian ‘church’ as an earthly institution. According to Augustine, however, 
all members of a ‘state’, including its ruler, must place themselves completely 
under the authority of God in order to achieve justice, the essential precondition for 
any ‘state’ that can legitimately be called a civitas Dei. This, according to 
Augustine, cannot be achieved on earth. 
  
III. Concepts of Augustinian Political Thought 
  
This section will lay out concepts of Augustinian political thought that I 
have selected on the basis both of their prominence in the De civitate Dei and their 





Terminology for Types of Politically Organised Communities 
  
In her research on the concept of “love” in Augustine, Arendt drew 
attention to problems regarding terminology, among them Augustine’s 
terminological inconsistency. Arendt wrote that the Latin translation of the Greek 
New Testament could accommodate three Greek terms for “love” – ἔρως, στοργή, 
ἀγάπη – with the corresponding Latin terms being amor, dilectio and caritas. She 
remarked, moreover, that Augustine’s use of these terms is quite flexible, since he 
frequently uses them synonymously and even emphasises this fact repeatedly. Still, 
Arendt said, Augustine had three terms at his disposal where we have only one, at 
best two, in modern English: “love” and “charity”. She explained that Augustine 
generally, but not consistently, uses these three terms in different contexts.237 The 
same terminological problem is relevant to our analysis of Augustine’s conception 
of different types of politically organised communities. I observed that in his work 
De civitate Dei Augustine reflects on various types of political entities and, 
accordingly, avails himself of different Latin terms when talking about these 
different forms of government. Again, Augustine is not always consistent in the 
terminology he employs. On that account, a brief examination of the various words 
Augustine uses will follow, in order to come closer to Augustine’s understanding. 
                                                
237 According to Arendt, Augustine as a general rule avails himself of amor to designate desire and 
craving (that is love in its largest, least specific sense), dilectio to designate the love of self and 
neighbour and caritas to designate the love of God and the “highest good”. As an example of 
Augustine’s terminological inconsistency Arendt mentioned that Augustine also distinguishes 
occasionally between licit and illicit caritas. Arendt 1996, pp. 38-39. The Augustinus-Lexikon has 
articles on amor, dilectio and caritas by Dideberg. In accordance with Arendt, Dideberg establishes 
that Augustine uses all three words in order to denote a concept, which, in the most general sense, 
translates as “love”. As far as the term amor is concerned, Dideberg’s argument corresponds to that 
of Arendt who claims that, according to Augustine, amor has a wider and more indefinite sense than 
dilectio and caritas. With regard to dilectio and caritas, however, Dideberg finds little to distinguish 
their use in Augustine. AL vol. 1 1986-1994, pp. 294-300, 730-743, vol. 2 1996-2002, pp. 435-453. 
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The chief Latin terms that occur in the De civitate Dei are: regnum, imperium, res 
publica, civitas and societas. 
Regnum, which could mean “the office of king”, “monarchy”, “royal state”, 
“kingdom”, “realm”, “autocratic/despotic rule/state” or “tyranny”, “the power of 
king”, “kingship” or “political control”, and is a derivative of rex (“king”, “leader”, 
“the sovereign ruler of a state/people”),238 appears in the De civitate Dei in the 
books on politics and the Roman empire and other worldly empires, as well as in 
the books that are concerned with the Christian significance of history and the two 
spiritual ‘states’, the civitas Dei and civitas terrena.239 That is to say, regnum can be 
found as both a political and a spiritual/religious concept.240 When regnum does not 
refer to a ‘state’ or community ruled by a leader, it can usually be translated as “the 
power of king” or “political control”;241 in the other cases regnum generally means 
“autocratic state” or “realm” (which means that, according to Augustine, regnum is 
not necessarily a “royal state”, but may very well be any kind of realm, including a 
“world power” or an “empire” such as that of the Romans, governed by 
imperatores and dominant over other ‘states’ and their rulers242). Regnum then 
generally marks a body that is controlled by someone. The following phrases and 
expressions provide evidence of this: 
                                                
238 OLD vol. 2 1976, pp. 1600-1601, 1650-1651. 
239 Civ. IV, V, XVIII, XX. 
240 As a result, the translations of regnum in modern languages often also have both connotations 
(e.g. “kingdom” as a political unit and “Kingdom” as a spiritual unit). 
241 Civ. IV 3, p. 150, IV 6, p. 153, V 21, p. 233, V 25, p. 238, XIV 1, p. 3, XIV 7, p. 15, XV 8, p. 
72, XVIII 3, p. 260, XVIII 6, p. 263, XVIII 15, p. 274, XX 23, pp. 464, 465. 
242 See also Martin 1972, pp. 195, 203-206. Martin argues that Augustine, in chapter 4 of Book IV 
of the De civitate Dei, equates regna with imperia. According to Martin, regna and imperia both 
have certain features in common with latrocinia (“bands of robbers”). Thus, the general theme of 
chapter 4 of Book IV is the nature of “imperial states” as a whole. The similarity of all “imperial 
states” lies “[...] in their motivation by love of domination and their imposition of rule by war and 
force [...]” Ibid., p. 203. My interpretation of Augustine’s use of regnum in the sense of “world 




Deus [...], in cuius potestate sunt regna omnia243 
regnum Dei244 
regnum [...] a Saule rege sumpsit exordium245 
regnum Christi.246 
 
Another passage247 that touches upon the etymology and meaning of rex by 
drawing on Cicero clearly indicates that Augustine sees regnum as closely related 
to and as a derivative of rex. 
The word imperium, which holds the meanings “supreme power (of Roman 
emperors)”, “(military) command”, “rule”, “empire” and “world power”, is a 
derivative of imperare (“command”, “rule (over)”)248 and primarily occurs in the 
books249 dealing with politics and the characteristics of Roman power. Only once is 
imperium found as a spiritual/religious concept.250 Strikingly, this is at the 
beginning of the De civitate Dei (in the last chapter of Book II), where Augustine 
urges the Romans to abandon the cult of the gods. In fact, imperium occurs as part 
of a quote from two verses of Virgil’s Aeneid, which have been adapted by 
Augustine. Virgil’s original text says: “For these [Romans] I set neither limits of 
government nor time limits; I have given an empire without end.”251 These verses 
belong to Book I of the Aeneid and are included in Jupiter’s speech to Venus. It 
                                                
243 Civ. I 36, p. 52, IV 2, p. 148. 
244 This is a Biblical phrase often used by Augustine. Civ. V 24, p. 237, XIV 2, p. 5, XVIII 31, p. 
298, XX 4, p. 411, XX 9, p. 428. 
245 Civ. XVIII 20, p. 281. 
246 Civ. XX 9, pp. 429, 430, 431, XX 13, p. 437. 
247 Civ. V 12, p. 212. 
248 OLD vol. 1 1968, pp. 843-845; TLL Online 1900 -, Lemma/Sublemma, s.v. imperium, -ī n. 
249 Civ. I, IV, V. 
250 Civ. II 29, p. 96. 
251 His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono; 




shows Venus the future of Aeneas and the Trojans. Augustine in the De civitate 
Dei, instead, attempts to convince the reader that if envious Juno already begrudges 
Aeneas and the Trojans their earthly happiness, which is the seat of power in 
Rome, she will feel a lot more bitter when learning about the humans’ felicitas 
aeterna (“eternal happiness”). Therefore, the humans must break away from their 
old gods and strive after the one and true God who “[...] sets neither limits of 
government nor time limits, He will give an Empire without end.”252 Augustine 
adapts Virgil in a similar way as he avails himself of Cicero for his own argument. 
That Augustine uses imperium in a spiritual sense is an exception in the De civitate 
Dei. It can be explained by examining more closely both contexts – the context in 
which Augustine draws on Virgil, and the context in which Virgil writes these 
verses. In Book II of the De civitate Dei Augustine denounces the Roman gods and 
criticises their values, exhorts the Romans to abandon these gods, defends the 
Christian religion and draws attention to its healing powers. In the first ten books 
of the work, in general, Augustine explains why the heathen Romans need to give 
up their gods, and why they are wrong to assume that Roman decline, being 
attributable to the fact that some citizens have left their old gods in order join 
Christianity, has only started after the emergence of Christianity. Augustine’s 
reasoning when using Virgil suggests that he is seeking to prove the unreliability of 
the Roman gods. He draws attention to the fact that Juno was, from the very outset, 
against the Romans’ rise to power. What Augustine wants to say is that, if it was in 
their power, some of these gods would certainly never have allowed the Romans to 
achieve world domination. Consequently, no conclusive evidence can be presented 
                                                
252 [...] nec metas rerum nec tempora ponit, 
Imperium sine fine dabit. Civ. II 29, p. 96, ll. 7-8. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 75 
that the Christians are to blame for the overthrow of the seat of power in Rome. 
The context in which the verses feature in the Aeneid is, correspondingly, a forecast 
of the future Roman world power. The aim Augustine pursues by referring to the 
eternal realm of the Christian God as an imperium is mainly to offer a 
comprehensible and possible alternative for the heathen Romans who are distraught 
over the limitedness and temporary nature of their military power. He uses the 
heathen Romans’ vocabulary simply to build a bridge between the two antithetical 
ideas – the idea of the supreme Roman military power and the idea of the 
transcendent realm of the Christian God. In most of the other instances in which 
imperium occurs in the De civitate Dei, however, it is used in the worldly sense of 
“empire” or “world power” and often refers to the Roman empire253 (imperium 
Romanum), and sometimes also to other supreme ‘states’254 in history (i.e. ‘states’ 
dominant over others in power and influence). Furthermore, imperium frequently 
means “supreme power (of Roman emperors)”255 and “command”256. What is 
notable about the forms in which imperium emerges in the De civitate Dei is that 
they almost exclusively carry a military connotation. This seems to agree with the 
meaning of imperium that was most common in the Classical Roman Period.257 It is 
therefore not surprising that in the De civitate Dei imperium hardly ever has a 
                                                
253 Civ. I 30, p. 47, I 36, p. 52, II 17, p. 73, II 20, p. 79, IV 2, p. 148, IV 5, p. 151, V 1, p. 190, V 18, 
pp. 227, 228, XX 19, p. 450. 
254 Civ. IV 6, p. 152, XVIII 21, p. 283, XIX 7, p. 366, XIX 24, p. 400. 
255 Civ. I 36, p. 52, IV 2, p. 147, IV 7, p. 153, IV 15, p. 165, IV 29, p. 182, V 12, pp. 211, 214, 215, 
216, V 15, p. 220, XII 3, p. 515. 
256 Civ. I 23, p. 38, I 26, p. 41, IV 26, p. 178, V 18, p. 224, XII 26, p. 553. 
257 Another derivative of imperare, imperator, which in the Classical Roman Period signified 
“commander”, “commander-in-chief”, “(victorious) general” (as a title of honour) and “emperor”, 
even more strongly expresses its relatedness to military affairs. OLD vol. 1 1968, pp. 842-843; TLL 
Online 1900 -, Lemma/Sublemma, s.v. imperātor, -ōris m. See Combès 1966 for further reading on 
the formation of the term imperator during the Roman Republic. 
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spiritual or religious meaning. It also suggests that Augustine’s spiritual 
community, the civitas Dei, is incompatible with any form of military power. 
The term res publica, which generally means “activities affecting the whole 
people”, “affairs of state”, “the resources of the state”, “body politic”, “the 
(Roman) state” and “(free) state”,258 is encountered above all in the books259 on the 
decay and characteristics of the Roman ‘state’ as understood by Cicero. In most 
cases, res publica has the meaning of “state” or “body politic” and sometimes 
“political career”260, “the authority of the state”261, “public life”262 and “the resources 
of the state”263. To the worldly ‘states’ which are called res publica in the De 
civitate Dei belong the early Christian Roman ‘state’264 and, above all, the pagan 
Roman ‘state’265. What is intriguing is that in the De civitate Dei res publica 
twice266 even stands for the civitas Dei. In one of these instances, Augustine 
explicitly comments on his use of the word res publica. He writes of: 
 
                                                
258 OLD vol. 2 1976, pp. 1635-1636. Schofield’s translations of the term res publica do not include 
the English word “state”. Instead, he suggests “public[-spirited] activity”, “public affairs/business”, 
“the public interest”, “the community [sc. as the prime locus of public activity/the prime beneficiary 
of the public interest]”, “the community constituted by the civitas or populus” and “the country”. 
Schofield 1999, p. 180. Schofield reflects Skinner’s proposition that “so long as the powers of the 
community, if exercised by a prince or a magistrate, are regarded on Ciceronian principles as simply 
entrusted to him, there is no logical space for the idea of a state or commonwealth distinct from the 
people or the community. But where it is held [...] that political powers involve a transfer 
(‘translatio’) of the people’s sovereignty – not so much delegation as alienation – a logical gap 
opens up between the powers of a community of citizens and those of a distinct impersonal 
authority, even if vested in a prince or magistrate, which is now in the sense indicated absolute.” 
Ibid., p. 181. However, I do not think that all of Schofield’s alternatives necessarily imply less 
alienation than delegation – certainly not the renderings “public affairs/business” or “the country”. 
259 Civ. I, II, V, XIX. 
260 Civ. II 11, p. 65. 
261 Civ. II 18, p. 74. 
262 Ibid., p. 75. 
263 Civ. V 18, p. 227. 
264 Civ. V 24, pp. 236, 237. 
265 Civ. I 15, p. 25, II 18, p. 75, IV 2, p. 147, V 12, p. 212, XV 5, p. 64, XIX 21, p. 389. 
266 Civ. II 19, p. 77, II 21, p. 83. 
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[...] the ‘state’, whose founder and ruler is Christ, if it pleases to call also 
this a ‘state’, seeing as we cannot deny that it is the affair of a people. But 
if this name, which has become common in other places and other 
circumstances, is perhaps too remote from the use of our discourse, in that 
‘state’ there is certainly true justice [...].267 
 
This remark indicates that it is slightly unusual in Latin to apply the concept of res 
publica to a spiritual/religious body, and Augustine himself finds his wording 
slightly awkward. The reason why Augustine here chooses res publica to refer to 
the civitas Dei is that immediately before he treated Cicero’s notion of the ‘state’ in 
his discussion of Cicero’s work De re publica, and now picks up his argument with 
regard to the civitas Dei. In the proper sense, res publica is a concept that was 
established by Roman political thinkers and refers to the ‘state’ in its political 
structure. The root of the adjective publicus, -a, -um is populus.268 Apart from the 
fact that publicus and populus are cognates, the phrase res publica itself does not 
make any direct reference to the people or citizens of a ‘state’. However, it relates 
to the populus in the sense that it describes the ‘state’ as a public body which in 
certain respects belongs to the populus and is at their disposal. It is not, though, the 
individual citizen to whom the res publica belongs, but rather the populus as a 
whole.269 In turn, the res publica demands from the populus a certain ethical 
behaviour, for example to refrain from violent private conflicts and enmities or to 
                                                
267 [...] re[s] publica, cuius conditor rectorque Christus est, si et ipsam rem publicam placet dicere, 
quoniam eam rem populi esse negare non possumus. Si autem hoc nomen, quod alibi aliterque 
vulgatum est, ab usu nostrae locutionis est forte remotius, in ea certe civitate est vera iustitia [...]. 
Civ. II 21, p. 83, ll. 9-14. 
268 Schofield 1999, p. 183. 
269 Civ. XIX 24, p. 400. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 78 
sacrifice their lives for the ‘state’.270 In this regard, res publica is to be seen as a 
value concept. 
Civitas may carry the meaning of “citizenship”, “citizenry”, “citizens”, 
“commonwealth”, “body politic”, “community based on law”, “state”271 or “city”, 
                                                
270 KlP vol. 4 1972, pp. 1381-1384. 
271 In looking for possible translations of the Latin term civitas, Oort’s main argument is that 
“state”, although often used by earlier German and Dutch scholars to render Augustine’s concept of 
civitas, is not a suitable word because Augustine does not aim to offer a detailed political theory. 
Oort van 1991, pp. 102-108. Oort’s claim that civitas translated as the English “state”, or 
German/Dutch “Staat”/”staat”, has too strong a political connotation, is only partly correct – it may 
apply to the English “state” but not to the German term “Staat” as it is presently used. Ibid., pp. 
104-105. Although quoting in the original language is a laudable practice, it must nevertheless be 
noted that Oort’s references to and quotations from German scholarship are often outdated, which is 
perceptible even in the language of the quotations themselves. Thus, the reference to German 
scholarship Oort uses in order to support his main claim that both the English “state” and the 
German “Staat” are not appropriate translations – i.e. Scholz 1911 [sic!] – is no longer valid. Ibid., 
pp. 104-105 (note 472). Scholz talks about the “Klangfarbe” of the German word “Staat” as it was 
used over a hundred years ago. His judgment is no longer defensible, since the connotations of the 
German word “Staat” have slightly changed. The German word “Staat” is a very broad term today 
with a wide range of meanings. See Max Weber’s “Staatsbegriff” discussed in Pohl 2006, pp. 9-10. 
The general definition provided by DUDEN 2012 shows that the word “Staat” does not necessarily 
need to be linked to the political sphere. “Staat” is defined as “Gesamtheit der Institutionen, deren 
Zusammenwirken das dauerhafte und geordnete Zusammenleben der in einem bestimmten 
abgegrenzten Territorium lebenden Menschen gewährleisten soll”. DUDEN 2012, s.v. Staat. (Such 
words as “Bienenstaat” are also expressive of the broad spectrum of meanings the German term 
“Staat” covers.) The fact that Oort quotes in the original languages (e.g. English and 
German/Dutch) and hence uses words from different languages as translations of the Latin term 
civitas clouds the matter: Oort presumes that the connotations of the English “state” and German 
“Staat” are exactly identical. See Airlie, Pohl and Reimitz 2006, Vorwort. The compound civitas 
Dei itself makes it clear that this civitas belongs first and foremost to the Christian God, who is its 
leader. English “states” (or German “Staaten”) do have a leadership. In the possible English 
translation “city” (or German “Stadt”) for civitas, the leadership is not as readily implied, nor would 
“mayor” be an appropriate equivalent to the Christian God whom Augustine presents as the leader 
of the civitas Dei. See also Oort van 1991, p. 106. Even in terms of the size of Augustine’s spiritual 
communities (civitas Dei and civitas terrena), the English “state” (or the German “Staat”) would be 
a more realistic translation. Neither is Oort’s reason for insisting on the two “cities” of Jerusalem 
and Babylon as the best representatives of the civitas terrena and civitas Dei on earth entirely 
plausible. On p. 105 Oort maintains: “A strong argument for the choice of ‘city’ is the fact that, 
when writing about the origin and nature of the civitas Dei, Augustine makes special reference to 
biblical passages pertaining to Jerusalem. The same applies for the designation of the terrena civitas 
as a city: Babylon.” This claim is supported only with few references. What is more, a conflicting 
statement can be found on p. 71, where Oort refers to relevant passages in Book XVIII of the De 
civitate Dei. He writes about Book XVIII: “First the author outlines the development of the terrena 
civitas since Abraham, so that the readers can compare the two cities. He gives an overall view of 
world history, always chronologically related to that of Israel: Assyria (= Babylonia prima), Egypt, 
Greece and the rise of the Roman Empire (Roma quasi secunda Babylonia).” In the De civitate Dei 
Israel and pagan Assyria or Babylonia appear with at least the same frequency next to the cities of 
Jerusalem and Babylon. A word search on the eMGH showed 98 hits for Israel, 66 hits for the ‘city’ 
of Hierusalem, 22 hits for Babylonia and Assyria together and 21 hits for the ‘city’ of Babylon in 
the De civitate Dei. It must be acknowledged that, when drawing analogies from the spiritual to the 
temporal sphere, Augustine generally relates the civitas terrena and the civitas Dei to systems and 
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and is a derivative of civis (“citizen”).272 In chapter 15 of Book I of the De civitate 
Dei Augustine himself writes that “[…] civitas is nothing else but a concordant 
crowd of people” (aliud civitas non sit quam concors hominum multitudo).273 This 
definition is later on expanded as follows: “[…] civitas […] is nothing else but a 
crowd of people brought together by some bond of association […]” (civitas […] 
nihil est aliud quam hominum multitudo aliquo societatis vinculo conligata).274 The 
similarity between the latter, more refined definition of civitas and Augustine’s 
definition of res publica adapted from Cicero is undoubtedly striking. K. Flasch 
remarks that civitas is the Latin equivalent of the Greek πόλις (“city-state”, “city”, 
                                                                                                                                  
communities that are larger than a ‘city’. The philosopher Martin bases his analysis of Augustine’s 
political philosophy on the claim that Augustine does not identify either of the two civitates with 
earthly institutions. However, he argues that some institutions represent these civitates in history: 
the “imperial states” collectively embody the civitas terrena and the institutional ‘church’ (since 
Christ) does the work of the civitas Dei. Martin 1972, p. 203. On these grounds, Martin retains the 
notion of a Christianised ‘state’ as a possible interpretation of Augustine and writes that “it is 
possible that the church might appropriate some sort of political apparatus for its own purposes just 
as the Hebrew nation had generated a state, the Hebrew Kingdom”. Ibid., p. 204. It is clear that in 
Martin’s study likewise, both bodies, the civitas terrena and the civitas Dei, are intrinsically 
associated with systems and communities that resemble ‘states’. Last but not least, the only reason 
Augustine refers to the ‘city’ of Babylon and the pagan Assyrian ‘state’ more frequently than to the 
‘city’ of Rome and the pagan Roman ‘state’ when talking about the origins of the civitas terrena, is 
because Babylon and Assyria form the “pre-image” (typos) and existed first. After all, in chapter 1 
of Book XI Augustine relates his use of civitas back to the (Latin) Bible. But is the ‘city’ of 
Babylon or the pagan Assyrian ‘state’ really given more weight in general than Rome or the pagan 
Roman ‘state’? Noteworthy passages prove otherwise: in the De civitate Dei the pagan Assyrian and 
Roman ‘states’ are presented as the two Eastern and Western ‘states’ that succeed and replace each 
other – the former relevant to the Old Testament, the latter relevant to the New Testament. My 
argument is that in the De civitate Dei it is rather the Roman ‘state’ that appears as more relevant 
(Civ. V 13, p. 217, XVIII 22, p. 284.). In chapter 2 of Book XVIII Augustine explains that his 
portrayal of the civitas terrena as paralleling the civitas Dei will, due to the density of available 
source material, focus in the first instance on the Roman ‘state’ (Civ. XVIII 2, p. 258.). Compared 
to the Assyrians, Augustine sees the Romans as more competent and efficient in political 
organisation and the military subjection of other races. It is said that the Romans had to overcome 
much more dangerous enemies who were more capable in their defence than the enemies of the 
Assyrians had been (Civ. XVIII 22, p. 284.). On the general use of the English word “state” for 
Latin terminology relating to different types of politically organised communities see my argument 
in the Introduction under ‘State’ and ‘Church’. 
272 OLD vol. 1 1968, p. 330; TLL Online 1900 -, Lemma/Sublemma, s.v. cīvitās, -ātis f.; Flasch 
2003, p. 385. On the most common meanings of the word civitas see also Oort van 1991, p. 102. 
273 Civ. I 15, p. 27, ll. 3-4. See also Oort van 1991, p. 107. 
274 Civ. XV 8, p. 73, ll. 27-29. See also Oort van 1991, p. 103; Markus 1970, pp. 61-62. 
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“state”), and hence denotes the ‘state’ in legal rather than in local terms.275 K. F. 
Morrison also observes that civitas is very much a legal corporation.276 As a 
concept, civitas includes the citizen and his rights in the ‘state’ or, to put it more 
precisely, stands for the citizens as a collective, who have joined together and 
formed a community based on a valid legal order, with a common intent and to 
their mutual benefit. Furthermore, Flasch comments that because of the close link 
between politics and cult in antiquity, civitas may also signify “cult community”.277 
In view of the above, civitas appears to be the most suitable term for labelling the 
two transcendent communitites, the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, since in 
these civitates too the people are united by two different devotional purposes: to 
live either after God or after the people278. In line with my own reasoning, Oort 
observes: “The City of God is an apologetic work, and in his very choice of the 
term civitas Dei the author is defending himself against the pagan opposition. 
While his opponents argued that Christianity is not a community-building force, 
                                                
275 Flasch 2003, p. 385; Procopé 1988, p. 21. Boler finds that the image of the two civitates appeals 
to the polis. Boler 1978, p. 83. Oort strongly supports this thesis. Oort van 1991, pp. 103-105, 107-
108. He notes that even Cicero translated polis as civitas. Ibid., p. 107 (note 483). However, his 
argument concerning the correct interpretation of civitas is ambiguous. On p. 104 Oort maintains 
that “if a definitive choice must be made for a ‘translation’ of the comprehensive concept civitas, 
the best approximation would be polis”, and on p. 107 restates that, “for Augustine, as for others, it 
[civitas] is an equivalent of the Greek concept polis”. On pp. 103-104 he draws attention to the 
important fact that polis, although often rendered as “city-state”, “encompasses much more than we 
can indicate with this word combination, namely the entire communal life of a group of people, 
including their politics, culture, ethics and economics. And a polis certainly need not be a city with 
one centre [...] even regions could be denoted by this name.” Nevertheless, on p. 105 Oort 
somewhat inexplicably arrives at the judgment that “the use of the word city is, in my opinion, the 
best way to denote the meaning of civitas”. 
276 Morrison 1985, p. 8. 
277 Flasch 2003, p. 385. Oort confirms the meaning of both the polis and the civitas as “cult 
communities”. Oort van 1991, pp. 104, 107-108. He writes: “It is especially significant in this 
context that every polis had its own particular cult: religion and polis, polis and religion were 
inextricably bound up with each other. The civitas was even the central object of the Roman 
religion. [...] To see the extent to which civitas could be an explicitly religious concept for the 
Romans, one has only to look at various epithets found in non-Christian classical writings.” Oort 
adds that “[...] in Augustine’s description of civitas Dei and terrena civitas the unity of culture, 
custom and especially religion has a prominent role”. Ibid., p. 104. 
278 Civ. XIV 28, p. 56. 
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the name civitas Dei is the self-assured proclamation of the Christian idea of 
community: the civitas surpassing all civitates is of divine origin. While all 
civitates (poleis!) are linked to their particular cult of gods, the civitas Dei is united 
with the true God.”279 My argument therefore is that, had res publica carried the 
additional meaning of “cult community” (as does civitas), Augustine would have 
chosen res publica in the sense of his remodelled definition based on Cicero.280 
Then the meaning of both transcendent concepts would have been complete: the 
“people” is neither “associated in an agreement with respect to justice” (Cicero), 
nor “united by a mutual interest in whatever is loved” (Augustine adapted from 
Cicero), but assembled by either the worship of the true Christian God (in the 
civitas Dei) or the worship of idols (in the civitas terrena).281 It is thus the particular 
nuance in the meaning of civitas, which conveys the idea of association on the 
grounds of a common cult or religion, that must have been decisive in Augustine’s 
choice of civitas for denoting the two spiritual communities. 
Augustine was still strongly influenced by the Greek notion of πολιτεία 
(“the conditions and rights of the citizen”, “citizenship”). Aside from the Greek 
concepts of πόλις or πολιτεία and ἔθνη (pl.), which in the singular form corresponds 
to the Latin populus and means “people” and in the plural form means “races”, 
“tribes”, “nations”,282 I will not have space to trace any further Latin social and 
political terms back to the Greek language. In the Hellenistic period, the cities were 
of primary importance. Christianity also first developed in the cities. In Greek, a 
                                                
279 Oort van 1991, p. 107. 
280 Schofield provides evidence that in several instances in the De re publica the term civitas 
functions as a synonym of res publica, which is arguably reminiscent of Greek polis. Schofield 
1999, p. 182. 
281 See also Oort van 1991, pp. 107-108. 
282 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, pp. 140-141. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 82 
πολίτης is a “citizen” or “townsman”; the Latin equivalent is civis. In the Classical 
Roman Period, foreigners first had to move from the countryside to the cities, and 
then learn Latin (in the West) or Greek (in the East), if they wanted to qualify for 
Roman citizenship. The Latin equivalent of the Greek ἔθνη (pl.) is gentes (pl.) 
(“races”, “tribes”, “nations”).283 The definition of gentes relevant to Augustine is 
“less influential groups of people”. Hence, both gentes and ἔθνη refer to a less 
dominant group of people, such as country people, in contrast to the urban 
“citizens” or “townsmen”. In Christian Latin, gentiles are “pagans” or “heathens”, 
which is evidently derived from gentes, and are pictured as living in the 
countryside. This makes sense, considering that Christianity first formed in the 
cities, and rural populations remained pagan for longer. Looking at the history of 
the meaning of civitas, Augustine’s choice of this term for denoting the spiritual 
communities seems well considered. 
Of all the Latin expressions for politically organised communities civitas is 
most used in the De civitate Dei to denote the two spiritual ‘states’. Occasionally, 
Augustine chooses societas (“society”, “association”)284 as a synonym for civitas 
when he talks about these two spiritual groups, in order to call particular attention 
to their community character.285 In several instances, civitas also refers to a 
temporal worldly ‘state’.286 This is a use of the word that was widespread in 
                                                
283 Ibid., pp. 140. 
284 KlP vol. 5 1975, p. 245. 
285 Civ. V 15, p. 220, XII 1, p. 512, XII 9, p. 525, XII 28, p. 556; see also Flasch 2003, p. 385; 
Markus 1970, pp. 61-62; Oort van 1991, p. 103. Baynes already wrote that “[...] students are now, it 
would seem, agreed [...] that [civitas] is best rendered by some such word as ‘society’ [...].” Baynes 
1936, p. 5. Oort also draws attention to the community character and personalistic element inherent 
in both civitas and the ancient polis. Oort van 1991, p. 107. 
286 Civ. I 31, p. 48, II 9, p. 63, II 11, p. 65, IV 31, p. 185, XIX 24, p. 400. Oort, by contrast, writes: 
“Only rarely does he [Augustine] use the word civitas to indicate the state as we know it today”. 
However, his claim is not supported by any evidence. Oort van 1991, p. 104. 
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classical Roman literature. The related term that denotes the “citizens” is cives. The 
Roman citizens of the Classical Roman Period commonly called themselves cives 
from the third century BC onward. It must be stressed, however, that the classical 
Romans only in some cases spoke of civitas when their own ‘state’ was concerned, 
since this term more often than not designated a foreign ‘state’ or a foreign city 
(even one within the Roman empire, since citizenship in classical Roman terms 
could also mean citizenship of a city within the Roman empire287). In the cases in 
which a foreign ‘state’ or city was meant, civitas was sometimes qualified by the 
attribute peregrina (“outlandish”, “strange”, “foreign”).288 This very combination of 
words – civitas peregrina – also appears in the De civitate Dei: not, however, with 
reference to a foreign worldly ‘state’, but with reference to the civitas Dei289, which 
is not of this world. Books II290, XI291 and XVI292 of the De civitate Dei give clues as 
to why the author chooses civitas as the key term for the two spiritual communities. 
Augustine traces his use of civitas for both concepts back to the (Latin) Bible. The 
fact that Augustine in the De civitate Dei explicitly explains to the reader the 
source of his concept of civitas suggests that he is well aware of the general 
reader’s curiosity about the origins of the concept. For the present study, where we 
are concerned mainly with the De civitate Dei, the answer Augustine himself 
provides in the text may suffice.293 
                                                
287 Those living in the Roman empire who had no Roman citizenship first acquired the citizenship 
of a particular Roman city before gaining the Roman citizenship. 
288 By far the most common expression in classical Latin for the Roman ‘state’ is populus Romanus. 
KlP vol. 1 1964, pp. 1198-1199. 
289 Civ. I 35, p. 51, XVIII 1, p. 255, XVIII 2, p. 258. 
290 Civ. II 21, p. 83, ll. 13-15. 
291 Civ. XI 1, pp. 461-462. A more detailed treatment of Book XI of the De civitate Dei can be 
found in Chapter Two under IV. Alcuin’s Use of Augustinian Vocabulary, ‘Civitas Dei’. 
292 Civ. XVI 4, pp. 129-131, XVI 10, pp. 139-141, XVI 11, pp. 142-145. 
293 Oort, however, gives a comprehensive account of the most frequently discussed elements of 
influence on Augustine’s doctrine of the two civitates with particular focus on the Donatist 
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It is a fact that Augustine’s concept of the civitas Dei – although it is a 
Christian idea – would be unthinkable without reference to the pagan Roman 
‘state’. The Roman ‘state’ as a politically organised community undoubtedly 
served Augustine as a model when establishing his concept of the civitas Dei. I 
believe that, when choosing a name for this concept, Augustine looked at the terms 
most commonly used for the Roman empire. Imperium was not a suitable term for 
the spiritual concept of the civitas Dei because of its military connotation. Res 
publica, on the other hand, was associated with the republican form of government 
(although its meaning might have changed slightly since the beginning of the 
Roman imperial period294). Civitas was a more suitable term, particularly because it 
highlighted the social, cultural and religious aspects of the politically organised 
community. Augustine’s civitas Dei seems to draw on imperial formulations such 
as Constantini Civitas. I think that, at the most basic level, Augustine’s model for 
the civitas Dei was the pagan Roman imperial idea of empire and emperor. For in 
the Roman imperial period the conception prevailed that the realm and its ruler 
together formed an inseparable unit – and this, I think, is the underlying idea of the 
concept of the civitas Dei. Eusebius was the thinker who updated this pagan notion 
to a new Christian version, envisaging it fulfilled in a moral civilisation united by a 
permanent Christian order, and in a holy, world-wide peace which it was the role of 
the ruler to create and safeguard.295 
                                                                                                                                  
theologian Tyconius and Manichaean thought. Oort van 1991, pp. 8ff., 108-115, 274f. The earlier 
scholar Baynes also gives prominence to the influence of Tyconius’ commentary on the 
Apocalypse. He writes: “The conception of the two ‘cities’ comes ultimately from the Bible: 
Jerusalem, the holy city, is contrasted with Babylon: but, more directly, modern research has tended 
to show, Augustine derived his theme from Ticonius, the Donatist, who in his work on the 
Apocalypse had interpreted the Book of Revelation on similar lines.” Baynes 1936, p. 5. 
294 Cf. the debated notion of res publica restituta under Augustus. 
295 Campenhausen von 1963, p. 65; Young 2010, p. 651; Garnsey 2010, p. 411. 
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 As a final point it should be noted that the terms res publica, civitas and 
societas all have a wider connotation of political reciprocity (or at least rule for the 
common good and with a common aim), whereas regnum and imperium merely 




Dispensatio corresponds to the Greek οἰκονοµία in its original and literal 
meaning of “(house) management”, “stewardship”, as well as in its figurative uses, 
of which the common nuance “divine rule”, or “divine world order”, already 
present in the Stoic text, became most important for the Christian linguistic 
usage.296 In the same way, in the New Testament οἰκονοµία denotes on the one 
hand “priest”, “priesthood”, “bishop” and “episcopacy”297 , and on the other “God’s 
plan of salvation” (which embraces the concept of providentia) that underlies 
historical events. This double spectrum of meanings is transmitted to the Latin 
equivalents dispensator and dispensatio.298 Moreover, the use of 
dispensatio/οἰκονοµία for the relationship between the persons of the Trinity had 
been popular since Tertullian.299 With respect to Augustine, the development of the 
meaning of dispensator and dispensatio is distinctive as far as both language and 
content are concerned: Augustine adopts the two main denotations “priest”, 
“priesthood”, “bishop” and “episcopacy”, and “God’s plan of salvation”, but 
submits them to a fundamentally new interpretation. This is based – the figurative 
                                                
296 AL vol. 2 1996-2002, p. 487. 
297 It must be noted, however, that debate surrounds the existence of these roles, in their later sense, 
in the New Testament. 
298 AL vol. 2 1996-2002, p. 487. 
299 Ibid., p. 488. 
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meanings borrowed from the Greek not being applicable – on the derivation of 
these nouns from the verb dispensare, which in its basic sense means “divide 
carefully”, “dispense/distribute in a considered and organised manner”, “put in 
order”.300 Depending on the context, Augustine interprets dispensatio as “order”, 
“arrangement/plan”, “dispensation/distribution” and “donation”, and explores its 
new definition by linking these original or literal senses with the aforementioned 
conventional metaphorical senses.301 The outcome of Augustine’s creativity is both 
the merging of the traditionally diverging individual meanings into an integrated 
concept, and the elimination of denotations which did not fit into this overall 
concept (the Trinitarian meaning is missing altogether).302 As a consequence of 
Augustine’s strong emphasis on the verbal derivation of dispensator and 
dispensatio, the concept he develops is particularly dynamic, and hence often 
describes an act or a process rather than (according to the traditional static use of 
the word) a situation, property or feature. The subject performing the act of 
dispensare is again either God, the priest, or the bishop.303 The metaphoric use of 
dispensator for the priest/bishop actually appears quite often in Augustine’s 
texts.304 Augustine understands the dispensatio of a priest/bishop as the act of a 
dispenser/donor. For him, the priest/bishop as the dispensator has a dual function: 
the preaching of the Gospel and the donation/bestowal of divine spiritual goods. 
Augustine subsumes this double task of the priest/bishop under the formula of 
dispensator verbi et sacramenti/verbum et sacramentum dispensare.305 The verb 









dispensare is used in a similar manner elsewhere in Augustine’s oeuvre. The act of 
dispensare in the sense of “preaching the Gospel” or “spreading the word of God 
(verbally or in writing)” – a use of the verb dispensare which is in fact limited to 
Augustine – may be performed by the dispensatores or by God himself.306 Another 
spectrum of meanings in Augustine’s language concerns the dispensatio of God in 
particular.307 Augustine uses dispensatio as a term for the working of God’s plans 
(which are unfathomable to humans) mainly in connection with the historical 
economy of salvation (a use which Augustine developed in his treatises against 
Manichaeism).308 Here, Augustine usually interprets dispensatio as the 
“structuring/dividing” of history into the eras of the Old Testament and the New 
Testament or as the “attribution/assignment” of commandments or revelations to 
these eras.309 Consequently, the word dispensatio belongs to the terminology of 
salvation history, which is understood as the planned revelation of God in His 
creation by means of variable (verbal or nonverbal) saving acts.310 A further level 
                                                




310 Ibid. Here I may refer to Markus’ discussion of the concepts of “salvation history”, “sacred 
history” and “secular history” without, however, going as far as adopting his terminology in my 
research. Markus 1970, pp. 9-21, 231-232. Despite his awareness elsewhere (p. 72) that the method 
of “[...] read[ing] back into Augustine” is in principle impermissible, as this may lead to a historical 
anachronism, Markus’ aim in the discussion of these concepts is “[...] to render explicit and precise 
what is implicit in Augustine’s view.” Ibid., p. 231. His argument is based on the Augustinian term 
“sacred history” (historia sacra), which is drawn from chapter 8 of Book XV of the De civitate Dei 
where it refers to the Christian Scriptures. Ibid., p. 9 (note 5). Markus uses this term in order to 
discriminate between the Biblical narratives and “secular”, historical narratives, while admitting 
that “[...] the expression ‘secular history’ does not form part of his [Augustine’s] vocabulary.” Ibid., 
p. 9. His reasoning is that, according to Augustine, “sacred history” was infused with a special 
character, which derived from the Biblical authors’ prophetic insight into the events recorded by 
them. Ibid., pp. 14-15. Markus writes: “The difference between ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ history is 
therefore to be defined by distinguishing between two different kinds of narrative: the one 
prophetically inspired, the other not.” Ibid. According to Markus, Augustine made a distinction 
between two types of “history”: i.e. “history” as a series of past events and “history” as a record of 
past events. Markus holds that in Augustine’s conception of “sacred history” (historia sacra), 
“history” is always seen as a record, since in “history” as a series of past events “[...] there is 
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of meanings is constituted by the dispensatio of Christ.311 Here, it is to be noted that 
the Augustinian understanding of dispensatio as a “structuring/dividing” (into Old 
Testament and New Testament) implies an interpretation of dispensatio as a 
process that encompasses temporality as a whole, and is not limited to the 
incarnation of Christ.312 Furthermore, Augustine also uses dispensatio more 
generally, in order to define any events relevant to eschatology – a thought that is 
essentially in agreement with the traditional denomination of Christ’s act of 
redemption as οἰκονοµία.313 Nevertheless, Augustine hardly ever refers to Christ 
himself as the dispensator or the issuer of the dispensatio.314 The only compound of 
dispensatio is dispensatio temporalis. This comprehensive concept was introduced 
into the Latin language by Augustine. Unlike the few other uses of the verb 
dispensare which have God as their subject in Augustine’s writings, the 
dispensatio temporalis refers to the Christology that has yet to unfold.315 
(Augustine supported this Christology, which prompted his structural shaping of 
                                                                                                                                  
nothing distinctive about any part of history in virtue of which some history is ‘sacred’ [...]” Ibid., p. 
231. Thus, Markus argues, “his [Augustine’s] distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ history 
only makes sense if ‘history’ is understood [...] as statements about the past, recording events.” 
Ibid., p. 14. Markus criticises Cullmann’s notion of “salvation history” (Heilsgeschichte) because it 
merely seems to refer to “[...] what has happened [...]”, and does not presuppose any distinction 
between “history” as events and “history” as record on Augustine’s part. Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
Cullmann’s view appears to be in line with the terminology provided in the Augustinus-Lexikon. In 
my research I use “salvation history” without suggesting that Augustine’s conception presupposed a 
distinction between the two senses of “history”. The main reason is that the distinction Markus 
makes is entirely based on the conceptual division of “sacred history” and “secular history”, which 
was never explicitly expressed by Augustine. In the work Saeculum Markus is consistent in his use 
of the concepts of “sacred history” and “secular history”. However, the difference in meaning 
between the terms “sacred history”, “salvation history”/”history of salvation” and 
Heilsgeschichte/heilsgeschichtlich is not entirely clear. These English and German terms are used 
indiscriminately on pp. 44, 47, 54, 55. 
311 AL vol. 2 1996-2002, p. 490. 
312 Ibid., pp. 490-491. 





the theology of history, around 390.)316 The compound dispensatio temporalis 
appears for the first time in the work De vera religione but soon becomes obsolete 
for Augustine.317 
  
‘Felix/Felicitas’ and ‘Beatus/Beatitudo’ 
  
 The concept of felix/felicitas does not feature as a lemma in the Augustinus-
Lexikon. In “Translating Images of Authority: The Christian Roman Emperors in 
the Carolingian World”, J. L. Nelson correctly translates felix as “happy” when 
drawing attention to Augustine’s phrase imperatores felices.318 In chapters 24 and 
25 (on Constantine I) of Book V of the De civitate Dei, Augustine uses felix more 
than any other attribute to characterise the Christian Roman emperors. The term 
felix is well chosen. “Happy” at first might not seem the right translation, since 
“fortunate” or “blessed” sound better in English. However, they would both be 
wrong for different reasons. “Fortunate” should be strictly avoided in describing 
Augustinian thought, since the Christian Augustine believed in Providence, not 
Fortune. This is voiced in chapter 33 of Book IV, where Augustine claims that God 
is the giver of felicitas, which He distributes according to His own judgment, 
beyond the comprehension of human beings: 
 
Therefore, that God himself, the producer and giver of happiness, because 
He alone is the true God, gives the earthly realms to both the good and the 
bad, and this not at random or sort of fortuitously, since He is God, not 
                                                
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid., pp. 491-492. 
318 Nelson 1996a), p. 89. 
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Fortuna, but according to an order of things and times obscure to us, and 
most known to Him […].319 
 
The adjective “blessed” can also mean “made holy”. Hence, it designates “happy”, 
but at the same time has the connotation of “being endowed with divine favour and 
protection”. At first glance, this seems to be a suitable attribute of a Christian 
Roman emperor according to Augustinian political thought and ethics. However, 
those statements in the first five books of the De civitate Dei which include the 
term felicitas show that in Augustinian political discourse felicitas is used 
exclusively with reference to worldly happiness – and in the cases where it does 
allude to “eternal life” it is complemented by in regno caelorum320, aeterna321, 
vera322 and also plena323. Only by these complements does felicitas become 
synonymous with beatitudo (“blessedness”). Augustine’s various uses of felicitas 
are reflected in chapter 33 of Book IV. First, Augustine declares that “[…] indeed, 
happiness He [God] only gives to the good ones.”324. Then he says, “In fact, the 
serving can both not have and have, the reigning can both not have and have this 
[happiness]; which, however, will be complete in this life, where no one will serve 
any more.”325. The chapter ends with “[…] true happiness.”326 At least in the first 
                                                
319 Deus igitur ille felicitatis auctor et dator, quia solus est verus Deus, ipse dat regna terrena et 
bonis et malis, neque hoc temere et quasi fortuito, quia Deus est, non fortuna, sed pro rerum ordine 
ac temporum occulto nobis, notissimo sibi […]. Civ. IV 33, p. 188, ll. 6-10. 
320 Civ. V 21, p. 232. 
321 Civ. V 24, pp. 236-237. 
322 Civ. IV 3, p. 150. 
323 Civ. IV 33, p. 188. 
324 […] felicitatem vero non dat nisi bonis. Ibid., p. 188, l. 12. 
325 Hanc enim possunt et non habere et habere servientes, possunt et non habere et habere regnantes; 
quae tamen plena in ea vita erit, ubi nemo iam serviet. Ibid., p. 188, ll. 13-15. 
326 […] vera felicitas. Ibid., p. 188, ll. 23-24. 
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five books of the De civitate Dei, which focus on the Roman secular power, 
Augustine is consistent in his usage of felicitas and felicitas aeterna. 
From this it can be inferred that, by choosing these specific terms, 
Augustine consciously avoids any potential association of worldly rulers – 
including Christian Roman emperors – with “divine privilege” in the sense of a 
prospect of “eternal life”. In this perspective, the concept of felix/felicitas 
(“happy/happiness”) stands in opposition to that of beatus/beatitudo 
(“blessed/blessedness”). Correspondingly, in the first five books of the De civitate 
Dei, beatus/beatitudo is linked with “eternal life”. Some examples may serve as 
evidence: in Book II we read, “[…] where they may hear how they should live well 
here in time, in order that after this life they earn to live blessedly and forever 
[…].”327; later on, “Hence, if you wish to reach the blessed state, avoid the society 
of the demons.”328; then in Book V, “[…] which tortures are not to be despised for 
faith in that fatherland, to whose blessedness faith itself leads?”329 
In the Latin Bible (already in the Vetus Latina), the term selected to signify 
“blessed”, with the connotation of “being endowed with divine favour and 
protection”, is beatus. A central passage where this is expressed is the Beatitudes in 




                                                
327 […] ubi audiant quam bene hic ad tempus vivere debeant, ut post hanc vitam beate semperque 
vivere mereantur […]. Civ. II 28, p. 94, l. 31-p. 95, l. 1. 
328 Proinde si ad beatam pervenire desideras civitatem, devita daemonum societatem. Civ. II 29, p. 
97, ll. 4-5. 
329 […] qui cruciatus non sunt pro fide illius patriae contemnendi, ad cuius beatitudinem fides ipsa 
perducit? Civ. V 18, p. 226, ll. 25-27. 
330 Beati […]. Mt 5:3-12. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 92 
‘Iustitia’ and ‘Pax’ 
  
In his thesis L’Augustinisme Politique the Belgian scholar H.-X. Arquillière 
presented a thought-provoking theory about the development of Augustinian 
thought from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages. His theory is discussed and 
strongly supported by Dvornik.331 Arquillière was aware of Augustine’s dilemma as 
manifested in the De civitate Dei. He rightly maintained, contrary to Bernheim, 
that Augustine does attribute a legitimate power, in conformity with God’s 
providential plan, even to the ancient pagan realms before the emergence of 
Christianity. Thus, according to Arquillière, Augustine also pleads (in line with St. 
Paul and the patristic tradition) for obedience on the part of the people to any ruler 
– unless the ruler’s will is against Christian moral principles.332 Dvornik believes 
that some scholars, including Bernheim, assumed that Augustine considers the 
good deeds of the citizens of the civitas Dei alone to be legitimate virtues. While 
Dvornik admits that for Augustine the legitimate virtues which grant men eternal 
salvation are the deeds done by members of the civitas Dei (who have true faith in 
God), he emphasises that Augustine at the same time also accepts the existence of 
natural virtues, which, for instance, prevailed among the heathen Romans and 
helped them to expand and protect their ‘state’.333 In the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. 
iustitia the theologian R. Dodaro makes a similar argument.334 In addition, Dodaro 
reasons that in some letters to public officials and authorities engaged in secular 
pursuits (e.g. Augustine’s epist. 48 ad Vincentium, quoted by Hincmar in the De 
                                                
331 Dvornik 1966, p. 849. 
332 Ibid., p. 841; Chadwick 1988, pp. 12-13. On the Carolingians see the discussions in Wallace-
Hadrill 1971, pp. 127-128; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 193-195. 
333 Dvornik 1966, pp. 846-847. 
334 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 879. 
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regis persona et regio ministerio), Augustine outlines an argument concerning the 
transformation of the four virtutes civiles (sapientia/prudentia, temperantia, 
fortitudo/magnitudo animi and iustitia) beyond the fundamental level of virtue 
attained by pagan politicians who lack vera pietas (which consists in the 
knowledge and love of the true God). By allowing their conception of iustitia to be 
transformed by fides, spes and caritas, Christian politicians will, according to 
Augustine, fight wars in a more virtuous manner than that which is sustained by the 
Roman concept of bellum iustum335, and they will punish offenders with iustitia 
tempered with misericordia.336 Unlike Bernheim, Arquillière, Dvornik and Dodaro 
seem to acknowledge the natural dimension of the concepts of iustitia and pax. 
Both concepts permeate the De civitate Dei and have the purpose of establishing 
true order in human society.337 They function in like manner in the civitas Dei as in 
the civitas terrena. In simple terms, their double meaning – i.e. their natural vs. 
divine sense – can be defined as follows: the natural form of iustitia or pax338 is the 
iustitia or pax given by men to men; the divine form of iustitia339 or pax340 is the 
iustitia and pax given by God to men. As soon as the concepts of iustitia and pax 
are spiritualised, they are determined by the Gospel’s main law of love of God and 
                                                
335 On this concept see Markus 1988, pp. 115-116; Wiedemann 2010, p. 524. 
336 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 879. 
337 On Augustine’s concept of iustitia in the De civitate Dei see also Dodaro 1999, pp. 181-183; 
Markus 1970, pp. 64f., 99f., 208; Wilks 1967, pp. 496-499; Baynes 1936, pp. 16-17. The concept of 
pax is discussed by Schofield 2010, pp. 667-671; Martin 1972, p. 214ff.; Markus 1970, pp. 68f., 
83f., 95f. 
338 Dvornik defines the natural pax as “natural mutual accord” in human society. Dvornik 1966, p. 
846. 
339 Arquillière states that Augustine’s divine iustitia basically corresponds to St. Paul’s evangelical 
justice. However, he claims, Augustine was the first to apply it to the constitution of ‘states’. 
Arquillière 1934, p. 21. 
340 Dvornik’s translation of Augustine’s definition of divine pax in chapter 13 of Book XIX of the 
De civitate Dei is: “The peace of the heavenly city is a perfectly ordered and fully concordant 
fellowship in the enjoyment of God and in mutual enjoyment by union with God; the peace of all 
things is a tranquillity of order”. Dvornik 1966, p. 845. 
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of one’s neighbour. Arquillière stated that Bernheim indeed saw correctly the 
importance of the Augustinian concepts of iustitia and pax in later, medieval 
political thought. However, Bernheim seemed not to have realised that for 
Augustine their natural, worldly forms likewise have a substantial value for life on 
earth.341 
Arquillière claimed that the devaluation of the natural forms of these goods 
started in Merovingian times when kingship gradually began to be seen in a 
subordinate relationship to the ‘church’. Accordingly, earlier medieval thinkers, 
such as Gregory the Great and Isidore, and later Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel and 
Jonas of Orléans, retained from Augustine merely the extreme statements that 
devalued the earthly ‘state’ (above all the Roman ‘state’). Dvornik notes that in 
Isidore’s texts from the late seventh century the idea of the ‘state’ based on natural 
law had almost disappeared. He reasons that Isidore regards the ‘state’ as necessary 
only for the defence and protection of the ‘church’.342 This shift in focus, away 
from the recognition of the natural law of the ‘state’, Arquillière termed 
Augustinisme politique.343 What is most striking is that Arquillière saw exceptional 
circumstances under Charlemagne’s reign: he argued that under Charlemagne 
Catholicism did not exist as a separate entity because of the merging of political 
and religious affairs.344 While Augustine had separated Catholicism from political 
affairs, Augustinisme politique did not. Dvornik, for his part, notes that the theory 
of Augustinisme politique was integrated into the coronation rituals of the medieval 
Frankish kings. He maintains that kings were still seen as elected by God, not on 
                                                
341 Arquillière 1934, pp. 151f. 
342 Dvornik 1966, p. 848. 
343 Arquillière 1934, p. 152. 
344 His argument is supported by Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 103; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 189, 193. 
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the grounds of natural law as the emperors in Christian Hellenism, but through the 
‘church’ as a mediator. Thus it occurred that, by the end of the eighth century, the 
notion of natural law was superseded by that of the divine law, and the purpose of 
the ‘state’ was believed to lie solely in the service of the ‘church’.345 At the time of 
Charlemagne, iustitia and pax were wholly safeguarded by the omnipotent 
emperor.346 The political and religious domains were both successfully dominated 
by Charlemagne. Hence, he was the one medieval emperor who, by taking on the 
task of implementing iustitia and pax, could give to these concepts the religious 





The foregoing analysis of Augustine’s understanding of worldly rule and 
rulership and his definitions of politically organised communities has revealed that 
in the De civitate Dei Augustine evidently praises the Christian Roman emperors. 
His praise is primarily aimed at two Christian rulers who have successfully 
promoted Christianity and have supported the Christian ‘church’, namely emperors 
Constantine I and Theodosius I. However, it has turned out that Augustine’s praise 
is not general, but is rather particular, since it focuses on specific achievements and 
deeds for which there is conclusive evidence. Moreover, Augustine chooses a 
formulation that gives the reader scope for deciding on how to judge worldly 
                                                
345 Dvornik 1966, pp. 848-849. 
346 Arquillière 1934, p. 128. 
347 Ibid., p. 131. 
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Christian rulership: “[...] the reward for which deeds is eternal happiness, whose 
giver is God to the truly pious alone.”348 Nowhere in the De civitate Dei does 
Augustine clearly state that in his opinion a particular secular leader will be 
rewarded with eternal happiness. This is expressive of the unfolding tension in the 
work between an approval of the supreme worldly power of Christian (and to some 
extent pagan) rulers and a harsh criticism of any form of worldly social 
organisation, government and power. 
In philosophical, conceptual and linguistic terms, an intellectual 
development from a Greco-Roman to a Judaeo-Christian perspective via neo-
Platonism and St. Paul can be observed. An important strand of the philosophical 
tradition comes via Cicero. It is probably first and foremost Cicero’s sceptical 
stance, his manner of considering supporting and opposing arguments, which is 
reflected in Augustine’s discourse and reasoning on divine and earthly rule. Cicero, 
on the one hand, by enhancing Polybius’ argument and claiming that the key 
element in the Romans’ rise to power has been from the beginning the wisdom and 
moral superiority of individuals, sets the basis for Roman political thinking. 
Augustine, on the other hand, by providing an alternative definition of “state” 
based on divine law alongside that suggested by Cicero based on natural law, lays 
the foundation for a versatile application of his brand of political thought and ethics 
in Christian considerations of the ‘state’ in later periods. 
 Augustinian political thought and ethics, as based on the Old Testament and 
Biblical as well as on the aforementioned philosophical tradition, will prove to be 
reflected in Christian Carolingian political thought. Its versatile application in 
                                                
348 Civ. V 26, p. 240, ll. 26-27. 
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Christian political reflections will be illustrated in the different arguments made by 
two eminent Carolingian advisers to the rulers of the first and third generation: 
Charlemagne and Charles the Bald. Augustine’s De civitate Dei was, according to 
Einhard’s account in the Vita Karoli Magni, Charlemagne’s favourite text.349 
Having examined Augustine’s treatise in greater detail, and having exposed the 
terminological problem and ambiguity that arises in Augustine’s conception of 
different types of politically organised communities, it remains to be seen how the 
political advisers Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Reims understood the work’s 
message. What will emerge, among other things, is that Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s 
different views of Augustinianism are expressed particularly well in their ideas and 
political discourse on both the Roman emperors (Constantine I and Theodosius I) 
and the Old Testament kings (David and Solomon). 
                                                
349 V.Kar. 24, p. 29. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Alcuin of York 
 
 
This chapter explores what kind of impact Augustine of Hippo had on 
Alcuin’s writing.350 The intention is to examine a range of Augustinian influence in 
Alcuin’s surviving body of work, with a strong focus on Alcuin’s political ideas. 
His Epistolae will provide the basis for this analysis. Alcuin’s correspondence 
deserves particular attention because the letters he wrote – to Charlemagne, his 
children, and his closest friends (e.g. Arn, Bishop of Salzburg, and Angilbert, 
Abbot of Saint-Riquier) – not only reveal the nature of Alcuin’s political thought, 
but also the manner in which he communicated to his peers the thoughts that he 
considered important for the strengthening of Carolingian rule. The epistles show 
much more clearly than any of his treatises the way in which Alcuin attempted to 
put his political agenda into effect.351 
                                                
350 On Alcuin’s background and his career at Charlemagne’s court see Bullough 2004; Brunhölzl 
1967; Fleckenstein 1967; 1990; Steinen 1967. As far as Alcuin’s literary influences are concerned, 
Bullough 2004 argues that Cicero, Virgil and Isidore of Seville were inter alia prominent in shaping 
Alcuin’s work. 
351 M. Kempshall’s analysis of Alcuin’s treatise Disputatio de rhetorica et de virtutibus is worth 
mentioning here. Kempshall does not explicitly refer to any methodology – his investigation is 
entirely guided by the Latin text. Kempshall examines the various sources Alcuin uses in his 
argument (inter alia Cicero, Augustine and Quintilian). Kempshall 2008, p. 7. Augustine’s De 
civitate Dei and Contra Iulianum are mentioned alongside the De musica and the De doctrina 
christiana. Ibid., pp. 17-23. Kempshall convincingly argues that Alcuin makes his adaptation of 
Cicero appropriate to a Christian context of learning by raising the relevant question of the value of 
natural vs. Christian virtues treated in the De civitate Dei and Contra Iulianum. Ibid., p. 17. In my 
research, Augustine’s political ethics, as they are discussed in the De civitate Dei, will be 
comprehensively examined in Chapter Three. Hincmar’s work contains a much more detailed 
treatment of Christian virtues, in combination with moral instruction for rulers. Unlike Hincmar’s 
work De regis persona et regio ministerio, none of Alcuin’s treatises fulfil the criteria necessary for 
them to be categorised in the genre of “mirrors for princes”. Ibid., p. 9. H. H. Anton and J. M. 
Wallace-Hadrill both question Wallach’s thesis that Alcuin’s Disputatio de rhetorica et de 
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Finding direct Augustinian influence in this material is challenging, since it 
is not always possible, on the basis of references to Augustine, to ascertain whether 
Alcuin is quoting from Augustine directly or through another intermediary author 
(such as Gregory the Great and Isidore). D. A. Bullough, for instance, writes: 
 
[...] how much of the Doctor’s [Augustine’s] massive oeuvre he [Alcuin] 
read over his lifetime is only dimly recoverable from his own writings [...] 
and how far he [Alcuin] had followed or endeavoured to follow the 
sophisticated argumentation of Augustine’s major treatises is hardly 
clearer.352 
 
On the other hand, Bullough is clearly convinced of the impact Augustine’s work 
had on Alcuin, particularly as far as political thought is concerned: 
 
It is impossible to imagine Alcuin without Augustine [...] Alcuin’s 
familiarity in his York years with all or a substantial part of Augustine’s 
De civitate Dei, and its consequent influence on his thinking about 
kingship and emperordom, has been widely assumed.353 
 
However, Bullough does not go into much further detail regarding Augustine and 
Alcuin’s common ground in ideas of rulership and empire, and leaves the matter 
fairly open. 
                                                                                                                                  
virtutibus is a treatise on kingship; Anton instead highlights the importance of Alcuin’s 
correspondence. Anton 1968, pp. 87-88; Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 101. 
352 Bullough 2004, p. 261. 
353 Ibid., pp. 261-262. 
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 The approach taken in this study of Augustinian influence in Alcuin’s work 
will be as follows: as a first step, a sample letter from Alcuin to Charlemagne, 
which includes various explicit references to Augustine, will be taken as a starting-
point, in order to see in what way and for what purpose Augustine is formally 
represented in Alcuin’s correspondence. The essence of the letter, its structure and 
the development of the argument will be briefly outlined to show how Alcuin 
incorporates Augustine into his reasoning. References will then be made to other 
letters, in order to establish correspondences in their structure. 
The second part of this chapter will be concerned with the parallels in 
political thought between Augustine and Alcuin – with a particular emphasis on the 
notions of kingship/imperial authority and the value of rulership within the context 
of God’s providential plan. The question of the salvific meaning Alcuin attributes 
to the Carolingian realm, compared and contrasted with that which Augustine 
assigns to earlier supreme worldly ‘states’ (such as the Christian Roman empire) in 
the De civitate Dei, constitutes a key aspect of this discussion. Alcuin’s Epistolae 
to Charlemagne and to other figures of religious and political importance will form 
one part of the material under examination; another part will be provided by 
Alcuin’s Carm. 1 and the Vita Willibrordi archiepiscopi Traiectensis. 
As a complement to the content analysis, a formal analysis of said sources, 
concerned with Alcuin’s language and use of terminology, will follow. It will 
centre on selected Augustinian concepts found in the De civitate Dei which I regard 
as being particularly crucial (or which have been highlighted as such in the existing 
secondary literature), and which also have a bearing on the Carolingian source 
material. These will include, for instance, the political terms civitas Dei, populus 
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Christianus and imperium Christianum (discussed by F. L. Ganshof354), regna 
terrarum, imperium and gentes (discussed by Bullough355 and R. McKitterick356); 
the expressions subicere, subdere and subiugare/iugum; the concept of dispensatio 
as well as elements of the doctrine of Augustinisme politique as defined by H.-X. 
Arquillière357 in the mid-1930s. The meaning and function of these concepts, terms 
and expressions in Alcuin’s texts will be compared with those found in Augustine’s 
own. 
 In the course of this investigation, Augustine will emerge as heavily 
represented both through direct quotation as well as through indirect reference 
visible in the content and language of the sources. At the same time, an essential 
difference in the aim of explicit and implicit references to Augustinian thought will 
be revealed: on the surface, Alcuin explicitly avails himself of Augustine as a 
preeminent authority and binding guideline in matters relating to Christian 
doctrine. His use of Augustinian thought in this sense is straightforward. However, 
a deeper reading that takes into account content as well as language and views 
Alcuin’s texts as a political discourse, reveals a more complex scheme on the 
author’s part. Alcuin draws on the most negative of all Church Fathers in terms of 
assessing worldly rule and rulership in order to make a positive statement about 




                                                
354 Ganshof 1949. 
355 Bullough 1999. 
356 McKitterick 2004. 
357 Arquillière 1934. 
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I. Explicit References to Augustine 
  
Alcuin’s Epistle 307 
  
The sample letter to be analysed is Alcuin’s Epist. 307, sent to Charlemagne 
within the first few years after his imperial coronation (Charlemagne is addressed 
as excellentissime imperator358). The letter as a whole appears to be purely 
instructional359, and there seems to be no other underlying purpose for writing it. 
Alcuin’s instruction to Charlemagne begins in the first line after the greeting360 and 
ends with the letter itself361. The letter opens by introducing the philosophical 
concept of sapientia (“wisdom”), which Alcuin defines in agreement with the 
“philosophers” as “the knowledge of divine and human affairs”362. Alcuin praises 
Charlemagne for being inclined to seek sapientia from the people surrounding him, 
including Alcuin himself as a teacher, in order that perfection of intellect and 
character might be spread to all people.363 Charlemagne’s thirst for gathering 
wisdom, Alcuin says, provides the impetus for his interest in the complexities of 
Christian doctrine. In this letter the problem under discussion is one raised by an 
unnamed “learned Greek” regarding the pretium (“price”) paid for the salvation of 
the human race.364 About this learned Greek Alcuin says: 
                                                
358 Most excellent emperor. Epist. 307, p. 466, lin. 24. 
359 That Alcuin’s relationship with Charlemagne is a friendship based on eruditio (“instruction”) is 
shown by Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 101-102. Alcuin’s exceptional role as a public adviser is 
explored by M. Garrison. She describes key traits of his character (e.g. knowability, social skills, 
self-perception) and work (discourse of admonition) that helped him to gain a unique status in and 
outside the court circle. Garrison 2010, pp. 137-151. 
360 Epist. 307, p. 466, lin. 23. 
361 Ibid., p. 471, lin. 6. 
362 Ibid., p. 466, lin. 23. 
363 Ibid., p. 466, lin. 24. 
364 Ibid., p. 466, lin. 28. 
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That aforementioned wise man is said by certain sons of Catholic learning 
at the palace to have inquired what price was given to whom, and – as his 
wisdom was apparent to those who heard him – wished to establish that 
death was the receiver of this price; thinking that there could be no 
redemption without someone to receive the price from the purchaser and to 
give something of his own to the purchaser for the price received; he has 
also endeavoured to confirm this by the judgment of apostolic authority, 
because it was said: “Death reigned from Adam to Moses”.365 
 
Before Alcuin sets out his argument on the matter and starts engaging with the 
hypothesis offered by the Greek sage, he announces that he will base his comments 
on the views of the Fathers.366 His words are: 
 
To avoid saying anything thoughtless, I will begin to respond to the 
profundity of his [the wise man’s] question through the opinions of the 
Fathers; and if I wished to respond to his obscurity, the size of a book 
would be necessary; nevertheless, I will restrain my pen so that it does not 
exceed the space of a longer letter.367 
 
                                                
365 Quod precium cui daretur, sapiens ille praedictus a quibusdam catholicae eruditionis filiis in 
palatio inquirere dicitur et - ut visum est eius sapientiam audientibus - velle eum adstruere huius 
precii acceptricem esse mortem; putans redemptionem esse non posse, nisi forte esset, qui precium 
accepisset ab emptore atque aliquid sui iuris emptori pro precio tradidisset accepto; hoc ipsum 
quoque apostolicae auctoritatis sententia confirmare nisus, quia dictum est: “Regnavit mors ab 
Adam ad Moysen”. Ibid., p. 466, lin. 31. 
366 Ibid., p. 467, lin. 1. 
367 Ad cuius questionis profunditatem, ne quid temere dicam, sensibus patrum respondere ingrediar; 
adque eius obscuritatem si respondere velim, magnitudine libri opus erit; tamen ita temperabo 
calamum, ut longioris epistolae modum non excedat. Ibid., p. 467, lin. 1. 
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Alcuin begins his instruction by elaborating on the meaning of the word 
mors (“death”) as used by the Apostle Paul.368 Further down, Alcuin exhorts 
Charlemagne not to misinterpret a passage in the New Testament by assuming that 
the spilt blood from Christ’s side stayed behind on earth in order to be spared from 
death.369 Here, Alcuin bases his instruction on Book IV of Augustine’s De trinitate: 
it is the entire body of Christ that escapes death.370 In order to reinforce his position, 
Alcuin draws on Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe, who also affirmed the physical 
integrity of Christ after his resurrection.371 Using Cassiodorus, Alcuin demonstrates 
that Christ gave to his people the ransom he earned through his suffering.372 In 
addition, Alcuin finds it necessary to delve much further into the problem of 
whether “death” demanded and took the pretium from the redeemer or whether 
“death” itself was the pretium of redemption.373 In order to give a meticulous 
commentary on the function of “death” in Christ’s act of redemption, he once more 
uses Augustine as his main source of reference. Again, Alcuin explicitly cites Book 
IV of the work De trinitate, which, according to him, gives the most detailed 
information on “death”.374 From there, Alcuin quotes a passage that makes clear 
why “death” is deserved by mankind but not by Christ. This passage says that 
mankind came to “death” through sin, whereas Christ did so through justice; hence 
our “death” is the punishment for our sin, and his “death” the sacrifice for our 
sin.375 From another chapter of Book IV of the De trinitate Alcuin draws the 
                                                
368 Ibid., p. 467, lin. 4. 
369 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 28. 
370 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 28-34. 
371 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 35. 
372 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 42. 
373 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 5. 
374 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 7. 
375 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 9. 
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statement that Christ was not put to death by the judgment of some authority or 
power, but died willingly, choosing earthly authorities to enact his will.376 Alcuin 
continues quoting from Book IV and calls attention to a chapter entitled “about the 
perfect and true sacrifice which the saviour himself made for us”. He praises this 
chapter, which concerns itself with who the sacrificing priest was, who the sacrifice 
was, and for whom or by whom the sacrifice was made, for its outstanding 
elucidation of the Trinity.377 In two lengthy quotations Alcuin first demonstrates 
that the Son of God was the perfect priest, as a result of not being a sinner either 
through inheritance or through his own deeds, and thus not in need of washing his 
own sins away by making a sacrifice.378 Secondly, he shows that in making this 
human sacrifice which was so desperately needed by all men, the sacrificer and the 
sacrifice were one and the same, and were also at one and in agreement with the 
receiver of the sacrifice, God the Father.379 At the same time, the four key aspects 
of a sacrifice are explained: for whom the sacrifice was made, by whom it was 
made, what it was and on whose behalf it was performed.380 Alcuin considers 
Augustine’s statements to constitute ample evidence that the sacrifice or price was 
meant for, and was received by, God the Father.381 Following this line of argument, 
Alcuin uses another quotation from Augustine, drawn from his commentary on 
Psalm 58, where it is shown that Christ’s suffering first led to his death and then to 
his resurrection.382 Alcuin then mentions the parallel between Isaac in the Old 
Testament, who carried the cross on his shoulders for his own sacrifice, and the 
                                                
376 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 11-15. 
377 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 16. 
378 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 19-22. 
379 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 22. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 28. 
382 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 36-38. 
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Passion of Christ in the New Testament, which was purposefully initiated by 
God.383 As a last piece of evidence from one of the Fathers, underlining that Christ 
was at the same time the sacrificer and the sacrifice, Alcuin quotes Cyprian, Bishop 
of Carthage, whom he refers to as an outstanding scholar and glorious martyr.384 
The remaining part of the letter debates a question reportedly posed by Paul and 
aimed at the Stoics from the Athenian school of philosophy: the question of 
whether “death” is a substantia (“matter”).385 
 Looking at the structure of Epist. 307, three noticeable features mark the 
beginning of Alcuin’s instructional correspondence: first Alcuin uses the positive 
philosophical concept of sapientia when addressing Charlemagne in order to 
motivate the emperor and, most importantly, encourage him to absorb the Catholic 
Christian doctrine. Secondly, he confirms and praises Charlemagne’s interest in the 
subject matter to be elucidated. Thirdly, in order to integrate his own thoughts into 
an existing discourse and present an orthodox argument, at the very outset Alcuin 
points out the importance of the views of the Fathers in this discussion. 
Augustine is only one of several patristic sources consulted by Alcuin, but 
he is presented in a different way from the others. Alcuin’s citations from 
Augustine appear alongside – and are at times intertwined with – other phrases 
from saints and scholars, as well as with quotations from the Scriptures. Apart from 
the Bible and Augustine, the authors cited in the letter are Fulgentius386, 
Cassiodorus387, and Cyprian388, in that order. Strikingly, all citations from Augustine 
                                                
383 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 41-42. 
384 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 44-p. 470, lin. 1. 
385 Ibid., p. 470, lin. 19, 27. 
386 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 35. 
387 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 42. 
388 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 44-p. 470, lin. 1. 
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are referenced (even if only imprecisely): they are all drawn from the De trinitate, 
mostly Book IV, except for a single quote from his commentary on Psalm 58389. 
The quotations from other writers, by contrast, are not referenced in this precise 
manner, with the exception of the phrase from Fulgentius, which is said to be part 
of his best-known work De fide390. Moreover, Augustine is the only author (besides 
the evangelists) who keeps recurring in the text. Having thus identified Augustine 
as Alcuin’s prime reference in this correspondence, two further observations need 
to be made regarding the position and prominence of Augustine’s opinion in the 
text: Augustine is the first author (again, apart from the evangelists) to be brought 
into the discussion, and already at his first mention the De trinitate is introduced.391 
This work is then used as a principal source to refute the misinterpretation that 
death had any impact on Christ’s body.392 The quotation from Fulgentius that 
follows Augustine’s statement is clearly placed in a position of secondary 
importance. The second instance in which Alcuin has recourse to Augustine is even 
more remarkable. At this point Alcuin writes that he finds it indispensable to 
investigate much more rigorously the role played by “death” in Christ’s act of 
redemption.393 Here, Augustine’s argument becomes prominent. The entire 
elucidation that follows is put together by collating extended quotations from 
Augustine’s De trinitate and, finally, from his commentary on Psalm 58.394 This 
part of the letter clearly reveals that Alcuin very much relies on Augustine when 
there are intricate theological problems to spell out, since Augustine can be used to 
                                                
389 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 36-38. 
390 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 35. 
391 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 28. 
392 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 28-34. 
393 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 5. 
394 Ibid., p. 469, lin. 7-38. 
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give the reader multiple pieces of information within only a few lines395. Last but 
not least, Alcuin himself repeatedly stresses Augustine’s outstanding eloquence 
and reasoning in the letter.396 
  
Comparison with Other Epistles 
  
Epist. 307 presents clear similarities with other letters written by Alcuin 
(both letters addressed to Charlemagne and those addressed to other 
acquaintances), in terms of his methods of reasoning and citation (including 
citation from Augustine397), as well as in his form of address to his correspondent. 
The mobilisation of sapientia with reference to Charlemagne, for example, 
is a recurring theme in Alcuin’s letters to the ruler. References to sapientia can 
accompany the beginning398 or end399 of a letter, where they tend to feature as part 
of a formulaic greeting or complimentary closing; or they can occur elsewhere400 in 
the text. Such references almost always serve to inspire Charlemagne to internalise 
and propagate the Catholic doctrine and, crucially, to take note of Alcuin’s opinion. 
In Epist. 110, for instance, Alcuin instructs the king on baptism and the procedure 
                                                
395 See particularly the quotation used on p. 469, lin. 22. 
396 Ibid., p. 468, lin. 28, p. 469, lin. 15-16. 
397 On Alcuin’s use of the Church Fathers in theological debates see Otten 1997, pp. 3-50. 
398 Epist. 136, p. 205, lin. 16; Epist. 178, p. 294, lin. 21; Epist. 257, p. 414, lin. 20. 
399 Epist. 249, p. 404, lin. 7. 
400 Epist. 110, p. 157, lin. 22; Epist. 136, p. 207, lin. 26; Epist. 177, p. 292, lin. 29-33; Epist. 202, p. 
335, lin. 21, 24; Epist. 257, p. 415, lin. 6. 
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for converting newly subdued peoples401, first discussing the Saxons402, then the 
Avars403. Afterwards Alcuin exhorts Charlemagne: 
 
But now your most wise, God-placating devotion should provide pious 
preachers for the new people; honest in character, learned in the 
knowledge of the sacred faith and imbued with evangelical precepts; also 
intent on preaching the words of God through the examples of the saintly 
apostles.404 
 
In Epist. 136 Alcuin explains to the king that conversion to the Christian faith 
should not be forced by the sword, but should be achieved by the words of God. At 
the beginning of the epistle Alcuin writes: 
 
By these praiseworthy letters of your wisdom, as you are accustomed to, I 
managed to want to wake my sluggishness shrewdly through prudent 
questions; I realised indeed to teach better by inquiries than to study the 
unknown. 
For to ask wisely is to teach, just as we found it written on a page of your 
authority.405 
                                                
401 I agree with Wallace-Hadrill that eruditio (“instruction”) for Alcuin was always linked to the 
idea of national salvation. Alcuin advised Charlemagne to be aware of his important function as the 
founder of a new Christian community. Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 102. 
402 Epist. 110, p. 157, lin. 13. 
403 Ibid., p. 157, lin. 18. 
404 Sed nunc praevideat sapientissima et Deo placabilis devotio vestra pios populo novello 
praedicatores; moribus honestos, scientia sacrae fidei edoctos et evangelicis praeceptis inbutos; 
sanctorum quoque apostolorum in praedicatione verbi Dei exemplis intentos. Ibid., p. 157, lin. 22. 
405 In quibus laudabilibus quoque vestrae sapientiae apicibus meam, ut soliti estis, segnitiem per 
interrogationes prudentissimas sagaciter excitare velle inveni; immo per inquisitiones magis docere, 
quam ignorata discere agnovi. 
Quia sapienter interrogare docere est, veluti in vestrae auctoritatis pagina scriptum repperimus. 
Epist. 136, p. 205, lin. 16-18. 
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In order to convince Charlemagne to take notice of and act on what he says, Alcuin 
emphasises the reciprocal relationship between him and the king. He puts forward 
that it was first and foremost Charlemagne’s wise inquiries, his curiosity and 
eagerness for knowledge that helped him reach these conclusions. 
Likewise, Alcuin’s mode of reasoning and way of quoting sources in Epist. 
307 finds parallels in other letters. As far as the composition of Epist. 110 is 
concerned for example, a similar arrangement of sources can be found: as one 
would expect in a correspondence dealing with conversion and baptism, the 
Apostle Paul406 and the Gospel407 are quoted. From the Fathers, the views of Jerome 
and Augustine are featured in the text. The letter contains three quotations from 
Jerome408, of which the first is not referenced, and the other two are drawn from his 
commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. The letter to the king closes with a detailed 
summary409 of the procedure for converting heathens proposed by Augustine in his 
De catechizandis rudibus.410 Alcuin rates this work as very important and useful to 
Charlemagne. He states: 
 
Therefore, that order in teaching a man already grown is to be observed, 
diligently, as I believe, which the blessed Augustine set out in the book 
which he entitled de catecizandis rudibus.411 
 
                                                
406 Epist. 110, p. 157, lin. 25-28, p. 158, lin. 17, 33. 
407 Ibid., p. 157, lin. 31. 
408 Ibid., p. 158, lin. 1, 20-25, 28. 
409 Ibid., p. 158, lin. 36-p. 159, lin. 10. 
410 See Bouhot 1980, pp. 176-240 on Alcuin’s use of Augustine’s De catechizandis rudibus and 
Phelan 2010, pp. 455-474 on Alcuin’s adaptation of an Augustinian catechetical programme for 
missionary purposes among the Avars. 
411 Igitur ille ordo in docendo virum aetate perfectum, diligenter, ut arbitror, servandus est, quem 
beatus Augustinus ordinavit in libro, cui de catecizandis rudibus titulum praenotavit. Epist. 110, p. 
158, lin. 36. 
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Subsequently, Alcuin outlines the main points to consider in the process of 
conversion. He notes the following: first, the catechumen needs to be instructed on 
the immortality of the soul, the future life, and the retribution for good and evil as 
well as the endlessness of each of these fates.412 After this, he needs to be told for 
which sins and crimes one suffers eternal punishment with the devil, and for which 
virtues or good deeds one enjoys eternal glory with Christ.413 Next, the faith of the 
Holy Trinity must be taught most diligently, and the coming of Christ, the Son of 
God, for the benefit of mankind needs to be explained; equally, the mystery of his 
Passion, the truthfulness of his resurrection, the glory of his ascension into heaven, 
his Second Coming to judge all people, the resurrection of our bodies and the 
eternity of the punishments for the evil and of the rewards for the good. In this 
way, a new awareness is formed quickly414, and the man, confirmed by this faith, is 
ready to be baptised.415 Then, at a convenient time, evangelical rules have to be 
given more often through a service of diligent praise, until his faith is consolidated, 
and he has become a perfect son of God.416 From this abstract it can be seen that 
Alcuin indeed wanted Charlemagne to follow Augustine’s directions, and that he 
uses Augustine’s authority to persuade the king away from his current course. 
Another piece of correspondence worth considering in this respect is Epist. 
182. It is a letter in which Alcuin argues against Adoptionism. He roughly reasons 
that Christ is not only human, but also divine. Consequently, Christ could not have 
been adopted. He is both the Son of God and a human. Striking in this letter is that 
already in the greeting Alcuin announces which Fathers’ opinions will be 
                                                
412 Ibid., p. 158, lin. 38. 
413 Ibid., p. 159, lin. 2. 
414 Ibid., p. 159, lin. 3. 
415 Ibid., p. 159, lin. 9. 
416 Ibid., p. 159, lin. 10. 
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prominent in the text. He mentions Ambrose, Augustine, Isidore and Jerome.417 
Apart from them, Alcuin also quotes Cyprian418 and Gregory the Great419 and 
moreover names Athanasius420 and Hilary421 in the correspondence. Just as in Epist. 
307, the voice of the prophets422 and that of the apostles423 are represented alongside 
other Biblical quotations. Augustine is named and quoted several times.424 As in 
Epist. 110, the representation of Augustine’s position which appears towards the 
end of the letter is very extensive in comparison with Alcuin’s use of quotations 
from the other authors.425 
 The first stage of the analysis of Alcuinian source material has been to 
locate explicit references to Augustine and to investigate how and to what end 
Augustine is formally represented in Alcuin’s correspondence. It has emerged that 
the epistles in which Augustine is prominent by direct quotation at some level all 
have a strong instructional component. Thus, those letters addressed to 
Charlemagne additionally make calls on his sapientia, which is used as a tool of 
encouragement for him to learn and spread the correct Christian doctrine. It is fair 
to say that in Alcuin’s writings Augustine is directly quoted as the leading 
authority in questions of faith. He appears to be Alcuin’s prime reference for the 
following reasons: first, compared to other authors and texts, Augustine is named 
and cited more frequently and more rigorously (Epist. 307, Epist. 110, Epist. 182); 
second, Augustine’s articulateness and logic are repeatedly praised by Alcuin 
                                                
417 Epist. 182, p. 301, lin. 1. 
418 Ibid., p. 307, lin. 1. 
419 Ibid., p. 301, lin. 20. 
420 Ibid., p. 302, lin. 36. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid., p. 304, lin. 12. 
423 Ibid., p. 302, lin. 4, p. 304, lin. 40. 
424 Ibid., p. 301, lin. 1, p. 302, lin. 36, p. 303, lin. 27, p. 305, lin. 41, p. 306, lin. 3-29. 
425 Ibid., p. 306, lin. 3-20. 
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(Epist. 307); third, quotes from Augustine are more often given a precise textual 
reference than quotes from other authors (Epist. 307); fourth, Augustine usually 
occupies a key position in the structure of the letter, i.e. he is either mentioned in 
the opening (Epist. 307) or in the closing (Epist. 110, Epist. 182) of the text; 
finally, Alcuin relies more heavily on Augustine when complex theological 
questions are raised, since Augustine’s texts contain concentrated information in 
few lines (in Epist. 307 the De trinitate is used to disprove misinterpretations, 
while Epist. 110 ends with an accurate review of the method of conversion 
suggested by Augustine in the De catechizandis rudibus). This evidence shows that 
Alcuin really wanted Charlemagne to follow Augustine’s directions in matters of 
faith above all others, and was promoting him as holding an overriding authority, 
in a way that bolstered his own. 
  
II. Augustine and Alcuin on Rulership and the Civitas Dei 
  
In Chapter One, which dealt with Augustine’s thoughts on rulership, his 
assessment of ‘states’ and his integration of them into God’s providential plan, I 
noted the following features: first of all, an unfolding tension in the De civitate Dei 
that reflects Augustine’s dilemma between approval of the supreme worldly power 
of Christian (and to some extent pagan) rulers and harsh criticism of any form of 
worldly social organisation, government and power. Despite his negative view of 
worldly affairs, Augustine arrives at the judgment that it is the greatest bliss for the 
condition of human beings on earth if people come to power who are granted a 
strong belief in Christianity, hence true virtuousness, and in addition a talent in 
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ruling over nations. The Christian rulers are presented in just this manner by 
Augustine. However, according to Augustine, all members of a ‘state’, including 
its ruler, must place themselves completely under the authority of God in order to 
achieve justice, the essential precondition for a ‘state’ (as claimed by Cicero in 
Book I of his De re publica426) – something that he considered was not in fact 
achievable in practice. In the work De civitate Dei the ruler or emperor is not 
discussed as being in essence different from other human beings as a result of their 
function. 
In what follows, an attempt will be made to look for more implicit forms of 
Augustinian influence on Alcuin, by analysing Alcuin’s writings as a 
comprehensive political discourse. Alcuin’s representation of the Carolingian ruler 
will be considered with reference to the content of Alcuin’s Epistolae, Carm. 1 and 
the Vita Willibrordi archiepiscopi Traiectensis. Section III will then focus in 
greater detail on the language and terminology of these same sources. Bearing in 
mind Augustine’s main thoughts on worldly power, I intend to evaluate to what 
extent Alcuin saw Charlemagne as a successor of the Roman emperors, and what 
he thought the ruler’s function should be with regard to both secular and religious 
duties. Conclusions will then be drawn from these findings regarding the place 
Alcuin allocates to Charlemagne and his realm within God’s providential plan. Last 
but not least, in the process of the analysis, I will attempt to explain the intention 
behind Alcuin’s implicit use of Augustine, and present a hypothesis on the 
difference in aims between the direct quotation of and indirect reference to 
Augustine. 
                                                





Epist. 246 is a letter from Alcuin to Theodulf of Orléans written around 
801/802, hence after Charlemagne’s imperial coronation.427 It is part of a cluster of 
epistles (Epist. 245-Epist. 249) concerning a well-known conflict in Tours, edited 
by E. Dümmler. The dispute flared up when a sinful cleric took refuge in the 
Basilica of Saint-Martin de Tours, involving the community, with Alcuin as its 
abbot and Archbishop Theodulf of Orléans as his adversary, himself a former 
fellow adviser to Charlemagne.428 R. Meens has drawn attention to the importance 
of the right of sanctuary and the practice of penance in the management of conflicts 
in the Carolingian age.429 Furthermore, by examining the argument between Alcuin 
and Theodulf, Meens points out existing conflicting views on sin and crime, 
penance and punishment at the Carolingian court. A cleric had been judged and 
found guilty in Orléans by Theodulf for some unknown serious crime. The tribunal 
where he had been sentenced had been presided over by Theodulf, and a canonical 
penance had been imposed on the cleric.430 However, despite being put in chains, 
the cleric managed to escape. He found refuge in the Basilica of Saint-Martin de 
Tours, where he apparently appealed to the emperor and requested safe conduct to 
him. Theodulf dispatched a group of men to Tours to retrieve the convict, and 
Alcuin affirms that the monks of Saint-Martin were ready to hand him over. Yet 
Theodulf’s men, having heard rumours about an ambush, left the cleric in front of 
the ‘church’ and returned empty-handed. Full of anger, Theodulf thereupon sent a 
                                                
427 Epist. 246, pp. 393-399. 
428 Meens 2007, p. 277. 
429 Ibid., pp. 277-300. 
430 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
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small army to fetch the prisoner by force. The army collaborated with Joseph, 
Bishop of Tours, who escorted eight of them on a Sunday into the crowded 
Basilica to capture the cleric – an action clearly condemned by Alcuin.431 This 
intrusion was followed by an uproar in the ‘church’ and terror and turmoil, 
especially among the poor, in the city. Subsequently, Theodulf wrote a letter of 
complaint to the emperor. This piece has not survived, but Alcuin refers to it in his 
own correspondence.432 The exact nature of Theodulf’s criticism is unknown; 
however, the available texts suggest that Theodulf complained to Charlemagne 
about disrespect towards his own men, as well as Joseph’s, on the part of Alcuin 
and the monks of Saint-Martin during the upheaval. A further accusation was that 
of disrespect for the emperor’s written order to hand over the fugitive. Alcuin 
thought that Charlemagne’s command was unjust. According to him, the injustice 
lay both in capturing offenders seeking sanctuary in sacred places and in hindering 
a person from appealing to the ruler.433 This perspective is reflected in Alcuin’s 
correspondence, and the way he went about justifying himself is significant. 
Epist. 246 is also remarkable because it links Charlemagne as an emperor 
with the Roman imperial tradition. The letter cites the laws regarding the right of 
sanctuary which had been enacted by Roman emperors. Alcuin mentions laws 
imposed by Constantine I, Theodosius I, Valentinian and Honorius, to the effect 
that anyone prosecuted by the law might find shelter and be protected from a judge 
in any ‘church’ consecrated by the emperor.434 Alcuin justifies the importance of 
                                                
431 Ibid., p. 283. 
432 Ibid., p. 284. 
433 Ibid., p. 285. 
434 The Christian form of sanctuary dates back to the middle of the fourth century and is a 
continuation of Greek and Roman practices related to the imperial cult of granting sanctuary in 
sacred places. During the late fourth and early fifth centuries (at the time of Augustine’s 
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this law by saying that every sinner and offender devoted to the Christian God 
needs a place of refuge and safety from prosecutors. He begs Theodulf to 
understand that this law is authorised for refugees in the protectorates. To reinforce 
his appeal he adds that he is certain that the most Christian and noble emperor 
Charlemagne would never legislate differently from his predecessors, the Roman 
emperors. Alcuin here evidently presents the above-named Roman emperors as 
Charlemagne’s antecessores. It is in this very statement that Alcuin uses the name 
Carolus for the first and only time in this letter. Before, he refers to the emperor 
using his pseudonym David. Considering that Alcuin’s main concern was to 
promote a law that was in force under Roman emperors, it makes sense at this point 
to use the ruler’s proper name and not his pseudonym, which had a strong spiritual 
connotation. It is undeniable that Alcuin’s linking of Charlemagne to the Roman 
imperial tradition is a strategy to put the Carolingian ruler under an obligation to 
acknowledge and uphold a particular law that used to be in force during the Roman 
imperial period.435 
Towards the end of the letter Alcuin gives a clear explanation for why he 
deems it indispensable for the ‘churches’ of Christ in Charlemagne’s realm to have 
                                                                                                                                  
episcopate), imperial expenditures and corruption resulted in a growing tax burden and in an 
increasing number of delinquent taxpayers who sought sanctuary in ‘churches’. A constitution dated 
18 October 392 recognised the custom of sanctuary in ‘churches’ but excluded from its protection 
certain types of offenders (among them delinquent taxpayers). The bishops assembled at the 
Council of Carthage (399) appealed to Emperor Honorius to allow sanctuary in ‘churches’ to 
anyone. On 21 November 419 the emperors Honorius and Theodosius II eventually issued an edict 
recognising an inviolable right of sanctuary that extended to within fifty feet of the doors of 
Christian ‘churches’. Dodaro 1999, pp. 178-179. 
435 Another epistle from Alcuin to the emperor sent around 800/802, Epist. 249, also draws a 
parallel between Charlemagne and the Roman emperors when reminding him of the value of the 
virtue of clementia (“clemency”). Here Alcuin asserts: “[...] clemency to his subject peoples was 
always a special virtue, excellence and praise of the emperors, in so much as the most noble 
Emperor Titus says that not a single one should depart in sadness from the emperor.” (“[...] specialis 
virtus bonitas atque laus imperatorum semper fuit clementia in subiectos suos, in tantum ut Titus 




also the additional function of providing shelter to Christian refugees: he says that 
it is imperative that neither the dignity of the ‘church’, nor fear and reverence for it, 
should be smaller in the most excellent regnum (“realm”) and most powerful 
imperium (“empire”). Instead, they should continually grow for the praise and 
glory of Jesus Christ who honoured Charlemagne above all other kings and 
emperors with the beauty of sapientia (“wisdom”) and exalted him with the 
potentia regni (“power of reign”). This declaration manifests unmistakably that, 
even though with reference to legal matters Charlemagne is ranked among the 
Christian Roman emperors, Alcuin thinks of him and his realm as superior to any 
other earthly power. There is no question that Alcuin’s words are also a means of 
persuading the ruler to rule according to the highest standards, which of course 
would imply doing what Alcuin advises him to do. 
Among the features elevating Charlemagne over all other rulers are, 
according to Alcuin, the sapientia and potentia regni he had received from the 
Christian God. These two gifts already appear in Epist. 178, a letter addressed to 
the king in 800.436 In this correspondence Alcuin strives to convince Charlemagne 
of the urgency of accepting the imperial title. He argues that God elected 
Charlemagne among all others to become a supreme ruler by granting him the 
exceptional gifts of imperium (“supreme power”) and spiritalis sapientiae latitudo 
(“the breadth of spiritual wisdom”). This is one of the writings to the king showing 
Alcuin’s endeavour to instruct Charlemagne in the notion of imperium. 
As far as Charlemagne’s political and religious responsibilities are 
concerned, Ganshof argued that it was the ruler’s task to govern, defend and extend 
                                                
436 Epist. 178, pp. 294-296. 
CHAPTER TWO 
 119 
his realm and at the same time to safeguard faith and ‘church’.437 There is an 
epistle, Epist. 257, written to Charlemagne in the aftermath of his imperial 
coronation, which reflects on Charlemagne’s political and religious responsibilities 
as a ruler.438 It is a dedicatory letter for Alcuin’s manual De fide sanctae et 
individuae Trinitatis.439 Epist. 257 reveals most clearly the meaning Alcuin 
attributes to the imperial authority and how he evaluates Charlemagne’s worldly 
realm and ruling power within God’s providential plan. Charlemagne is portrayed 
as an exceptional Christian emperor. Moreover, the writing discloses that the 
author must have had Augustine in mind when composing this text. In the first 
paragraph of the epistle Alcuin explains in simple terms what the imperial dignity, 
with which Charlemagne had recently been invested, is for: it has no other purpose 
than to “preside over” (praeesse) and “be of use to” (prodesse) the people. To be 
able to accomplish this task, Alcuin says, potestas (”power”) and sapientia 
(“wisdom”) are given by God to the elected.440 Here, as in Epist. 178441, which dates 
from before the imperial coronation and where he even gives a direct quotation, 
Alcuin alludes to the hexameter from Virgil’s Aeneid (parcere subiectis et 
debellare superbos), from the passage in which Anchises prophesies to Aeneas, his 
son, the future Roman world power.442 Augustine also cites this very hexameter in 
the De civitate Dei, more precisely in Book V443 (which presents the heathen 
                                                
437 Ganshof 1949, p. 15. See also the discussions in Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 102-103; Wallace-
Hadrill 1975, pp. 188-190. 
438 Epist. 257, pp. 414-416. 
439 The manual De fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis, completed at Saint-Martin around 802, is 
Alcuin’s most influential work. See Cavadini 1991, pp. 124-125. 
440 Epist. 257, p. 414, lin. 20. 
441 Epist. 178, pp. 294-296. 
442 Aen. 6.853. A discussion of the reception of Virgil in Alcuin’s work can be found in Holtz 1997, 
pp. 67-80. 
443 Civ. V 12, p. 213, l. 30. 
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Babylonian and the heathen Roman powers as two eschatologically relevant 
empires – the Eastern relevant to the Old Testament, the Western relevant to the 
New Testament due to the fact that God allowed Christ to be born under the 
Romans’ rule). Alcuin states that “power” is used by the ruler ut superbos opprimat 
(“so that he may oppress the proud”) and “wisdom” ut regat et doceat pia 
sollicitudine subiectos (“so that he may rule and teach the subject peoples with 
pious concern”). Alcuin tends to remind Charlemagne of the gifts of “(supreme) 
power” (imperium/potestas/potentia) and “wisdom” (sapientia) granted by God in 
moments in which he wants to present him as a supreme Christian ruler. It appears 
that Alcuin strives to link Charlemagne’s empire with the Roman and Assyrian 
realms, which have a notable function in God’s providential plan. It also seems 
that, when using the title of imperator, Alcuin follows Augustine’s definition of a 
“ruler who has the supremacy over other rulers in power” and seeks to equate 
Charlemagne with the Roman imperatores who are significant within God’s 
providential plan because their empire was meaningful for the development of 
Christianity. However, in the second paragraph Alcuin refines the statement made 
in the first, by asserting: “With these two gifts [potestas and sapientia], holy 
emperor, divine grace has exalted and honoured your sublimity above others, in a 
manner incomparable to the predecessors of the same title and divine power 
[...].”444 By arguing that divine grace445 has endowed Charlemagne with potestas 
and sapientia to a higher degree than any past or present political agent, Alcuin 
portrays Charlemagne as superior to any other secular leader and contrasts him 
                                                
444 His duobus, sancte imperator, muneribus divina vestram inconparabiliter sublimitatem, eiusdem 
nominis et numinis antecessoribus gratia superexaltavit et honoravit [...]. Epist. 257, p. 414, lin. 23. 
445 The implications of gratia are summarised in Wallace-Hadrill 1975, p. 190. 
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with all previous emperors. 
While the first paragraph of Epist. 257 only hints at the purpose of these 
gifts, the following text quite clearly divulges their different function. The second 
paragraph states that divine grace inflicts the terror of Charlemagne’s potentia 
(“power”) upon all the gentes (“races”) from all parts, so that those may come to 
Charlemagne by voluntary subjection whom the labour of war could not subdue at 
earlier times. One can see that the various forms of the verb “to subject” (subicere), 
which features in Virgil’s hexameter quoted by Augustine, build up to a recurrent 
theme in Epist. 257. What is furthermore implied here is, first, that Charlemagne’s 
gift of “power” has a political function – namely that of expanding and securing his 
empire.446 Secondly, Alcuin intimates that, after successful victories in war, the 
remaining unsubdued tribes will eventually bow voluntarily to such a powerful 
ruler. In other words, Alcuin hints that the hard times of war are over. Accordingly, 
the rest of the text expands on the role of the second gift of “wisdom”, which 
comes into play after the first one has fulfilled its purpose. Alcuin continues by 
asking Charlemagne: “What then, what must be done for your most devoted 
concern [again: sollicitudo] for God, at a time of serenity and peace [...]?”447 It 
becomes apparent that Charlemagne’s attribute of “wisdom” instead has a religious 
function.448 After drawing the emperor’s attention to a sermon on the Holy Trinity, 
                                                
446 Another example of the same use of “power” can, for instance, be found in Epist. 41, where 
Alcuin writes: “[...] and blessed is the people that is exalted by a ruler of such a kind and fortified 
by such a public preacher; and each of both: the sword of triumphal power vibrates in the right hand 
[...].” (“[...] et beatus populus tali rectore exaltatus et tali praedicatore munitus; et utrumque: et 
gladium triumphalis potentiae vibrat in dextera [...].”) Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 12. 
447 Quid igitur, quid agendum est vestrae Deo devotissimae sollicitudini, tempore serenitatis et pacis 
[...]. Epist. 257, p. 414, lin. 27. 
448 In his comments on Alcuin’s conception of peace in Epist. 257, P. Kershaw makes reference to 
the imperial duties set out by Alcuin. Kershaw 2011, p. 153. In particular, he evaluates Alcuin’s 
“[...] perception of Charlemagne’s duties in a time of peace.” Ibid. He fails to notice, however, that 
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which he composed for Charlemagne in the form of a manual449, Alcuin expands on 
the significance of “wisdom”. He writes: 
 
And that is to say that I neither estimated wisdom to be worthier than any 
other gift of your imperial majesty: nor did I think any other to be equally 
worthy of accepting such an excellent gift, as it is very well known that it 
is necessary for the leader of the Christian people to know everything and 
preach what pleases God.450 
 
To Alcuin “wisdom” also allows the ruler to discern and make known God’s 
will.451 (The same conclusion has already been reached in the first part of this 
                                                                                                                                  
Alcuin’s concept of sapientia and its derivatives have the described religious function and introduce 
Charlemagne’s religious responsibilities as a ruler more than anything else. 
449 J. Cavadini demonstrates that Alcuin’s manual evidences a clear dependence on Augustine’s 
works and thinking. On Alcuin’s use of Augustine’s concept of catholica pax (“Catholic peace”) 
see Cavadini 1991, pp. 127-129. The “Augustinian theology” construed by Alcuin is assessed on pp. 
140-141. See also Cavadini’s list of sources for the De fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis on pp. 
142-146. Of particular interest to my research is Cavadini’s exploration of a certain “editorial 
technique” Alcuin employs when drawing on Augustine. Cavadini uses the term “reduction” to 
describe a technique that is characterised by a combination of half or whole sentences quoted 
verbatim and complex paraphrasing. Cavadini explains that “the effect is to reproduce not only the 
content but the atmosphere or tone of the original as well, yet to do it in scope far reduced from that 
of the original, and all in such a way that it does not appear to be in a voice different from that of the 
editor.” Ibid., p. 137. Interestingly, the technique comes into play both at the beginning and end of 
the De fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis, where Alcuin relies heavily on Augustine. The 
beginning of the manual is modelled after chapter 1 of Book IV of Augustine’s De trinitate, 
whereas Alcuin’s last chapter is based on the last chapter of the De civitate Dei. Ibid. 
450 Nec videlicet alio quolibet vestrae imperialis maiestatis munere digniorem aestimabam 
sapientiam: nec alium quemlibet tam excellenti dono in accipiendo aeque dignum putabam, dum 
principem populi christiani cuncta scire et praedicare quae Deo placeant necesse esse notissimum 
est. Epist. 257, p. 415, lin. 1. 
451 Another correspondence that reflects the value of “wisdom” equally well and in an equal manner 
is Epist. 177, a letter from Alcuin to Charlemagne written during the summer of 799 that implores 
the king to intervene in favour of Pope Leo III. It says: “Look what has been done with regard to the 
apostolic see in the particular city, to the most excellent dignity. 
All these are only saved by your judgment; in order that with the most prudent counsel of wisdom, 
given to you by God, with temperate consideration the things that have to be corrected are 
corrected, and the things that have to be preserved are preserved; and these which divine piety 
carried mercifully are raised in praise of that one’s name, who healed his slave and freed him from 
the cursed persecution of infidelity. 
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chapter on the explicit use of Augustine, where it was shown that in letters to 
Charlemagne forms of sapientia have in many cases the function of encouraging 
Charlemagne both to learn and spread the correct Christian doctrine taught by 
Augustine.) Overall, in Epist. 257 Alcuin presents Charlemagne as superior to any 
other secular authority by claiming that he has gained potestas (“power”) and 
sapientia (“wisdom”), which reflect the ruler’s political and religious 
responsibilities of defending and enlarging his realm and defending and spreading 
the Catholic Christian faith, to a higher degree than any past or present ruling 
                                                                                                                                  
In fact, your wisest prudence of mind – while it understands all about what is fitting for which 
person – in doing good or in punishing should do and perform what pleases God.” (“Ecce quid 
actum est de apostolica sede in civitate praecipua, in dignitate excellentissima. 
Quae omnia vestro tantummodo servantur iudicio; ut prudentissimo consilio sapientiae, vobis a Deo 
datae, temperata consideratione corrigantur quae corrigenda sunt, et conserventur quae conservanda 
sunt; et quae clementer divina gessit pietas extollantur in laudem nominis illius, qui salvum fecit 
servum suum et liberavit a persecutione exsecrande infidelitatis. 
Vestra vero sapientissima animi prudentia – dum omnia intellegat, quid cui conveniat personae – in 
benefaciendo sive in vindicando faciat et perficiat quod Deo placeat.”) Epist. 177, p. 292, lin. 28-33. 
Further writings from Alcuin that contain the concept of “wisdom” are, for instance, Epist. 249, 
Epist. 148 and Epist. 111. In Epist. 249 Alcuin states: “How I always praised to wonderfully thrive 
in the vigour of your [Charlemagne’s] wisdom [...].” (“Quam semper agnovi in animo sapientiae 
vestrae mirabiliter vigere [...].”) Epist. 249, p. 404, lin. 3. In Epist. 148 Alcuin first maintains after 
thanking the king for the gifts Fredegysus brought to him: “In these [gifts] I both recognised the 
love towards me as well as considered the wisdom within you [...].” (“In quibus utrumque et 
dilectionem agnovi in me et sapientiam consideravi in te [...].”) Epist. 148, p. 237, lin. 30. Later on 
he observes: “Such deliberations, most loved and sweetest David, I have to write to you – not to any 
countrymen – in which I know that your learned wisdom lies and of which I know that they please 
you totally, in order that your mind takes pleasure in the calculations of things, just as mine is very 
glad rather often to lay such things out to you.” (“Tales rationes, dilectissime et dulcissime David, 
vobis mihi scribendae sunt – non rusticis quibuslibet – in quibus sapientiam tuam eruditam esse scio 
et quae tibi placere omnino agnosco, ut gaudeat mens tua in rationibus rerum, sicut mea multum 
gaudet tibi saepius talia dirigere.”) Epist. 148, p. 241, lin. 1. The religious function of “wisdom” is 
particularly well expressed in Epist. 111, which was forwarded to the treasurer Megenfried. Alcuin 
says of Charlemagne, who is referred to as David: “For all these things my esteemed David knows 
best, to whom God gave both wisdom and good will; so that he might convert most peoples to the 
love and praise of Christ. 
To him all goodness and power to do good sufficed, except only for one thing on account of the 
dangerous times of this era: that he has fewer assistants in the work of God than necessary. 
Nevertheless, no one in the world, as I believe, has better ones than him. 
These he should instruct, admonish and teach according to the wisdom given to him by God.” (“Scit 
enim haec omnia optime dilectus meus David, cui Deus et sapientiam dedit et bonam voluntatem; ut 
plurimos convertit populos ad caritatem Christi et laudem. 
Cui omnis bonitas et potentia ad benefaciendum sufficit, nisi unum tantummodo propter tempora 
periculosa huius saeculi: quod rariores habet adiutores in opere Domini, quam necesse sit. 
Nullus tamen in mundo meliores, ut credo, habet quam ille. 





Alcuin’s choice of words when referring to Charlemagne as a Christian 
emperor and his people is noteworthy. He chooses princeps populi christiani, 
which certainly does not make him an ordinary constituent of the Roman imperial 
tradition. Charlemagne is given a different, superior position. Alcuin adds with 
regard to Charlemagne’s religious responsibility that the emperor above all others 
needs to know which doctrine can benefit all the subject peoples (again: subiecti). 
Alcuin ends the debate on the purpose of “wisdom” by saying: 
 
The means for all believers to glorify your piety is manifold, as long as the 
concern [again: sollicitudo] of your clemency has a priestly vigour, as is 
seemly, in the preaching of God’s words, and a perfected knowledge in the 
Catholic faith and a most sacred devotion for the well-being of all.452 
 
In the conclusion of the epistle Alcuin then, in line with the requests of all 
believers, wishes both for Charlemagne’s empire to be expanded and for the 
Catholic faith to be spread. Besides the reference to Virgil’s hexameter cited by 
Augustine in the De civitate Dei, another obvious indication can be found in the 
text that Augustine was at the forefront of Alcuin’s mind when drafting this letter: 
the opening of the discussion of the function of “wisdom” mentions Alcuin’s own 
handbook on the Holy Trinity. Then, after the significant statement that the 
emperor before everyone else has to know which doctrine will benefit all the 
people under his power, Alcuin mentions Augustine. He refers to Augustine not 
                                                
452 Multa est omnibus fidelibus in vestra pietate gloriandi facultas, dum clementiae vestrae 
sollicitudo sacerdotalem, ut decet, habet in praedicatione verbi Dei vigorem, et perfectam in 
catholica fide scientiam et sanctissimam pro omnium salute devotionem. Epist. 257, p. 415, lin. 26. 
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only in terms of the work De trinitate, which must have laid the groundwork for 
the manual, but also in connection with Charlemagne’s thirst for knowledge in 
philosophy. One of the main aims of this manual is, according to Alcuin: 
 
[…] and indeed that I convince those, who belittled your most noble 
intention of wanting to learn the methods of the dialectic discipline, which 
St. Augustine in the books about the Holy Trinity thought to be necessary 
in the highest degree, when he demonstrated that the most profound 
questions concerning the Holy Trinity can only be explained through the 
subtlety of categories.453 
 
  
Old Testament Kings 
  
The pseudonyms that were in use among the notables at the Carolingian 
court (including the royal family) have been studied comprehensively by J. 
Fleckenstein.454 The established pseudonyms for Charlemagne were (novus) David, 
(novus) Salomon, (novus) Moyse and (novus) Konstantinus. The name David, in 
particular, made reference to anointing as a sign of God’s approval of 
Charlemagne’s assumption of the title of patricius Romanorum.455 Responding to 
                                                
453 [...] necnon, ut convincerem eos, qui minus utile aestimabant vestram nobilissimam intentionem 
dialecticae disciplinae discere velle rationes, quas beatus Augustinus in libris de sancta Trinitate 
adprime necessarias esse putavit, dum profundissimas de sancta Trinitate quaestiones, non nisi 
categoriarum subtilitate explanari posse probavit. Ibid., p. 415, lin. 6. 
454 On Alcuin’s pseudonyms and understanding of social relationships see Garrison 1998, pp. 59-79. 
On the Carolingian idea of the Old Testament kings under Charlemagne and his successors see 
Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 99f.; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 184-191. 
455 Fleckenstein 1967, pp. 43-46. Wallace-Hadrill correctly notes that the title of patricius 
Romanorum meant “[...] protection for Rome and her patrimony.” Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 100. 
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H. von Fichtenau and Dümmler, Fleckenstein remarks that the pseudonyms for 
Charlemagne only appear after 794, Epist. 41 being the first letter of Alcuin’s to 
celebrate Charlemagne as David. This phenomenon only spread at court after 
Alcuin had won Charlemagne’s approval. This supports the theory that Alcuin was 
the introducer of this practice of using pseudonyms.456 Because of its frequent 
occurrence in Alcuin’s epistles, the name David has attracted the most attention out 
of all pseudonyms for Charlemagne. It has been stated above that the name David 
has a strong spiritual connotation in Alcuin’s correspondence. This can be 
confirmed by looking at some selected epistles in which the names of the two 
Biblical kings David and Solomon are applied to Charlemagne and/or his newly 
crowned son, Charles the Younger.457 The analysis will shed light on the ruler’s 
status and bring more clarity to the question of what place Alcuin allocated to the 
Frankish realm within God’s providential plan. Overall the writings bear out to 
some extent Arquillière’s argument that Charlemagne, by taking on the mission to 
implement pax and iustitia, could lend to these concepts the religious contents they 
had adopted since Merovingian times under the so-called Augustinisme politique. 
Indeed, a connection will become apparent between Alcuin’s use of the notions of 
pax and iustitia and his reference to the Biblical kings. Moreover, in one case an 
intriguing association is made between Charlemagne as King David and the civitas 
Dei. 
                                                
456 Fleckenstein 1967, p. 45. 
457 For further reading on the evocation of early medieval rulers as David and Solomon see Kershaw 
2011, pp. 2-8, 50-61, 81-124, 128-147, 180-196. 
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 It makes sense to start with Epist. 41, addressed to the king, where Alcuin 
for the first time draws a parallel between Charlemagne and King David.458 After 
explaining that he had received from the visitor Candidus the king’s gift and 
salutation as well as the good news about the king’s prosperity and diligence in 
studying the Catholic faith, Alcuin introduces the parallel right away. He first 
outlines the most striking features of Charlemagne as a ruler and his realm. After 
this he explains that in a similar manner King David, elected and loved by God459, 
conquered surrounding tribes and instructed them in the true faith and in the law of 
God. Alcuin begins as follows: “Blessed is the nation, whose master is their God: 
and blessed is the people that is exalted by a ruler of such a kind and fortified by 
such a public preacher; and each of both: the sword of triumphal power vibrates in 
the right hand and the trumpet of Catholic preaching resounds on the tongue.”460 
Then he adds: “In such a way also David, once king of a preceding people, was 
elected by God and loved by God and, as an excellent psalmist of Israel subjecting 
by his victorious sword races from all directions, emerged among the people as a 
chosen preacher of the law of God.”461 It thus appears that Charlemagne and David 
are both kings of a people that have God as their leader.462 Hence, these rulers have 
not only the function of expanding their realm politically, but also of spreading the 
Word of God. Alcuin presents Charlemagne and David as two kings who are ruling 
                                                
458 Epist. 41, pp. 84-85. 
459 At the beginning of Epist. 148 in his address to Charlemagne, who is referred to as King David, 
Alcuin also presents the king as chosen and loved by God. Epist. 148, p. 237, lin. 27. 
460 Beata gens, cuius est dominus Deus eorum: et beatus populus tali rectore exaltatus et tali 
praedicatore munitus; et utrumque: et gladium triumphalis potentiae vibrat in dextera et catholicae 
praedicationis tuba resonat in lingua. Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 12. See Anton’s “[...] Verbindung von 
Schwert und Predigt [...]”. Anton 1968, p. 109. 
461 Ita et David olim praecedentis populi rex a Deo electus et Deo dilectus et egregius psalmista 
Israheli victrici gladio undique gentes subiciens, legisque Dei eximius praedicator in populo extitit. 
Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 14. 
462 This is in line with Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 102. 
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in accordance with the will of God, implementing the law of God. This comparison 
is followed by a second parallel, this time with Christ. Alcuin writes: 
 
By the select noble origin of his [David’s] sons to the well-being of the 
world, Christ blossomed from a twig as a flower of the open field and 
narrow valleys, who, a little while ago in those times and of the same 
name, virtue and faith, authorised King David as a ruler and teacher for his 
people. 
Under his supernal shadow the Christian people rests peacefully, and 
terrifying it stands out from the pagan races everywhere.463 
 
Alcuin unambiguously links Charlemagne and David with Christ by indicating that 
Christ is of the house of David. Alcuin uses the formula populus Christianus 
(“Christian people”) to refer to Christ’s heavenly realm. This term (as established 
by Ganshof and previous scholars464) is one of the key terms Alcuin employs to 
denote Charlemagne’s realm shortly before the imperial coronation. It sets 
Charlemagne’s empire apart from all previous Christian ‘states’ on earth. 
Epist. 217, directed to King Charles the Younger, reinforces Alcuin’s 
argument that Charlemagne and his successors are higher in rank than all earlier 
Christian rulers.465 The address introduces the motivation of the letter, which is the 
celebration of the royal coronation of Charles the Younger. Charlemagne is 
                                                
463 Cuius eximia filiorum nobilitate in salute mundi, de virga flos campi et convallium floruit 
Christus, qui istis modo temporibus ac eiusdem nominis, virtutis et fidei David regem populo suo 
concessit rectorem et doctorem. 
Sub cuius umbra superna quiete populus requiescit christianus, et terribilis undique gentibus extat 
paganis. Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 17-19. 
464 Ganshof 1949, pp. 14-15. 
465 Epist. 217, pp. 360-361. 
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mentioned as David when Alcuin states that this coronation took place with his 
consent.466 Alcuin first expresses his happiness about the young king’s newly 
acquired title and power, and then his hopes that the young ruler may be of service 
to many peoples as well as to the Christian ‘church’.467 In the following passage 
Alcuin points out that, in order for his wishes to come true, Charles the Younger 
needs to implement justice and bring about forbearance – the two fundamental 
elements, according to Solomon (son and successor of King David, as Charles was 
to Charlemagne), which constitute a God-placating rule. Alcuin declares: “From 
there, most beloved son, through your actions, create justice and forbearance 
among the Christian people; because these are the ones, since Solomon is attesting 
it, that exalt the official seat of a realm, and bring about a laudable and God-
placating power.”468 Alcuin uses the Biblical words of Solomon from the Old 
Testament, in order to identify the essential goals of a ruler who executes God’s 
commands. Moreover, he again chooses the term populus Christianus, which 
Alcuin applies to Christ’s heavenly realm in Epist. 41. By drawing a parallel 
between Charles the Younger and Solomon, Alcuin presents a role model of a true 
Christian king. But shortly afterwards Alcuin even admits: “It is not for you to look 
for examples at length. For in the house in which you were brought up, you have 
the best examples of all goodness.”469 Alcuin advises Charles the Younger to follow 
the example of his father Charlemagne by saying: 
 
                                                
466 Ibid., p. 360, lin. 35-37. 
467 Ibid., p. 360, lin. 38. 
468 Unde, dilectissime fili, faciens facito iustitias et misericordias in populo christiano; quia haec 
sunt, Salomone adtestante, quae exaltant solium regni, et laudabilem Deoque placabilem regiam 
efficiunt potestatem. Ibid., p. 361, lin. 6. 
469 Non sunt tibi exempla longe quaerenda. 
Habes enim in domo, in qua nutritus fuisti, optima totius bonitatis exempla. Ibid., p. 361, lin. 15. 
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And trust that the benediction follows you, you most assured of your well-
known, excellent father, most noble through every glory, of the ruler and 
emperor of the Christian people, as long as God grants it, if you make an 
effort to imitate the morals of his nobility as well as piety and all modesty; 
and to earn most fully the forbearance of the master of the house, which is 
better than the glory of all time.470 
 
Charlemagne is here described as rector et imperator populi christiani (“ruler and 
emperor of the Christian people”).471 
In Epist. 177472, where Alcuin begs Charlemagne to intervene in favour of 
Pope Leo III, Alcuin once more uses the pseudonym David.473 Before announcing 
the urgency of the situation in Rome and before pointing out that Charlemagne is 
the only candidate entitled to direct the judicial investigation, Alcuin expresses 
warm approval and admiration for the king. In these lines, Alcuin first addresses 
Charlemagne as decus populi christiani (“glory of the Christian people”). 
Afterwards he writes: “With all these vows it is necessary to exalt your 
blessedness, to assist it by intercessions, until the Christian empire is preserved by 
your success, the Catholic faith is defended, the rule of justice becomes known to 
all.”474 Besides the military defence of the Christianum imperium (“Christian 
empire”) and the protection of the Catholic faith, Alcuin cites the spread of the 
                                                
470 Et crede certissime illius excellentissimi et omni decore nobilissimi patris tui, rectoris et 
imperatoris populi christiani, benedictionem te consequi, Deo donante, si nobilitatis illius et pietatis 
et totius modestiae mores imitari nitaris; Dominique misericordiam, quae melior est totius saeculi 
gloria, plenissime promereri. Ibid., p. 361, lin. 16. 
471 Cf. Wallace-Hadrill’s apt remark: “Charlemagne does not need a mirror of princes; he is himself 
one.” Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 103. 
472 Epist. 177, pp. 292-293. 
473 Ibid., p. 292, lin. 9. 
474 Quibus tuam beatitudinem omnibus necessarium est votis exaltare, intercessionibus adiuvare, 
quatenus per vestram prosperitatem christianum tueatur imperium, fides catholica defendatur, 
iustitiae regula omnibus innotescat. Ibid., p. 292, lin. 25. 
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principles of justice as a third main responsibility of the Christian ruler – which in 
the course of the letter gains in importance when Alcuin expands on the judicial 
matter and portrays Charlemagne as the only man alive endowed with the power to 
execute what pleases God. The acts of performing justice and making law are 
repeated further down in the epistle among the other duties of the Christian ruler. 
As a reward for accomplishing these tasks, Alcuin maintains, God will bless 
Charlemagne’s sons richly and preserve the royal throne for all of his descendants, 
just as he did with his favourite, King David. Alcuin contends: “[…] and a rich 
blessing should grow through your good deeds for the most illustrious sons of your 
nobility; just as it is read that, through the sanctity of your only homonym, David, 
of the king most loved by God, the power of the royal throne was preserved for all 
his descendants.”475 
In his De civitate Dei Augustine had reasoned that true justice in a ‘state’ 
can only be achieved if God is the commander of all people and all of them obey 
Him.476 This, Augustine believes, cannot possibly be realised on earth, wherefore a 
worldly civitas Dei becomes inconceivable. However, Epist. 41, Epist. 217 and 
Epist. 177 suggest that Alcuin thinks otherwise as far as the Carolingian ‘state’ is 
concerned.477 Epist. 41 depicts Charlemagne as well as Christ as descendants of 
King David. In Epist. 41 populus Christianus occurs with reference to the people 
of the kingdom of Christ, while in Epist. 217 and Epist. 177 the same expression 
stands for both the people of Charles the Younger and the people of Charlemagne. 
                                                
475 [...] clarissimisque vestrae nobilitatis filiis benedictio copiosa per vestra benefacta adcrescat; 
sicut per solius omonymi tui David Deo dilectissimi regis sanctitatem legitur omnibus nepotibus 
suis regalis throni potestas conservata fuisse. Ibid., p. 293, lin. 10. 
476 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391, XIX 23, p. 399. 
477 Alcuin’s idea of justice is briefly outlined by Kershaw 2011, pp. 149-150. 
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Epist. 41 contains a phrase that is tremendously telling in terms of the depth of 
Alcuin’s political statement in these epistles dealing with the status of the 
Carolingians as Christian rulers. Alcuin notes: “Blessed is the nation, whose master 
is their God”478. This comment makes the Carolingian ‘state’ meet Augustine’s 
prime condition for being a godly ‘state’ on earth. It also takes the existence of 
implicit Augustinian elements in Alcuin’s correspondence to a new level: it now 
stands to reason that Alcuin has well understood the conditions set by Augustine in 
the De civitate Dei under which a ‘state’ might be recognised as worldly or godly. 
His programme is evidently to show by argument that the Carolingians are 
Christian rulers able to lead a people to the furthest extent possible under the divine 
commandments of the Christian God. Accordingly, Alcuin holds that the 
conditions of iustitia and pax that prevail within the Carolingian ‘state’ are not the 
worldly forms of these concepts, but amount to the justice and peace granted to the 
Christian ruler and his Christian people by God. Epist. 217 argues that, in order for 
King Charles the Younger to be a successful ruler, gain the blessing of God and 
eventually become a citizen of the Kingdom of God, he first and foremost has to 
bring about justice among the Christian people along with forbearance. Only if 
these two conditions are reached – as stated by Solomon – will the ruler have 
gained an authority that is pleasing to God. In Epist. 177, where Alcuin 
communicates to Charlemagne the plan of action to be taken to restore the Holy 
See, Alcuin introduces the proclamation of the rules of justice among the nations as 
a further responsibility of the Christian ruler. Last but not least, in Epist. 174, 
written to Charlemagne and addressing him as King David in early summer 799, 
                                                
478 Beata gens, cuius est dominus Deus eorum. Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 12. 
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Alcuin says: “You are the judge of the crimes, you are the guide of the erring” (Tu 
vindex scelerum, tu rector errantium).479 
When considering the occurrences of pax in Alcuin’s correspondence, one 
finds that there is again no doubt as to the quality of this concept: the peace within 
the Carolingian realm is the peace given by the Christian God.480 The most 
significant reference to peace can be found right at the beginning of Epist. 198, 
after Alcuin greets Charlemagne as King David. Alcuin says: 
 
While I know that the glorious sublimity of your power does not rule over 
a Jerusalem ready to be destroyed by the Chaldean fires, but guides and 
governs the city of eternal peace built with the precious blood of Christ, 
whose [the city’s] living stones are kept together by the glue of love and 
whose walls of heavenly structure, made out of various gems of virtues, 
rise up to the sky […].481 
                                                
479 Epist. 174, p. 288, lin. 26. 
480 Here I mean “peace” in its divine sense: vera pax, which is also identified by Kershaw as 
Augustine’s “true peace” or “perfect peace”. Kershaw 2011, pp. 67, 148-153. Kershaw, however, 
highlights the need for caution when considering Augustine’s influence on Alcuin’s ideas of peace. 
Ibid., p. 150. He draws attention to the variety of concepts of pax that Alcuin deployed in his 
writing. Ibid., pp. 150-151. Clearly, depending on the type of writing, Augustine also had to employ 
different concepts of pax. What is important for purposes of my research, however, is that Alcuin 
makes it clear time and again in his address to the Carolingian rulers that Charlemagne and his sons 
are capable of bringing about vera pax in an Augustinian sense. This is supported even by Kershaw 
2011, p. 152. Wallace-Hadrill is again more cautious in his reading of Alcuin’s conception of pax. 
Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 104. He simply writes that for Alcuin pax “[...] is the condition achieved 
by a people that is God-centred [...]” and relates Alcuin’s pax to Augustine’s representations in the 
De civitate Dei of the imperator felix. Ibid. The pax of the imperator felix, however, is without 
question “peace” in its natural sense. Augustine’s influence on Alcuin’s Paxidee is furthermore 
confirmed by Anton 1968, pp. 99-101. In view of the prominence of the concept of pax (and its 
derivatives, notably pacificus) in Alcuin’s letters to the ruler(s), Kershaw is probably right to 
assume that, although “[...] there was almost certainly no single impetus [...]” behind the strong 
emphasis upon peace at Charlemagne’s court in the 780s and 790s, “[...] its particularly political 
application [...] may have come from Alcuin and his circle.” Kershaw 2011, pp. 141, 145. 
481 Dum vestrae potentiae gloriosam sublimitatem non periturae Chaldeis flammis Hierusalem 
imperare scio, sed perpetuae pacis civitatem pretioso sanguine Christi constructam regere atque 
gubernare, cuius lapides vivi de caritatis glutino colliguntur et caelestis aedificii ad altitudinem ex 
diversis virtutum gemmis muri consurgunt [...]. Epist. 198, p. 327, lin. 2. 
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Alcuin terms Charlemagne’s ‘state’ perpetuae pacis civitas (“city of eternal 
peace”), which comes very close to a city of God realised on earth. In any case, in 
this passage Charlemagne’s civitas is shown to be clearly superior to Old 
Testament Jerusalem, which is referred to as condemned to certain destruction.482 
This implies that Alcuin thinks of Charlemagne’s reign as ranking higher than that 
of the Old Testament kings. Alcuin considers himself to be a member of 
Charlemagne’s perpetuae pacis civitas when he asserts: “[…] I, some insignificant 
part of this city […]” (ego, minima quaedam huius civitatis portio).483 
This is not the only case where Alcuin alludes to the civitas Dei when 
talking about the Carolingian ‘state’. Like Epist. 198, Epist. 139 also contains both 
a powerful link between Charlemagne and the Old Testament kings David and 
Solomon and a direct association of Charlemagne’s realm with the civitas Dei.484 
The epistle is addressed to Paulinus II of Aquileia, who was greatly concerned with 
the unity of Catholic doctrine. From 792 onwards he took action against 
Adoptionism (taught by, among others, the Spanish bishops Felix of Urgel and 
Elipandus of Toledo) by writing a book that was sent to Spain and taking part in 
the councils of Regensburg (792), Frankfurt (794) and Cividale (796/797). Besides 
his involvement against heresy, he elaborated on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. 
Epist. 139 conveys Alcuin’s admiration and respect for Paulinus’ efforts and 
provides encouragement and support. While the letter includes some notes on the 
Trinity, it first and foremost calls attention to the prominence of Paulinus as an 
                                                
482 Wallace-Hadrill writes of the Carolingian perception of kingship and empire in the ninth century 
that “what could happen in the Old Israel could equally happen in its successor, the New Israel”; 
this clearly did not apply under Charlemagne. Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 125. 
483 Epist. 198, p. 327, lin. 2. 
484 Epist. 139, pp. 220-222. 
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advocate of the integrity of Catholicism. In the conclusion of Epist. 139, Paulinus 
is even represented as the primary defender of the Catholic ‘church’, on whose 
victory the entire Christian community, including its leader, relies. In these lines, 
Paulinus appears as the guardian of the doors of the civitas Dei as well as the 
holder of the clavis Daviticae potentiae (“key of David’s power”). Immediately 
afterwards Alcuin declares that he himself will pray, while waiting together with 
King David in the safest tower of the civitas, until Paulinus has succeeded against 
the heretics. In the following paragraph Charlemagne is then paralleled with King 
Solomon. The passage is as follows: 
 
But it is your task, excellent shepherd of the flock and guardian of the 
doors of the city of God, who hold the key of David’s power in your right 
hand, and keep hidden five most limpid stones in your left, to crush with 
one blow of truth all those Philistines485 blaspheming in the name of the 
most arrogant Goliath against the army of the living God. 
It is our task together with Moses486 with hands elevated towards the sky, 
to assist you with prayers of humility and to watch with David in the safest 
tower of the city, until the look-out, calling from the high top of the 
mountain, announces to us your victory. 
The eyes of all who wish to hear anything of your exceptionally rich 
heavenly speech are directed towards you: and they observe that through 
                                                
485 On Alcuin’s use of Philistia as the antithesis of Francia and the evocation of Charlemagne as the 
peaceful King Solomon see Kershaw 2011, p. 146. 
486 One might assume that Moses here alludes to Charlemagne, since Moyse was one of the 
pseudonyms Alcuin used for him. Fleckenstein 1967, pp. 43-46. However, this might just be a 
figure of speech Alcuin avails himself of when he refers to the act of praying. In Epist. 93, a letter 
addressed to Pope Leo III (written by Alcuin on behalf of Charlemagne), the figure “elevatis ad 
Deum cum Moyse manibus” appears instead of “elevatis cum Moyse manibus in caelum” when 
Alcuin compares the responsibilities of the pope to those of the king. Since Epist. 93 is composed in 
Charlemagne’s name, Moses cannot represent Charlemagne there. Epist. 93, p. 137, lin. 34. 
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you the coldest stones of the hailstorm, which are not afraid of striking the 
crown of the wisest Solomon, are melted very swiftly by the burning sun 
of wisdom.487 
 
Charlemagne’s ‘state’ is pictured as the perfect Christian community of the civitas 
Dei on earth, which is defended by Paulinus from ungodly outside attackers, the 
heretics.488 According to Alcuin, he is the man who knows best the doctrine of 
Catholic faith and is therefore the legitimate protector of the power of the ruler of 
the civitas Dei, Charlemagne (in the person of an Old Testament king). Alcuin’s 
statement that he himself is situated in the fortress of the city together with King 
David and the subsequent comment that the assaulters would not even stop before 
the king, the “wisest Solomon”, are sure indications that Charlemagne is meant as 
the ruler of the civitas Dei. 
That Alcuin presents the Carolingians and their ‘state’ as an exception – i.e. 
the rulers as superior in Christian morals to the most respectable Christian Roman 
emperors and their ‘state’ as ranking higher than Old Testament Jerusalem – would 
have as a logical consequence that Alcuin thinks of the Frankish nation as a people 
chosen by God. In her article “The Franks as the New Israel? Education for an 
Identity from Pippin to Charlemagne” Garrison has taken a critical look at the 
                                                
487 Sed tuum est, pastor electe gregis et custos portarum civitatis Dei, qui clavem Daviticae 
potentiae dextera tenes, et quinque lapides limpidissimos laeva recondis, blasphemantes exercitum 
Dei viventis Philistaeos in superbissimo Goliath uno veritatis ictu totos conterere. 
Nostrum est elevatis cum Moyse manibus in caelum, humilitatis precibus te adiuvare et spectare 
cum David in munitissima civitatis turre, donec speculator ex alto culminis fastigio clamitans nobis 
tuam adnunciet victoriam. 
Ad te omnium aspiciunt oculi aliquid de tuo affluentissimo eloquio caeleste desiderantes audire: et 
ferventissimo sapientiae sole frigidissimos grandinum lapides, qui culmina sapientissimi Salomonis 
ferire non metuunt, per te citius resolvi spectantes. Epist. 139, p. 221, lin. 34-p. 222, lin. 3. 
488 In his investigation of Alcuin’s theological conception of pax (“peace”) Anton notes: “Haeresien 
und Schismata verhindern den wahren Frieden; wie für Augustin ist für Alcuin der Haeretiker der 
Feind des Friedens.” Anton 1968, p. 100. 
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evolution of the concept of election by God among the Franks.489 She traces its 
origin back to the Bible and defines the method – typological thought – necessary 
to apply this idea. Garrison shows that the Carolingians, from the mid-eighth 
century onward, increasingly made typological comparisons.490 The essence of 
Garrison’s argument is that the first authors to create the most expressive 
representations of the Carolingians as the people of God were non-Franks: the 
popes (Zacharias, Stephen II, Leo III) and then the insular emigrés in the mid-780s 
and 790s.491 The typological comparisons examined by Garrison also include Old 
Testament parallels to the kings David and Solomon.492 Alcuin is treated towards 
the end of her article as one of the most prominent devisers of typological 
images.493 Garrison maintains that by the 790s the Bible had become authoritative 
to the extent that Biblical law could be applied to the Franks (as claimed in the 
prologue of the Admonitio Generalis of 789), and Charlemagne could not only be 
equated to King David but even be named David. In this context Garrison mentions 
Alcuin’s Epist. 229, a very late piece of correspondence with the emperor.494 She 
explains: “In 801, after Charlemagne had been addressed as David for the better 
part of a decade, and after Alcuin and Theodulf had likened his wisdom to 
Solomon’s, Alcuin dared to fuse the beata gens of the Old Testament with the 
blessed res publica of the famous Platonic proverb that asserted that ‘states’ would 
                                                
489 Garrison 2000, pp. 114-161. 
490 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
491 Ibid., pp. 120, 123. 
492 Ibid., pp. 122, 153-161. 
493 Ibid., pp. 156-161. 
494 Epist. 229, pp. 372-374. 
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be blessed if their kings were philosophers or philosophers were their kings.”495 
Afterward, the relevant passage from Epist. 229 is quoted: 
 
Blessed is the nation, for which divine clemency provided such a pious 
and prudent ruler. 
Happy is the people, which is led by a wise and pious leader; just as one 
can read in the well-known Platonic proverb which says that realms are 
happy, if philosophers, that is lovers of wisdom, have royal power, or if 
kings study philosophy. 
Since nothing in this world can be compared to wisdom. […] 
Since it is solely true of wisdom, that it will bring about eternally blessed 
days.496 
 
That Alcuin prefaces the proverb with the phrases beata gens and felix populus, 
Garrison observes, clearly connects Alcuin’s passage with the two verses (Beata 
gens cuius est Dominus Deus eius497 and beatus populus cuius Dominus Deus 
eius498) of Psalms 32 and 143, referring to the blessed nation of Israel.499 Garrison 
rightly says that in Epist. 229 Alcuin intimates that the Carolingians under 
Charlemagne will achieve the same eternal blessedness as the chosen people of the 
                                                
495 Garrison 2000, pp. 159. She uses “blessed” when referring to Plat. Rep. 5.473e, although Plato’s 
verb is εὐδαιµονῶ, which means “I am prosperous/well off/truly happy” rather than “I am blessed”. 
LSJ 1996 (s.v. εὐδαιµονῶ), p. 708. 
496 Beata gens, cui divina clementia tam pium et prudentem previdebat rectorem. 
Felix populus, qui sapiente et pio regitur principe; sicut in illo Platonico legitur proverbio dicente 
felicia esse regna, si philosophi, id est amatores sapientiae, regnarent, vel reges philosophiae 
studerent. 
Quia nihil sapientiae in hoc mundo conparari poterit. […] 
Quia solummodo vera est sapientia, quae beatos aeternos efficiet dies. Epist. 229, p. 373, lin. 1-7. 
497 Ps 32:12. 
498 Ps 143:15. 
499 Garrison 2000, pp. 160. 
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Old Testament achieved. She also correctly stresses: “[…] the traditional exegesis 
of beata gens interpreted the beata gens as the heavenly Jerusalem or else the 
Christian people generally, but never as approximating any secular political entity 
as Alcuin seems to do.” Here Augustine’s Enarrationes in psalmos I-L appear as a 
reference among others.500 But then a statement made at the very end of the text 
attenuates Garrison’s argument. She points out that the cited paragraph from Epist. 
229 introduces Alcuin’s request for retirement and thus was composed by Alcuin 
for the explicit purpose of flattering the emperor. Her words are: “Thus, what 
appears to be the grandest equation of all between the Franks and the chosen 
people is flattery addressed only to Charlemagne”.501 
However, Garrison overlooks the much earlier letter Epist. 41, which first 
gives the pseudonym David to the king.502 This writing testifies that Alcuin already 
made the equation of Charlemagne’s people with the people of God after the king 
had taken up residence at Aachen in 794. This epistle does not contain any appeal 
on Alcuin’s part comparable to that made in Epist. 229. Yet the wording here is 
even closer to that of the verses of the Psalms, when it says: “Beata gens, cuius est 
dominus Deus eorum: et beatus populus tali rectore exaltatus et tali praedicatore 
munitus […].”503 The lines include the expressions beata gens as well as beatus 
populus. What is more, the following sentence begins with: “Ita et David olim 
praecedentis populi rex a Deo electus et Deo dilectus […].”504 This rather suggests 
that the passage alluding to the Psalms refers directly to Charlemagne’s realm, 
                                                
500 Ibid. 
501 Garrison 2000, pp. 161. 
502 Epist. 41, pp. 84-85. 
503 Ibid., p. 84, lin. 12. 
504 Ibid., p. 84, lin. 14. 
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since it is only after that that the comparison is made to the former “people of God” 
ruled by King David. 
A letter already mentioned in the first section of this chapter, dealing 
specifically with the problems and complexities of subjugation, Christianisation 
and the process of conversion (inter alia exhorting the king to go about conversion 
using more lenient means), further clarifies the question of the “chosen” status of 
the Frankish people: in Epist. 110, written to Charlemagne (and to “the preachers 
of the words of the holy God”505), it becomes evident that Alcuin sees the 
Carolingian ‘state’ more than anything else as a godly realm.506 The address to the 
king discloses that Alcuin wishes Charlemagne success in his political duties only 
as far as they agree with the doctrine of the Catholic ‘church’. The letter 
commences with: 
 
The humble young son of the holy mother ‘church’, Albinus, wishes to the 
most excellent master Charles, devoted to every honour of Christ, king of 
Germania, Gaul and Italy, and to the public preachers of the words of the 
holy God, every blessing towards eternal glory in Christ.507 
 
The following lines emphasise even more Charlemagne’s function as an executor 
of God’s plan.508 Alcuin expresses his gratitude towards God, who granted 
Charlemagne the strong will to expand the Christianitatis regnum (“realm of 
                                                
505 Epist. 110, p. 157, lin. 1. 
506 Ibid., pp. 157-159. 
507 DOMINO EXCELLENTISSIMO ET IN OMNI CHRISTI HONORE DEVOTISSIMO 
CAROLO, REGI GERMANIAE GALLIAE ATQUE ITALIAE, ET SANCTIS VERBI DEI 
PRAEDICATORIBUS HUMILIS SANCTAE MATRIS ECCLESIAE FILIOLUS ALBINUS 
AETERNAE GLORIAE IN CHRISTO SALUTEM. Ibid., p. 157, lin. 1. 
508 There is at least one other instance in Epist. 110 that reflects Charlemagne’s role as an 
accomplisher of God’s will. 
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Christianity”) – which indicates that he is not yet emperor – by military 
subjugation and Christianisation.509 Alcuin’s words are: 
 
Glory and praise to God the Father and Our Lord Jesus Christ, since He 
extended the realm of Christianity as well as the knowledge of the true 
God thanks to the Holy Spirit – through the devotion and service of your 
holy faith and good will – and led most peoples far and wide away from 
their errors of impiety onto the road of truth.510 
 
Another significant piece of information is contained in these lines: Alcuin uses the 
formulation plurimi populi (“most peoples”) when he talks about the peoples who 
have been conquered and been brought as well onto the right path in terms of faith. 
This expresses indirectly that there must be a certain number of people who are 
disloyal and therefore – at least for the time being – not part of the elect Christian 
community. Elsewhere in Epist. 110 Alcuin confirms: “But since election with 
regard to those seems not yet to have been divine, many of them even still persist 
to the worst in the lowness of a condemnable lifestyle together with the devil.”511 
The chosen status of Charlemagne’s subject peoples is hence restricted to only 
those who are thoroughly converted. To these elect, however – in opposition to 
Augustinian thought – eternal life is guaranteed by their perfected Christian faith: 
 
                                                
509 In support of my argument see the useful summary by Wallace-Hadrill of the obligations of 
Charlemagne as a Christian sovereign ruling a Christian people. Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 188-190. 
510 Gloria et laus deo Patri et domino nostro Iesu Christo, quia in gratia sancti Spiritus - per 
devotionem et ministerium sanctae fidei et bonae voluntatis vestrae - christianitatis regnum atque 
agnitionem veri Dei dilatavit, et plurimos longe lateque populos ab erroribus impietatis in viam 
veritatis deduxit. Epist. 110, p. 157, lin. 5. 
511 Sed quia electio necdum in illis divina fuisse videtur, remanent huc usque multi ex illis cum 
diabolo damnandi in sordibus consuetudinis pessime. Ibid., p. 157, lin. 14. 
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What glory will there be for you, most blessed king, on the day of eternal 
retribution, when all these, who have been converted through your good 
care from the culture of idolatry to the recognition of the true God, will 
follow you before the tribunal of Our Lord Jesus Christ, as you stand 
among the blessed kind, and when from all these the price of eternal 
blessedness is enriched.512 
 
  
III. Alcuin’s Use of Augustinian Vocabulary 
  
 In the following part of the chapter, which is concerned with Alcuin’s 
language and terminology, I will trace a set of Augustinian concepts in Alcuin’s 
source material (mostly in texts already discussed above) and explore Alcuin’s use 
of words relating to them. The selected Augustinian concepts, terms and 
expressions are: the political terms civitas Dei, imperium and gentes (around which 
regna terrarum and the expressions subicere, subdere and subiugare/iugum are 
clustered); the expression in cuius potestate sunt omnia regna terrarum as well as 
the concept of dispensatio. It will be shown that in linguistic terms Alcuin imitated 
the Augustinian political discourse. This does not imply, however, that Alcuin did 
not have his own political agenda. On the contrary, the language and terminology 
Alcuin availed himself of were given a new political meaning. E. Auerbach, in fact, 
was led to similar findings in his linguistic analysis of Einhard’s Vita Karoli 
                                                
512 Qualis erit tibi gloria, o beatissime rex, in die aeternae retributionis, quando hi omnes, qui per 
tuam bonam sollicitudinem ab idolatriae cultura ad cognoscendum verum Deum conversi sunt, te 
ante tribunal domini nostri Iesu Christi in beata sorte stantem sequentur et ex his omnibus perpetuae 
beatitudinis merces augetur. Ibid., p. 157, lin. 8. 
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Magni, where he established agreements in form with Suetonius’ biography of 
Augustus.513 He examined two passages that had no overt political content like the 
extracts under discussion here, but they instead both contained descriptions of the 
relationship of the emperors (Charlemagne and Augustus) with their respective 
relatives.514 While the portraits of these emperors were entirely different 
(Charlemagne was pictured as an impulsive sentimentalist with little self-control, 
but was nevertheless praised for his pietas; Augustus appeared as a contained and 
stern figure, who very much suffered from the misconduct of his descendants and 
punished them severely), Auerbach found correspondences between these passages 
in terms of style, syntax and vocabulary. Auerbach’s method of interpretation 




In Chapter One of this thesis, which deals with the Roman ‘state’ and 
Augustine’s political philosophy, I identified five Latin expressions that come 
close to the English word “state” and which appear in the De civitate Dei, and 
explained their use by Augustine. At their heart is civitas, which Augustine – as he 
himself maintains in the first chapter of Book XI515 – very consciously selected as 
the key term for the city of God (and the earthly city) with which his apology is 
concerned.516 When searching for the word combination civitas Dei in Alcuin’s 
                                                
513 Auerbach 1958, pp. 83-88. Other sources for Einhard’s Vita Karoli Magni were Cicero and 
possibly Tacitus. See De Jong 2009a), pp. 67-69. Suetonius and Cicero are also mentioned in Ganz 
2005, p. 40. 
514 Auerbach 1958, pp. 83-84. 
515 Civ. XI 1, pp. 461-462. 
516 AL vol. 1 1986-1994, p. 958. 
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texts, few results are found. One of them (in Epist. 139), where the civitas Dei is 
directly associated with the realm of Charlemagne who is typified by King David, 
has already been discussed. Two further occurrences are particularly revealing 
when taken as a pair. They appear in Epist. 76 and Epist. 89. 
Epist. 76 is a letter to Bishop Remedius of the East-Alpine diocese of 
Chur517 (the recipient is addressed as Remedius episcopus518), seemingly a friend 
stationed far away from Alcuin (the letter says “Love between friends is certainly 
better than gold and loyalty between distant ones more precious than jewels 
[...]”519). The letter has a motivational purpose.520 The bishop has apparently been 
well and successful (at the beginning Alcuin writes “[...] we are very glad about 
your prosperity [...]”521), and now Alcuin encourages him further by observing that 
God will eventually reward him by receiving him into his eternal realm: 
 
You most diligently pursue what is yours, and multiply the received talents 
of godly522 wealth [...]. 
Now is the time to work, then the time to rest; now the time to earn, then 
the time to repay. 
Act as you should be, so that what you want may come to you. 
                                                
517 Bullough 2004, p. 451. 
518 Epist. 76, p. 118, lin. 13. 
519 Caritas vero inter amicos melior est auro et fides inter absentes praetiosior gemmis […]. Ibid., p. 
118, lin. 16. 
520 Bullough, in contrast, considers this writing to be an unemotional request for prayers linked with 
thanks for gifts received. Bullough 2004, p. 451. 
521 […] multum laetati sumus de prosperitate vestra […]. Epist. 76, p. 118, lin. 14. 
522 Here an allusion is made to the Parable of Talents in the New Testament. Mt 25:14-30, Lk 19:11-
27. Even though the parable in Matthew involves a secular master and his servants and that in Luke 
tells of a man of noble descent (who leaves to a foreign country with the intention of becoming a 
king) and his servants, I here translate dominicae pecuniae talenta in a spiritual sense as “the talents 
of godly wealth” because the letter is addressed to a cleric. 
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Love the one who loves you, until you may deserve to arrive at the most 
blessed seat of the well-known one and say: “Just as we have heard, so we 
have also seen in the realm of our God”, in which there is complete 
happiness and no disturbance, the greatest rest and everlasting 
blessedness.523 
 
The quotation containing the word civitas Dei is drawn from a verse of Psalm 48.524 
Epist. 89 is directed to a bishop in England525 who remains unnamed (the 
salutatory address is Pro pontifici ill.526). He is asked to pass this writing on to 
another bishop in England.527 Again, the text gives the impression of being a letter 
of encouragement. At first the bishop is praised, inter alia because of his concern 
for the well-being of his fatherland and its inhabitants.528 Then Alcuin declares that 
it is the bishop’s work, reward, praise and glory that he can preach the word of God 
with great confidence.529 Alcuin reminds him not to be fearful of tongues that are 
talking idly and are trying to ignite flames together with a rich man clothed in 
purple (i.e. of high office):530 this must be an exhortation to fight heresy. Instead, 
                                                
523 Vos quod vestrum est diligentissime exsequimini et accepta dominicae pecuniae talenta 
multiplicate […]. 
Nunc tempus est laborandi, tunc quiescendi; nunc promerendi, tunc remunerandi. 
Fac ut sis, ut tibi veniat quod vis. 
Dilige diligentem te, quatenus ad beatissimam illius sessionem pervenire merearis et dicere: “Sicut 
audivimus, ita et vidimus in civitate Dei nostri”, in qua est tota felicitas et nulla perturbatio, summa 
requies et sempiterna beatitudo. Epist. 76, p. 118, lin. 18-22. 
524 Ps 48:9. 
525 Alcuin refers to the bishop’s place of residence as the patria (“fatherland”). Epist. 89, p. 133, lin. 
17. 
526 Ibid., p. 133, lin. 14. See Bullough 2004, p. 86. 
527 Obsecro, ut has litteras alterius cartule iubeatis dirigere ad fratrem vestrum ill. episcopum. Ibid., 
p. 133, lin. 15. See Bullough 2004, p. 86. 
528 Multum me laetificavit ill. presbiter de [...] desiderio, quod habetis de salute patrie 
habitantiumque in ea. Epist. 89, p. 133, lin. 17. 
529 Hoc est [...] opus vestrum, haec est merces vestra, haec laus et gloria vobis sempiterna, ut 
praedicetis verbum Dei [...] cum magna fiducia. Ibid., p. 133, lin. 19. 
530 Nullum gladium timentes, quanto magis nec linguas vaniloquas, que sibi cum divite purpurato 
flammas incendere probantur. Ibid., p. 133, lin. 21. 
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Alcuin urges the addressed bishop, and the other bishop to whom the message was 
supposed to be communicated, to get ready to join God in eternity, just as another 
recently deceased devout bishop had done.531 He appeals to them: 
 
Cover with your apostolic clothes the road for Christ’s donkey, in order 
that it [the donkey], carrying the famous one, may proceed towards 
Jerusalem on even foot, lest it [Jerusalem] be destroyed by the Roman 
armed forces, but be continuously rebuilt by the souls of the saints, to there 
lead me, not confident about any rewards, away with you, through the 
prayers of your piety giving divine grace, where we together may say: 
“Just as we have heard, so we have also seen in the realm of our God, 
glorious things are told about you; the realm of the Lord is eternal peace to 
me through your virtue and abundance of all joy in your towers”.532 
 
It is not known from where exactly Alcuin draws the last quoted sentence; it could 
be his own composition or the phrase of another author. Either way, it is clear that 
the quotation once again starts with the beginning of verse 9 of Psalm 48.533 The 
following part, “[…] gloriosa dicta sunt de te […]”, surprisingly belongs to an 
entirely different Psalm.534 The rest of the quotation can unfortunately not be 
                                                
531 Vos vero, verbi Dei doctores, parate vobis locum letitiae, non dico in sinu Abrahae, sed in 
domini Salvatoris aeterna beatitudine, quo translatus est idem pius patriarcha cum omnibus prioris 
seculi sanctis. Ibid., p. 133, lin. 22. 
532 Sternite cum apostolis vestimentis vestris viam asino Christi, ut plano pede illum portans pergat 
ad Ierusalem, non Romanis manibus destruendam, sed animabus sanctorum perpetuo construendam 
[this figure of speech again hints at verse 9 of Psalm 48], quo me vobiscum, meritis non 
confidentem, precibus pietatis vestrae, gratia donante divina, deducite, ubi pariter dicamus: “Sicut 
audivimus, ita et videmus in civitate Dei nostri, gloriosa dicta sunt de te; civitas Domini est pax 
perpetua mihi virtute tua et abundantia totius letitiae in turribus tuis”. Ibid., p. 133, lin. 25. 
533 Ps 48:9. 
534 Ps 87:3. 
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identified, except for the last words “[…] in turribus tuis”, which once more allude 
to Psalm 48.535 
What is intriguing is that Alcuin’s quotations “Sicut audivimus, ita et 
vidimus in civitate Dei nostri” (and the remaining part of verse 9) from Psalm 48 
and “gloriosa dicta sunt de te” from Psalm 87 in Epist. 76 and Epist. 89 both appear 
(next to another brief excerpt from a Psalm which contains the term civitas Dei536) 
in the first chapter of Book XI537 of Augustine’s De civitate Dei. This chapter is, as 
has been said, highly revealing regarding Augustine’s choice of subject for his 
oeuvre and of terminology.538 Here, Augustine refers his use of civitas for the city 
of God back to the (Latin) Bible by saying that it is from these Psalms that we have 
proof of the existence of a civitas Dei; and this evidence gives Augustine the 
motivation for composing his work.539 He adds that, having selected and given 
justification for the subject matter of his book, he is aware that in the following text 
he owes to the reader a detailed description of the roots, evolvement and final state 
of the city of God and of the earthly city.540 The purpose for which Alcuin avails 
himself of the phrase civitas Dei is here fundamentally different from that of Epist. 
139, where Charlemagne’s realm, as a ‘state’ perfect in its Christian principles, is 
equated with the civitas Dei. Epist. 76 as well as Epist. 89 appear less as letters of 
formal notice and official political weight – although this does not mean that they 
are politically insignificant. Alcuin’s primary concern in the letters to these bishops 
is to give support, confidence and hope. In Epist. 89 Alcuin cordially brings the 
                                                
535 Ps 48:13. 
536 Ps 46:5-6. 
537 Civ. XI 1, p. 461, ll. 12, 15-17. 
538 AL vol. 1 1986-1994, p. 958. 
539 Civ. XI 1, p. 461; AL vol. 1 1986-1994, p. 958. 
540 Civ. XI 1, p. 462. 
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bishop’s main commitment – to preach the word of God with conviction and 
assertiveness – to the addressee’s attention. Epist. 76 explicitly stresses the 
importance of loyalty and friendship between distant associates. Both texts display 
the workings of politics under Charlemagne: the success of the ruling elite was 
dependent on consensus, cooperation, good will and on inspiring loyalty in each 
other. The hope expressed at the end of each letter in the promise of eternal 
happiness for the members of the civitas Dei indicates that Alcuin not only used 
this concept politically when drawing a parallel to Carolingian rule, but also 
included it in writings to his peers. This shows that Alcuin wanted to spread the 
Augustinian idea of the civitas Dei among all his acquaintances and wished them to 
participate in it. Furthermore, Alcuin evidently tried to win them over to the 




Another keyword in Augustinian historiography that is worth tracing in 
Alcuin’s material is dispensatio. The concept of 
dispensatio/dispensator/dispensare appears in a number of places in Alcuin’s 
written material, and in almost all the meanings attributable to Augustine, except in 
its composite form dispensatio temporalis. However, it should be noted that Alcuin 
is also acquainted with the regular use of the noun dispensatio/οἰκονοµία as it 
occurs in the New Testament, where one of its two principal meanings is “God’s 
plan of salvation” (in which also the concept of providentia is incorporated). In the 
second paragraph of Epist. 196, for example, Alcuin emphasises that there is no 
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other knowledge except the one which heavenly grace distributed to the human 
race according to the dispensation of divine providence.541 Furthermore, dispensatio 
is found in its literal sense of “(house) management”, “stewardship” as it 
corresponds to the original meaning of the Greek οἰκονοµία: in Epist. 111, directed 
to Megenfried (treasurer of the royal court542), Alcuin writes the phrase “[…] 
dispensatio vineae Christi, id est ecclesiarum Dei”543. As far as Augustinian 
influence is concerned, there is clear evidence of Alcuin’s familiarity with the idea 
of the dispensatio of God as a term for the working of God’s plans (which are 
unfathomable to men) applied in connection with the historical economy of 
salvation. One example is the following sentence at the end of Epist. 159: 
 
However, God’s forbearance, by aiding and steering our thoughts and 
desires, may grant us, since the wish has been prayed for, to come together 
in order to search for the salvation of everlasting prosperity, in accordance 
with the convenience of His [God’s] attribution […].544 
 
Augustine’s more general use of dispensatio in order to define any kind of events 
relevant to eschatology can also be found in Alcuin’s writings. Toward the end of 
Epist. 307 Alcuin explains that the entire Passion of Christ happened through the 
dispensation of godly love/dutifulness. Alcuin writes: 
 
                                                
541 [...] neque aliam esse veram sapientiam, nisi quae humano generi secundum dispensationem 
divinae providentiae caelestis gratia administravit. Epist. 196, p. 323, lin. 28. 
542 Regalis palatii arcarius Megenfridus. Epist. 111, p. 159, lin. 22. 
543 [...] the management of the vines of Christ, that is of the ‘churches’ of Christ. Ibid., p. 162, lin. 2. 
544 Sed Dei misericordia opitulante et gubernante cogitationes voluntatesque nostras, concedat nos 
optato desiderio ad quaerendum perpetuae prosperitatis salutem convenire secundum suae 
dispensationis oportunitatem [...]. Epist. 159, p. 258, lin. 24. 
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Whatever can be read that was done towards the suffering of our Lord, the 
Saviour, either through devilish spite or through Jewish ungodliness, this 
was all the dispensation of divine piety […].545 
 
In this sentence the dispensation is evidently effected by God in order that the 
Passion of Christ as man may be completed. In another letter from the summer of 
800, Epist. 200, Alcuin conveys his firm belief that it was by divine dispensation 
that he had been summoned to become active in Charlemagne’s kingdom.546 It says: 
 
For the means of his service, at the command of divine dispensation, as I 
believe, I, having been called, came to Charles, the glorious leader and 
king of this realm, who is to be named with all honour, […].547 
 
However, as for the dispensatio of Christ, Alcuin deviates from Augustine in that – 
in his Commentaria in sancti Iohannis Evangelium – he makes frequent use of the 
traditional denomination of Christ’s act of redemption as dispensatio. In two 
passages Alcuin unambiguously presents Christ in the function of dispensator or as 
the issuer of dispensatio. First Alcuin maintains: 
 
Thus, the first dispensation of our Lord Jesus Christ was remedial, not 
judicial; for if He had first come in order to judge, He would have found 
no one to whom He could have given the rewards of justice.548 
                                                
545 Quicquid in domini salvatoris nostri passione diabolica invidia vel Iudaica perfidia gestum esse 
legitur, hoc totum fuit divine pietatis dispensatio [...]. Epist. 307, p. 470, lin. 45. 
546 Bullough 2004, p. 3. 
547 Ad cuius servitii facultatem, divina ut credo iubente dispensatione, ad gloriosum et omni honore 




Later on he claims: 
 
Because whatever has been done there with regard to the distribution of 
human salvation, the one Christ achieved all this, the only proper and 
perfect Son of God […].549 
 
The formula of verbi dispensare or dispensatio verbi “(the) spreading (of) the word 
of God (verbally or in writing)”, which is recurrent in Augustine’s writing, is 
represented in Alcuin’s texts as well. In a letter to Charlemagne, Epist. 136, Alcuin 
says when quoting Luke550: 
 
And somewhat later: “Who listens to you, listens to me; and who scorns 
you, scorns me; and who scorns me, scorns the one who sent me”, and 
other things, which are read there about the spreading of God’s words.551 
 
Furthermore, the noun dispensator occurs in Alcuin’s work both with reference to 
God as well as with reference to persons who perform their duties in a manner 
loyal to God. Examples of both instances can be found in Epist. 111 to the treasurer 
Megenfried. In one case it is written: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
548 Prima ergo dispensatio Domini nostri Iesu Christi medicinalis, non iudicialis; nam si primo 
venisset iudicaturus, neminem invenisset cui praemia iustitiae redderet. Commentaria in sancti 
Iohannis Evangelium, Epist. ad Gislam et Rodtrudam, col. 890, lin. 41. 
549 Quia quidquid ibi factum est in dispensatione humanae salutis, totum unus Christus egit, unus 
Filius Dei proprius et perfectus, unus Deus verus et omnipotens [...]. Commentaria in sancti 
Iohannis Evangelium, ibid., col. 857, lin. 19. 
550 Lk 10:16. 
551 Et paulo post: “Qui vos audit, me audit; et qui vos spernit, me spernit; et qui me spernit, spernit 




There is one who receives the gift of preaching; another that of wisdom; 
another that of wealth; another that of any aid, a certain other perhaps the 
gift of some unknown skill from God, the dispenser of all these goods.552 
 
In another case it says: 
 
And you, most faithful dispenser of treasures and preserver of resolutions 
and devoted assistant, firmly do his [Charlemagne’s] will.553 
 
Here, it seems that the man Megenfried in his function as the loyal treasurer of 
Charlemagne, the representative of God in Francia, has also earned the title of a 
dispensator (although only relating to the treasures). Finally, there is evidence in 
the sources that Alcuin in fact uses forms of the verb dispensare (in the 
Augustinian sense), from which Augustine typically derives the nouns dispensator 
and dispensatio. In his Vita Willibrordi archiepiscopi Traiectensis554 Alcuin relates: 
 
But in order that the truth of the dream, while God is dispensing, might be 
fulfilled, which the mother [of Willibrord] testifies to have once seen 
regarding him [Willibrord],555 he, conscious of his will, though up to then 
ignorant of the divine dispensation, thought to sail to these parts and, if it 
                                                
552 Alius est, qui talentum praedicationis accipit; alius sapientiae; alius divitiarum; alius cuiuslibet 
amministrationis, quidam forte alicuius artificii donum a Deo, horum omnium bonorum 
dispensatore. Epist. 111, p. 160, lin. 5. 
553 Et tu, fidelissime dispensator thesaurorum et servator consiliorum et adiutor devotus, viriliter fac 
voluntatem illius. Ibid., p. 161, lin. 19. 
554 Anton confirms the congruence in form between Augustine and Alcuin’s Vita Willibrordi 
archiepiscopi Traiectensis. Anton 1968, pp. 98-99 (note 117). See Rambridge 2003, pp. 371-381 for 
further reading on the Vita Willibrordi archiepiscopi Traiectensis and Alcuin’s encouragement of 
continuing missionary effort. 
555 Mothers were often said to have had dreams about their unborn sons’ careers. 
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was God’s will, to enlighten with the brightest light of evangelical 
preaching peoples slumbering in a long faithlessness.556 
 
The representation of dispensatio/dispensator/dispensare in the above 
passages overall suggests that Alcuin’s use of the concept was both wide-ranging 
and similar to Augustine’s notion of the terminology. Having thoroughly discussed 
Augustine’s specific understanding of the idea in Chapter One and having explored 
Alcuin’s conception above, it is now time to look at the terms 
dispensatio/dispensator/dispensare in a more revealing context. In the oeuvres of 
both Alcuin and Augustine, the noun dispensatio and the verb dispensare emerge 
in passages where the dispensatio (“dispensation/distribution”, 
“attribution/assignment”) of God decides on the election of earthly governors or 
representatives (dispensatores).557 
First of all (and of less concern in terms of content), there is Epist. 272, in 
which Alcuin reports that God assigned him as the leader of a congregation 
consecrated to John the Baptist. Epist. 272 begins with the words: 
 
For the first congregation, which I was given to govern by God dispensing, 
was consecrated to the blessed John the Baptist.558 
 
                                                
556 Sed ut somnii, Deo dispensante, inpleretur veritas, quod mater olim de eo se vidisse testatur, suae 
conscius voluntatis, licet adhuc divinae dispensationis ignarus, illas in partes navigare cogitavit et 
clarissima evangelicae praedicationis luce torpentes longa infidelitate populos, si Dei esset voluntas, 
inlustrare. Vit.Will., p. 119. 
557 In his reflections on the dispensatio (temporalis), C. Müller emphasises that God distributes 
(‘dispensat’) his administrators and governors (‘dispensatores’) to different times and places. Müller 
1993, p. 226. 
558 Nam prima congregatio, quam Deo dispensante gubernandam accepi, beato Iohanni baptistae 
consecrata est. Epist. 272, p. 430, lin. 21. 
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Epist. 174 is part of the correspondence written after the assault on Pope 
Leo III on 25 April 799,559 in which Alcuin repeatedly indicated to the king that he, 
as patricius Romanorum, was responsible for the defensio ecclesiae Romanae as 
well as the welfare of the pope, and was the one authority who needed to act at this 
time of turbulence.560 Alcuin wrote this letter to the king in early summer 799.561 
The text evaluates the current state of affairs and the three supreme Christian 
powers on earth – that of the pope, that of the Byzantine emperor and that of 
Charlemagne. The papal authority is discussed first: 
 
[...] it is the apostolic sublimity, which is accustomed to govern the seat of 
the blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, in the function of a representative; 
but what was done to him, who used to be the ruler of the aforementioned 
seat, your venerable kindness cared to make known to me.562 
 
The above passage shows that Alcuin directs Charlemagne’s attention to the 
present crisis and to the pope’s incapacity for office. Thereupon Alcuin expands on 
the Byzantine imperial dignity: 
 
The other one is the imperial dignity and the secular power of the second 
Rome; everywhere there grows a rumour recounting how impiously the 
                                                
559 Classen 1967, p. 569; Fleckenstein 1990, pp. 59-60. 
560 Ibid., p. 56; Classen 1967, pp. 570-571, 579. 
561 Ibid., pp. 571, 579; Fleckenstein 1990, p. 56. 
562 […] id est apostolica sublimitas, quae beati Petri principis apostolorum sedem vicario munere 
regere solet; quid vero in eo actum sit, qui rector praefate sedis fuerat, mihi veneranda bonitas vestra 
innotescere curavit. Epist. 174, p. 288, lin. 17. 
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governor of the empire of that one was deposed, not by foreigners, but by 
his own people and fellow citizens.563 
 
Here, Alcuin points to the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VI having also been 
removed from office by his own mother and co-regent Irene, who became the sole 
ruler of the empire in August 797 after having blinded her son.564 In second place 
after the pope Alcuin thus names the authority of the Byzantine ruler and refers to 
it as the “imperial dignity” and as the “secular power of the second Rome”, while 
in the following part of the letter Charlemagne’s status is unmistakably defined as 
“regal dignity”. All the more surprising are Alcuin’s remaining words regarding the 
influence of the king: 
 
The third is the regal dignity, for which the dispensation of our Lord Jesus 
Christ set you in order as a ruler over the Christian people, since you 
exceed the other aforementioned dignities in power, being brighter in 
wisdom, being more sublime in your dignity of rulership. 
See, in you alone lies inclined the entire salvation of the ‘churches’ of 
Christ. 
You are the judge of the crimes, you are the guide of the erring, you are 
the consoler of the sad, you are the exaltation of the good.565 
                                                
563 Alia est imperialis dignitas et secundae Romae saecularis potentia; quam impie gubernator 
imperii illius depositus sit, non ab alienis, sed a propriis et concivibus, ubique fama narrante 
crebrescit. Ibid., p. 288, lin. 20. 
564 Classen 1967, pp. 566, 579; Fleckenstein 1990, pp. 57-59. 
565 Tertia est regalis dignitas, in qua vos domini nostri Iesu Christi dispensatio rectorem populi 
christiani disposuit, ceteris praefatis dignitatibus potentia excellentiorem, sapientia clariorem, regni 
dignitate sublimiorem. 
Ecce in te solo tota salus ecclesiarum Christi inclinata recumbit. 
Tu vindex scelerum, tu rector errantium, tu consolator maerentium, tu exaltatio bonorum. Epist. 
174, p. 288, lin. 22-26. 
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In Epist. 174 Alcuin assigns greater potentia (“power”), sapientia 
(“wisdom”) and regni dignitas (“dignity of rulership”) to the king than to the pope 
and the Byzantine emperor, even though his title alone would place him clearly 
below the other authorities. The aim of such representation is to show that by 
God’s will, through the influence and reputation gained, Charlemagne has already 
risen above the status of a king. Since the pope and the Byzantine emperor as 
Christian powers are temporarily suspended and Charlemagne is the only power 
worthy of remaining in office, he is at this moment in time ordained to take charge 
of the protection of the ‘church’. A few lines further down, Alcuin warns 
Charlemagne of the seriousness of the situation by quoting some words from the 
Sermon on Apocalyptic Prophecy.566 In the above excerpt describing the authority 
of Charlemagne, Alcuin avails himself of the noun dispensatio to refer to the 
working of God’s plans. Alcuin uses dispensatio neither in the preceding 
examination of the papal dignity of Pope Leo III nor in the evaluation of the 
Byzantine imperial dignity of Constantine VI, but solely with reference to 
Charlemagne: he thus aims to draw attention to God’s salvific work as underlying 
Charlemagne’s extraordinary power and capacity for rulership. Alcuin confirms 
Charlemagne’s chosen status even before his elevation to his imperial one.567 
 In Chapter One, which was concerned with the Roman ‘state’ and 
Augustinian political philosophy, chapters 25 and 26 of Book V of the work De 
civitate Dei emerged as most crucial in terms of divulging Augustine’s evaluation 
of Christian earthly rule and rulership. These chapters are dedicated to the 
                                                
566 Tempora sunt periculosa olim ab ipsa veritate praedicta, quia refrigescit caritas multorum [Mt 
24:12.]. Ibid., p. 288, lin. 32. 
567 This argument is supported by Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 101. 
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personalities and achievements of Constantine I and Theodosius I, the two 
Christian Roman emperors whose influence was decisive for the consolidation of 
the Christian ‘church’. Furthermore, it was also observed in Chapter One that the 
Christian Roman empire (and particularly the Christian emperors Constantine I and 
Theodosius I) is less rigorously criticised by Augustine – indeed, it is praised, 
albeit within reasonable limits – and also that in his discussion of Christian worldly 
‘states’ Augustine concludes that “[...] the reward for which deeds is eternal 
happiness, whose giver is God to the truly pious alone.”568 This conclusion is made 
in chapter 26, which expounds on the efforts and accomplishments of Emperor 
Theodosius I. Immediately following this judgment, there is a sentence explaining 
God’s dispensation of earthly life and earthly goods – and here, Augustine 
emphasises that among these goods, which are, significantly, assigned to both good 
and evil men, there is in particular the gift of rulership, which God distributes for 
the control of the times. Augustine formulates: 
 
[…] among them [the other things of this life] is also whatever size of 
power, which He dispenses for the control of the times.569 
 
It can be assumed that Augustine’s use of the verb dispensare in this particular 
location of the De civitate Dei (where it becomes apparent that to Augustine the 
Christian Roman emperors hold a superior position among earthly authorities) 
                                                
568 [...] quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Civ. V 
26, p. 240, ll. 26-27. 
569 […] in quibus est etiam quaelibet imperii magnitudo, quam pro temporum gubernatione 
dispensat. Ibid., p. 240, ll. 30-32. 
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inspired Alcuin to apply it in a formal letter to the king where he takes a clear stand 
on the distribution of power in the actual political world. 
Everything considered, it is fair to claim that the concept of 
dispensatio/dispensator/dispensare appears in all the meanings attributable to 
Augustine – save in its composite form dispensatio temporalis. However, as 
opposed to Augustine, Alcuin does make regular use of the traditional 
denomination of Christ’s act of redemption as dispensatio. Still, in Alcuin’s and 
Augustine’s writings, the noun dispensatio and the verb dispensare can evidently 
be found in crucial passages where the dispensatio (“dispensation/distribution”, 
“attribution/assignment”) of God chooses Christian earthly governors or 
representatives (dispensatores). 
  
‘Imperium’ and ‘Gentes’ 
  
Furthermore, Alcuin’s use of the political terms imperium and gentes, 
particularly in one of his Epistolae570 to Charlemagne and in his carmen571 about the 
city of York, seems striking. They are two opposed terms around which the 
following other words are found being grouped in order to heighten their polarity: 
subicere (“to subject”), subdere (“to subdue”), iugum (“yoke”) and regna terrarum 
(“realms of the earth”). The word imperium, which holds the meanings “supreme 
power (of Roman emperors)”, “(military) command”, “rule”, “empire” and “world 
power”, is a derivative of imperare (“command”, “rule (over)”)572 and in the 
                                                
570 Epist. 178, p. 294. 
571 Carm. 1. 
572 OLD vol. 1 1968, pp. 843-845; TLL Online 1900 -, Lemma/Sublemma, s.v. imperium, -ī n. 
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Classical Roman Period commonly carries a connotation that refers to the 
military.573 
Gentes (pl.) translates as “races”, “tribes”, “nations” and is the Latin 
equivalent of the Greek ἔθνη (pl.).574 In contrast to the Greek term βάρβαροι, gentes 
does not have an overtone of “being uncivilised”, but instead implies superstition, 
idolatry and polytheism, as well as the making of violent sacrifices and later on 
also hostility towards the Christian religion.575 From the fourth century onwards, 
pagani (“pagans”) (which has no precedent in Greek) began to replace gentes, 
probably because of the polysemy of gentes and because its pejorative meaning 
was considered not to be strong enough.576 In the language of the councils, 
gentiles577 took the place of gentes.578 In the Latin Old Testament (in the Vetus 
Latina) gentes was initially only used for the non-Jews (while at the same time its 
general meaning “races”, “tribes”, “nations” persisted).579 It was when Christians 
began to dissociate themselves further from both the faithless non-Jews and the 
Jews that they first perceived pagans and Jews as a single entity. However, when 
                                                
573 Another derivative of imperare, imperator, which in the Classical Roman Period signified 
“commander”, “commander-in-chief”, “(victorious) general” (as a title of honour) and “emperor”, 
even more strongly expresses the term’s relation to military affairs. OLD vol. 1 1968, pp. 842-843; 
TLL Online 1900 -, Lemma/Sublemma, s.v. imperātor, -ōris m. 
574 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 140. It should be noted that this notion will here only be considered in 
its plural form because of its different meaning in the singular. Unlike gentes, gens does not have a 
negative undercurrent. Already the Hebrew Old Testament generally differentiated between the 
plural haggõjîm (“non-Jewish/heterodox tribes”) and the singular ha'am, which meant the small, 
elected “people of God” tied by faith and by a blood bond. The Septuagint then further reinforces 
this opposition, using originally the terms ἔθνη and λαóς (corresponding to the Latin gens). Hence, 
the word gens also appears in the Latin Old Testament with reference to the Jewish nation. As for 
Augustine, he uses the singular gens when he talks about both the “Jewish people” (gens 
Iudaeorum) and the “Roman people” (gens populi Romani) (here following Varro). Ibid., pp. 140-
142. 
575 Ibid., p. 141. 
576 Ibid., p. 140. 
577 In Latin, gentiles are “pagans” or “heathens”, which is evidently derived from gentes, who 
usually lived in the countryside. This makes sense, considering that Christianity first formed in the 
cities and country people remained pagan for longer. 
578 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 140. 
579 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Christianity was made the ‘state’ religion, the term gentes became not only further 
opposed to the (true) Christians but also opposed to the Jews and Israel.580 
What I will do below is look at the occurrences and determine the exact 
meanings of imperium and gentes in the contexts of first Alcuin’s epistle and then 
his poem on York.581 I will then elucidate in what way imperium and gentes are 
employed by Augustine, particularly in his De civitate Dei, and analyse the 
correlation between Alcuin’s and Augustine’s use of the two political terms. At the 
same time, it will be demonstrated how the terms subicere, subdere, iugum and 
regna terrarum are often assembled around the terms gentes and imperium in 
several of Alcuin’s texts and that the sender, in so doing, imitates the political 
discourse Augustine shaped in the De civitate Dei (when evaluating God’s 
arrangement of worldly power in time and space), in order to make his own 
judgment about Carolingian rule. Eventually, I will recapitulate the significance of 
the manner in which Alcuin avails himself of imperium and gentes. 
The contents of Alcuin’s Epist. 178 sent to Charlemagne in preparation for 
the imperial coronation are, firstly, that the king’s successes and triumphs should 
assist God in subduing the heathen gentes (“races”) everywhere and put them under 
the yoke of Christian belief. Furthermore, according to God’s plan, Charlemagne’s 
extraordinary power should facilitate the conquering and Christianisation of many 
realms of the earth. For God’s grace presents Charlemagne once more with the two 
exceptional gifts of imperium (“supreme power”) and spiritalis sapientiae latitudo 
                                                
580 Ibid. 
581 Alcuin’s use of pax, iustitia and imperium in the poem on York and the question of these 
concepts’ Augustinian origin are discussed in Kershaw 2011, pp. 148ff. 
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(“the breadth of spiritual wisdom”).582 The gifts of “supreme power” and “the 
breadth of spiritual wisdom”, with which God’s grace favoured the king, stand out 
as being of crucial importance in this epistle, and Alcuin describes this bestowal as 
extraordinary.583 Obviously, imperium refers to a power to which not every ruler is 
readily entitled. Eventually, Alcuin’s conclusion that a ruler so richly endowed by 
God should spare his converted people and defend the ‘churches’ of Christ builds a 
bridge to the Roman empire and to the De civitate Dei: after quoting a hexameter 
from Virgil’s Aeneid, Alcuin comments that it was originally meant to address the 
emperors of the Roman empire. More importantly, he explicitly states that the very 
same line is also discussed and cited with praise in Augustine’s De civitate Dei.584 
By referring to this passage, in which Augustine discusses the sovereignty, 
function and supreme qualities of the Roman power as an eschatologically relevant 
empire and cites Virgil to support his argument, and by making the same appeal to 
the Carolingian king as Virgil made to the Roman emperors, Alcuin places 
Charlemagne and his realm on an equal footing with that of the Romans and its 
emperors. However, at the time the letter was written, Charlemagne was a Christian 
ruler who had not yet received the title of imperator. Examining Alcuin’s use of 
imperium within its context has helped to perceive the equation made between 
Charlemagne and the imperatores Romani regni in this epistle, and to discern the 
fact that Alcuin actually portrays the Carolingian ruler as superior to the 
imperatores Romani regni by indicating to Charlemagne as king that he is 
exceptional because he has already achieved the status of an emperor before having 
                                                
582 Epist. 178, p. 294, lin. 21. 
583 Ibid., p. 294, lin. 21-25. 
584 Ibid., p. 294, lin. 26. 
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obtained the imperial title. 
Turning to the term gentes, we find that it occurs only once, in the opening 
of the epistle.585 The lines in which gentes appears speak about God and his plan to 
use Charlemagne’s strength as a tool for conquering hostile tribes and converting 
them to Christianity for their own well-being. They can be translated as follows: 
 
We have received the writings about your prosperity and our comfort with 
great love and worthy good will, which praise very much the clemency of 
the almighty God, who arranged that you and your loyal people be strong 
with prosperous accomplishments and who placed the enemies of His own 
name below the feet of your power. 
Indeed, God should do this, and should add this, so that He may subject the 
hostile races from all directions with the triumph of your terror; and that 
He may subject the fiercest minds by the sweetest yoke of His love to the 
Christian faith, so that only God and our Lord Jesus Christ be held true, 
worshipped, and loved. 
Your most illustrious power and most sacred will should be involved in 
this extensive striving, so that Christ’s name should be made famous and 
his divine power become known to many realms of the earth through the 
triumphs of your strength […].586 
 
                                                
585 Ibid., p. 294, lin. 14. 
586 Litteras prosperitatis vestrae et consolationis nostrae magno amore et digno favore suscepimus, 
Dei omnipotentis clementiam conlaudantes, qui vos fidelesque vestros prosperis successibus pollere 
fecit, et inimicos sui nominis vestrae potentiae subdidit pedibus. 
Hoc enim faciat Deus et hoc addat, ut triumpho terroris vestri inimicas undique subiciat gentes; et 
suavissimo suae dilectionis iugo in christiana fide ferocissimos subiciat animos, ut solus deus et 
dominus noster Iesus Christus credatur, colatur, atque ametur. 
Vestra clarissima potestas et sanctissima voluntas in hoc omni laboret studio, ut Christi nomen 
clarificetur et eius divina potestas per fortitudinis vestrae triumphos multis terrarum regnis 
innotescat […]. Ibid., p. 294, lin. 10-17. 
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It seems that the word gentes here refers to groups of people that are enemies from 
outside but inferior to Charlemagne’s power. Moreover, these peoples are 
characterised as non-Christians who are on the verge of being imbued with 
Christian principles: as I will argue further down, Alcuin’s use of the term gentes, 
in the sense of non-believers and lower-ranking tribes, owes a great deal to 
Augustine. 
Two passages from Alcuin’s Vita Willibrordi archiepiscopi Traiectensis 
show the terms imperium and gentes as two polar ideas, whereby imperium 
intimates the Carolingians’ supremacy over gentes.587 The first passage, which 
relates the takeover of Charles Martel from his father Pippin of Herstal, reads thus: 
 
Moreover, it occurred that Pippin, Duke of the Franks, died and his son 
Charles obtained his father’s realm. 
He added many races to the rule of the Franks, among them he also added 
Frisia with the glory of triumph to the fatherly power, after having 
overpowered Radbod.588 
 
The second passage celebrating the descent and accomplishments of Charlemagne 
is worded as follows: 
 
He [Willibrord] then baptised Pippin, the son of the strongest Duke of the 
Franks Charles, the father of this most noble Charles, who presently 
                                                
587 This is supported by Nelson 1988, p. 230. 
588 Contigit autem, Pippinum ducem Francorum diem obire et filium eius Carolum regno patris 
potiri. 
Qui multas gentes sceptris adiecit Francorum, inter quas etiam cum triumphi gloria Fresiam, devicto 
Rabbodo, paterno superaddidit imperio. Vit.Will., p. 127, lin. 5-6. 
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governs the empire of the Franks most gloriously with the greatest 
triumphs and every dignity. […] 
For the entire people knows by what triumphs the most noble victor is 
celebrated, or how far he stretched the boundaries of our empire, or how 
devotedly he propagated the Christian religion in his realm, or what he 
effected for the defence of the holy ‘church’ of God among the races from 
without.589 
 
Another set of expressions that appears in Epist. 178 together with gentes 
and reinforces its meaning of hostile, subordinate tribes to be converted, involves 
iugum, subicere, subdere and regna terrarum. The sentence about the gentes also 
includes the noun iugum (“yoke”) once and the verb subicere (“to subject”) twice, 
where Alcuin says: God “[…] may subject the hostile races from all directions 
[…]” and “[…] may subject the fiercest minds by the sweetest yoke of His love 
[…]”. In the preceding sentence these gentes are already referred to as ungodly, 
hostile groups of people who are defeated by Charlemagne: Alcuin chooses 
subdere in the phrase “God […] who placed the enemies of his own name below 
the feet of your power.” Alcuin’s double use of subicere in the opening section of 
the text is a prelude to Virgil’s hexameter cited by Augustine (parcere subiectis et 
debellare superbos), which follows as a quotation further down in the epistle. 
                                                
589 Baptizavit igitur Pippinum, filium fortissimi Francorum ducis Carli, patrem huius nobilissimi 
Caroli, qui modo cum triumphis maximis et omni dignitate gloriosissime Francorum regit 
imperium. […] 
Scit namque omnis populus, quibus nobilissimus victor celebratur triumphis, vel quantum terminos 
nostri dilatavit imperii, vel quam devote christianam in regno suo propagavit relegionem, vel quid 




In Epist. 257590, the letter addressed to Charlemagne after his imperial 
coronation, in which Alcuin makes known his opinion about Charlemagne as an 
exceptional Christian emperor, various forms of the verb “to subject” (subicere) 
also constitute a theme throughout the text, in order to strengthen the allusion to 
Virgil’s hexameter contained in the De civitate Dei.591 Likewise, the verb subdere 
(“to subdue”) features in this correspondence – right next to gentes and subiectio, 
when Alcuin comments: “divine grace […] inflicts the terror of your 
[Charlemagne’s] power upon all the races from all parts, in order that those come 
to you by voluntary subjection, whom the labour of war could not subdue at earlier 
times.”592 
In Epist. 110 we meet the same constellation of words.593 It is the letter to 
the king on the process of conversion. The Frankish people are presented as being 
elected by God to form the perfect Christian ‘state’ on earth. By God’s own favour, 
their ruler is said to have been divinely ordained to execute God’s plan to increase 
the number of predestined members of the civitas Dei by military expansion and 
Christianisation. Alcuin calls Charlemagne the “lover of truth and of the salvation 
of many” (veritatis et salutis multorum amator).594 Hence, Charlemagne will be 
particularly rewarded on Judgment Day when leading such a vast nation to 
salvation. The words gentes and iugum can be found several times in the text. The 
lines in which Alcuin uses gentes, iugum and subdere together parade Charlemagne 
                                                
590 Epist. 257, pp. 414-416. 
591 Ibid., p. 414, lin. 20-p. 415, lin. 12. 
592 Ibid., p. 414, lin. 23. 
593 Epist. 110, pp. 157-159. 
594 Ibid., p. 157, lin. 17. 
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as the glorious executor of God’s will and give an account of his success in taming 
and Christianising the savage Avars. Alcuin’s words are: 
 
The races and peoples of the Avars, terrible by their old wildness and 
strength, He [God] placed to His own honour under your military 
authority: and by foreseeing grace He conquered the necks that have been 
most arrogant long enough by the yoke of holy faith, and He poured the 
light of truth into their minds that had been blind since ancient time.595 
 
In Epist. 41, in which the pseudonym David is first established, the noun 
gentes occurs twice and the verb subicere once.596 In the crucial sentence 
introducing King David as Charlemagne’s analogue, both expressions appear 
together when Alcuin relates: “In such a way also David, once king of a preceding 
people, was elected by God and loved by God and, as an excellent psalmist of 
Israel subjecting by his victorious sword races from all directions, emerged among 
the people as a chosen preacher of the law of God.”597 
The same cluster of words features in Epist. 119, a letter to Charlemagne’s 
son, Pippin of Italy.598 At the beginning of the correspondence Alcuin alerts Pippin 
to the enormous moral obligation he has as a successor of such a noble Christian 
king (Charlemagne) and lineage. He reminds Pippin that God will only favour his 
rule to the same level if he fulfils this obligation. Here again Alcuin avails himself 
                                                
595 Gentes populosque Hunorum, antiqua feritate et fortitudine formidabiles, tuis suo honori 
militantibus subdidit sceptris: praevenienteque gratia colla diu superbissima sacrae fidei iugo 
devinxit et caecis ab antiquo tempore mentibus lumen veritatis infudit. Ibid., p. 157, lin. 18. 
596 Epist. 41, pp. 84-85. 
597 Ita et David olim praecedentis populi rex a Deo electus et Deo dilectus et egregius psalmista 
Israheli victrici gladio undique gentes subiciens, legisque Dei eximius praedicator in populo extitit. 
Ibid., p. 84, lin. 14. 
598 Epist. 119, p. 174. 
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of the terms gentes and subicere. He exhorts Pippin: 
 
And you, most excellent youth, should be eager to embellish the 
excellence of your birth by excellence of conduct; and seek zealously to 
accomplish the will of the omnipotent God as well as honour through 
every virtue; to the extent that his unutterable piety exalts the throne of 
your realm and extends its borders, and subjects the races to your power.599 
 
 The phrase regna terrarum in Epist. 178 emerges in the sentence after the 
one containing gentes, iugum and subicere. It here refers to any worldly ‘state’. 
Alcuin uses the phrase regna terrarum when expressing his hope that, through 
Charlemagne’s power and will, the Christian religion will be spread across many 
realms. Alcuin notes: “[…] Christ’s name should be made famous and his divine 
power become known to many realms of the earth […].”600 A more complex phrase 
containing regna terrarum can be located in Epist. 202.601 At the end of this letter 
Alcuin again expresses the wish that through Charlemagne’s will and power the 
Christian faith might be defended, taught and propagated and the imperium 
Christianum (“Christian empire”) expanded. To this he adds: “[…] with Him 
assisting, in whose power are all realms of the earth […]” (ipso auxiliante, in cuius 
potestate sunt omnia regna terrarum).602 The word combination regna terrarum 
                                                
599 Et tu, excellentissime iuvenis, nobilitatem generationis morum nobilitate adornare studeas; et Dei 
omnipotentis voluntatem atque honorem tota virtute implere contende; quatenus illius ineffabilis 
pietas solium regni tui exaltet et terminos dilatet, et gentes tuae subiciat potestati. Ibid., p. 174, lin. 
10. 
600 […] Christi nomen clarificetur et eius divina potestas per fortitudinis vestrae triumphos multis 
terrarum regnis innotescat […]. Epist. 178, p. 294, lin. 17. 
601 Epist. 202, pp. 335-336. 
602 Ibid., p. 336, lin. 20. 
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here, in the vicinity of imperium Christianum designating Charlemagne’s empire, 
expresses its implied meaning of “all earthly realms”. 
In Alcuin’s poem on York603, we come across instances of both imperium 
and gentes. Probably the most common meaning of imperium in the poem is 
“empire”, “world power” or simply “realm having power over others”. In one case 
imperium stands for the Roman “empire” or “world power”: it says that York had 
first been built by the Romans and that Britannia, then fertile, supported their 
venture rightfully, “[…] in order that it be a public trading centre of land and sea, 
/and become to military commanders a fearless force of the realm, /and a glory of 
the empire and a terror to hostile arms […].”604 In another case imperium refers to a 
“realm having power over others”, when the successful King Edwin expands his 
realm. The poem says: “[…] in assiduous triumphs defeating the hostile military 
camps, /he added to his realm all the races, /[…]. /And already the people of the 
Saxons, the Pict and the Scot, the Briton /went with a curbed neck under the yoke 
of the leader […].”605 
As in the letters discussed above, the plural gentes in Alcuin’s poem has 
(mostly) the meaning of “subordinate races/tribes/nations”. Where the foundation 
of York is described, Alcuin writes: “This one [the city of York], high with walls 
and towers, /the Roman hand founded first, drawing on the native British races 
                                                
603 Carm. 1. 
604 […] ut foret emporium terrae commune marisque, 
et fieret ducibus secura potentia regni, 
et decus imperii terrorque hostilibus armis […]. Ibid., p. 170, vers. 19. 
605 […] assiduis superans hostilia castra triumphis, 
imperioque suo gentes superaddidit omnes, 
[…]. 
Iamque iugum regis prona cervice subibant 
Saxonum populus, Pictus Scotusque, Britannus […]. Ibid., p. 172, vers. 115-122. 
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/only as partners and sharers of labours […].”606 In the second example of imperium 
above, gentes is used to signify nations inferior to Edwin’s realm, which are 
conquered by him.607 In the very same quote one can also spot the noun iugum in 
the sentence immediately following the one comprising imperium and gentes. 
An investigation of Augustine’s use of imperium in the De civitate Dei 
shows that imperium primarily occurs in the books608 dealing with politics and the 
characteristics of Roman power. Only once is imperium found as a 
spiritual/religious concept.609 In many instances imperium is used in the sense of 
“empire” or “world power” and often refers to the Roman empire610 (imperium 
Romanum) and occasionally to other supreme ‘states’611 (i.e. ‘states’ dominant over 
others in power and influence). In one case (chapter 7 of Book XIX612) imperium613 
or imperiosa civitas614 simply represents a sample model of a superior ‘state’ that, 
in order to be able to communicate with its neighbours, first conquers them and 
then together with the peace treaty also imposes its language on the freshly 
subdued “races” (gentes). However, Augustine draws attention to the fact that even 
when this state is reached, peace is not once and for all secured, because enemies 
                                                
606 Hanc Romana manus muris et turribus altam 
fundavit primo, comites sociosque laborum 
indigenas tantum gentes adhibendo Britannas […]. Ibid., p. 170, vers. 19. 
607 Ibid., p. 172. McKitterick, discussing the text and message of the Annales regni Francorum, 
literally uses the word gentes when she refers to the peoples who are about to be taken over by the 
Franks (saying that they will become “appendages to the Franks”). McKitterick 2004, p. 115. 
608 Civ. I, IV, V. 
609 This is the instance when Augustine adapts Virgil for his own argument and says about the 
Christian God: “[...] He sets neither limits of government nor time limits, 
He will give an Empire without end.” (“[...] nec metas rerum nec tempora ponit, 
Imperium sine fine dabit.”) Civ. II 29, p. 96, ll. 7-8. The passage is given greater consideration in 
Chapter One under III. Concepts of Augustinian Political Thought, ‘State’. 
610 Civ. I 30, p. 47, I 36, p. 52, II 17, p. 73, II 20, p. 79, IV 2, p. 148, IV 5, p. 151, V 1, p. 190, V 18, 
pp. 227, 228, XX 19, p. 450. 
611 Civ. IV 6, p. 152, XIX 7, p. 366. 
612 Civ. XIX 7, pp. 366-367. 
613 Ibid., p. 366, l. 28. 
614 Ibid., p. 366, l. 19. 
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from the outside must be warded off continually, and the imperium strives for 
constant expansion. The result is a never-ending cycle of war. This example shows 
that in the De civitate Dei imperium clearly has unhappy connotations of war and 
repression. Apart from this, imperium in Augustine’s work frequently means 
“supreme power (of Roman emperors)”615 and “command”616. What is notable 
about the forms in which imperium emerges in the De civitate Dei is that they 
generally carry a connotation that refers to the military. It is therefore not 
surprising that in the De civitate Dei imperium hardly has a spiritual or religious 
meaning. It also suggests that Augustine’s spiritual community, the civitas Dei, is 
incompatible with any form of military power. In the De civitate Dei the word 
imperium is, for instance, also found in the verses Augustine quotes from Virgil, 
where it says the Roman should govern the peoples with imperium (“supreme 
power”).617 Overall, it can be said that although Augustine does recognise some 
positive contexts for the use of force (e.g. against pagans, non-believers and 
schismatics), these are mainly worldly and therefore have no place in the city of 
God itself. 
Bullough has explored the political term imperium.618 He broadly translates 
imperium as “lawful authority/rule”619. Alongside this more general translation, 
Bullough further refers to a very specific meaning of imperium – “authority 
exercised over other gentes and their rulers”620 – which he attributes particularly to 
early medieval England and to Alcuin. Yet the examples from the De civitate Dei 
                                                
615 Civ. I 36, p. 52, IV 2, p. 147, IV 7, p. 153, IV 15, p. 165, IV 29, p. 182, V 12, pp. 211, 214, 215, 
216, V 15, p. 220, XII 3, p. 515. 
616 Civ. I 23, p. 38, I 26, p. 41, IV 26, p. 178, V 18, p. 224, XII 26, p. 553. 
617 Civ. V 12, p. 213, l. 28. 
618 Bullough 1999, pp. 42f. 




given above (not least the multiple occasions in which imperium stands for the 
dominant Roman power) explicitly manifest that imperium in this particular sense 
of the word was already very much in use by Augustine (and Virgil). McKitterick 
and J. L. Nelson agree that Alcuin (and Bede) used imperium in order to denote 
“power over many subject peoples”.621 It turns out that to both Alcuin and 
Augustine imperium as a term for a ‘state’ is reserved for a power that has 
supremacy over other ‘states’ or, in Augustine’s terms, for ‘states’ that are 
eschatologically relevant. In an article entitled “The Imperial Coronation of 
Charlemagne”622 Ganshof evaluates the significance of Alcuinian political thought 
in the lead-up to the imperial coronation, and treats the meaning of Alcuin’s notion 
of imperium in depth. While Ganshof broadly holds that Alcuin’s impact on 
Charlemagne’s elevation is undeniable623, he sets out in detail the crucial argument 
put forward by A. Kleinclausz, L Halphen624, U. Pfeil, E. Caspar625 and particularly 
H. Löwe and E. E. Stengel626 that Alcuin made his notion of the imperium 
Christianum, which started to appear in Alcuin’s correspondence around 798 and 
was often used by him up to 801/802627, familiar to Charlemagne in order to 
acquaint him with the idea of emperorship.628 In a similar way, according to 
Ganshof and the scholars he cited, this term gradually conquered the minds of other 
Frankish clerics of the royal circle, such as Alcuin’s confidential agents, whom he 
                                                
621 McKitterick 2004, p. 115. She furthermore holds that, especially in the Frankish annals, in which 
the Franks establish their descent as a gens and construct their own history, imperium appears in the 
sense of “rule of the Franks over many peoples”. Ibid., p. 118. Nelson 1988, p. 230. 
622 Ganshof 1949. 
623 Ibid., pp. 10-28. 
624 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
625 Ibid., p. 11. 
626 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
627 Ibid., pp. 11, 14.  
628 Ibid., pp. 12-13. However, as noted by Ganshof, H. Hirsch has shown that already in the late 
eighth century the term imperium Christianum emerged in liturgy as an attribute of the Carolingian 
king. Ibid., p. 10. 
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had sent to Rome in 800: Witto (Candidus), Fridugisus (Nathanael) and other 
monks of Saint-Martin.629 The expression imperium Christianum especially features 
in Alcuin’s epistles to Arn of Salzburg, and Ganshof reasons that another of 
Alcuin’s correspondents, Angilbert of Saint-Riquier, shared Alcuin’s thoughts on 
empire.630 Alcuin’s imperium Christianum, according to Ganshof, corresponds to 
the whole of the territories submitted to Charlemagne’s authority and inhabited by 
the populus Christianus, which is the community of Christians spiritually 
dependent on Rome.631 Charlemagne’s duty is to govern, defend and enlarge it, and 
linked with these obligations is his task to protect faith and ‘church’.632 Ganshof 
specifically contends that the term imperium Christianum has a ‘geographical’ 
meaning, since Alcuin mentions its frontiers and alludes to a territory in some of 
his epistles.633 Ganshof here argues along the lines of Caspar and Pfeil and 
dismisses above all the views of Löwe, who rejected any meaning of imperium 
Christianum apart from a purely religious one.634 In the light of the evidence 
provided above that Alcuin most likely drew from Augustine the notion of 
imperium as a power with supremacy over other ‘states’635, the following theory 
promoted by Löwe and Stengel, and debated by Ganshof, is noteworthy with 
regard to Charlemagne’s acquaintance with the concept of emperorship: one 
important constituent of Charlemagne’s idea of imperial dignity is, according to 
                                                
629 Ibid., p. 22. 
630 Ibid., p. 17. 
631 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
632 Ibid., p. 15. See also Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 101-103. 
633 Epist. 185, 202, 234. Ganshof 1949, p. 15. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Wallace-Hadrill specifies that Alcuin’s ideas “[...] belonged to the insular tradition of the 
interpretation of kingship [...]” and “[...] were rooted in the Bible, in Pseudo-Cyprian’s Twelve 
Abuses, and in Isidore”. Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 100-101. On Pseudo-Cyprian’s and Isidore’s 
influences on Alcuin see Anton 1968, pp. 93, 101, 103, 107. The Old Testament, in particular, was 
relevant to Alcuin’s perception of kingship. Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 105. The argument of these 
scholars is plausible in light of our finding that Isidore drew his idea of imperium from Augustine. 
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Löwe and Stengel, a notion of authority, conceived as a superior royal power – i.e. 
a power of supremacy – which was already familiar to the Franks.636 These scholars 
reason that since the notion of imperium would have been known to the Anglo-
Saxons in this sense of a power of supremacy (in this regard they anticipated 
Bullough’s conclusion), imperium would have contributed to the creation of the 
notion of empire as understood by Charlemagne.637 In other words, Löwe and 
Stengel suggest that Alcuin was particularly successful in making Charlemagne 
familiar with his understanding of imperium because a similar notion of authority 
already existed among the Franks. While this theory may or may not be accurate, it 
is certainly an indicator of the wide acceptance of the idea that Alcuin was the one 
who drew Charlemagne’s attention to the notion of imperium in the sense of a 
power having supremacy over other ‘states’.638 Alcuin then additionally conferred a 
spiritual Christian meaning on this idea of imperium as a notion of supremacy. 
The definition of gentes relevant to Augustine seems to be “less influential 
groups of people”.639 For example, again in chapter 12 of Book V of the De civitate 
Dei Augustine writes when he quotes Virgil: 
 
                                                
636 Ganshof 1949, pp. 12-13. 
637 Ibid., p. 13. 
638 Here I refer to Wallace-Hadrill’s study, the argument of which about the search for the main 
characteristics and elements of influence on the Carolingians’ idea of kingship and their 
understanding of the association between God and the ruler is only partly convincing. Wallace-
Hadrill 1975. While the point that the Carolingian age remained vague “[...] about its heritage of 
‘Germanic’ kingship” is probably the most cogent part in his narrative on pp. 181-185, Wallace-
Hadrill is not clear about how exactly the different elements of influence are to be assembled to 
yield the actual “Carolingian” conception of kingship. On p. 183 Wallace-Hadrill refers to the 
Greek or Byzantine ideas of “divine kingship”, while on p. 185 reference is made to the Old 
Testament idea of the divinely ordained king. The Greek notion of “divine kingship” and the Old 
Testament “kingship ordained by God”, however, are two entirely different categories. In Wallace-
Hadrill’s analysis neither of them is distinctly defined in relation to the Carolingian conception of 
kingship. Statements such as “the idea of the personal sanctity of the ruler [...] comes straight from 
the Old Testament” are thus vague and inaccurate. Ibid., p. 185. 
639 Civ. II 5, p. 58, IV 7, p. 153, V 12, p. 211, V 15, p. 221, XVIII 22, p. 284. 
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Hence, there is also that [extract] from the same poet [Virgil], which, since 
he [Virgil] prefers these very distinctive skills of the Romans – to reign 
over and also to rule over and to subjugate and furthermore to vanquish 
peoples – to the skills of other groups of people, says: some will forge the 
blazing metals more smoothly, 
indeed I admit that they will derive living faces from marble, 
that they will plead their causes more convincingly, that they will both 
describe the movements of the sky with a pointed rod and tell the risings of 
the stars: you Roman, remember to govern the peoples with supreme 
power 
(these skills will belong to you) and to establish morals for peace, 
to spare the subject peoples and to vanquish the proud.640 
 
Here it becomes apparent that the Romans, due to their special achievements, are 
thought to rank above the other races, whose achievements are considered second-
rate. The term iugum (“yoke”) in Alcuin’s texts, in sentences expressing 
authoritative leadership, is reminiscent of the recurring verb subiugare 
(“subjugate”) in the extract above (chapter 12 of Book V641) and in chapter 2 of 
Book XVIII of the De civitate Dei, where Augustine contends: 
 
                                                
640 Hinc est et illud eiusdem poetae, quod, cum artibus aliarum gentium eas ipsas proprias 
romanorum artes regnandi atque imperandi et subiugandi ac debellandi populos anteponeret, ait: 
excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, 
cedo equidem, uiuos ducent de marmore uultus, 
orabunt causas melius caeli que meatus 
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent: 
tu regere imperio populos, romane, memento 
(hae tibi erunt artes) paci que inponere mores, 
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. Civ. V 12, p. 213, ll. 20-30. 
641 Ibid., p. 213. 
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For in almost all races in some measure the well-known voice of nature 
resounded that they would rather choose to be subjugated by their 
conquerors, to whom it occurred that they were conquered, than to be 
destroyed by any kind of military ravaging. 
From this cause it was arranged, not without the providence of God, in 
whose power it is that every one is either subjugated or subjugates in war, 
that some are endowed with realms, others are subdued to those with royal 
power. 
But among most of the realms of the earth, into which society is divided 
for its earthly welfare or rather cupidity (which we call by the universal 
name of worldly ‘state’), we discern that two realms have come forth as far 
the more prosperous compared to the others: first that of the Assyrians, 
then that of the Romans, ordered and separated in time and space between 
themselves. 
For in the manner in which the former was before, this one was later in 
order: in this manner the former rose in the East, this one in the West; in 
short, in the final stages of the former was immediately the beginning of 
this one. 
The other realms and the other leaders I would like to designate as some 
sort of appendages to these well-known ones.642 
                                                
642 Nam in omnibus fere gentibus quodam modo uox naturae ista personuit, ut subiugari uictoribus 
mallent, quibus contigit uinci, quam bellica omnifariam uastatione deleri. 
Hinc factum est, ut non sine dei prouidentia, in cuius potestate est, ut quisque bello <aut> 
subiugetur aut subiuget, quidam essent regnis praediti, quidam regnantibus subditi. 
Sed inter plurima regna terrarum, in quae terrenae utilitatis uel cupiditatis est diuisa societas (quam 
ciuitatem mundi huius uniuersali uocabulo nuncupamus), duo regna cernimus longe ceteris 
prouenisse clariora, assyriorum primum, deinde romanorum, ut temporibus, ita locis inter se 
ordinata atque distincta. 
Nam quo modo illud prius, hoc posterius: eo modo illud in oriente, hoc in occidente surrexit; 
denique in illius fine huius initium confestim fuit. 
Regna cetera ceteros que reges uelut adpendices istorum dixerim. Civ. XVIII 2, p. 257, ll. 2-17. 
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In the quotations of Alcuin as well as in both excerpts from the De civitate 
Dei (chapter 12 of Book V and chapter 2 of Book XVIII), subiugare and iugum 
both appear in close proximity to the word gentes. The term subicere is likewise 
part of the hexameter Augustine quotes from Virgil in chapter 12 of Book V. Even 
the verb subdere has a prominent position in chapter 2 of Book XVIII, emerging in 
the context of gentes, subiugare and regna terrarum. The sense Augustine gives to 
regna terrarum here matches the one Alcuin is acquainted with: “any earthly 
realms”. 
One of the routes by which ancient political concepts such as regna 
terrarum found their way into early medieval texts runs via the historiographer and 
Bishop Isidore of Seville, whose reflections are to a large extent based on 
Augustinian thinking.643 This link is clear in the following passage from the 
Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX where Isidore’s use of regna terrarum is 
documented.644 In addition, the text illustrates how Cicero’s etymological claim – 
regnum is derived from rex –, which is also adopted by Augustine in the De 
civitate Dei645, was passed on: 
 
ABOUT THE REALMS AND THE TERMS OF MILITARY SERVICE. 
Regnum is derived from reges. 
For just as rulers are named from ruling, so is realm from rulers. 
All nations without exception had a realm at their particular times, like the 
Assyrians, Medians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, whose succession the 
                                                
643 See e.g. Leyser 2012, p. 453. 
644 Even though this passage is only one among several possible examples, it is illustrative of how 
Augustine’s political reflections were transmitted from Late Antiquity into the Early Middle Ages. 
To provide a more comprehensive overview of the transmission of Augustine’s texts and ideas 
would, however, be beyond the scope of this research. 
645 Civ. V 12, p. 212. 
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fate of times turned over in a manner that the former [realm] was 
terminated by the latter. 
But among all the realms of the earth two realms are related to be famous 
compared to the others: First that of the Assyrians, then that of the 
Romans, both in time and space in good order and distinct within 
themselves. 
For in the same way as the former was before and this one was later in 
order, so the former arose in the East, this one in the West: in short, in the 
final stages of the former was immediately the beginning of this one. 
The other realms and the other leaders are regarded as some sort of 
appendages to these well-known ones.646 
 
In Alcuin’s sources the more complex word combination in cuius potestate 
sunt omnia regna terrarum647, found in Epist. 202648, has moreover been 
highlighted. The exact same formulation does not exist in Augustine’s De civitate 
Dei. However, three instances in which Augustine uses almost the same wording 
occur within the first five books of the text. The phrases are: “[…] in whose power 
are all realms […]” (in cuius potestate sunt regna omnia)649 and “[…] in whose 
                                                
646 DE REGNIS MILITIAE QVE VOCABVLIS. 
Regnum a regibus dictum. 
Nam sicut reges a regendo uocati, ita regnum a regibus. 
Regnum uniuersae nationes suis quaeque temporibus habuerunt, ut Assyrii, Medi, Persae, Aegyptii, 
Graeci, quorum uices sors temporum ita uolutauit ut alterum ab altero solueretur. 
Inter omnia autem regna terrarum duo regna ceteris gloriosa traduntur: assyriorum primum, deinde 
Romanorum, ut temporibus, et locis inter se ordinata atque distincta. 
Nam sicut illud prius et hoc posterius, ita illud in oriente, hoc in occidente exortum est: denique in 
illius fine huius initium confestim fuit. 
Regna cetera ceteri que reges uelut adpendices istorum habentur. Etym., Cl. 1186, lib.: 9, cap.: 3, 
par.: 1-3. 
647 Epist. 202, p. 336, lin. 20. 
648 Ibid., pp. 335-336. 
649 Civ. I 36, p. 52, l. 14, IV 2, p. 148, ll. 14-15. 
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power are also the earthly realms.” (in cuius potestate sunt etiam regna terrena)650. 
At this point, it is worth looking at the surviving Carolingian copies and 
corrections of copies of Augustine’s De civitate Dei651, which are the following: 
 
L² Codex Lugdunensis 607 (Lyon), saec. VI (lib. I-V), correcturae, saec. 
IX 
I Codex Lugdunensis 606 (Lyon), saec. IX (lib. I [in.]; VI-XIV) 
Λ Codex Lugdunensis 606 (Lyon), saec. IX (lib. I-V) 
F Codex Monacensis (München) Lat. 6267 (Frising.), saec. IX (lib. I-
XVIII) 
K Codex Coloniensis 75 (Köln) (Darmstadt. 2077), saec. VIII (lib. I-X) 
G Codex Sangallensis 178 (St.Gallen), saec. IX (lib. XI-XXII) 
 
These indicate that by the end of the ninth century all books of the De civitate Dei 
were known. It further appears that in the eighth century the knowledge of the De 
civitate Dei may have been limited to the first ten books and the first five must 
have been best known. The oldest manuscript of the De civitate Dei that has been 
preserved, the Codex Lugdunensis 607, from the sixth century, also only comprises 
the first five books. The ninth-century Carolingian manuscripts again show that 
there seems to have been a certain interest in copying particularly the first books 
(up to Book XIV). Maybe Carolingian scribes simply always endeavoured to copy 
Augustine’s work from the very beginning, then gave up part of the way through. 
However, by considering the development of the author’s argument in the De 
                                                
650 Civ. V 12, p. 211, l. 13. 
651 On the transmission of Augustine’s texts in the Early Middle Ages see Leyser 2012. 
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civitate Dei some interesting observations can be made: in the first five books of 
the De civitate Dei Augustine primarily responds to the gradual disintegration of 
the Roman empire and embeds this event into salvation history. He assesses the 
heathen and Christian Roman ‘states’ and expresses particular approval of the 
Christian emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I. Augustine also rates and 
compares several influential temporal ‘states’ in the first ten books and reflects on 
the value of secular power at large and the role of free will and divine providence 
in the transmission of power. In Books X to XVIII the two communities civitas Dei 
and civitas terrena are then properly introduced; their origin is explained, and they 
are characterised and juxtaposed. In the remaining books Augustine transcends the 
present status quo and links earthly happenings with salvation history. Thus, it is 
confirmed that the discussion of the value of secular power and the concrete 
evaluation of specific temporal ‘states’ according to certain criteria in the first ten 
books were deemed to be the most critical contents of the work by Carolingian 
readers. They certainly attracted attention. Alcuin must have known them to the 
extent that he internalized Augustine’s language and reused phrases such as in 
cuius potestate sunt omnia regna terrarum which keep occurring in the first five 
books of the De civitate Dei. 
It has become evident that Augustine uses gentes often in the sense of less 
influential groups of people. Bullough, too, makes reference to the word gentes in 
connection with Alcuin, and the definition suggested by him corresponds exactly to 
that which is relevant to Augustine: less influential groups of people.652 What is 
more, in the Augustinus-Lexikon it is noted that, according to Augustine, gentes in 
                                                
652 Bullough 1999, pp. 42-43. 
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a pejorative sense usually means “non-believers”.653 And here the Augustinus-
Lexikon (s.v. gentes) refers to a particular differentiation Augustine makes between 
the Jews and the gentes as “non-believers”, as, in the course of the fourth century, 
gentes became opposed to the Jews and Israel.654 Augustine takes this opposition 
further. He devalues the Jews in relation to the gentes (arguing that they are far 
more to blame for Christ’s death), seeing the Jews as arrogant, the gentes however 
as somewhat humble, since they will at least eventually open up to the Gospel.655 
Now, if we return to Alcuin and to the single instance of gentes in his epistle656 
(“Hoc enim faciat Deus […]”), we discover that gentes in this context suits 
Augustine’s notion of gentes who are to open up to conversion. 
If we re-evaluate the appearance of the notions of imperium and gentes in 
the vicinity of the terms subicere, subdere, iugum and regna terrarum in Epist. 178 
to Charlemagne, in the poem on York and in other sources, we find that, in 
alignment with Augustine’s understanding, imperium for Alcuin must have meant 
“ruling over gentes” (in the sense of inferior groups of people who will eventually 
open up to conversion). Having observed Augustine’s multiple use of imperium 
with reference to the superior Roman empire in the De civitate Dei, it appears valid 
to claim that Alcuin, by quoting from the passage in which Augustine discusses the 
sovereignty, function and supreme qualities of the Roman power as an 
eschatologically relevant empire, seeks both to link Charlemagne’s rule with the 
Roman empire and confer eschatological significance to Charlemagne. To Alcuin 
and Augustine the title of imperator therefore seems to be reserved solely for rulers 
                                                
653 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 144. 
654 Ibid., p. 141. 
655 Ibid., p. 144. 
656 Epist. 178, p. 294, lin. 14. 
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who have the supremacy over other rulers in power or, in Augustine’s terms, for 
eschatologically relevant rulers. It is in view of this that Alcuin’s equation of King 
Charlemagne with the imperatores Romani regni in Epist. 178 takes on its true 
meaning. 
In one regard, however, Alcuin’s understanding of imperium and imperator 
differs from that of Augustine. As shown above, to Alcuin these notions do not 
simply refer to eschatologically relevant empires and rulers in the sense of the 
Assyrians, whom Augustine deems relevant to the Old Testament (birth of 
Abraham657), and the Romans, whom he considers relevant to the New Testament 
(birth of Christ658), but to an actual people of God on earth. This difference is 
manifested in the single distinction in meaning of the word imperium in Augustine 
and Alcuin’s texts: it has been pointed out that imperium in the Classical Roman 
Period commonly carried a connotation that refers to the military. Similarly, the 
forms in which imperium can be found in the De civitate Dei also almost 
exclusively carry that connotation. There, imperium hardly has a spiritual or 
religious meaning, which proposes that Augustine’s spiritual community, the 
civitas Dei, is in principle at odds with any secular political power. This 
corresponds to Garrison’s claim that Augustine interpreted the Psalms beata gens 
and beatus populus always in a purely spiritual way, i.e. as referring to the 
heavenly kingdom.659 
                                                
657 Civ. XVIII 2, p. 257, 3, pp. 259-260. 
658 Civ. XVIII 27, p. 292. 
659 Garrison 2000, pp. 160. 
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The military usage of the word imperium as observable in the De civitate 
Dei660 is, for instance, still prevalent in Isidore’s Etymologiarum sive Originum libri 
XX. At some point Isidore examines the different titles of Roman rulership and 
reasons: 
 
The name Caesars began with Julius, who, after a civil war had been 
stirred up, was the first of the Romans to obtain single supremacy. 
However, he was named Caesar either because he was carried and drawn 
out of his dead mother’s womb after it had been cut open, or because he 
was born with long hair. 
Henceforth also the succeeding emperors were named Caesars, for the 
reason that they were long-haired. 
Indeed those, who were taken out of the cut womb, were called Caesones 
and Caesars. 
But Julius he was named, because he derived his origin from Julus, the son 
of Aeneas, as Vergil confirms: Julius, the name deduced from the great 
Julus. 
However, the name emperors existed among the Romans much earlier, 
among whom it was founded on the highly important military institution, 
and from there emperors were named from the commanding of the army: 
yet, while for a long time the generals had served under the title of 
emperors, the senate decreed that this name should belong to the Caesar 
Augustus alone, and by that [name] he should distinguish himself from the 
other leaders over races; that [name] from then onward also the succeeding 
Caesars used. 
                                                
660 Civ. I 23, p. 38, I 26, p. 41, IV 26, p. 178, V 18, p. 224, XII 26, p. 553. 
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For it is the common practice to happen that the name of the first leader 
also the future ones possess, just as among the Albanians from the name 
Silvius all the leaders of the Albanians are called Silvii; in the same way as 
among the Persians they are called Arsacids; among the Egyptians 
Ptolemies; among the Athenians Cecropids. 
Accordingly, Augustus is among the Romans the name of the empire, from 
there that they once had augmented the republic by enlargement. 
This name in the beginning the senate bequeathed to Caesar Octavian, in 
order that he may be deified under this very name and title, for the reason 
that he had expanded the territories. 
But at the time when the very Octavian was already called Caesar and 
emperor, or Augustus, indeed later on, when he was watching the games, 
and it was proclaimed to him by the people that he should also be called 
“Master”, he repressed the inglorious flatteries instantly with a hostile 
hand and facial expression and refused the name “Master” like a human 
being, and on the following day he even rebuked the entire people in a 
very grave proclamation, and he thereupon would not even permit his 
freedmen to call him “Master” any more. 
However, he was the son of Actia, who was the offspring of the sister of 
Julius Caesar.661 
                                                
661 Caesarum nomen a Iulio coepit, qui bello ciuili commoto primus Romanorum singularem 
optinuit principatum. 
Caesar autem dictus, quod caeso mortuae matris utero prolatus eductus que fuerit, uel quia cum 
caesarie natus sit. 
A quo et imperatores sequentes Caesares dicti, eo quod comati essent. 
Qui enim execto utero eximebantur, Caesones et Caesares appellabantur. 
Iulius autem dictus, quia ab Iulo Aeneae filio originem duxit, ut confirmat Vergilius: Iulius, a 
magno demissum nomen Iulo. 
Imperatorum autem nomen apud Romanos eorum tantum prius fuit apud quos summa rei militaris 
consisteret, et ideo imperatores dicti ab imperando exercitui: sed dum diu duces titulis imperatoriis 
fungerentur, senatus censuit ut Augusti Caesaris hoc tantum nomen esset, eo que is distingueretur a 
ceteris gentium regibus; quod et sequentes Caesares hactenus usurpauerunt. 
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This treatise on the origin of the titles of Roman rulership draws attention to the 
widespread custom among nations of naming an entire dynasty after the first ruler 
in line. The title of imperator (“emperor”) is expounded by Isidore in particular 
detail: after explaining its emergence in the Roman army, he hints at a Senate 
decision which prescribed that henceforth Caesar Augustus (Gaius Octavius) alone 
should be titled imperator, in order that he could distinguish himself from the other 
reges (“leaders”) over gentes (“races”). According to the old custom, Isidore states, 
the title of imperator was then transferred to the subsequent Caesars. Bullough’s 
argument suggests that the Senate’s idea of the exclusiveness of the title of 
imperator is shared by Isidore.662 It is obvious that Isidore’s terminology is strongly 
influenced by Augustine. However, Alcuin’s understanding of imperium stands in 
contrast to the political term imperium in classical Roman writings, in Augustine’s 
writings and in Isidore’s: Alcuin’s notion of imperium, which gains prominence in 
the correspondence leading up to Charlemagne’s imperial coronation, refers to a 




                                                                                                                                  
Solet enim fieri ut primi regis nomen etiam reliqui possideant, sicut apud Albanos ex Siluii nomine 
omnes reges Albanorum Siluii appellati sunt; sicut apud Persas Arsacidae; apud Aegyptios 
Ptolomei; apud Athenienses Cecropidae. 
Augustus ideo apud Romanos nomen imperii est, eo quod olim augerent rempublicam amplificando. 
Quod nomen primitus senatus Octauio Caesari tradidit, ut quia auxerat terras, ipso nomine et titulo 
consecraretur. 
Dum autem idem Octauianus iam Caesar et imperator appellaretur, uel Augustus, postea uero dum 
ludos spectaret, et pronuntiatum esset illi a populo ut uocaretur et Dominus, statim manu uultu que 
auerso indecoras adulationes repressit et Domini appellationem ut homo declinauit, atque insequenti 
die omnem populum grauissimo edicto corripuit, Dominum que se post haec appellari ne a liberis 
quidem suis permisit. 
Fuit autem filius A[c]tiae, quae nata est de sorore Iulii Caesaris. Etym., Cl. 1186, lib.: 9, cap.: 3, 
par.: 12-17. 





 This chapter has attempted to trace various forms of reference to Augustine 
in Alcuin’s writings. What has been observed is the consistent way in which Alcuin 
draws on Augustine through both direct quotation and through a more indirect, but 
nevertheless pervasive borrowing of concepts. In the first stage of analysis, 
concerned with Alcuin’s explicit use of Augustine, several epistles showed that, in 
the more instructional parts of the content, Augustine is presented as the most 
distinguished authority and as a binding guideline in questions relating to Christian 
doctrine. At the second level of analysis, Alcuin’s texts were examined for implicit 
reference to Augustine in content as well as language. This kind of indirect 
reference is confirmed by the fact that nearly all the letters mentioned in the first 
part on direct reference emerge also in the second part on indirect reference (Epist. 
307, Epist. 136, Epist. 178, Epist. 257, Epist. 249, Epist. 110, Epist. 177, Epist. 
202). This shows that, in one and the same piece of writing, explicit reference 
tended to be used in statements that served to instruct in the domain of Christian 
faith, while implicit reference, below the surface, forms part of an underlying 
political discourse that begins to permeate Alcuin’s texts from 794 onward (after 
Charlemagne’s move to Aachen), when the pseudonym David came into use. 
Alcuin manifestly reinvented Augustine to suit his own project. He availed 
himself of the ideas of iustitia (“justice”) and pax (“peace”) in his correspondence 
with Charlemagne, and in Epist. 41 and Epist. 229 alluded to Psalms 32 and 143 
(including the verses Beata gens cuius est Dominus Deus eius and beatus populus 
cuius Dominus Deus eius), fulfilment of which Augustine had made the 
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precondition for a civitas Dei. Thus, it is clear that Alcuin was well acquainted with 
the harsh and seemingly unachievable criteria Augustine had set for a ‘state’ to 
gain the status of a civitas Dei. Alcuin assessed the Carolingian ‘state’ according to 
these strict criteria, established by the Church Father with the most negative stand 
on worldly rule, to give a positive evaluation of Charlemagne and his people. His 
argument is that, while even Old Testament Jerusalem and the reign of its kings 
had been doomed to failure and the Christian Roman emperors likewise had not 
succeeded in meeting Augustine’s challenge, Charlemagne was the first ruler 
capable of doing so, by leading a people perfectly under the command of the 
Christian God. Moreover, by using Augustinian political thought in order to make a 
positive statement about Carolingian rule, Alcuin resolves the tension in 
Augustine’s argument in the De civitate Dei, i.e. the author’s dilemma between 
approval of the supreme worldly power of Christian rulers and harsh criticism 
towards any form of worldly social organisation, government and power. 
In several instances, Alcuin portrayed Charlemagne as superior to any other 
authority by stating that he had gained and deserved imperium (“supreme 
power”)/potestas/potentia (“power”) and sapientia (“wisdom”), which reflected the 
ruler’s political and religious responsibilities of defending and enlarging his realm 
and defending and spreading the Catholic Christian faith, to a higher degree than 
any past or present political figure (Epist. 246, Epist. 178, Epist. 257, Epist. 174). 
This places Charlemagne’s ‘state’ above that of the Assyrians and Romans, which 
Augustine presents as eschatologically relevant in the De civitate Dei. Throughout 
his correspondence after 794, Alcuin applied the names of the two Biblical kings 
David and Solomon to Charlemagne and/or one of his sons (Epist. 246, Epist. 41, 
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Epist. 217, Epist. 177, Epist. 174, Epist. 198, Epist. 139, Epist. 229, Epist. 148). 
Thereby, he portrayed both Charlemagne and Christ as related to King David and 
linked the Carolingians directly with Christ by using the formula populus 
Christianus (“Christian people”) for Charlemagne and his son’s people as well as 
for Christ’s people of God (Epist. 41, Epist. 217, Epist. 177). What is more, in 
Epist. 198 Alcuin presented Charlemagne’s civitas as superior to Jerusalem and the 
reign of the Old Testament kings, which were doomed to destruction. Also in Epist. 
110, written to Charlemagne (and “the preachers of the words of the holy God”) 
and dealing with the complexities of subjugation and Christianisation, it becomes 
evident that Alcuin saw the Carolingian ‘state’ as a godly realm. The writing 
suggests that – as opposed to Augustinian thought – eternal life was perceived as 
guaranteed for all of Charlemagne’s faithful subject peoples through their perfected 
Christian faith. 
Yet Alcuin did not stop there: he literally termed Charlemagne’s ‘state’ 
perpetuae pacis civitas (“city of eternal peace”) and civitas Dei (“city of God”) 
(Epist. 198, Epist. 139, Epist. 76, Epist. 89) and thereby proposed that the 
conditions of iustitia and pax in the Carolingian realm were not the worldly, but in 
fact the divine forms of these concepts. What is noteworthy about the contexts in 
which these expressions are used is that Alcuin, with this statement, was not 
merely trying to reach out to Charlemagne himself. In Epist. 139 Alcuin conveyed 
his admiration and respect for Paulinus II of Aquileia’s involvement against heresy 
and offered him encouragement and support. He is represented as the primary 
defender of the Catholic ‘church’, on whose victory the entire Christian community 
(including its leader Charlemagne) relies. Paulinus appears as the guard of the 
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doors of the civitas Dei as well as the holder of the clavis Daviticae potentiae (“key 
of David’s power”). Charlemagne’s ‘state’ is pictured as the perfect Christian 
community on earth, which is defended from ungodly attackers from the outside by 
Paulinus. According to Alcuin, Paulinus was the man who knew best the doctrine 
of Catholic faith, and was therefore the legitimate protector of the power of the 
ruler of the civitas Dei, Charlemagne (in the person of King David). In Epist. 198, 
right after addressing Charlemagne as King David, Alcuin contrasted the 
Carolingian ‘state’ with Old Testament Jerusalem (referred to as condemned to 
certain destruction) by naming it perpetuae pacis civitas (“city of eternal peace”). 
Alcuin clearly considered himself to be a member of Charlemagne’s civitas when 
he called himself: “[…] I, some insignificant part of this city […]” (ego, minima 
quaedam huius civitatis portio). In Epist. 76 to Bishop Remedius and in Epist. 89 
to a bishop in England, Alcuin’s primary concern was to give support, confidence 
and hope. In Epist. 89 Alcuin cordially brought a bishop’s main commitment – to 
preach the word of God with conviction and assertiveness – to the addressee’s 
attention. Epist. 76 stresses the importance of loyalty and friendship between 
distant associates. The hope of a promise of eternal happiness among the members 
of the civitas Dei is expressed at the end of each correspondence. These contexts 
reveal that Alcuin indeed tried to win his acquaintances over to the political 
discourse he had established among Charlemagne’s inner circle. Alcuin’s 
programme was undeniably to include – even actively to involve – his peers. He 
made the civitas Dei a joint project. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Hincmar of Reims 
 
 
 This chapter will investigate the significance of Augustine of Hippo in 
Hincmar’s writing. Particular emphasis will be placed on Augustinian political 
ethics besides political thought. Again, an attempt will be made to trace 
connections to Augustine at different levels of the text. I approach Hincmar’s 
material in two ways: by searching first for explicit and then for implicit evidence 
of Augustinian influence. To locate the direct and indirect references in the 
sources, I have used the Monumenta Germaniae Historica and the Patrologia 
Latina Database. 
 In the first approach I will look at all kinds of direct references to 
Augustine, including the mentioning of his name, citation and quotation. The 
second approach will explore the implicit evidence of Augustinian influence at two 
levels: the level of content and the formal level of Hincmar’s texts. Here, 
prominence will be given to the Augustinian political ethics and political thought 
contained in the work De civitate Dei. As in the analysis of Alcuin’s writing, the 
formal analysis of Hincmar’s sources, concerned with Hincmar’s use of 
terminology, will complement the content analysis. It will focus on a number of 
identified Augustinian terms, concepts and figures found in the De civitate Dei, 
which also occur in the Carolingian source material. The meaning and function of 
all these terms, concepts and figures will be defined in Hincmar’s texts, and 
Hincmar’s use of them will be compared with Augustine’s (and, if relevant, also 
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with Alcuin’s663). Particular attention will be devoted to the argument made in the 
Augustinus-Lexikon664. 
 Among the noteworthy concepts, terms, expressions and figures treated in 
this study are: the political terms imperare/imperium and gentes/gentilitas; the 
expressions dilatare and subiugare; the concepts of pax, iustus/iustitia, 
felix/felicitas and felicitas aeterna, beatus/beatitudo, misericors/misericordia and 
humilis/humilitas as well as the figures of the Old Testament kings David and 
Solomon. I will also study the representation of the Christian Roman emperors 
Constantine I and Theodosius I, of Charlemagne as well as of leading clerics and 
theologians who prove relevant in comparisons of selected textual passages. It will 
become evident in my analysis that these terms, concepts and figures appear as 
clusters in similar contexts in Augustine and Hincmar (and every so often also in 
Alcuin). 
 The term sapientia (“wisdom”) will not be discussed in the analysis of 
Hincmar’s sources for the following reasons: as far as Alcuin’s writing is 
concerned, the term sapientia has been shown to be prominent in those letters to 
Charlemagne which have a strong instructional component, and to feature often in 
the author’s personal address to the ruler – i.e. at the beginning and end of a text. 
Alcuin firstly avails himself of the term sapientia when addressing Charlemagne, 
in order to persuade the emperor to learn and promote the Catholic Christian 
doctrine (as propagated by Augustine) and to take note of Alcuin’s opinion. 
Secondly, Alcuin exalts Charlemagne above all other secular leaders by claiming 
                                                
663 J. Devisse remarks that Hincmar was more influenced by Alcuin’s thinking before 860 than he 
was later in his life. Devisse 1976, p. 1354 (note 1). This is probably due to Hincmar’s upbringing 
and education at both Saint-Denis (under Abbot Hilduin) and the court of Louis the Pious. 
664 AL vols. 1-4, 1/2 1986-2013. 
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that he has gained sapientia besides imperium (“supreme power”) or alternatively 
potestas or potentia (“power”), which together reflect the ruler’s religious and 
political responsibilities of defending and spreading the Catholic Christian faith 
and defending and enlarging his realm, to a higher degree than any past or present 
ruling figure. In Hincmar’s writing, the term sapientia features too. Its use by 
Hincmar, as well as its meaning, are, however, less consistent. Alcuin, at some 
point, defines sapientia as “the knowledge of divine and human affairs”665. 
However, apart from this definition, the consistency with which he applies this 
terminology in his writing allows the reader to attribute to both sapientia and 
imperium a separate, clear-cut and well-defined meaning relating to Christian 
political thought. Hincmar’s personal addresses, however, will prove to be much 
less original and rather uncreative, since repetitive. This is largely due to the fact 
that Hincmar has never pursued education and learning for their own sake. He 
mainly absorbed literary knowledge for practical purposes: in consequence, similar 
ideas recur in different works in a similar linguistic form. Moreover, they have 
usually been borrowed by Hincmar from other authors. 
The aim of this analysis will be to examine a range of Augustinian 
influence in Hincmar’s surviving texts. In my study of Hincmar’s writing, I will 
primarily concentrate on his Epistolae for different kinds of explicit references to 
Augustine and on his Expositiones ad Carolum Regem and De regis persona et 
regio ministerio for direct as well as indirect references to Augustine. In the 
Expositiones ad Carolum Regem and the De regis persona et regio ministerio I will 
                                                
665 Divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia. Epist. 307, p. 466, lin. 23. 
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focus on references to Augustinian political ethics and political thought contained 
in the De civitate Dei. 
 Hincmar composed more than thirty-seven works in the course of his life. It 
will therefore not be possible to consider all his surviving works in this study. 
There are at least two other works written by Hincmar which at a first glance 
appeared suitable for my analysis: the De ordine palatii and the De cavendis vitiis 
et virtutibus ad Carolum Calvum Regem. The De ordine palatii was written shortly 
before Hincmar’s death. It is a memorandum directed at King Carloman II of 
Western Francia between 5 August or 9 September and 21 December 882, 
following the death of Louis III.666 It was recorded under the title Admonitio 
Hincmari archiepiscopi ad episcopos et ad regem Karolomannum per capitula and 
became known as the De ordine palatii.667 In it, Hincmar devises principles that 
should help the young ruler to achieve the reerectio honoris et pacis ecclesiae ac 
regni.668 It cannot be proven that Hincmar had Adalhard of Corbie’s libellus de 
ordine palatii to hand when he composed his “mirror for princes” (and Adalhard’s 
text is no longer extant).669 However, the fact that Adalhard’s description of the 
court of Charlemagne existed and has had an impact on Hincmar’s De ordine 
palatii is no longer a matter for debate.670 Hincmar himself mentions the libellus de 
ordine palatii as a source in his text.671 Hincmar’s De ordine palatii initially 
seemed suitable for analysis particularly because of its first part, which is founded 
                                                
666 Schrörs 1884, pp. 440-442. 
667 De Ord.Pal., p. 10; Schrörs 1884, pp. 440-441 (note 103). 
668 De Ord.Pal., p. 34, l. 17. 
669 Ibid, p. 11. 
670 Ibid. 
671 De Ord.Pal., p. 54, l. 218ff; Schrörs 1884, pp. 440-442. 
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on the records he had edited of the Synod of Fismes (881).672 While the second part 
draws on Adalhard’s lost work and contains a description of the composition and 
organisation of the Frankish court as well as of the political administration at the 
time of Charlemagne, the first part reflects Hincmar’s ideas on kingship as a form 
of worldly government and discusses them in a broader context of world order.673 
The language and content of this first section are strongly shaped by the sources he 
draws from – which are the Holy Scriptures and the works of the Fathers. In other 
words, in the De ordine palatii, linguistic formulations from patristic sources in the 
first part exist side by side with vernacular elements from the so-called lingua 
rustica in the second part. Furthermore, King David and Emperor Constantine I are 
mentioned in the text. However, R. Schieffer argues that the quotations in the first 
section are largely drawn from earlier works and that the structure and style 
corresponds to that found in his other texts of admonition.674 A closer examination 
has confirmed that the De ordine palatii hardly contains any thoughts that are not 
already expressed in the De regis persona et regio ministerio, where many direct 
references to the De civitate Dei are made. Hincmar instead draws much more on 
Gregory the Great and (pseudo-) Cyprian. References to the De civitate Dei are 
rare.675 The De cavendis vitiis et virtutibus ad Carolum Calvum Regem is a work on 
the doctrine of virtue and is essentially a compilation of Bible passages and 
relevant expressions of the Fathers. It was written between 860 and 877.676 
However, as pointed out by Schrörs, most of the content is drawn from Gregory the 
                                                
672 Ibid., p. 441. 
673 Ibid. 
674 De Ord.Pal., p. 11. 
675 On the De ordine palatii see the brief analysis of Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 193ff. 
676 H. Schrörs assumes 869 to be the year of composition. Schrörs 1884, p. 388 (note 33). 
CHAPTER THREE 
 194 
Great’s Moralia in Iob.677 This is indicated by Hincmar himself (pp. 102f.) – 
although, contrary to his usual habit of quoting, there is a general lack of references 
and direct quotations in this text. The other patristic sources remain largely 
unspecified.678 Schrörs notes that Hincmar appreciated patristic anthologies679 – and 
probably more of them existed by Hincmar’s time. Schrörs refers to Epist. 76680, 
written by Lupus Servatus to Hincmar, which reveals that Hincmar once asked 
Lupus for a commentary on the Pauline epistles compiled by Bede from 
Augustine’s writings.681 Already Schrörs hints at the lack of originality in the De 
cavendis vitiis et virtutibus ad Carolum Calvum Regem.682 
 In his biography Hincmar, archevêque de Reims, 845-882, under 
“Appendice II: Dogmatique et Patristique”683, Devisse provides a table showing the 
number of Hincmar’s direct references to the texts of relevant authors at four 
different periods of Hincmar’s work: before 860; in 860; between 861 and 870 as 
well as between 871 and 882. Devisse does not identify the particular works in 
which the references to these authors occur. Augustine is one of the authors 
listed.684 The table shows that, overall, Hincmar quotes the De civitate Dei thirteen 
times in his works: three times before 860 (once in Epist. 48, which are the 
fragments of a letter sent to Archbishop Amolo of Lyons before March 852, 
recounting the incidents at Gottschalk of Orbais’ conviction and detailing 
                                                
677 Ibid., pp. 388-389 (including note 35). 
678 Ibid., pp. 388-389 (note 35). 
679 Ibid., p. 389 (note 35). 
680 Migne 119, 536. 
681 Schrörs 1884, p. 389 (note 35). 
682 Ibid., pp. 388-389. 
683 Devisse 1976, pp. 1351-1393. 
684 Ibid., pp. 1358-1363. 
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Gottschalk’s heresy),685 once in 860 (either in the De praedestinatione Dei et libero 
arbitrio686 from early 860 – which is extant – or, less likely, in the De divortio 
Lotharii regis et Theutbergae reginae687, written between March and October 860), 
once between 861 and 870, eight times between 871 and 882 (all these references 
can be found in the De regis persona et regio ministerio from ca. 873).688 The De 
regis persona et regio ministerio is indisputably the work in which the obligations 
of the ruler as a moral authority are most clearly defined, and the one in which 
Hincmar takes the most uncompromising stance towards moral failure on the 
ruler’s part. It is therefore not surprising that this work contains by far the highest 
number of direct references to the De civitate Dei. 
As far as Hincmar’s Epistolae are concerned, I will investigate in what 
manner and with what objective Augustine is formally represented in them. Those 
letters with explicit references to Augustine sent to secular as well as religious 
authorities will be scrutinised, and I will illustrate how Hincmar uses Augustine in 
his arguments alongside other patristic, dogmatic (and legal) sources. 
The text by Hincmar that is referred to as the Expositiones ad Carolum 
Regem is made up of three legal opinions written for the Synod of Pîtres in 868. 
                                                
685 Thus, before 860, the De civitate Dei must have been used chiefly in the context of Gottschalk’s 
heretical doctrine of predestination. The role of Augustine in this discourse will be elucidated in the 
analyses of Epist. 37 (which contains the foreword, conclusion and notes to the Ad reclusos et 
simplices in Remensi parrochia contra Gothescalcum, Hincmar’s first writing against Gottschalk on 
predestination, composed around 849-850) and Epist. 99 (a dedicatory letter for the lost extensive 
work against Gottschalk on predestination written between September 856 and early 857, which is 
an earlier version of Hincmar’s De praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio from the beginning of 
860). For Hincmar’s texts on predestination see also Ganz 1990, pp. 288, 298-299; Marenbon 1990, 
p. 304. 
686 In all probability, the De civitate Dei is quoted in the De praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio, 
because Epist. 48 (from early 852), which is equally concerned with the controversy over 
predestination, also contains a direct reference to the De civitate Dei in a discussion of the role of 
the free will of man in predestination. 
687 The analysis of Epist. 134 (which comprises Hincmar’s foreword to the De divortio Lotharii 
regis et Theutbergae reginae from 860) should help illuminate Augustine’s role in the argument 
made by Hincmar. 
688 Devisse 1976, p. 1359. 
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The first opinion, the so-called Quaterniones, contain all the explicit and implicit 
references to Augustine that can be found in this work. 
Hincmar’s text De regis persona et regio ministerio is a “mirror for 
princes” written for King Charles the Bald. In it, both explicit and implicit 
influences of Augustine can be found. It appears that the art of ruling promulgated 
by Hincmar is imbued with Augustinian elements of political ethics. More 
precisely, these elements used by Hincmar belong for the most part to the political 
doctrine developed by Augustine in the De civitate Dei. This stands in contrast, for 
instance, to twelfth- and thirteenth-century “mirrors for princes” which are usually 
much more influenced by Vegetius. In establishing principles on how to be an 
exemplary Christian ruler, Hincmar evidently takes a moral approach. Moreover, 
the De regis persona et regio ministerio is interesting for my research because a 
dominant theme in Hincmar’s works are guidelines on how to lead a Christian life 
according to certain moral criteria, or on how to govern by adhering to Christian 
political ethics. The genre of “mirrors for princes” was meant to instruct Christian 
rulers. I will base my study on the premise that political ethics were valuable for 
inculcating a sense of common mission for secular power and thus formed a crucial 
part of Carolingian political thought.689 
It remains to be seen what specific moral values Hincmar expected of the 
Carolingian rulers and how he evaluated the Carolingian rulers’ particular 
association with God. This chapter attempts to reveal which Augustinian elements 
of political ethics and political thought found most resonance with Hincmar. 
                                                
689 Nelson 1986, pp. 170-171; Nelson 1994, pp. 66-69; Nelson 1996a), p. 97; Nelson 1996b), pp. 
115-120. The Carolingian notion of unanimitas, based on Augustine’s concerns, is evident in 
Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 105 and is explained in Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 189f. On the purpose of 
the De regis persona et regio ministerio see Wallace-Hadrill 1975, p. 193. 
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I. Explicit References to Augustine 
  
The first section of the analysis of Hincmar’s source material will be 
devoted to locating direct evidence of Augustine alone. It will be examined in what 
way and for what purpose Augustine is explicitly represented in Hincmar’s texts. 
As a complement to the investigation of Alcuin’s Epistolae in Chapter Two of my 
thesis, I will look at some letters from Hincmar that include various explicit 
references to Augustine. Hincmar wrote several hundred letters to kings and 
emperors, popes and bishops. Many of them have not survived in the full text, but 
only in a summary by Flodoard of Reims in his Historia ecclesiae Remensis. The 
approach to the epistles will be the following: a sample letter from Hincmar to 
Charles the Bald (Epist. 99) will be selected for discussion. Its subject matter, 
structure and argument will be considered in a summary. I will show how Hincmar 
integrates Augustine into his reasoning. Following the study of Epist. 99, other 
letters whose argument is heavily based on Augustine will be treated. I will discuss 
their content and explore the relationship that exists between them with regard to 
the direct references to Augustine. 
A general survey of Hincmar’s Epistolae has revealed that Hincmar draws 
on Augustine mainly in his texts against Gottschalk’s doctrine of predestination 
and in his criticism of the divorce of King Lothar II. The reason for this most 
probably lies in the relation that exists between the function of paenitentia in ninth-
century Carolingian legal proceedings and the existing debate over praedestinatio 
based on Augustine. What is more, throughout the Epistolae, Prosper of Aquitaine 
is prominent alongside Augustine and appears as a leading exponent of 
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Augustine’s teachings – especially in Hincmar’s arguments on predestination. 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that particularly in the letters concerned with 
Gottschalk’s heresy and free will Hincmar tends to quote pseudo-Augustinian next 
to Augustine (by using the pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon). 
  
Hincmar’s Epistle 99 
  
Epist. 99, written to King Charles the Bald, is a dedicatory letter for 
Hincmar’s first extensive work690 against Gottschalk on predestination. This was 
written between September 856 and the beginning of 857 but does not survive. 
According to Hincmar himself, it consisted of three volumes.691 The only surviving 
parts are the contents of the dedicatory letter Epist. 99.692 A later version survives 
from late 859 and early 860, the so-called De praedestinatione Dei et libero 
arbitrio. It is a detailed and lengthy report to King Charles the Bald on 
Gottschalk’s doctrine of predestination as well as the Synod of Langres in 859, 
which is rejected by Hincmar. Hincmar himsef refers to this work as a compendium 
of his first work.693 In Epist. 99 Prosper features once together with Augustine.694 
Apart from them and the Holy Scriptures, other influential authors such as Bishop 
Remigius of Reims, St. Paul, Gelasius, Bede, Gregory the Great, Archbishop 
                                                
690 E. Perels mistakenly refers to Epist. 99 as the dedicatory letter of Hincmar’s “zweite Schrift über 
die Prädestination”. Perels 1975, p. 44. According to Schrörs, however, Epist. 99 must belong to 
Hincmar’s first extensive work on predestination, which is lost. Schrörs 1884, pp. 136-137. For 
Hincmar’s texts on predestination see also Ganz 1990, pp. 288, 298-299; Marenbon 1990, p. 304. 
691 Schrörs 1884, p. 136 (note 27); Ganz 1990, pp. 288, 298; Marenbon 1990, p. 304. 
692 Schrörs 1884, pp. 136ff. 
693 Ibid., p. 136 (note 27); Ganz 1990, pp. 298-299. 
694 Perels 1975, p. 46, ll. 2-10. 
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Theodore, Paulinus II of Aquileia, Alcuin of York and Charlemagne are 
mentioned.695 
Epist. 99 has been singled out and will be dissected as a sample letter on the 
following grounds: the writing contains a number of references to Augustine along 
with other, later religious (and secular) authorities. As a result, it can shed light not 
only on the significance and function of Augustine within the argument but also on 
Hincmar’s evaluation of later authorities in relation to Augustine – particularly as 
far as their method of treating and interpreting other writers’ texts is concerned. 
 After the death of Augustine and his adherents Prosper and Hilary (who had 
supported Augustine in the struggle against the doctrine of Pelagius), the Fifth 
Council of Orange (529) endorsed most of Augustine’s doctrine of predestination 
and free will and defended a strict Augustinianism against Semi-Pelagianism.696 
From the late 830s onward in the Carolingian period, the Saxon theologian 
Gottschalk started to preach “double predestination”697, which he based on the 
theology of Augustine.698 His strong position launched a public controversy over 
predestination and free will among ninth-century Carolingian theologians.699 Two 
opposing parties were involved in this controversy: “double predestination” was 
                                                
695 Ibid., p. 45-49. 
696 Tavard 1996, pp. 22-23. 
697 On Gottschalk’s view of predestination see the summaries in Ganz 1990, pp. 288, 296-297. 
698 Gottschalk was a monk first of Fulda, then Reichenau, then Orbais. He had supporters until 866. 
For more biographical information see ibid., pp. 287, 301; Marenbon 1990, p. 304. 
699 See Marenbon 1990, p. 304 and the summary in Tavard 1996, pp. 32-35. D. Ganz notes that 
engaging in theological controversy on a regional scale was only possible because patristic texts 
were easily and quickly accessible throughout the empire. In contrast to these texts, however, the 
treatises on predestination were hardly copied or disseminated. As a result, authors felt the need to 
quote extensively from the work they were criticising. Ganz adds that “the debate derived its 
momentum from the number of participants, not from the dissemination of treatises. These treatises 
were indeed written not for wide circulation but as dossiers for kings, bishops or councils.” Ganz 
1990, pp. 290-291. The paper by Ganz is a compelling study of this controversy from the 
perspective of the Carolingian clerical elite at a time of social crisis. Ganz shows how the debate 
over predestination was expressive of the elite’s different views of social order. By treating these 
views as “ideology”, Ganz illustrates how this elite group defined its role as a “Heilsaristokratie 
(‘aristocracy of salvation’)”. Ibid., pp. 286, 301-302. 
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supported in a more moderate form by the so-called Augustinian party of Remigius 
(Archbishop of Lyon)700, Lupus Servatus (Abbot of Ferrières)701, Ratramnus (monk 
of Corbie)702 and Prudentius (Bishop of Troyes)703. Their position was sanctioned 
by the Synod of Valence in 855704 and the Synod of Langres in 859705. The so-called 
Semi-Augustinian party consisted of Hincmar (Archbishop of Reims)706, Rabanus 
Maurus (Archbishop of Mainz)707 and Pardulus (Bishop of Laon)708 and promoted a 
conditional predestination – in simple terms, a predestination to salvation only (by 
allowing free will). Their view was confirmed by the Synod of Quierzy in 853709 
and partly by the Synod of Savonnières in 859710. A third opinion was held by John 
Scotus Erigena: this was aimed against Gottschalk but at the same time was not in 
line with the orthodox view.711 
It has to be stressed that both main parties in the public debate over 
predestination recognised Augustine as the highest authority in the Latin ‘church’. 
They jointly accepted Augustine’s doctrine of salvation, i.e. the doctrine of a 
                                                
700 See ibid., pp. 298-299. 
701 See ibid., pp. 284, 289-291. 
702 See ibid., pp. 290-291. 
703 See ibid., pp. 289, 293-294; Marenbon 1990, pp. 311ff. 
704 Ganz 1990, pp. 286, 298-300. 
705 Ibid., p. 298; Marenbon 1990, p. 314 (note 69). 
706 See Ganz 1990, pp. 285-291, 295, 297-300, 302; Marenbon 1990, pp. 304-311. 
707 See Ganz 1990, pp. 283, 287-289, 302; Marenbon 1990, pp. 304-312. 
708 See Ganz 1990, pp. 286 (note 20), 289f., 295. 
709 Ibid., pp. 285-286, 297-299. 
710 Ibid., p. 298. 
711 John Scotus’ stance on predestination and free will, reflected in the De divina praedestinatione, 
is summarised in Ganz 1990, pp. 292-293 and comprehensively discussed in relation to 
Gottschalk’s other opponents, Hincmar and Rabanus Maurus, in Marenbon 1990. Scholars seem to 
have differing opinions of the impact of John Scotus’ work. While Devisse supports the view that 
the original and novel character of the work was not properly understood by Scotus’ colleagues, J. 
Marenbon argues differently. Devisse 1976, p. 148; Marenbon 1990, pp. 303ff. Marenbon integrates 
John Scotus into the contemporary debate and shows how members of the clerical elite did not only 
understand and engage with John Scotus’ argument but also shared some of his opinions (e.g. 
Hincmar and Rabanus Maurus). Ibid., pp. 304-311. It becomes evident in his masterpiece, the 
Periphyseon, that John Scotus modified some of the ideas he earlier expressed in the De divina 
praedestinatione according to the criticism he had received by Prudentius of Troyes and Florus of 
Lyons. Ibid., pp. 311-325. 
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universal fall in Adam and a limited redemption through Christ. They also agreed 
that some humans are saved by receiving the gift of God’s grace, while others are 
condemned by their own sins, and that the hope of salvation is limited to human 
life (which means that a man’s earthly exertions alone may have an influence on 
God’s last judgment). However, the Augustinian party supported “double 
predestination”, i.e. predestination to both salvation and condemnation; the Semi-
Augustinian party taught single predestination (to salvation) and claimed that 
God’s grace is offered to all humans due to the universal passion and benevolence 
of God.712 It emerges that the Augustinian system is more abstract, while the Semi-
Augustinian scheme is more practical and more amenable to the principles and 
mission of the earthly Christian ‘church’. Hincmar declared himself to be an 
Augustinian. Yet, although he generally adhered to the Augustinian propositions, 
he failed to see to some extent their logical consequences. For instance, Perels’ 
edition of Hincmar’s Epistolae713 reveals particularly well that in the letters dealing 
with predestination and free will Hincmar quoted generously and without 
restriction from the pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon. As a result, Hincmar 
strengthened the more moderate view of predestination to salvation only, which 
shows greater flexibility with regard to free will but is not entirely faithful to 
Augustine’s thought. 
There are five Carolingian ‘church’ councils that were concerned with 
predestination and that produced capitula on this debate: the Synod of Quierzy 
(853) brought forth four capitula against Gottschalk (the third one is taken from the 
                                                
712 See the discussions in Ganz 1990, pp. 286ff., 297 and in Marenbon 1990, pp. 304ff. 
713 Perels 1975. 
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writings of Prosper).714 Hincmar’s point of view was endorsed before the emperor 
(Charles the Bald). Gottschalk was declared a heretic, deposed as a priest and 
imprisoned. At the Synod of Valence (855) Emperor Lothar I summoned fourteen 
bishops of the ‘church’ provinces of Lyon, Vienne and Arles. Hincmar was 
accused of contradicting the Synods of Africa and Orange. The four capitula of the 
Synod of Quierzy (853) were attacked, and the main positions as understood by 
Archbishop Remigius of Lyon were confirmed.715 These objections made at the 
Synod of Valence (855) are criticised in Hincmar’s two comprehensive works on 
predestination and free will (of which only the second is extant).716 The Synod of 
Langres (859) was held under the authority of Charles the Bald, who requested that 
bishops from the provinces of Lyon, Vienne and Arles meet at Langres in order to 
amend the capitula on predestination made at the Synod of Valence (855).717 The 
bishops conducted revisions, the censure of the four capitula was lifted, and a 
compromise was arranged. The Synod of Savonnières (859) near Toul was 
attended by bishops from twelve provinces. Archbishop Remigius of Lyon again 
made an effort to have his position on predestination, as presented at the Synod of 
Valence (855) and corrected at the Synod of Langres (859), reaffirmed by the 
council.718 But the decision was deferred until October 860, when an agreement 
was made at the Synod of Toucy (near Toul). The synod was chaired by Emperor 
Charles the Bald, King Lothar II and Charles of Provence.719 An assembly of 
bishops of fourteen ecclesiastical provinces succeeded in terminating the dispute on 
                                                
714 Ganz 1990, p. 297. 
715 Ibid., pp. 298-300. 
716 Perels 1975, p. 44; Schrörs 1884, pp. 136-137. For Hincmar’s texts on predestination see also 
Ganz 1990, pp. 288, 298-299; Marenbon 1990, p. 304. 
717 Ganz 1990, p. 298; Marenbon 1990, p. 314 (note 69). 
718 Ganz 1990, pp. 298-299. 
719 On the decisions made at the Synod of Toucy (860) see ibid., pp. 286, 300-301. 
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predestination between Hincmar (the adversary of Gottschalk) and the ‘church’ of 
Lyon. It rejected the doctrine of predestination to condemnation and declared its 
support for the idea of God’s universal benevolence in Prosper’s (and Augustine’s) 
terms. Hincmar was the person in charge and composed the synodical letter. Even 
though Hincmar had the final say in these decisions on the doctrine of 
predestination and free will, his stance was not ecumenically sanctioned. Pope 
Nicholas I, having sympathy with Gottschalk and being dissatisfied with Hincmar 
on hierarchical grounds, is said to have upheld the Augustinian capitula of the 
Synod of Valence (855) and the Synod of Langres (859). On this basis, a revival of 
strict Augustinianism was able to take place in the sixteenth century. 
The main content of Epist. 99 is concerned with the fact that in the capitula 
of the Synod of Valence (855) Hincmar finds himself attacked and humiliated in a 
disrespectful and unbrotherly manner. It is important to note, however, that 
Hincmar is not mentioned by name. Nevertheless, Hincmar observes that in these 
capitula the four capitula of the Synod of Quierzy (853) against Gottschalk (i.e. the 
decisions he himself proposed) are ridiculed and dismissed. The fourteen bishops 
of the ‘church’ provinces of Lyon, Vienne and Arles, summoned by Emperor 
Lothar I at the Synod of Valence (855), did not want to insert the four capitula of 
the Synod of Quierzy (853) into their writings. Instead, Hincmar maintains, the 
meaning of these capitula has been distorted in a manner harmful to his reputation, 
since Hincmar is criticised for arguing against the synods of Africa and Orange. 




Hincmar, bishop of the people of Reims – although the name has not been 
deserved – to the glorious master King Charles together with my fellow 
lords and brothers, the venerable bishops, devoted in prayers for both your 
salvation and prosperity. 
We say thanks to God, who inflames your heart with love of Him and has 
ignited in it the knowledge of truth and the science and love of orthodox 
faith; who has also given you prudence and understanding in the divinely 
inspired writings; and who, by the study and practice of these writings (as 
much as your responsibilities to the ‘state’ permit you), raises with daily 
increase the endeavours of your devotion to the usefulness of His holy 
‘church’. 
In other respects, we repeat the synodal capitula720 of our very venerable 
fellow bishops, naturally of three provinces721, exactly as it is contained in 
this same place and as will be found written further below: these capitula 
have been delivered to you, and you have been given them to read and 
discuss, in concurrence with the custom of preceding kings, for the study 
of the truth to be understood, to our humility in accordance with the 
Scripture that teaches: ‘Ask the priests about my law’, since we read that 
there is also a law of the faith. In these, although our names have been 
omitted, we nevertheless find ourselves by clear designation, reproved as 
non-Catholics and scorned without respect for brotherhood. Also we find 
the capitula722 – which we extract for you from the sentiment and words of 
the Catholic Fathers for the purpose of recognition and below as a 
necessity to be made clear – rejected and abhorred, as if useless, or even 
                                                
720 The capitula of the Synod of Valence (855). 
721 Emperor Lothar I requested the presence of fourteen bishops from the ecclesiastical provinces of 
Lyon, Vienne and Arles at the Synod of Valence (855). 
722 The four capitula of the Synod of Quierzy (853) against Gottschalk. 
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harmful. These capitula, as they have been extracted from us, they did not 
want to insert into their writings, nor were they read by those, in whose 
hands their capitula ended up; but some of the things, which were 
contained in the capitula gathered by us, they have duped into an other 
sense and other words, that they could show that these have to be 
abhorred, other things, however, they suppressed and have thought about it 
in a way as if we believed against the ideas of the holy Fathers in the 
synod of Africa and Orange.723 
 
 After these initial comments, Hincmar complains that, apparently, the 
bishops who assembled at Valence included content from certain XIX capitula 
(either taken directly from John Scotus’ De divina praedestinatione or from an 
extract composed by Archbishop Wenilo of Sens724) into their writings, which they 
presented as originating from Hincmar. Hincmar says that Augustine, during his 
lifetime, had also been the victim of adversaries who had twisted his words and 
                                                
723 Domno glorioso regi Karolo Hincmarus nomine non merito Remorum episcopus ac plebis dei 
famulus una cum collegis domnis et fratribus meis venerandis episcopis, oratoribus scilicet salutis 
atque prosperitatis vestrae devotis. 
Deo gratias agimus, qui cor vestrum ad amorem suum accendit et ad cognitionem veritatis et 
ortodoxae fidei scientiam et diligentiam ignivit, prudentiam quoque et intellegentiam vobis in 
litteris divinitus inspiratis donavit et in earum meditatione atque exercitatione, quantum vobis pro 
rei publicae negociis licet, studium vestrae devotionis cotidiano augmento ad utilitatem sanctae suae 
ecclesiae provehit. 
Ceterum capitula sinodalia venerabilium consacerdotum nostrorum, trium scilicet provinciarum, 
sicut ibidem continetur et inferius scriptum invenietur, vobis delata, quae nostrae humilitati iuxta 
scripturam praecipientem: ‘Interroga sacerdotes legem meam’, quia et legem fidei esse legimus, 
praecedentium regum more ob studium cognoscendae veritatis legenda et ventilanda dedistis, 
revolvimus. In quibus nos, licet nomina nostra sint tacita, designatione tamen effectus velut non 
catholicos reprehensos et sine fraternitatis respectu despectos reperimus. Capitula quoque, quae ob 
notam vobis et infra innotescendam necessitatem ex catholicorum patrum sensibus et verbis 
excerpsimus, velut inutilia, immo noxia, repulsa et abhominata invenimus. Quae capitula, sicut a 
nobis excerpta sunt, suis scriptis inserere noluerunt, ne ab illis legerentur, in quorum manus illorum 
capitula devenirent; sed quaedam de his, quae in capitulis a nobis excerptis habentur, alio sensu et 
aliis verbis tetigerunt, ut abhominanda illa monstarent, quaedam autem suppresserunt et taliter inde 
memoriam habuerunt, quasi nos contra sanctorum patrum sensa in Affricana et Arausica sinodo 
senserimus. Perels 1975, p. 44, l. 17-p. 45, l. 14. 
724 Ibid., p. 45 (note 11). 
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assigned a wrong meaning to them, in order to harm his reputation. Those 
opponents, however, Augustine could repel with his orthodox reasoning. Then, 
after Augustine’s death, there were those who were jealous of the high esteem 
Augustine had gained among theologians and who tried to use Augustine’s 
writings in order to damage his name and enhance their own image. One of the few 
rightful exponents and apologists of Augustine was Prosper, who was able to 
prevent Augustine’s rivals and prove Augustine right with the help of Pope 
Celestine at Rome. Besides the original Augustine, Prosper is a source Hincmar 
recommends relying on. By arguing in this manner, Hincmar indicates that it is 
vital for theologians to read and quote Augustine’s works in the original and not to 
refer to Augustine indirectly by using the words of successors who are discussing 
the doctrine of Augustine. Hincmar writes: 
 
They have also inserted into these same writings [things] from certain XIX 
capitula as though they should be ascribed to us, though we have neither 
heard nor seen anything about them – and inserted them before the 
venerable Bishop Ebbo of Grenoble has delivered them to you, as if 
transmitted by your brother Lothar I of good memory, at the palace of 
Verberie. The author of these capitula we have neither found annotated 
here nor been able to find, though we have researched it a lot. Therefore 
we think, because they have been compiled by the envy of someone in 
order to dishonour the reputation of a certain person (as we often read), 
that should recount a few of the many things which the venerable Bishop 
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Ibas725 has denied to be his in the synod, just as the epistle of capitula has 
now come to light – and as certain rivals726 had already done to the words 
of the blessed Augustine during his lifetime, which he denounced and 
catholically repelled, as much as came to his knowledge. Also after his 
death certain envious people have made an effort to collect a capitulum of 
his own writings – even of those which are presently dealt with – in order 
that they could have superior power to weaken his orthodox and most 
useful doctrine out of envy for his person, and to turn away devoted 
readers from the reading and estimation of him, as well as necessary belief 
in him. St. Prosper has shown in a Catholic and prudent style from the 
delegation to the holy Roman see [occupied] by Pope Celestine727 that 
these fictions of rivals are evidently false and carelessly presented, and has 
most clearly demonstrated that the doctrine of the man who is celebrated – 
and should be celebrated – is orthodox.728 
                                                
725 Bishop Ibas of Edessa. At the Second Council of Constantinople (553) Emperor Justinian tried to 
produce proof that Ibas had denied the authorship of his letter to the Persian Maris at the Synod of 
Chalcedon (451). Ibid., p. 46 (notes 1-2). 
726 By “rivals” (aemuli), Hincmar means the Semi-Pelagians. 
727 In 431 Prosper travelled to Rome, in order to ask Pope Celestine for a condemnation of Semi-
Pelagianism, which was strongly represented in the monasteries of Provence. Pope Celestine then 
addressed himself to the Gallic bishops. 
728 Inseruerunt etiam in eisdem suis scriptis de quibusdam XIX capitulis, quasi nobis debeant 
imputari, de quibus nil audivimus vel vidimus, antequam venerabilis Ebo Gratianopolitanus 
episcopus vobis ea, quasi a bonae memoriae fratre vestro Hlothario transmissa, apud Vermeriam 
palatium detulit. Quorum capitulorum auctorem nec ibi adnotatum invenimus nec, cum multum 
quaesierimus, invenire valuimus. Unde putavimus, quia alicuius inivdia ad cuiusquam opinionem 
infamandam fuerint compilata, sicut saepe legimus, ut de multis pauca commemoremus, veluti 
epistola capitulorum extitit, quam venerabilis Ibas episcopus suam esse in sinodo denegavit; et sicut 
quidam aemuli de verbis beati Augustini adhuc in sua vita fecerunt, quae ille arguit et catholice 
reppulit, quantum ad illius noticiam exinde pervenit. Post eius etiam obitum quidam invidi 
capitulum de eius ipsius scriptis, ex his etiam, unde nunc agitur, colligere curaverunt, ut illius 
doctrinam ortodoxam atque utillimam ob personae illius invidiam vilifacere praevalerent et lectores 
devotos ab illius lectione ac dilectione et necessaria credulitate averterent. Quae videlicet 
aemulorum mendacia ex delegatione sanctae sedis Romanae per Caelestinum papam sanctus 
Prosper catholico et prudenti stilo falsa esse et imprudenter obiecta ostendit et memorati ac 




 Hincmar is outraged by the bad practice of his fellow bishops. He alleges 
that the way in which they indicated the faults of the capitula of the Synod of 
Quierzy (853) was disapproving. He draws attention to the dominical rule on how 
to voice criticism to a colleague. Hincmar would have appreciated a constructive 
conversation with his fellow bishops before being judged. Thereupon, Hincmar 
uses Augustine as a role model of a fair-minded critic. He contends that Augustine 
always tried to be as impartial in judgment as possible. For, whenever he found 
anything that was well said in a text of his opponent, he acknowledged it and never 
attempted to weaken the other’s work by trying to alter the meaning of the content. 
Hincmar raises the question: 
 
How can it even happen that these capitula, which have been delivered or 
transmitted to you under the name of our colleague by persons other than 
themselves, have somehow not been recorded as an offence against us, but 
have been made at the instigation of the devil, alongside other evils – 
which now become frequent in this world – in order to cast discord among 
the priests of the Lord: the devil who both vehemently dreads and envies 
the love among us, when he sees that it is retained by us worldly men on 
earth, which this angelic spirit, refusing to retain, has let go to heaven.729 
For how could it happen that our brothers condemn us thus in anger, with a 
view of annihilation, who always have the dominical rule, on how each 
one must admonish his colleague, before their eyes and in daily use? For 
they understand what is written: ‘Before you ask, do not find fault with 
anyone and, when you have asked, reprove justly.’ For St. Augustine 
                                                
729 See also the comment in Ganz 1990, p. 288. 
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received the writings of his heretics and denouncers most benignly if he 
found anything in them that was well said, and he made an effort to 
interpret several in their right sense, but he did not attempt to divert any 
from their right sense to a wrong sense.730 
 
 Hincmar rejects the capitula of the Synod of Valence (855) also for the 
reason that Bishop Ebbo of Grenoble731 is conspicuously mentioned together with 
the archbishops, while the names of his fellow priests are excluded in the text. 
Moreover, Hincmar points out that, among the named archbishops, the role of 
Augustine is not sufficiently appreciated in the capitula. He maintains that 
Augustine’s contribution in the African councils surpasses that of any past or 
present archbishop. Again, Augustine features as a role model of good practice: 
Hincmar claims that, although Augustine outperformed everyone else in hard work, 
intellect and caution during his lifetime, he would neither have placed himself nor 
would have allowed to be placed before any other theologian. On the contrary, 
asserts Hincmar, Augustine tended to place himself below everyone else and would 
never have allowed any of his fellow bishops’ names to be left out. On the whole, 
Hincmar demands that Augustine should be referred to more explicitly as the 
                                                
730 Unde et fieri potest, ut ista capitula, quae vobis ex nomine confratrum nostrorum ab aliis quam 
ab illis delata vel transmissa sunt, taliter in suggillatione nostra conscripta non fuerint, sed instigante 
diabolo inter cetera mala, quae nunc in hoc mundo crebrescunt, ad immittendam inter Domini 
sacerdotes discordiam sint confecta, qui caritatem vehementer in nobis et timet et invidet, cum videt 
illam a nobis servari hominibus terrenis in terra, quam ille servare nolens angelicus spiritus amisit in 
caelo. Quomodo enim fieri posset, ut sic fratres nostri nos succensorie cum adnihilationis despectu 
iudicarent, qui regulam dominicam, qualiter confratrem quisque admonere debeat, continue prae 
oculis et in usu cotidie habeant? Scriptum enim esse cognoscunt: ‘Priusquam interroges, ne 
vituperes quemquam et, cum interrogaveris, corripe iuste.’ Sanctus enim Augustinus hereticorum et 
reprehensorum suorum scripta, si in eis quiddam bene dictum invenit, benignissime acceptavit et 
plura ad rectos sensus interpretari elaboravit, nulla autem de recto sensu ad pravum inclinare 
temptavit. Perels 1975, p. 46, ll. 11-23. 
731 Archbishop Ebbo of Reims’ nephew Ebbo of Grenoble was the prime mover in the the Synod of 
Valence (855). Ganz 1990, p. 298. 
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highest authority in the Latin ‘church’ and at the same time be taken as a role 
model of good practice in councils by the bishops who were present at the Synod 
of Valence (855). Hincmar reasons: 
 
And on that account we disbelieve that these capitula732 have been made 
by those, because, while the names of the other fellow priests have been 
omitted, the name of Ebbo733 alone is in the same place boastfully, as it 
seems to some, expressed together with the archbishops. And that he 
himself has collaborated on this in the highest degree, as it would make 
sense from the region, that among the archbishops he has also been greater 
and more learned than the others in his way of thinking, this, for instance, 
we find not at all about St. Augustine, who has emerged as greater in 
knowledge and hard work as well as vigilance in the African councils. For 
not only has St. Augustine himself refrained from placing himself or 
allowing himself to be placed before the other fellow bishops, seeking 
personal glory, but has indeed placed himself below the others, even 
though he himself has worked more than the others, just as anyone will be 
able to find in the epistles written to Pope St. Innocent and to the other 
protectors of the apostolic see, if they wish to read it there. And we do not 
read similarly about any of the bishops in any councils, unless perhaps the 
apostolic writings have decided for an evident reason to designate anyone 
of the fellow bishops by name to this affair together with his archbishop, 
such as we read about the bishop of Autun in the letters of the blessed 
Gregory. By how much more this religious and careful man would not 
have wanted to elevate himself of this sort or would have allowed to be 
                                                
732 The capitula of the Synod of Valence (855). 
733 Bishop Ebbo of Grenoble. 
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placed before by his fellow other bishops who were snubbed and omitted! 
It has come to this point, since our brothers and fellow priests did not have 
to go through the monitory saying of Solomon with a deaf ear, when they 
have accepted anything improper in secret from us, either by hearing or by 
writing, in order that they, driven by whatever activity of ours, make that 
official in public in extreme haste, of which we are not conscious, at 
disputes and official speeches, for he says: ‘The things that your eyes have 
seen, do not carry [them] into a dispute quickly, for afterwards you cannot 
make amends, when you have dishonoured your friend.’734 
 
 The end of this dedicatory letter is worthy of attention. In the main part of 
Epist. 99 Hincmar has shown that, due to his greatness in all respects, Augustine 
should be read and quoted in the original and his merits need to be acknowledged 
explicitly in the records of the ‘church’ councils. Apart from Augustine, the only 
reputable figures mentioned up to this point (besides Bishop Remigius of Reims735) 
                                                
734 Et idcirco discredimus ista capitula ab eis confecta, quia praetermissis aliorum consacerdotum 
nominibus solius Ebonis nomen cum archiepiscopis est ibidem iactanter, ut quibusdam videtur, 
expressum. Et quod quam maxime ipse in hoc collaboraverit, quasi e regione sit sensum, ut etiam 
cum archiepiscopis maior ceteris et doctior in sententia fuerit, hoc enim de sancto Augustino, qui in 
conciliis Affricanis scientia et labore ac vigilantia maior extitit, nequaquam invenimus. Nam et ipse 
sanctus Augustinus non solum se ceteris coepiscopis privatam gloriam quaerens non praetulit nec 
praeferri permisit, verum se aliis supposuit, cum ipse plus aliis laboraverit, sicut in epistolis ad 
sanctum Innocentium papam scriptis et ad alios apostolicae sedis praesules qui legere voluerit 
invenire valebit. Nec de ullo episcoporum in ullis conciliis taliter legimus, nisi forte apostolicae 
litterae propter evidentem causam aliquem coepiscoporum ad hoc negocium cum archiepiscopo suo 
ex nomine designari decreverint, sicut de Augustidunensi episcopo in epistolis beati Gregorii 
legimus. Quanto magis iste religiosus et vir cautus in huiusmodi se efferre noluisset aut praeferri 
despectis ac praetermissis ceteris coepiscopis permisisset! Huc accedit, quia fratres nostri et 
consacerdotes surda aure non debuissent transire Salomonis dictum commonitorium, si ex nobis aut 
auditu aut scripto quiddam sinistri secreto accepissent, ut praepropere illud in publicum quacumque 
mobilitate nostra moti, unde non sumus conscii, ad contentiones et iurgia propalarent; ait enim: 
‘Quae viderunt oculi tui, ne proferas in iurgio cito, ne postea emendare non possis, cum 
dehonestaveris amicum tuum.’ Perels 1975, p. 47, ll. 12-31. 
735 Between 877 and 878 Hincmar composed the Vita sancti Remigii episcopi Remensis, a 
hagiography of his predecessor St. Remigius. He was the first bishop of Reims and is referred to as 
the Apostle of the Franks, since he baptised Clovis I, the first king of the Franks, in 496. His 
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have been Prosper, together with Pope Celestine. Hincmar regards Prosper’s 
opinion as orthodox, since it corresponds to his own understanding of Augustinian 
doctrine. At the end of Epist. 99, however, Hincmar calls into play a range of 
religious and secular authorities, whom he uses as key witnesses. They are included 
in order to testify to the orthodoxy of Hincmar’s (and Prosper’s) interpretation of 
Augustine. The mentioned authorities are: Gelasius, Bede, Gregory the Great, 
Archbishop Theodore, Paulinus II of Aquileia, Alcuin of York and, last but not 
least, Emperor Charlemagne himself. All these are presented as aligning 
themselves alongside Augustine, Prosper and Hincmar against the bishops who 
were involved in the Synod of Valence (855). Hincmar declares: 
 
We embrace with equal reverence also the sentences of those who, after 
the canon itself had been composed by the blessed Gelasius, flourished in 
the ‘church’ with divine honour, in thought and Catholic doctrine, as well 
as in the sanctity of conversation; and who have written or taught nothing 
dissonant and nothing contrary about the trustworthy since Catholic 
doctrine of the Orthodox Fathers, who are themselves annotated in the 
same canon: and likewise those of the venerable presbyter Bede, imbued 
with the Catholic faith by the disciples of Pope St. Gregory and by 
Archbishop St. Theodore736, trained in both languages – Greek and Latin – 
and sent by the Holy Roman ‘church’ to the Anglos for instruction in the 
manner of the blessed Gregory’s disciples; and also no less those of the 
learned and of venerable memory Patriarch Paulinus, of the parochiality of 
                                                                                                                                  
baptism resulted in the conversion of the Frankish people. In Epist. 99 St. Remigius is praised as a 
model of humilitas (“humility”). Ibid., p. 47, ll. 2ff. 
736 Theodore of Canterbury. 
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Aquileia; and those of the religious and learned man Alcuin. The apostolic 
Roman see has not only benignly accepted their faith and doctrine, but has 
also elevated it with great praise, just as we find in the writings of the holy 
see itself, which our ‘churches’ have accepted from the same mother of 
‘churches’ at the time of Emperor Charles737 of divine memory, when the 
synod738 about the known infidelity of Felix739 has been held and 
transmitted to the Roman ‘church’ just as to the summit of ‘churches’. But 
also the one who reads their writings understands to what degree they 
should be praised and received.740 
 
 It has been found that although the doctrine of Augustine is at the heart of 
the debate on Gottschalk’s interpretation of predestination and free will, the 
purpose of Hincmar’s direct references to Augustine in Epist. 99 is rather practical. 
The subject matter of the dedicatory letter is the behaviour of the bishops 
assembled at the Synod of Valence (855) toward the four capitula, and the 
decisions taken at the Synod of Quierzy (853) under the direction of Hincmar and 
endorsed before Charles the Bald. Hincmar is under the impression that the bishops 
                                                
737 Emperor Charlemagne. 
738 The Synod of Frankfurt (794). 
739 Felix of Urgel. 
740 Eorum etiam sententias, qui divina dignatione, postquam ipse canon a beato Gelasio conscriptus 
est, sensu et doctrina catholica et sanctitate conversationis in ecclesia floruerunt et ab ipsorum 
ortodoxorum patrum, qui in eodem canone adnotati sunt, fideli quia catholica doctrina nihil 
dissonum, nihil diversum scripserunt vel docuerunt, reverentia pari amplectimur, veluti venerabilis 
Bedae presbiteri a discipulis sancti papae Gregorii catholica fide imbuti et a sancto Theodoro 
archiepiscopo, utriusque linguae, Grecae videlicet et Latinae, perito et a sancta Romana ecclesia ad 
Anglos post discipulos beati Gregorii ad eruditionem transmisso, non mediocriter instructi ac 
venerandae memoriae Paulini patriarchae Aquileiensis parrochiae atque Alcuini viri religiosi et 
docti. Quorum fidem et doctrinam apostolica sedes Romana non solum benignissime acceptavit, 
verum et multis laudibus extulit, sicut in scriptis ipsius sanctae sedis invenimus, quae ecclesiae 
nostrae ab eadem ecclesiarum matre acceperunt tempore divae memoriae Karoli imperaoris, quando 
sinodus pro cognita infidelitate Felicis est habita et ad Romanam ecclesiam velut ad apicem 
ecclesiarum transmissa. Sed et eorum scripta qui legit, quam sint laudanda et recipienda, intellegit. 
Perels 1975, p. 49, ll. 1-16. 
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present at Valence tried to harm his reputation as a theologian for their own gain. 
He feels that his contributions to the judgment made at Quierzy have partly been 
ignored, partly misinterpreted, and criticised. Furthermore, he insists that some of 
the content assigned to him does not originate from him. By using Augustine, 
Hincmar explains that even though the Augustinian doctrine had been exposed to 
criticism throughout Augustine’s life and has since been repeatedly questioned by 
jealous opponents, Augustine had always been a fair-minded critic and a role 
model of good practice. It is clearly the case that in Epist. 99 Hincmar draws 
attention to the importance of reading and quoting Augustine in the original and 
not through intermediaries (who may flaw his work) and of acknowledging 
Augustine as the highest patristic authority. However, for the most part, Hincmar’s 
argument in the letter is that it is virtually impossible that those bishops who 
criticised his own view of predestination and free will at the Synod of Valence 
(855) actually understand Augustine and his doctrine correctly, seeing as their bad 
practices in giving a judgment are entirely opposed to Augustine’s method of 
treating and judging texts of authors he did not agree with. Rather, Hincmar’s own 
practices, views and standards are those which resemble Augustine’s most. 
Therefore, it is his opinion that must be declared valid. 
  
Hincmar’s Epistles 179, 28, 37 and 48 
  
Epist. 179 is directed to Louis the German and explains to the king the 
contents of Psalm 103, 17. It is composed after the 19th of February 865. Epist. 
179 is mentioned here as a representative example of those letters that are 
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concerned with subject matters other than predestination, free will and the divorce 
of King Lothar II. Typically, Augustine and Prosper are mentioned together.741 
Various authorities such as Jerome, Cassiodorus, Gregory the Great (and St. Paul) 
are prominent.742 In this epistle the direct references to Augustine have no particular 
significance alongside those to other Church Fathers. 
 There are three other distinctive letters that are directly concerned with 
Gottschalk, his conviction and doctrine of predestination: Epist. 28, Epist. 37 and 
Epist. 48. They are noteworthy because they express, firstly, the nature of the 
dispute on predestination; secondly, the way in which Hincmar reproaches 
Gottschalk for his view of predestination; thirdly, which parts of Augustine and 
pseudo-Augustine Hincmar quotes most often and, lastly, what function the direct 
reference to Augustine’s De civitate Dei in Epist. 48 performs. Moreover, while in 
Epist. 28 and Epist. 37 Augustine is the only Church Father named in person as the 
protector of the apostolic faith743 and leader in the struggle against heresies744 
(whereas the remaining Fathers are mentioned only as a collective), Epist. 28 and 
Epist. 48 confirm Prosper and Hilary as the main apologists of Augustine used by 
Hincmar745. 
 Epist. 28 is a brief missive directed at Gottschalk himself and concerns 
itself with his view of predestination. It was written in 849 and displays Hincmar’s 
criticism of Gottschalk’s doctrine. Hincmar claims that the monk became a heretic 
mainly because he failed to understand what Prosper had written and demonstrated 
on the basis of Augustine’s teaching. Hincmar writes: 
                                                
741 Perels 1975, p. 169, l. 11, l. 17. 
742 Ibid., p. 168-171. 
743 Ibid., p. 10, l. 2. 
744 Ibid., p. 16, ll. 9-10. 
745 Ibid., p. 10, l. 1, p. 28, l. 22, p. 30, ll. 2-3. 
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To the monk Gottschalk, who has slipped into heresy because of some 
authors’ sentences, which he has neither understood nor interpreted well – 
especially of Prosper, whose meaning he mainly interprets through 
sentences of the blessed Augustine. Declaring other suitable doctors as 
witnesses of the apostolic faith, he urges that their doctrine has to be 
followed by everyone; and he shows by manifest evidence that God 
foreknows both the good and the bad, but He only foreknows the bad, 
while the good He both foreknows and predestines. Thus, prescience can 
also exist without predestination: predestination, however, cannot exist 
without prescience; and since He foreknew as well as predestined the good 
to enter the Kingdom, but only foreknew the bad, He did not predestine the 
bad, nor did He compel that they perish by his prescience.746 
 
 Epist. 37 consists of the foreword, conclusion and notes to Hincmar’s first 
writing against Gottschalk on predestination. The writing Ad reclusos et simplices 
in Remensi parrochia contra Gothescalcum is a circular letter to the members of 
his diocese concerning Gottschalk’s stance on predestination. It was written 
between 849 and 850, and Augustine is used explicitly at the end of the foreword. 
The context is thus: Hincmar says that those who did not understand correctly have 
distorted the meaning and interpretation of what Augustine and the other Church 
Fathers had said in their fight against heresies to their own destruction. Hence, 
                                                
746 Gothescalco monacho, qui erat prolapsus in heresim, de quibusdam sententiis auctorum, quas ille 
non bene intelligebat vel exponebat, maxime Prosperi, quarum sensum per sententias precipue beati 
Augustini exponit, et ceteros idoneos proponit testes apostolicae fidei doctores; quorum sequendam 
in omnibus admonet esse doctrinam, ostenditque testimoniis manifestis Deum et bona prescire et 
mala, sed mala tantum prescire, bona vero et prescire et predestinare; unde et prescientia esse potest 
sine predestinatione, predestinatio autem non potest esse sine prescientia; et quia bonos prescivit et 
predestinavit ad regnum, malos autem prescivit tantum, non predestinavit nec ut perirent sua 
prescientia compulit. Ibid., p. 9, l. 25-p. 10, l. 7. 
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Hincmar recommends that the simplices in his diocese adhere to this brief, 
summarised exposition. Hincmar states further that the unlearned spoil what has 
been said correctly, which is confirmed by the statement about the writings of St. 
Paul contained in the Second Epistle of Peter.747 In his writings against Gottschalk’s 
heretical doctrine Hincmar repeatedly calls attention to Peter’s Second Epistle, 
because it emphasises the importance of the correct interpretation of the Holy 
Scriptures. In Hincmar’s reference to the Church Fathers, Augustine is the only 
Father named in person. In other words, in Epist. 37, concerned with Gottschalk’s 
doctrine of predestination, Augustine appears as the spearhead of the struggle 
against heresy. The end of the foreword addressed to the simplices is an attempt to 
justify why the Word of God should be communicated in an appropriate language 
also to the uneducated and simple people. It is worded as follows: 
 
For this collection is not considered necessary by those who are learned 
and erudite, and a vulgar discourse of this sort seems unworthy [to these 
men], who even in their understanding abound with gratefulness to God 
and who have learned the Holy Scriptures and the Catholic expositions of 
the holy Fathers. But you, with whom divine wisdom speaks conformably 
to your holy simplicity, as it is written: ‘His conversation is with the 
simple people’, nevertheless hold onto this brief chapter and Catholic 
collection, since you do not have an abundance of books and have not 
studied or read these oratorical tergiversations. Just as when the blessed 
Paul poses questions as a great orator in his epistles and solves them for 
us, and as the blessed Augustine and the remaining doctors have 
                                                
747 2 Pt 3:16. 
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dialectically said, fighting against the heretics: those who understand less 
when they speak – by inquiring, or by extending, or by solving – ‘distort’ 
these things which have been said correctly, and do so ‘to their own 
destruction’ (as the blessed Apostle Peter says, speaking about the epistles 
of St. Paul). From there, much could be collected from the sayings of the 
many Fathers. But since they all hear and say it according to the Apostle, 
and it has all been collected for you succinctly under the name of the few – 
some of it by sense, some of it by the words expressed by the very same – 
take it as sufficient.748 
 
 Epist. 48, the fragments of a letter sent to Archbishop Amolo of Lyons, 
relates the incidents at Gottschalk’s conviction. This epistle was drafted before 
March 852. Besides Augustine, Hincmar uses the Holy Scriptures and quotes from 
Matthew, Paul, Peter and John. Prosper and Hilary feature as debaters and 
supporters of Augustine in his argument against Pelagius and his main follower 
Caelestius.749 The letter ends with the Holy Scriptures and excerpts from the Book 
of Psalms.750 
                                                
748 Nam doctis et eruditis ista collectio necessaria non habetur et huiusmodi vulgaris locutio indigna 
videbitur, qui et in sensu suo gratias Deo habundant et sanctas scripturas atque sanctorum patrum 
catholicas exposiiones notas habent. Vos autem, cum quibus divina sapientia pro sancta simplicitate 
vestra loquitur, sicut scriptum est: ‘Cum simplicibus sermocinatio eius’, tamen, quoniam librorum 
copiam non habetis et istas oratorias tergiversationes non didicistis neque legistis − unde si beatus 
Paulus ut mgnus orator in suis epistolis quaestiones proponit et nobis solvit et beatus Augustinus ac 
ceteri doctores contra hereticos pugnantes dialectice sund locuti: quae minus intelligentes, quando 
percontando, quando intentando, quando solvendo locuti sunt, ‘depravant’ bene dicta ‘ad suam 
ipsorum perditionem’, sicut beatus Petrus apostolus de epistolis sancti Pauli loquens dicit −, tenete 
istam capitularem brevem et catholicam collectionem. Unde ex multorum patrum dictis multa 
colligi poterant. Sed quia id ipsum omnes secundum apostolum sentiunt et dicunt, quae breviter 
vobis ex paucorum nomine − quaedam sensu, quaedam verbis ab eisdem expressis − collecta sunt, 
pro sufficientibus habetote. Perels 1975, p. 16, ll. 3-16. 
749 Ibid., p. 28, ll. 22-24, p. 30, ll. 1-6. 
750 Ibid., p. 30, ll. 24-31. 
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Epist. 37 and Epist. 48 both display the public debate over predestination 
and explain Gottschalk’s heresy by making explicit reference to Augustine (and 
pseudo-Augustine) in a discussion of the notions of praescientia, praedestinatio, 
praeparatio and liber arbiter. The main theme of Epist. 37 and Epist. 48 is that 
praescientia (“prescience”) refers to God’s foreknowing of the good and the bad, 
while praedestinatio (“predestination”) refers to God’s foreordaining of only the 
good. Praedestinatio (“predestination”) may be deemed the equivalent of a 
praeparatio (“preparation”) for grace and (eternal) life. Those who teach “double 
predestination” are on the wrong track: praedestinatio (“predestination”) is not 
intended to speak of divine foreordaining of damnation. Some excerpts from Epist. 
37 and Epist. 48 show which parts of Augustine and pseudo-Augustine Hincmar 
quotes repeatedly. 
 The conclusion to Epist. 37 (the first writing against Gottschalk) is 
interspersed with direct references to Augustine. Hincmar first explains: 
 
For ‘predestination’, as the blessed Augustine says, ‘is designated by the 
sending in advance and anticipating or preordaining of anything future. 
And thus God – for whom prescience has always been and is no accident 
but rather His very essence – foreknows whatever is before and 
predestines it: and He predestines it for the reason that He foreknows of 
what sort the future is. The bad, namely, He only foreknows, the good, 
however, He both foreknows and predestines.’ And elsewhere Augustine 
again says: ‘Predestination is preparation for grace, and grace itself is a 
gift of life, that is the result of predestination.’ And man, as we have 
mentioned much earlier, has neither been created nor predestined by God, 
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in order to be sent into the eternal fire, nor has the eternal fire been created 
because of man, but because of the devil, just as the Lord says in the 
Gospel: ‘It has been prepared for the devil and his angels’.751 
 
Later on, Hincmar restates: 
 
Prescience is foreknowing, what is known before that would happen or 
how would happen what is known; ‘predestination’, however, ‘is’, as St. 
Augustine says, preordination or ‘preparation for grace’, that is, as the 
Apostle says: God has predestined the elect to glory and has prepared them 
– that is preordained [them] – in faith, in good deeds, so that they would 
arrive at the grace of reward through those deeds, just as it is written: 
‘These God has prepared’ – obviously the good deeds – ‘in order that we 
may walk among them’. This is predestination. After the predestination, 
however, and preordination or preparation of God (which is according to 
the plan of His good will) nothing else follows, except for ‘the result of 
predestination’: that is ‘grace’, which is ‘itself a gift’ of life.752 
 
                                                
751 Quia praedestinatio, sicut beatus Augustinus dicit, a praemittendo et praeveniendo vel 
praeordinando futurum aliquid dicitur. Et ideo Deus, cui praescientia non accidens, sed essentia fuit 
semper et est, quicquid antequam sit praescit, praedestinat, et propterea praedestinat, quia quale 
futurum sit praescit. Mala enim tantum praescit, bona vero et praescit et praedestinat. Et alibi idem 
dicit: Praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio et gratia est ipsa vitae donatio, id est praedestinationis 
effectus. Et homo, sicut longe superius diximus, non est factus neque praedestinatus a Deo, ut iret in 
ignem aeternum, neque ignis aeternus factus est propter hominem, sed propter diabolum, sicut dicit 
Dominus in evangelio: ‘Qui praeparatus est diabolo et angelis eius’. Ibid., p. 17, ll. 25-33. 
752 Praescientia est praecognoscentia, quod ante scitur quod eveniat vel quam fiat quod scitur; 
praedestinatio autem est, sicut sanctus Augustinus dicit, praeordinatio vel gratiae praeparatio, id est, 
sicut apostolus dicit: Electos praedestinavit Deus ad gloriam et praeparavit illos, id est 
praeordinavit, in fide, in bonis operibus, ut per illa ad gratiam remunerationis pervenirent, sicut 
scriptum est: ‘Quae praeparavit Deus’, scilicet bona opera, ‘ut in illis ambulemus’. Haec est 
praedestinatio. Post praedestinationem autem et praeordinationem vel praeparationem Dei, quae est 
secundum propositum bonae voluntatis suae, nihil aliud sequitur, nisi praedestinationis effectus, id 
est gratia, quae est ipsa vitae donatio. Ibid., p. 19, ll. 13-21. 
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A part of Epist. 37 is repeated in the following passage from Epist. 48: 
 
But, just as foreknown, He has predestined some from the burden of sin – 
that is He has prepared [them] by grace – for the life and Kingdom; and 
those He has predestined to the life and eternal Kingdom – that is has 
prepared [them] by grace – to which the Gospel attests when it says: 
‘Come, blessed ones’ – that is those freed ones by grace from the first 
condemnation, and those elected and predestined –, ‘take possession of the 
Kingdom that has been prepared for you’, that is that which has been 
predestined for you, ‘from the beginning of the world’. Some, however, 
He has not predestined to death nor to the fire, as no doubt they were 
foreknown, but has left them justly in the burden of sin and perdition, from 
which He has freed those by His ‘predestination’, that is ‘preparation for 
grace’, by a judgment which is hidden but by no means unjust. For, just as 
the blessed Augustine sets forth, ‘predestination is preparation for grace: 
grace, however, is a gift of life’ – that is ‘the result of predestination 
itself’. And the blessed Prosper, commentator in this matter of St. 
Augustine, agrees with the other orthodox Fathers when he says: 
‘Predestination’ is nothing else but what ‘relates to the gift of grace or to 
the retribution of justice’.753 
 
                                                
753 Sed ex massa peccati quosdam, sicut praescivit, praedestinavit, id est gratia praeparavit, ad vitam 
et regnum, et illis vitam ac regnum praedestinavit, id est gratia praeparavit, aeternum, evangelio 
teste, qui dicit: ‘Venite, benedicti’ − id est de prima maledictione gratia erepti, electi et praedestinati 
−, ‘percipite regnum, quod vobis paratum est’, id est quod vobis praedestinatum est, ‘ab origine 
mundi’. Quosdam autem, sicut praescivit, non ad mortem neque ad ignem praedestinavit, sed in 
massa peccati et perditionis iuste deseruit, a qua eos ‘praedestinatione’ sua, id est ‘gratiae 
praeparatione’, occulto, sed non iusto iudicio nequaquam eripuit. Quia, sicut beatus exponit 
Augustinuns, ‘praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio; gratia autem est vitae donatio’, id est ‘ipsius 
praedestinationis effectus’. Et beatus Prosper, in hac re sancti Augustini expositor, cum ceteris 
orthodoxis concordans patribus dicit: Non est ‘praedestinatio’ nisi quod ‘ad donum pertinet gratiae 
aut ad retributionem iustitiae’. Ibid., p. 28, ll. 14-24. 
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What Epist. 48 further shows is that Hincmar is unable to deny that, in 
principle, to some extent the unbeliever falls prey to damnation;754 and it is here 
that there appears the only explicit reference to Augustine’s De civitate Dei 
(together with Augustine’s Enchiridion) which can be found in these letters on 
predestination.755 In other words, Hincmar cannot make use of the De civitate Dei 
in order to support his main argument against “double predestination”. 
Nevertheless, by using the pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon, Hincmar 
eventually succeeds in arguing that only malicious members of the ‘church’ are 
teaching “double predestination”.756 The text is as follows: 
 
I also write down some examples for your wisdom, just as they come to 
mind at this moment, which those men out of the very same foolishness 
put forward for their defence, proffering them because of faulty 
understanding. They bring forth from the Apostle that ‘the vessels of wrath 
have been prepared’ or finished ‘for destruction’, saying that the vessels 
are predestined for destruction and cannot be changed. But others 
understand it differently, particularly when the same Apostle says about 
the same vessels: ‘If anyone has purged himself from these’ – obviously 
for whom the vessel had been of shame – ‘he will be a vessel unto 
honour’. They set forth that ‘Whoever does not believe is already judged’, 
that is, is already condemned by the predestination of God. And Augustine 
says in the book about the Christian contest: ‘Whoever does not believe is 
already judged’, that is, ‘is already condemned – certainly by the 
prescience of God, who has learned, what threatens those who do not 
                                                
754 Ibid., p. 29, ll. 29-35. 
755 Ibid., p. 29, ll. 38-39. 
756 Ibid., p. 30, ll. 1ff. 
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believe’. They set forth: ‘The Lord has hardened the heart of Pharaoh’. 
‘God has given them over to a depraved mind’, He will send against them 
the spirit of error. ‘To be sure, you God will lead them away into a pit of 
extinction’. ‘Whoever passes over from justice to injustice, God has 
prepared him for the javelin’. 
But these ill-disposed people, not understanding what they are saying or 
what they give assurance of, confuse prescience with predestination. And 
just as they understand poorly the authentic texts, so too they understand 
even more poorly the words of St. Augustine in certain places, as when he 
says in the Enchiridion – and in the books of the De civitate Dei and 
elsewhere – that they are also predestined for destruction and the people 
born for wrath. From there, after he had written under the prosecution of 
many about free will and rebuke and grace and man’s perfection in justice 
and the predestination of the Saints to Prosper and Hilary – where he said 
nothing about the predestination of the rejected, but instead about the 
predestination of the Saints – he has written the book Hypomnesticon757 
against Caelestius and Pelagius about the five questions; and this sixth one 
he has added about predestination in the place of correction. There he 
excuses himself that he has not said or wants to be understood in the sense 
that they are predestined for destruction, but that a penalty is predestined 
for those who persist in injustice and impiety. He makes mention of these 
questions and acquittals in the book, which he has written against the 
Manichaeans about the Genesis.758 
                                                
757 The pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon. 
758 Aliqua etiam exempla, quae illorum stultitia ad munimen sui eadem male intellegendo proferens 
profert, sicut modo ad memoriam occurrunt, sapientiae vestrae scribo. Proferunt ex apostolo ‘vasa 
irae aptata’ vel perfecta ‘ad interitum’, dicentes vasa esse praedestinata ad interitum et mutari non 
possunt. Sed aliter alii intellegunt, maxime cum idem dicat apostolus de eisdem vasis: ‘Si quis 
emundaverit se ab istis’, videlicet pro quibus vas contumeliae fuerat, ‘erit vas in honorem’. 
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Hincmar’s Epistles 134 and 108 
  
Epist. 134759 consists of Hincmar’s foreword to his De divortio Lotharii 
regis et Theutbergae reginae. The work itself is written in 860 and is a detailed 
report on the legal dissolution of the marriage between King Lothar II and 
Theutberga.760 Hincmar answers to the questions of unspecified religious and 
secular figures, and the text is divided accordingly into twenty three responsiones. 
The work also contains the acts of the Synods of Aachen in January and February 
860. Epist.134, i.e. the foreword, ends with Augustine and Gregory the Great. 
Gregory the Great (together with his Regula pastoralis) prevails. Apart from them, 
the Holy Scriptures (which are also dominant) and other authorities, such as 
                                                                                                                                  
Proferunt: ‘Qui non credit, iam iudicatus est’, id est praedestinatione Dei iam damnatus est. Et 
Augustinus in libro de agone Christiano dicit: ‘Qui non credit, iam iudicatus est’, id est ‘iam 
damnatus est, praescientia utique Dei, qui novit, quid immineat non credentibus’. Proferunt: 
‘Induravit Dominus cor Pharaonis’. ‘Tradidit illos in reprobum sensum’, inmittet eis spiritum 
erroris. ‘Tu vero Deus deduces eos in puteum interitus’. ‘Qui transgreditur a iustitia ad iniquitatem, 
Deus paravit illum ad rompheam’. 
Sed isti malivoli, non intellegentes quae locuntur vel de quibus affirmant, confundunt praescientiam 
et praedestinationem. Et sicut male intellegunt authenticas scripturas, ita et pessime verba sancti 
Augustini in quibusdam locis, sicut in enchiridion et in libris de civitate Dei et alibi praedestinatos 
ad interitum et populum natum ad iram dicit. Unde etiam postquam de libero arbitrio et de 
correptione et gratia et de perfectione iustituae hominis et de praedestinatione sanctorum ad 
Prosperum et Hilarum − ubi nihil de praedestinatione reproborum, sed de praedestinatione 
sanctorum dixit − multis postulantibus scripserat, librum ypomnesticon adversus Caelestium et 
Pelagium scripsit de quinque quaestionibus et hanc sextam loco retractationis superaddidit de 
praedestinatione. Ubi se excusat non eo sensu dixisse nec intellegi velle praedestinatos ad interitum, 
sed in inquitate vel impietate perseverantibus poenam esse praedestinatam. Quarum quaestionum et 
absolutionum mentionem in libro, quem scripsit contra Manicheos ex Genesi, facit. Perels 1975, p. 
29, l. 24-p. 30, l. 9. 
759 In the newest edition, to which I adhere, the content of this writing appears as the praefatio to 
Hincmar’s De divortio Lotharii regis et Theutbergae reginae. See De divort. Loth. 
760 For an extensive treatment of the case see Heidecker 2010. A discussion of the case with 
particular regard to the themes of private and public is given by Airlie 1998. The analysis of the 
private and public spheres concentrates on the representation of Christian royalty and the role 
gender played in the case. On the relationship between a king and a queen, S. Airlie concludes: “A 
king who could not rule his own body was unworthy to rule his kingdom, just as a queen who could 
not rule her body was unworthy to be a wife. King and queen may thus have been seen in the 




Innocent, Celestine, St. Peter, Bede, Jerome, St. Paul and Cyprian, appear 
throughout the foreword. 
In the foreword Hincmar voices his thoughts on the divorce of King Lothar 
II: it is not Hincmar’s opinion that the divorce should be categorically prohibited 
(nor would he have the power to influence the outcome of the cause to such an 
extent).761 But Hincmar finds that an approval of Lothar’s conduct by the ‘church’ 
is certainly not appropriate either.762 In the De divortio Lotharii regis et 
Theutbergae reginae Lothar’s actions are officially criticised by Hincmar.763 While 
Lothar’s party insists that the absolute power of law and judgment should lie with 
the ruler,764 Hincmar argues that the secular and religious powers should both take 
part in reaching a sound verdict, albeit separately (in accordance with the Frankish 
law).765 The nature of the ‘church’s’ involvement, however, is not discussed in 
greater detail.766 But – and here Hincmar uses Augustine in Epist. 134 – the 
religious power is dominant. Moral failure on the part of the ruler as far as the 
Christian code of conduct is concerned implies that the ‘church’ intervenes as the 
superior power.767 Hincmar contends that also the secular law originates from 
God.768 He affirms: “[...] it is necessary for both the ecclesiastical and the civil 
court to thus give a decision concerning whatever legal matter and person under the 
                                                
761 Schrörs 1884, p. 195. 
762 Ibid., p. 204. 
763 Ibid., p. 205. 
764 Ibid., p. 203. 
765 Ibid., p. 196. 
766 Ibid., p. 195. 
767 See J. L. Nelson’s argument in Nelson 1986, pp. 140, 142. 




eyes of the supernal judge [...].”769 Furthermore, Hincmar gives examples by using 
the allegories of David and Saul, who were corrected by the prophets.770 He then 
mentions the case of Louis the Pious.771 Hincmar only supports the civil law 
because he sees in the decisions taken at the Synod of Aachen in February 860 a 
violation of said law (the bishops involved had apparently applied canon law). 
According to Hincmar, the proceedings – which were opened under application of 
the court law – should have been concluded accordingly. The opinion of the 
‘church’ should have been consulted only afterwards – even though in the end it 
would not carry less weight.772 
 In the foreword to the De divortio Lotharii regis et Theutbergae reginae 
Augustine only features at the very end, together with Gregory the Great. 
Strikingly, the affair as a whole is approached by Hincmar entirely from the 
perspective of the ‘church’ and the clerics who assume the role of representatives 
of God. In the last lines of the foreword the function of the clergy (or, more 
precisely, the bishops) in the proceedings is summarised clearly and concisely: 
 
[...] St. Augustine says in book four Contra Iulianum: Certainly, if we 
allowed those over whom we have power to commit crimes before our 
eyes, we would become partakers in their guilt. 
                                                
769 [...] necesse est et ecclesiasticis et publicae rei iudicibus, ut ita sub oculis superni iudicis in 
quacumque causa et de quacumque persona decernant iudicium [...]. De divort. Loth., p. 109, lin. 
22. 
770 Schrörs 1884, p. 203. 
771 On Louis the Pious see the analysis in Arquillière 1934, pp. 170ff. and chapters 5 and 6 in De 
Jong 2009a). The function of his penance is summarised in Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 124-125. 
772 Schrörs 1884, p. 193. 
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But how many innumerable [crimes] does He allow to happen before our 
eyes, which He would under no condition allow, if He did not want it in 
any way? 
And He is nevertheless just and righteous, since He gives room after 
patience for penitence, and does not wish that anyone perishes. St. Gregory 
demonstrates why this happens by giving evidence from the Scripture: 
Highest, in fact, is the patient forgiver, since He both endures our evils and 
forgives. 
For He bears them all day when they are converted, but the non-converted 
He condemns more sternly.773 
 
In the quoted passage from Augustine’s work against Bishop Julian of Eclanum, 
Augustine uses the first person plural to refer to the collective of bishops who are 
currently in office. He says that, ideally, the bishops may not allow any acts of 
misconduct on the part of subordinates, as this would violate their own integrity. 
But then Augustine considers that if God did not want any transgressions to 
happen, He would not allow them to happen. The transgressions do not affect 
God’s integrity. He does not want anyone to perish and can accept the repentance 
of the guilty thanks to His patience. Then, explaining why God’s integrity is 
maintained, Hincmar quotes Gregory the Great, who declares that the most 
virtuous ones are those who are patient and who forgive. The quotation further 
                                                
773 [...] sanctus Augustinus in libro quarto contra Iulianum dicit: Nos certe, si eos, in quos nobis 
potestas est, ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. 
Quam vero innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique, si noluisset, nulla ratione 
permitteret? 
Et tamen iustus et bonus est et, quod post patientiam dat locum poenitentiae, nolens aliquem perire. 
Quod cur fiat, sanctus demonstrat Gregorius exponens scripturae testimonium: Altissimus est enim 
patiens redditor, quoniam et patitur mala nostra et reddit. 
Nam quos diu, ut convertantur, tolerat, non conversos durius damnat. De divort. Loth., p. 113, lin. 
36-p. 114, lin. 3. 
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expresses that God is considerably more tolerant of converted sinners than of non-
converted sinners. Augustine acts as a referee in the discussion of the bishops’ (or, 
more generally, the clergy’s) role in the case: it is the bishop’s or cleric’s 
individual responsibility to prevent potential misconduct of the subordinate.774 
However, it is not possible for the cleric to prevent all crimes, since this would not 
be according to the will of God. Therefore, it is also the cleric’s duty not to approve 
of the subordinate’s transgressions, but to bear them. Being patient like God, the 
cleric remains just and righteous when he accepts the sinner’s contrition and 
repentance. This means that Hincmar’s own integrity is maintained if he allows the 
annulment of Lothar’s marriage. The condition is that Lothar repents of his action, 
which is an entirely spiritual, not legal, process. Its significance for the legal 
proceedings, as proposed by Hincmar in this writing, is therefore remarkable. One 
may speak of a “secularisation of sin”775. 
 There is another aspect of the discussion of the clergy’s function in this case 
which has so far been ignored and needs to be stressed. It concerns the manner in 
which the quotation from Augustine’s Contra Iulianum is used. The quoted 
passage begins with the statement that, in principle, the bishops must not permit 
any immorality of subordinates, as this would make them complicit. In the context 
of the dispute over the lawfulness of the divorce of King Lothar II, the statement 
intimates that, according to Hincmar, King Lothar II as a secular leader is 
subordinate to the power of the bishops and the bishops are accountable for his 
                                                
774 Nelson 1986, p. 139. 




misconduct.776 Strikingly, Hincmar here quotes Augustine, not Gelasius, in order to 
assert the superiority of the spiritual over the secular power.777 He claims – inter 
alia by referring to Augustine – that the spiritual power is superior to the secular 
power and that also the secular law stems from God. 
The reference to Augustine in Epist. 134 invites comparison with Epist. 
108, where Gelasius, Augustine and Gregory the Great are used in an evaluation of 
the relationship between the secular and spiritual powers. Epist. 108 consists of 
Hincmar’s foreword and beginning of the conclusion to his work Collectio de 
                                                
776 This is also the view of Anton 1968, pp. 307, 329. On the episcopal jurisdiction over the 
consecrated king see Nelson 1986, pp. 140, 142. 
777 An interesting but rather bold argument by M. J. Wilks may be able to delineate and explain a 
certain reading of Augustine that might have prompted Hincmar to recourse to Augustine in this 
context. Wilks’ fundamental proposition is that, when setting forth the doctrine of the two civitates, 
Augustine “was not juxtaposing Church and State, but comparing Christian and non-Christian 
empires”. Wilks 1967, p. 493. Although he argues that for Augustine iustitia was a pre-eminently 
divine quality, he assumes that Augustine in fact conceived a realisation of iustitia in a fully 
Christian setting. Wilks writes that, according to Augustine, it was ultimately the lack of iustitia 
among the heathen Romans that had prevented them from achieving a res publica. Ibid., pp. 491, 
493. Wilks maintains: “[...] Augustine’s point was that [...] from a Christian viewpoint [...] all these 
Roman virtues were vitiated by the lack of iustitia, something which could only be understood in 
terms of the Christian way of life and operated within the context of a Christian society.” Ibid., p. 
493. Wilks even goes so far as to suggest that, in Augustine’s eyes, “the Christian society had taken 
over the Roman empire and converted it into an empire of Christ, coterminous with the visible 
Church, the civitas Dei on earth.” Ibid., p. 499. On this theoretical basis, Wilks develops his broader 
argument against the scholarship influenced by H.-X. Arquillière that sees the millenium between 
Augustine’s death and the Aristotelian revolution as “[...] a period of development completely out 
of line with Augustinian theory, the age of political Augustinianism, a bastardisation of true 
Augustinian principles [...].” Ibid., p. 490. Wilks considers it wrong to assume that the papal-
hierocratic model is not representative of an important continuation and enhancement of 
Augustine’s thinking: he suggests an “all-pervasive teleological cast of Augustine’s mind” which 
“[...] is a cardinal feature of the Platonism which characterises his whole outlook.” Ibid., p. 491. 
Wilks claims that it was characteristic of Augustine’s attitude of mind to think about the purpose 
towards which an institution should be directed. He also writes that “[...] iustitia as giving each his 
due exemplifies Augustine’s deliberate attempt to suggest a continuity of Christian theory from the 
natural law of the classical Roman philosophers.” Ibid. Consequently, according to Wilks, it is 
Augustine who is the true deviser of the idea that institutions like royal power needed “[...] direction 
by the priesthood as the divine element in the community which alone had the proper understanding 
of divine things.” Ibid., p. 499. Wilks presents Augustine as the thinker who prepared the 
framework of the auctoritas Ecclesiae, the thought that it is the bishops who rule over the secular 
leadership and over the lay members of society. Ibid., pp. 502-503. Thus, by referring to the 
inheritor Gelasius, Wilks concludes: “Whilst Augustine cannot be said to have stressed the 
opposition between episcopal auctoritas and royal potestas in the same outspoken manner as 
Gelasius later in the century, he cannot, as a student of Cicero, Roman law and the Bible, have 
settled on this distinctive terminology by accident.” Ibid., p. 503. On Gelasius’ scheme of 
subordination and his formulation of the role of the secular ruler in the ‘church’ see also Markus 
1988, pp. 101-102. 
CHAPTER THREE 
 230 
ecclesiis et capellis, directed to Charles the Bald. It is written between 857 and the 
spring of 858. The Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis or Consultatio ad Carolum 
regem is a collection of canones on the legal status of proprietary ‘churches’ and 
the power of bishops in their dioceses, composed as a report for King Charles the 
Bald. 
 In the foreword to the Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis the distribution of 
power between the ‘state’ and the ‘church’ – in particular the authority to 
administer property – is assessed. Hincmar first introduces the composed collection 
before coming to the point. He writes: 
 
For that reason, though this may succeed in displeasing some, if perchance 
there are any who choose to follow without restraint what gladly pleases 
them rather than what is lawful, I will do what you entreat, knowing that it 
has been recommended by the Apostle that ‘the entire soul’, that is the 
entire man, ‘be placed below the higher powers; for there is no power 
except from God’; and once more he says: ‘Be subjected to every human 
being for the sake of God as much as to a superior king’. 
And since your royal sublimity established by God bends the necks of both 
the heart and the body to the priestly religion, one discerns that it is 
adequate that also the pontificial authority submits itself to the regal 
dignity with every obligation of loyalty, just as St. Gelasius shows in the 
decretal epistle to Emperor Anastasius, saying: ‘There are, of course, two 
[sovereignties], venerable emperor, by which this world is principally 
governed: the sacred authority of bishops, and the royal power. Of these, 
the importance of the priests is that much greater, by how much they will 
CHAPTER THREE 
 231 
also have to account for the kings of men themselves in the divine 
examination’. Hence, ‘as far as the order of public discipline is concerned, 
understanding that the supreme power has been conferred on you by a 
supernal arrangement, even the priests of the religion themselves are 
obedient to your laws, so that the sentences, excluded from secular affairs, 
do not seem to obviate’. And elsewhere: ‘Since Christ, mindful of the 
human fragility and that it was suited to the salvation of His [people], has 
thus regulated by sublime dispensation, in the same way has He set apart 
the offices of each power by particular public functions and separate 
dignities, wishing that His [people] are saved by medicinal humility, not 
snatched once more by human pride; so that the Christian emperors stand 
in need of the bishops for eternal life and then the bishops themselves 
profit by imperial arrangements for the running of temporal affairs, as long 
as the spiritual function stands apart from the carnal efforts, and for that 
reason, serving God, involves itself very little in the secular affairs. In turn 
the one does not seem to preside over the divine affairs who is involved in 
the secular affairs, in order that also the moderation of each order is 
ensured, lest the support on both sides be extolled; and, agreeing with the 
quality of the functions, the profession is individually adapted.’ And St. 
Augustine says in the Sermo VI. Ioannis Evangelii: ‘Manifest laws are 
read, where emperors have instructed those who, separate from the 
community of the Catholic ‘church’, use the Christian name for 
themselves and do not want to worship in peace the very founder of peace 
and dare to possess nothing in the name of the ‘church’’. ‘But what 
belongs to us’, they say, ‘and what to the emperor?’ ‘This is managed by 
the human law, and nevertheless the Apostle wished that the kings be 
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served, wished that the kings be honoured and said: ‘Revere the king’. Do 
not say: What belongs to me and what to the king? What to you, then, and 
the possession? By the royal law possessions are possessed’; and in the 
Sermo VII.: ‘For it is a matter of secular law that anyone who lies in any 
claims may not benefit from what he has brought to pass. For you said 
what you wanted and to whom you said it; he does not know whether it is 
true; he sent you away to your adversary to be convicted that, if you are 
convicted of lying before the judge, you are there deprived of the benefit 
of the very rescript by which you brought the rescript’. And the sacred 
canons and decrees of the Roman bishops show that we are bound to pay 
the kings many times for the honour and status of the ‘church’, just as 
anyone who reads it will be able to find. And the blessed Gregory has 
composed the entire commonitory to the defender John, who is going to 
Spain, about the imperial laws for the correction and constitution of 
ecclesiastical sanctions. And the Council of Toledo orders ‘that sentences 
of laws and canons are searched out’ for the definition of cases. Therefore, 
we have to obey the kings serving the cult of piety and the religion and law 
and comfort.778 
                                                
778 Qua de re, licet hoc quibusdam valeat displicere, si forte sunt, qui magis eligunt sequi quod eis 
libenter libet, quam quod licenter licet, faciam quod iubetis, sciens ab apostolo commendatum, ut 
‘omnis anima’, id est omnis homo, ‘potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; non est enim potestas nisi 
a Deo’; et iterum dicit: ‘Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum sive regi tamquam 
praeccellenti’. 
Et quoniam vestra regis a Deo constituta sublimitas sacerdotali religioni et cordis et corporis 
cervices devote inclinat, competens esse dinoscitur, ut et pontificalis auctoritas regiae dignitati cum 
omni pietatis officio se submittat, sicut sanctus Gelasius in decretali epistola ad Anastasium 
imperatorem ostendit dicens: ‘Duo sunt quippe, imperator auguste, quibus principaliter mundus hic 
regitur: auctoritas sacra pontificum et regalis potestas; in quibus tanto gravius pondus est 
sacerdotum, quanto etiam pro ipsis regibus hominum in divino reddituri sunt examine rationem’. 
Hinc, ‘quantum ad ordinem publicae pertinet disciplinae, cognoscentes imperium tibi superna 
dispositione conlatum, legibus tuis ipsi quoque parent religionis antistites, ne vel in rebus mundanis 
exclusae videantur obviare sententiae’; et alibi: ‘Quoniam sic Christus, memor fragilitatis humanae, 
quod suorum saluti congrueret, dispensatione magnifica temperavit, sic actionibus propriis 
dignitatibusque distinctis officia potestatis utriusque discrevit, suos volens medicinali humilitate 
salvari, non humana superbia rursus intercipi, ut et Christiani imperatores pro aeterna vita 
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In the foreword to the Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis Hincmar quotes Gelasius 
with regard to the separation of the secular and spiritual powers. Gelasius explains 
that in religious affairs the religious authorities should be consulted, in secular 
affairs the secular authorities.779 Furthermore, only by order of the emperor does the 
‘church’ acquire the right to own secular property – to the extent that it is necessary 
for the mission of the ‘church’. However, in essence, Gelasius claims the 
dominance of the spiritual over the secular power. His argument is that the bishops’ 
power is dominant, since the bishops take responsibility for the secular leaders’ 
moral conduct.780 It is the clerics who will eventually be held accountable for the 
secular people’s actions. Immediately afterwards, Augustine and Gregory the Great 
are used in support of this reasoning. 
 This section on direct evidence of Augustinian influence has examined in 
what manner and for what purpose Augustine is explicitly used by Hincmar. A 
study of the Epistolae has revealed that Hincmar avails himself of Augustine 
                                                                                                                                  
pontificibus indigerent et pontifices pro temporalium cursu rerum imperialibus dispositionibus 
unterentur, quatenus spiritalis actio a carnalibus distaret incursibus et ideo militans Deo minime se 
negotiis saecularibus implicaret, ac vicissim non ille rebus divinis praesidere videretur, qui esset 
negotiis saecularibus implicatus, ut et modestia utriusque ordinis curaretur, ne extolleretur utroque 
suffultus, et competens qualitatibus actionum specialiter professio aptaretur’. Et sanctus Augustinus 
in sermone VI. evangelii Iohannis dicit: ‘Leguntur enim leges manifestae, ubi praeceperunt 
imperatores eos, qui praeter ecclesiae catholicae communionem usurpant sibi nomen Christianum 
nec volunt in pace colere pacis auctorem, nihil nomine ecclesiae audeant possidere’. ‘Sed quid 
nobis’, inquiunt, ‘et imperatori?’ ‘De iure humano hoc agitur, et tamen apostolus voluit serviri 
regibus, voluit honorari reges et dixit: ‘Regem reveremini’. Noli dicere: Quid mihi et regi? Quid tibi 
ergo et possessioni? Per iura regum possidentur possessiones’; et in sermone VII.: ‘Iuris enim 
forensis est, ut qui in petitionibus mentitus fuerit, non illi prosit quod inpetravit. Dixisti enim quod 
voluisti et cui dixisti; nescit an verum sit; dimisit te adversario tuo convincendum, ut, si ante 
iudicem convictus fueris de mendaacio, ibi careas ipso beneficio rescripti, quo perduxisti 
rescriptum’. Et sacri canones atque decreta pontificum Romanorum multoties pro honore et statu 
ecclesiae apud reges satagere nos debere ostendunt , sicut qui legerit invenire valebit. Et beatus 
Gregorius commonitorium ad Iohannem defensorem euntem in Hispanias totum de legibus 
imperialibus ad correctionem et constitutionem ecclesiasticarum sanctionum composuit. Et 
Toletantum concilium in causarum diffinitione ‘legum et canonum sententias’ iubet ‘exquiri’. 
Oboediendum ergo nobis regibus pietatis cultui et religione et iure et solatio servientibus. Perels 
1975, p. 53, l. 7-p. 54, l. 12. 
779 This is made clear in Anton 1968, pp. 311ff. 
780 Nelson 1986, p. 139. 
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primarily when he writes against Gottschalk’s doctrine of predestination, and when 
he criticises the divorce of King Lothar II. Epist. 179 has conveyed that in contexts 
where matters other than predestination or the divorce of the king are debated, the 
direct references to Augustine have no particular significance alongside those to 
other Church Fathers. Notably in Hincmar’s discussion of predestination, Prosper 
and Hilary feature alongside Augustine. For instance, Epist. 28 and Epist. 48 
confirm Prosper and Hilary as the main apologists of Augustine mentioned by 
Hincmar. Epist. 28, Epist. 37 and Epist. 48. are noteworthy in relation to 
Gottschalk’s heresy. They express, firstly, the nature of the dispute on 
predestination; secondly, Hincmar’s own position in the debate and, lastly, which 
parts of Augustine and pseudo-Augustine Hincmar quotes in what contexts and 
with what intention. 
In the analysis of the sample letter Epist. 99, sent to Charles the Bald, it has 
emerged that the purpose of Hincmar’s direct references to Augustine is above all 
practical. Of course Hincmar draws attention to the importance of reading and 
quoting Augustine in the original and not through intermediaries (who may 
invalidate his ideas) and of acknowledging Augustine as the leading patristic 
authority. Also in Epist. 28 and Epist. 37 Augustine appears as the one Father who 
protects the apostolic faith and leads the struggle against heresies. However, the 
main argument in Epist. 99 is that the fellow bishops who attacked Hincmar’s own 
view of predestination so insolently at the Synod of Valence (855) cannot possibly 
have understood Augustine in the right way, seeing as their unmannerliness is 
entirely opposed to Augustine’s method of treating and judging the texts of other 
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authors. Hincmar’s own practices, views and standards, however, resemble 
Augustine’s much more. Hence, it is his view of predestination that should prevail. 
Epist. 48 contains the only explicit reference to Augustine’s De civitate Dei 
which can be found in these letters on predestination. It shows that, by referring to 
the original Augustine alone, Hincmar is unable to deny that every unbeliever falls 
prey to damnation on principle. That is to say, Hincmar cannot make use of the De 
civitate Dei in order to support his main point against “double predestination”. 
Hincmar merely succeeds in his argument against “double predestination” by 
drawing on the pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon. 
In Epist. 134, the foreword to Hincmar’s De divortio Lotharii regis et 
Theutbergae reginae, Hincmar refers to Augustine – not Gelasius, as one might 
have expected – in order to assert the superiority of the spiritual over the secular 
power. The passage from Augustine’s Contra Iulianum which Hincmar quotes 
opens with the declaration that, in principle, the bishops must not permit any 
immorality of subordinates, as this would make them complicit. However, since it 
is not possible for the cleric to prevent all crimes, it is the cleric’s duty to bear the 
subordinate’s transgressions. In the context of the dispute over the lawfulness of 
the divorce, Hincmar’s quotation from Augustine’s Contra Iulianum intimates that, 
according to Hincmar, King Lothar II as a secular leader is subordinate to the 
power of the bishops and the bishops are thus accountable for his misconduct. By 
referring to Augustine inter alia, Hincmar claims that the spiritual power is superior 





II. Hincmar’s Expositiones ad Carolum Regem 
  
In the spring of 868 a disagreement broke out between Charles the Bald and 
Bishop Hincmar of Laon, the nephew of Hincmar of Reims. In this confrontation, 
which resulted in a legal dispute, Hincmar of Reims took sides with his nephew 
and wrote three legal opinions for the Synod of Pîtres in 868: the so-called 
Quaterniones, defending the ‘church’ property against Charles the Bald’s claim; 
the so-called Rotula, providing supplementary legal evidence and the Admonitio, 
drawing the king’s attention to the commitments he had made to the ‘church’.781 
As far as the written tradition of the Expositiones ad Carolum Regem is 
concerned, it is worth asking why these three texts have been preserved. First of 
all, Reims was – not only in geographical terms – the most influential archdiocese 
in Western Francia. Secondly, between 865 and 870 the library and archives of 
Reims were restructured.782 This was partly the result of Hincmar’s realisation of 
the importance of keeping a complete record of the files. His defeat in the conflict 
of authority with Rothad of Soissons in 865, and the difficulties with Rome that 
this entailed, played a crucial role in this enterprise. He would henceforth make a 
particular effort to store all the documents concerning ecclesiastical law.783 
Accordingly, the three texts that constitute the Expositiones ad Carolum Regem 
were also recorded. Another reason why these legal opinions have been preserved 
and had become relevant for the entire Middle Ages is that Hincmar appears as a 
radical apologist for the liberties of the ‘church’. The work provides a first-rate 
                                                
781 The following information about the time of creation of the Expositiones ad Carolum Regem is 
taken from Devisse 1976, pp. 730-736. Devisse himself bases his argument on Amann. 
782 Ibid., p. 730 (note 20). 
783 Ibid.; Tavard 1973, p. 596. 
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example of a legal defence of ecclesiastical privileges against usurpation by secular 
power. 
The cause of the dispute of 868 was one of the many incidents relating to 
‘church’ property that mark the ninth century. At the request of Bishop Hincmar of 
Laon, Charles the Bald handed over a villa to him, which had recently been 
confiscated. Hincmar the Younger immediately gave it as a benefice to the king 
who then installed a faithful man by the name of Nortmann in the villa. Charles 
would then continually accuse the bishop of trying to seize five fiscal manses, in 
addition to the land rightly returned, while the bishop would in turn accuse 
Nortmann of being a raptor facultatum ecclesiasticarum for having taken back 
these five manses. The result of this conflict was the deposition of Bishop Hincmar 
of Laon. In 868, the king summoned Hincmar of Laon to appear in person before 
the royal tribunal or be represented by an intermediary. He accused the bishop of 
having made abusive confiscations of benefices dependent on his diocese and 
entrusted to certain men of the king. No bishop, not even the archbishop, was 
informed about the summons Hincmar the Younger had received. His refusal to 
appear was then punished by the seizure of the bishop’s revenues through 
Nortmann. 
When Hincmar of Reims learned about the incident, he carried out a 
detailed investigation and prepared a dossier to be given to the king at the Synod of 
Pîtres in the summer of 868. The two texts submitted in August were the 
Quaterniones and the Rotula. However, Charles the Bald decided to postpone the 
reading and intended to demand that the bishops give account if they confiscate 
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benefices from the holders. Thereupon Hincmar of Reims pronounced an 
allocution, the Admonitio, in order to force the king to acknowledge his dossier. 
The prelate’s survey found, among other things, evidence of unacceptable 
actions taken by Charles the Bald. Furthermore, it exposed the pretext for the rapid 
escalation of the judicial process: passing through the lands of Laon, the king 
received a complaint against Bishop Hincmar of Laon from the son of a certain 
Liudon. As was confirmed by the bishop, this boy should have received the 
benefice held by his father in exchange for a gift. However, for no apparent reason, 
Hincmar of Laon then revoked the concession. Enraged by what he had heard, the 
king publicly insulted the bishop. Hincmar of Laon did not appear before the royal 
court, and the king made him pay a fine despite his apologies for absence. Having 
repeatedly asked for the bishop’s advocate in vain, Charles the Bald finally ordered 
the confiscation of all the secular goods of Laon, with the exception of the 
cathedral, the residence of the bishop and the cloister of the clerics. The Count of 
Laon placed the property under the royal ban. Hincmar writes at the beginning of 
the Quaterniones where he provides a description of the facts: 
 
Since his [Bishop Hincmar of Laon’s] advocate had both been required 
and not been found, who should have given an account of his [Bishop 
Hincmar of Laon’s] offence for the aforesaid reason, with the exception of 
the ‘church’ and the house of the bishop, as well as the cloister of the 
clerics, everything he had accepted of the property and ecclesiastical goods 
commissioned to him at the episcopal ordination as a gift of the Holy 
Spirit to manage and distribute has been banned, at your command, by the 
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viscount of the county itself – which is legally called ‘proscription by 
confiscation’ in the Latin language.784 
 
The royal chancellor had informed Hincmar of Reims in detail about the steps 
taken by the king in order to achieve the bishop’s capitulation. It had never 
happened before that a bishop had been stripped of his property by a judgment of 
laymen without an ecclesiastical agreement. This is made clear somewhat further 
below in the Quaterniones: 
 
For it is new what has been done now, since it has never been heard under 
this sky, that a bishop has been expropriated with his ‘church’ under the 
title of ‘proscription’ by any religious leader, in a judicial investigation of 
laymen, after Emperor Constantine the Great had made a law for the entire 
body of clerics, saying: «Constantine greets the clerics. Beside the 
confirmation of inviolability that you have been asserted to have earned 
not long since, no one will restrain your lands and ecclesiastical tributaries 
by new collections, instead you will take pleasure in immunity.» For, since 
he says «no one», no one is excluded; certainly, in this comprehension the 
leading power is also included.785 
                                                
784 Et requisito et non invento advocato illius, qui de eius capite ex praedicta causa redderet 
rationem, excepta ecclesia et episcopii domo, ac clericorum claustro, quidquid de rebus et 
facultatibus ecclesiasticis sibi in episcopali ordinatione munere Spiritus sancti ad gubernandum et 
dispensandum commissis acceperat, iussione vestra, per vicecomitem ipsius pagi, in bannum, quod 
ius lingua latina proscriptio confiscando vocatur, est missum. PL 125, col. 1037A-1037B. 
785 Novum est enim quod nunc factum est, quia non est sub isto coelo auditum, ut episcopus cum 
Ecclesia sua proscriptionis titulo ab ullo religioso principe, laicorum iudicio, usque modo fuerit 
confiscatus, postquam Constantinus magnus imperator legem universis clericis dedit, dicens: 
«Constantinus clericis salutem dicit. Iuxta sanctionem quam dudum meruisse perhibemini, fundos et 
mancipia vestra nullus novis collationibus obligabit, sed vacatione gaudebitis.» Cum enim dicit 
«nullus», nemo excipitur; verum in hac comprehensione etiam principalis potestas concluditur. 
Ibid., col. 1038C-1038D. 
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Hincmar wants to make explicit that the ruler, as well as any of his direct officials, 
are included in this clause. 
All the texts the prelate gathered for the Quaterniones condemn the 
procedure followed by the king. Hincmar of Reims lays out the entire legislation on 
ecclesiastical goods, in order to remind Charles the Bald of the promises he made 
with regard to their protection. Hincmar adds some canonical texts that condemn a 
confiscation of the kind undertaken by the king. Furthermore, by using four pieces 
of Roman law as well as the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, he establishes an 
inviolable principle on the trial of clerics: a cleric cannot be summoned before a 
secular court. The civil law and the canon law have commonly agreed that the 
‘church’ will indict any bishop who has accepted to be judged by a layman. No one 
can seize the episcopal property – especially not in the absence of any legal ruling. 
As far as the case of Liudon and his son is concerned, Hincmar finds that it 
is proper that these homines militares who receive the benefices serve both the king 
and the ‘church’. When a son follows a man who has conscientiously fulfilled this 
double duty, the transfer of the benefice to the son is conventional. If a dispute 
arises between the homo militaris and the bishop, and all avenues of reconciliation 
have been explored, it is normal that the layman brings the appeal before the king. 
Up to that point, according to Hincmar, the procedure had been lawful. However, it 
was the king’s reaction to the complaint that was immoderate. First of all, the 
integrity of the ‘church’ property should have been protected. Secondly, missi 
should have been sent by the king in order to investigate discreetly. After the 
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investigation, the case should have been brought before an ecclesiastical tribunal. 
Canon law would have been applied to the cleric, the capitularies to the layman.786 
The prelate’s principal statement is that only a careful observance of the law 
can provide a solution to the matter, and that Charles the Bald, although king, is 
wrong to believe that he is above the law. The Rotula was essentially an aide-
mémoire highlighting particular points made in the Quaterniones (mostly with 
regard to the rules of judgment when the accused is a bishop). After Charles the 
Bald had dismissed both texts and insisted on having his own rights respected, the 
Admonitio reminded him more rigorously of his duties. The basic argument 
remained the same: the king is a prisoner of the texts. The predecessors of Charles 
the Bald made a point of respecting the laws their predecessors had respected and 
those they signed themselves.787 Hincmar of Reims indicated to the king that he 
himself, through his own concessions, had multiplied these promises of respect for 
the ‘church’, its members and its property. 
The first part, the Quaterniones, comprise all the explicit and implicit 
references to Augustine (of which there are five explicit references in total) present 
in Hincmar’s Expositiones ad Carolum Regem. No further references to Augustine 
can be found in the Rotula or the Admonitio. While the Admonitio has a purely 
monitory function and the Rotula merely gives additional evidence from canon 
law, the Roman law enforced by the Christian Roman emperors and from 
Carolingian capitularies, the Quaterniones contain the main argument of Hincmar’s 
legal opinion. For this reason, only the Quaterniones of the Expositiones ad 
Carolum Regem will be considered in my research. 
                                                
786 Ibid., col. 1052C. 
787 See also Nelson 1986, pp. 135, 162. 
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 In terms of originality and individuality, the Expositiones ad Carolum 
Regem are probably Hincmar’s most interesting piece of writing. They are written 
from the author’s point of view and are Hincmar’s personal statement in response 
to infringements of the libertates ecclesiae.788 In this regard, the Expositiones ad 
Carolum Regem seem to form a counterpart to the De regis persona et regio 
ministerio, which (like Hincmar’s other works) only contains a little of his own 
original work. Although intriguing because it draws heavily on Augustine and is 
interspersed with long quotations from the De civitate Dei, the De regis persona et 
regio ministerio does not comprise an original engagement with the source material 
it uses. Its lengthy quotes are often only loosely connected to the subject matter. 
 A number of questions will guide the investigation of the Quaterniones. 
The main question that is asked in the Quaterniones itself concerning a legal 
dispute that involves both the ‘state’ and the ‘church’ is: how does the secular law 
relate to the ‘church’ that is affected (i.e. accused) in this case? The main questions 
that will be posed with regard to Augustinian influence are: where in the text, in 
what context(s) and how often compared to other authors and sources is Augustine 
used explicitly and/or implicitly? For what purposes? To make what kind of 
statements? Of what nature are the explicit and implicit references to Augustine? 
What place does Augustine take in this legal opinion? As part of the search for 
implicit evidence of Augustinian influence a formal analysis of the Quaterniones 
will look at the following concepts: iustus/iustitia (taking into consideration 
Hincmar’s frequent references to Theodosius I), beatus/beatitudo vs. 
                                                
788 Because the Quaterniones provide the author’s own opinion, Hincmar defends the position he 
has taken so rigorously at the end of the text. PL 125, col. 1058C-1060A. (This will be explored in 
detail further below.) 
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(in)felix/(in)felicitas, superbus/superbia as opposed to humilis/humilitas (in various 
rulers, including King David, who has sinned like King Charles the Bald) and 
misericors/misericordia. In terms of intertextuality and performativity further 
inquiries will be made, such as: in what way does Hincmar refer to the (Christian) 
Roman emperors and the Frankish predecessors as well as contemporary rulers of 
Charles the Bald (compared with Alcuin’s Epist. 246 directed to Archbishop 
Theodulf of Orléans, which was composed after Charlemagne’s imperial 
coronation and associates Charlemagne with the Roman imperial tradition)? What 
aim does the author pursue by referring to these previous rulers? Is there any 
criticism involved? What are the roles of Charlemagne and Paulinus II of Aquileia 
(compared with Alcuin’s Epist. 139 directed to Paulinus, which contains a 
powerful link between Charlemagne as an Old Testament king and the civitas Dei), 
Emperor Theodosius I and Bishop Ambrose as well as King David in the 
Quaterniones? What is the meaning of the closing of the Quaterniones together 
with the direct references to Augustine? It will be seen that in the Quaterniones 
Augustine emerges in particularly interesting and important places of the text. 
 In the explanatory section at the beginning of the Quaterniones, Hincmar 
repeatedly emphasises the outrageousness of the fact that Bishop Hincmar of Laon 
is made answerable to a secular tribunal by Charles the Bald. He writes: 
 
Then you have ordered the aforementioned bishop to come to your cause, 
that is, to the secular court, on the designated day and place: and that he 
would present his advocate of his offence, naturally of his act which he has 
committed himself, that is, with some fellow bishop of whom I am not 
aware. This one has commissioned [put into writing], sending an excuse to 
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your lordship for the impossibility of him coming there. What we name an 
excuse in the indigenous language has been required, since he was unable 
to come: which has hitherto been unheard of.789 
 
 Right at the beginning of his criticism Hincmar voices the opinion that 
Charles the Bald has imposed too heavy penalties on Hincmar of Laon. He 
acknowledges Charles the Bald’s good intentions, but at the same time warns that 
rumours about his decisions will circulate in remote areas where his essentially 
good intentions will be misunderstood. Hincmar chooses the following words: 
 
And although, in view of the religious observance of your Christianity, one 
has to believe that you have carried this out for the correction of the bishop 
himself, your wisdom still has to be wondered at, which has thus measured 
the medicine for a [Hincmar of Laon’s] wound so that it was itself 
wounded from the medicine. The Lord sets the standards of the love of 
neighbour thus, that we love the neighbour as ourselves and do not love 
ourselves more. Fame – or, more precisely, infamy – penetrating 
Burgundy and Provence, as well as Italy, will reach Rome; and through the 
realm of your grandson, will not only come to nearer Germania, but also to 
the more remote parts; it will occupy Aquitania and Septimania, rushing 
through Neustria. And whoever does not know the sincere eye – that is to 
say the good intention – that is in you will think that where something is 
done contrary to the Lord, and hostile to the sacred canons (just as the 
                                                
789 Deinde iussistis praefatum episcopum, ut die et loco denominato veniret ad causas vestras, id est, 
ad saecularia iudicia, et suum advocatum de suo capite, videlicet de suo quod ipse egit actu, id est, 
non conscio quocunque coepiscopo suo, donaret. Qui mittens ad dominationem vestram, 
excusationem impossibilitatis suae illuc veniendi mandavit. Requisita est quam patriotica lingua 
nominamus exonia, quia venire nequiverit: quod hactenus est inauditum. Ibid., col. 1037A. 
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blessed Leo writes, constructed by the Holy Spirit and consecrated to the 
reverence of the entire world, whose founders reign in heaven with the 
Lord, and sparkle on earth with miracles, live to this day together with us 
in the constitutions), and also even to the laws, by which together with the 
same sacred canons the ‘church’ is regulated – they will think that where 
something like this is done, it is without doubt adverse [to the Lord].790 
 
 After the statement already mentioned above – that it is unprecedented that 
a bishop is summoned before a secular court – Hincmar starts listing major laws 
adopted by previous rulers. He remarks that a law enforced by Constantine I has 
been confirmed by the emperors Constantius II (a dedicated promoter of Arianism) 
and Constans, who have both granted the ‘church’ immunity.791 Also the emperors 
Valentinian I and Valens have similarly decreed that nothing concerning the 
ecclesiastical privileges can be changed.792 Thereafter, according to Hincmar’s 
account, these laws have indirectly been validated by the emperors Arcadius and 
Honorius, who have claimed: “Concerning the sacred ‘churches’, we order that 
whatever, they say, has been set up by our ancestors in different times, remains 
                                                
790 Et licet credendum sit de vestrae christianitatis religione, quoniam ad ipsius correctionem 
episcopi hoc egeritis; tamen miranda est vestra sapientia, quae sic medicamentum illius vulneri 
temperavit, ut de medicamento ipsa vulneraretur: cum Dominus mensuram in proximi dilectione 
talem ponat, ut proximum sicut nos ipsos, et non plus nos ipsos diligamus. Fama enim, quin potius 
infamia haec, Burgundiam et Provinciam, atque Italiam penetrans, Romam perveniet; et per regnum 
nepotis vestri, non solum usque ad citeriorem, verum et usque Germaniam ulteriorem perveniet, 
Aquitaniam et Septimaniam per Neustriam volitans occupabit. Et quis oculum simplicem, id est, 
rectam intentionem, quam in vobis nescit, putabit: ubi factum Domino contrarium, et inimicum 
sacris canonibus, sicut beatus Leo scribit, Spiritu Dei conditis et totius mundi reverentia consecratis, 
quorum conditores in coelo cum Domino regnantes, et in terris miraculis coruscantes, adhuc 
nobiscum in constitutionibus vivunt; sed et legibus, quibus una cum eisdem sacris canonibus 
moderatur Ecclesia, constat adversum? Ibid., col. 1037C-1038A. 
791 Ibid., col. 1038D. 
792 Ibid., col. 1038D-1039A. 
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inviolable and incorruptible.”793 The meaning of this precept in simple words is that 
whatever has been enacted by a predecessor cannot be repealed by a successor. 
 Before we discuss Hincmar’s consideration of the Christian Roman empire 
and emperors in the Quaterniones, two thought-provoking passages from the De 
civitate Dei must be recalled. They are drawn from chapters 24 and 26 of Book V 
of the De civitate Dei, where Augustine judges the Christian Roman ‘state’ and 
praises some of its leaders (emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I) within 
reasonable limits. Regarding the Christian emperors at large, Augustine first 
declares that that it would be wrong to consider some of them successful and lucky 
because they managed to overcome enemies of the ‘state’ and rebels and had a long 
and contented reign and a peaceful death. For even demon worshippers enjoy the 
benefit of such comforts. Rather, they must be called happy if they govern justly 
and with the right measure of forbearance under God’s authority, if they do not 
forget that they are human too, if they honour God and the Kingdom of God, if 
they live a modest, virtuous and pious life and do not wage unnecessary wars or 
conquer unnecessarily and, finally, if they do all this not for any kind of human 
recognition but in humility before God, for the love of God.794 In this extract (as 
well as in the last paragraph of chapter 19 in Book V of the De civitate Dei795), 
proof can be found that Augustine sees emperors in general as subordinate to God. 
However, at the same time, these lines also disclose that Augustine still holds a 
certain passion for temporal greatness and thinks of Christian emperors as 
particularly felices (“happy”). In the second passage, Theodosius I is praised above 
                                                
793 Quaecunque, inquiunt, a parentibus nostris diversis sunt statuta temporibus, manere inviolata 
atque incorrupta circa sanctas Ecclesias praecipimus. Ibid., col. 1039A. 
794 Civ. V 24, pp. 236-237. 
795 Civ. V 19, p. 230. 
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all for his piety and humility. Augustine expresses admiration for Theodosius I’s 
strong Christian belief, his strict prohibitions on heathen practices796 and his 
contributions to the consolidation of the Christian ‘church’ on earth. Great 
emphasis is placed on the emperor’s humility due to his willingness to forgive and 
repent after having punished the Thessalonians excessively for committing a crime. 
Augustine also does not fail to mention the group of bishops (to which Ambrose 
belonged) who encouraged the emperor’s noble gesture of penitence.797 His 
judgment of Emperor Theodosius I is as follows: 
 
But what was more admirable than his [Theodosius I’s] religious humility, 
when, by the protest of some who adhered to him, he was urged to take 
vengeance for the very grave crime of the Thessalonians, for which he had 
already promised indulgence since the bishops interfered, and corrected by 
the ecclesiastical instruction thus exercised penitence, so that the people 
praying for him shed more tears when seeing the imperial sublimity 
prostrated, than it feared the imperial sublimity enraged when sinning? 
He carried these good deeds – as well as others like it, which would be 
tedious to recount – with him out of this temporal society of any high 
quality and human sublimity; the reward for which deeds is eternal 
happiness, whose giver is God to the truly pious alone.798 
                                                
796 Civ. V 26, pp. 239-240. 
797 On the historical context of Ambrose’s intervention against Theodosius I see Young 2010, pp. 
658-659; Markus 1988, pp. 94-96. 
798 Quid autem fuit eius religiosa humilitate mirabilius, quando in thessalonicensium gravissimum 
scelus, cui iam episcopis intercedentibus promiserat indulgentiam, tumultu quorundam, qui ei 
cohaerebant, vindicare compulsus est et ecclesiastica cohercitus disciplina sic egit paenitentiam, ut 




 The first time Theodosius I and his laws are mentioned in the Quaterniones 
is when Hincmar suggests that Charles the Bald read the Codex Theodosianus. 
Hincmar observes: 
 
Many things could still be laid out here, which have been preserved by all 
those who are advantageously reigning, and justly judging for a long 
period of time; but I know that your wisdom is bound to understand most 
of these things which have been laid out from the sixteenth book of the 
Theodosian law.799 
 
Immediately after the Codex Theodosianus has been recommended to Charles the 
Bald, a link is made from the laws of the Christian Roman imperial period 
(Theodosius I) to those of the Frankish predecessors as well as contemporary rulers 
of Charles the Bald: Charlemagne is mentioned as the linking element between the 
Christian Roman and the Frankish rulers, of whom the Carolingians are the only 
ones mentioned. The Merovingians are excluded from this tradition for the purpose 
of entirely breaking the link between the notion of rulership of the Christian 
Carolingians and that of their ancestors with pagan, Germanic roots. Furthermore, 
Charlemagne and Paulinus II of Aquileia play the key roles in a praeiudicium 
(“prejudgment”) made by Charlemagne concerning the ecclesia res (which here 
                                                                                                                                  
Haec ille secum et si qua similia, quae commemorare longum est, bona opera tulit ex isto temporali 
vapore cuiuslibet culminis et sublimitatis humanae; quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, 
cuius dator est Deus solis veraciter piis. Civ. V 26, p. 240, ll. 16-27. 
799 Multa etiam hic poni poterant, quae ab omnibus salubriter regnantibus, et iuste iudicantibus 
longo tempore conservata sunt; sed scio sapientiam vestram ex his quae de decimo sexto libro 
Theodosianae legis sunt posita, debere comprehendere plura. PL 125, col. 1039D. J. M. Wallace-
Hadrill is right that Charles the Bald was familiar with the Codex Theodosianus. Wallace-Hadrill 
1975, p. 195. 
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clearly has the literal meaning of “‘church’ property”).800 The result is the 
publication of an edict, signed by Charlemagne (for his successors to adhere to), at 
the instigation of Paulinus and other bishops. According to Hincmar, a part of this 
edict can be found in the book of the imperial Capitularies, cap. 67801. In the edict 
the material ecclesiastical goods are presented under a spiritual veneer. Hincmar 
uses the edict and the capitulary in order to prove that the secular authorities have 
committed an offence. The passage says: 
 
And both the ancient as well as the modern kings of the Franks who take 
the religion of these emperors as a model, have been accustomed to 
granting privileges to the ‘churches’ and servants of God; while those who 
do not preserve them accumulate their sins from their alms. Thus, since we 
speak of other memorable emperors and kings, the memory of your 
grandfather, of the great emperor Charles, should not be passed over. From 
him, as is usual, [the religion] was snatched away by the tongues of 
flatterers, so that he made a certain prejudgment about his ‘church’ 
property; since the bishops disapproved, and especially Patriarch Paulinus, 
as I understand that it is well known to you, he has thus reminded himself, 
and has contented both the ‘church’ and the bishops; since the prompt oral 
confession has not satisfied him, he has transmitted for those descendants 
who will emerge from his lineage a writing of his confession and 
confirmation signed with his own hand. A part of this edict is retained in 
                                                
800 PL 125, col. 1040A-1040B. 
801 The liber Capitulorum imperalium, cap. 67 cited by Hincmar is a reference to the Collectio 
capitularium Ansegisi, cap. 77, which supposedly collected Charlemagne’s capitularies on 
ecclesiastical law. Cap. Ansegisi, p. 475, lin. 13-p. 477, lin. 5. However, this capitulary is from the 
Capitulare ecclesiasticum, which was issued by Louis the Pious (not by Charlemagne). Cap. 
Hludowici Pii, p. 275, lin. 37-p. 276, lin. 1. 
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your book, which is called the book of the imperial Capitularies, cap. 67 
where it is written: «Since we know that next to the tradition of the holy 
Fathers the affair of the ‘church’ is the religious engagement of the 
faithful, the punishment of sinners, and the patrimony of the poor: we wish 
for everyone not only to preserve the possessions, but also to collect many 
things with God’s help: nevertheless, in order that we could entirely 
eliminate from the ecclesiastics the mistrust of him previously held about 
the goods that are not to be divided, we have established that no division 
or diminution at all may be allowed either in our times, or in those of our 
sons; or, so long as God is dispensing, in those of our successors, who will 
have wanted to imitate either our will of the progenitors, or their 
example.»802 
 
The text suggests that Charlemagne was led to an offence against the ‘church’ by 
certain people at the court – so-called adulantium linguis (“tongues of flatterers”). 
The result, Hincmar writes, was that Charlemagne was robbed of his religion. 
However, the meaning of this statement remains vague. Hincmar uses the word 
subrepta (“snatched away”) with reference to religio (“religion”) but does not tell 
                                                
802 Et horum imperatorum imitantes religionem antiqui etiam et moderni reges Francorum, 
immunitates ecclesiis et servis Dei facere consueverunt, quas qui non servant, de illorum 
eleemosyna peccata sua accumulant. Itaque cum de aliis memorabilibus imperatoribus ac regibus 
loquimur, avi vestri, magni imperatoris Caroli non est praetereunda memoria. Cui cum, sicut 
assolet, adulantium linguis subreptam fuerit, ut ecclesiis de rebus suis praeiudicium quoddam 
inferret; obsistentibus episcopis, et specialiter Paulino patriarcha, sicut vobis bene notum esse 
cognosco, adeo se recognovit, et ecclesiae ac episcopis satisfecit; ut praesens oris sui confessio ei 
non suffecerit, sed ad posteros suos, qui ex illius progenie exorturi erant, confessionis et correctionis 
suae scriptum manu sua firmatum transmiserit. De quo edicto partem in libro vestro, qui appellatur 
liber Capitulorum imperalium, scriptum habetur, cap. 67 ubi scriptum est: «Quia iuxta sanctorum 
Patrum traditionem novimus res Ecclesiae vota esse fidelium, pretia peccatorum, et patrimonia 
pauperum: cuique non solum habita conservare, verum etiam multa Deo opitulante conferre 
optamus: tamen ut ab ecclesiasticis de non dividendis rebus illius suspicionem dudum conceptam 
penitus amoveremus, statuimus, ut neque nostris, neque filiorum, et Deo dispensante, successorum 
nostrorum temporibus, qui nostram vel progenitorum voluntatem, vel exemplum imitari voluerint, 
ullam penitus divisionem aut iacturam patiatur.» PL 125, col. 1039D-1040B. 
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us anything about any further consequences of Charlemagne’s loss of “religion”. 
The offence itself is termed praeiudicium de rebus ecclesiis (“prejudgment about 
the ‘church’ property”). The text says nothing about the exact nature of this crime. 
However – in view of Hincmar’s outrage – it has to be assumed that a property 
crime was committed by Charlemagne. He must have taken away property from 
the ‘church’. In any case, Paulinus introduced countermeasures by persuading 
Charlemagne to record the ownership rights of the ‘church’. Charlemagne 
subsequently confirms in writing that: firstly, ecclesiasticae res non sunt 
dividendae (“‘church’ property is not to be divided”), and secondly, any iactura 
(“diminution”) will not be tolerated.803 It is striking that in the quoted extract, it is 
Charlemagne’s Christian moral behaviour that is criticised. Heading down the path 
of aberration, he needed moral guidance from a cleric (i.e. Patriarch Paulinus). It 
was his instruction which allowed Charlemagne to save face. Hincmar wants to 
make the point that even Emperor Charlemagne had the need for ecclesiastical 
guidance, since his morals were not immaculate. Arguing in this manner, Hincmar 
hopes to encourage Charles the Bald to follow his instructions. Portraying all his 
predecessors as morally perfect would not have inspired Charles the Bald.804 At this 
point, Alcuin’s Epist. 139 to Paulinus II of Aquileia should be used for comparison. 
In Epist. 139 Paulinus features as a fighter against heresy and a champion for the 
correct Christian doctrine. The text contains an extraordinary link between 
Charlemagne as an Old Testament king and the civitas Dei. Paulinus appears as the 
guardian of the doors of the civitas Dei as well as the holder of the clavis Daviticae 
                                                
803 Ibid., col. 1040B. 
804 It will be seen that later in the Quaterniones King David (with reference to Bathsheba: 2 Sam 
11:1-12:25) and Theodosius I are presented as sinners. (The Old Testament episode of David’s 
seduction of Bathsheba is also illustrated in an ivory carving at the centre of the jewelled back cover 
of Charles the Bald’s Psalter. Nees 1995, pp. 202-212.) 
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potentiae (“key of David’s power”), which conveys Alcuin’s admiration and 
respect for the patriarch. In the conclusion of Epist. 139, the Carolingian ‘state’ is 
pictured as the perfect Christian community of the civitas Dei on earth, led by 
Charlemagne, who is cast first as King David, then as King Solomon, and is 
defended from ungodly attackers from the outside (the heretics) by Paulinus. In this 
situation, Charlemagne, under the pseudonym of an Old Testament king, certainly 
seems in need of ecclesiastical support – only, however, against irreligious assaults 
from the outside. The difference between the two representations of Charlemagne 
and Paulinus II of Aquileia is that in Alcuin’s Epist. 139 the ecclesiastical support 
is not the consequence of any misconduct on the part of the ruler: Charlemagne is 
portrayed as being innocent and completely in the hands of the non-Christian 
enemies.805 In Hincmar’s Quaterniones, however, the ecclesiastical support is 
mandatory for the restoration of the honour of Charlemagne, who has committed 
an offence.806 
 Only a few lines after Hincmar’s criticism of Emperor Charlemagne, who 
appears as an intermediary between the Carolingian and the Christian Roman 
emperors, King David features as a sinner. Hincmar alludes to 2 Sam 11:1-12:25, 
where David conceitedly claims Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, 
impregnates her and finally gets Uriah – one of his most loyal soldiers – killed in 
battle, in order to marry Bathsheba. As a consequence, David is reprimanded by the 
prophet Nathan, who is sent by God and proclaims a punishment for his sins of 
adultery and murder: David and Bathsheba’s son is doomed to die. Even though 
                                                
805 See Wallace-Hadrill’s discussions in support of this argument. Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 103; 
Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 189, 193. 
806 This is in line with H. H. Anton’s argument that Hincmar avoids deriving any royal inviolability 
from such Bible quotations. Anton 1968, pp. 290-291. 
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David turns all his pride into humility and repents by praying, fasting and sleeping 
on the ground during his son’s illness, the child dies. David is reconciled with God, 
and his second son, Solomon, is again loved. Hincmar comments as follows on this 
scriptural passage: 
 
What is lawful is not depicted, as it often tends to happen, in the eyes of 
men, but is nonetheless always depicted in the eyes of the Lord. But just as 
David who is to be extolled: Since the beginning of every sin is pride, 
acting against his avowal, which has been avowed, saying: The Lord lives, 
since I will frolic before God, and I will be humble in my own eyes the 
grace of the prophecy and the royal dignity, which he has lost by sinning, 
he has regained by repenting as a confessor before the eyes of Nathan.807 
 
By using the image of the Biblical king who has offended against God, Hincmar, 
who is clearly casting himself as Nathan here, has two messages for Charles the 
Bald: firstly, that if a person acts in a manner considered lawful by men, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is also considered lawful by God. In the eyes of men, 
Charles the Bald and his direct officials have acted within the law; in the eyes of 
God, they have sinned, since superbia (“pride”) is the sin itself. Secondly, David 
has repented of his sins and thus regained the favour of God. In other words, it is 
always possible for a person to correct what he has done wrong and restore his 
honour before God. 
                                                
807 Quod licet non fiat, sicut saepe solet accidere, in oculis hominum, fit tamen semper in oculis 
Domini. Sed sicut superbiendo David: Quia initium omnis peccati superbia faciens contra 
professionem suam, quam professus est, dicens: Vivit Dominus, quia ludam ante Dominum, et ero 
humilis in oculis meis prophetiae gratiam et dignitatem regiam, quam peccando perdidit, confessus 
coram Nathan poenitendo recuperavit. PL 125, col. 1040D-1041A. 
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 Subsequently, Hincmar lists all the promises Charles the Bald has already 
made to the ‘church’ at previous synods before the Frankish bishops (present and 
not present in person).808 Twice the concept of misericordia occurs in Charles the 
Bald’s own sequence confirmed and signed with his own hand at the palace in 
Quierzy.809 Afterwards, Hincmar reproduces some written statements made by 
popes810 and then refers particularly to the Antiocheni canones and the Gangrenses 
canones, emphasising that the canons are directly inspired by the Holy Spirit.811 
The words Hincmar quotes from the Antiocheni canones are exigent and 
unambiguous: 
 
But also the canons of Antioch instruct accordingly thus: «What belongs to 
the ‘church’ may be preserved under all solicitude and good conscience, as 
well as faith which is in God, who considers and judges everything: these 
things are also to be distributed by the judgment and power of the pontifex, 
to whom the people has been committed, and the souls who are assembled 
within the ‘church’.» And likewise: «The bishop should have the power 
over the ecclesiastical property for distribution to all those who are in 
need, with the highest reverence and fear of God. May also he himself 
partake in the things he needs, inasmuch as he still needs, for both his 
necessary future uses and those of the brethren who are received by 
him.»812 
                                                
808 Ibid., col. 1041B-1042D. 
809 Ibid., col. 1042C. 
810 Ibid., col. 1042D-1043C. 
811 Ibid., col. 1043D-1044B. 
812 Sed et Antiocheni canones, ita inde praecipiunt: «Quae sunt ecclesiae, sub omni sollicitudine et 
conscientia bona, et fide quae in Deum est, qui cuncta considerat iudicatque, serventur: quae etiam 
dispensanda sunt iudicio et potestate pontificis, cui commissus est populus, et animae quae intra 
ecclesiam congregantur.» Et item: «Episcopus ecclesiasticarum rerum habeat potestatem ad 
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The selected passage not only demands that the ecclesiastical goods be regarded as 
inviolable and that the bishop has the power of disposition, but also considers it 
important to highlight the bishop’s personal claim to a share in these possessions, 
beyond the mere financing of his clerics. Hincmar then returns a second time to the 
Christian Roman emperors in the context of proving that it is unlawful to summon 
a bishop before a secular court. Hincmar presents a law from the sixteenth book of 
the Codex Theodosianus, which is afterwards sanctioned by Constantine III.813 
Theodosius I occurs as christianissimus imperator together with Ambrose, who is 
called humillimus.814 Other Christian Roman emperors (Valens, Gratian, 
Valentinian etc.) are mentioned in support of the aforementioned argument.815 
 Thereupon, Hincmar states the fact that all the property owned by the 
‘church’ has been guaranteed by secular authorities.816 Hincmar corroborates this 
statement by quoting from Augustine’s Sermo VI. Ioannis Evangelii817. Ius humane 
is the “human law”. The main point Hincmar wants to make is that people own 
property as a result of the law made by the ruler. Whoever claims ownership has 
possessions solely by royal law. Hincmar uses Augustine in order to emphasise the 
following: the rulers are always legally involved as far as ‘church’ property is 
concerned. ‘Church’ property has to be guaranteed by the law of the secular leader. 
Only via the mediation of the ‘state’ can the ‘church’ own property. The ‘church’ 
                                                                                                                                  
dispensandum erga omnes qui indigent, cum summa reverentia et timore Dei. Participet autem et 
ipse quibus indiget, si tamen indiget, tam suis, quam fratrum qui ab eo suscipiuntur, necessariis 
usibus profuturis.» Ibid., col. 1043D-1044A. 
813 Ibid., col. 1045B-1045C. 
814 Ibid., col. 1045C-1045D. 
815 Ibid., col. 1045C-1049B. 
816 Regarding property law and Christian doctrine see H. Chadwick’s reference to Augustine. 
Chadwick 1988, p. 14. 
817 In the Quaterniones Hincmar quotes the same passages from Augustine’s Sermo Ioannis 
Evangelii that he quoted in Epist. 108 (in the foreword to his Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis) 
between 857 and the spring of 858. 
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cannot own property on its own authority. ‘Church’ property is sanctioned by royal 
decree. As far as ecclesiastical property guaranteed by a royal decree is concerned, 
this guarantee cannot easily be revoked or declared invalid by a ruler. 
 What has been decided by previous emperors must be observed. Again, 
laws enacted by the Christian Roman emperors Honorius and Theodosius I are 
mentioned: any clerics who are accused before a bishop must be confirmed by 
witnesses, and the bishop himself needs to hear the case. This is so that as many 
people as possible will learn about the case if the accused clerics prove to be 
innocent. 
 Drawing on Augustine’s Sermo VII. Ioannis Evangelii, Hincmar considers 
it to be a matter of secular law that anyone who has lied in any claims should not 
profit from what he has effected. This applies to people in general. Since any 
person may err, an emperor too may err, when taking up someone’s entreaties. 
Likewise, if the ‘state’ has promised to grant a request made by the ‘church’ under 
false pretences, the ‘state’ is not obliged to follow it through. By referring to 
Augustine, Hincmar wants to show that it is a matter of secular law that anyone 
who has lied when making any claims should not benefit from what he has 
achieved through lies. In other words, Hincmar wants to say that Charles the Bald 
has erred and made a rash judgment, which he now needs to revise. Furthermore, 
Hincmar argues that a cautious (cautus) Christian (sanctus) king investigates a case 
diligently before making a judgment.818 He adds that if the bishop (in this case 
Bishop Hincmar of Laon), when accused, will not accept the judgment of those he 
has elected or of those bishops esteemed by his metropolitan or the judgments of 
                                                
818 PL 125, col. 1052B. 
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the synodal canons, then there will always be the judgment decreed by the sacred 
canons, which he has to uphold. Conversely, if the man of the king’s military (in 
this case the son of a homo militaris named Liudon), when accused, refuses to obey 
to the royal missi and the secular laws, there will always be the legally binding 
judgment of the capitularies. Here, Hincmar makes it clear to Charles the Bald that 
canon law (as part of the ecclesiastical law) is to be applied to clerics, while 
capitularies (as part of the secular law) are to be applied to laymen. 
 Afterwards, mentioning Gregory the Great, Hincmar asserts: “From there, a 
legal sentence – which the Blessed Gregory, just as his predecessors did, decreed to 
be canonical in a monitory letter given to John – says: «It is necessary that what 
has been done against the laws does not have strength.»”819 Then, quoting from 
Augustine’s De vera religione, Hincmar writes: 
 
«Although in the matter of these temporal laws men judge over them when 
they establish them, nevertheless, once they have been established and 
confirmed, it will not be fitting for a judge to judge over them, but rather 
according to them. Notwithstanding, a legislator of temporal laws, if he is 
a good and wise man, should consult that eternal law, over which no soul 
is allowed to judge, so that he may discern according to its unchangeable 
rules what is to be ordered and prohibited at the moment. Thus, it is lawful 
that the worldly souls know the eternal law, but unlawful that they judge 
it.»820 
                                                
819 Unde legalis sententia, quam ut praedecessores illius, B. Gregorius in commonitorio Ioanni dato 
decrevit esse canonicam, dicit: «Necesse est ut quod contra leges est actum firmitatem non habeat.» 
Ibid., col. 1055C. 
820 «In istis temporalibus legibus quanquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt; tamen cum 
fuerint institutae atque firmatae non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. Conditor 
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Supported by Augustine, Hincmar says the following to Charles the Bald: firstly, in 
secular law, although fallible humans judge over it when they enact it, a judge is 
not allowed to give a verdict on it, but is merely allowed to decide on the basis of 
it. Secondly, secular law, once made and confirmed by men, cannot easily be 
repealed. Thirdly, at most, a judge can say that a law tends to have a particular 
meaning and then make adjustments accordingly. Finally, there are eternal laws 
which a judge must never neglect in his decision-making. Hincmar wants to draw 
the king’s attention to the fact that in the present case a fundamental Christian rule 
laid down in the Holy Scriptures has been violated, namely the tenth 
commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not covet.” After a quote from 
Prosper821, Hincmar continues as follows: 
 
For if the Roman emperors declared their law to be eternal or perpetual, 
then the law which has been promulgated by the Holy Spirit is so much 
more eternal. Speaking about the distinction that has been shown in it, S. 
Leo822 says: «Whatever may have been either doubtful, or obscure, in 
them, we have known that this is to be followed, which is found neither to 
be contrary to the evangelical precepts, nor against the decrees of the 
saints.»823 
 
                                                                                                                                  
tamen legum temporalium si vir bonus et sapiens est, illam ipsam consulit aeternam, de qua nulli 
animae iudicare datum est, ut secundum eius incommutabiles regulas quid sit pro tempore 
iubendum vetandumque discernat. Aeternam igitur legem mundis animis fas est cognoscere, nefas 
est iudicare.» Ibid., col. 1055C-1055D. 
821 Drawn from Epigrammata ex sententiis Augustini, XLI. De providentia Dei. PL 51, col. 0510C. 
822 Pope Leo I (the Great) (440-461). 
823 Nam si imperatores Romanorum suam legem aeternam, vel perpetuam appellaverunt, multo 
magis lex illa aeterna est, quae est sancto Spiritu promulgata. De qua S. Leo post discretionem quae 
in ea est ostensam dicit: «In his quae vel dubia fuerint, vel obscura, id novimus sequendum, quod 




 Eventually, by first making reference to the Books of Kings824, Hincmar 
returns to the Christian Roman emperors, in order to make his final principal 
statement. The passage reads as follows: 
 
And in the sacred history of Kings it is written: If a man has sinned against 
a man, the Lord can be reconciled with him; but if a man has sinned 
against the Lord, who will pray for him? Remember the memorable deeds 
of Theodosius, and of the memorable man Ambrose, and because 
Theodosius transgressed like a man, Ambrose reprimanded him like a true 
priest, and Theodosius patiently and humbly received divine correction 
through him. And thus he has been exalted, by his merit as well as by his 
name, and by his honour of sanctity above all Roman emperors after 
Constantine. Happy is that emperor, who has had during his time the kind 
of priest who has managed to impose on him a worthy apology for the 
aberration, and to confirm a law that if any leader, in an angry state of 
mind, decided to claim against anyone too severely, the ministers of the 
‘state’ dare not enforce that same law before thirty days, until the mind has 
cooled; and looking inwards, he would see what is true, and would decide 
what is lawful to do. For anger hinders the man so that he cannot discern 
truth, because, as a certain wise man has said, angry thoughts are the 
vipers of a generation: for they first eat the mind, their mother. And the 
Apostle: The anger of a man, he says, does not devote itself to the justice 
of God. And happy is Ambrose, the priest of God, who lived during the 
time of such an emperor. For it is written: Blessed the one who preaches 
justice to the attentive ear. Happy are indeed both, the priest as well as the 
                                                
824 1 Kgs 2. 
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emperor. For lest the anger of God come down upon the emperor for his 
aberration, he had during his time a priest, about whom the Lord has not 
complained […].825 
 
In this passage Hincmar affirms that thanks to the bishop the emperor rectified his 
excessive punishment of the Thessalonians and then repented humbly of his sin. He 
even enacted a law stating that when an enraged emperor imposes penalties, a 
period of thirty days has to be observed to see whether the emperor will decide 
otherwise when in a less agitated state. Although there is no direct evidence of 
Augustinian influence as for instance in Alcuin’s Epist. 139, where Charlemagne’s 
realm is explicitly referred to as the civitas Dei, there is clear evidence of indirect 
Augustinian influence at both levels: the level of content and the formal level of 
Hincmar’s text. At the level of content the Roman emperors Constantine I and 
Theodosius I appear as extraordinary Christian rulers. Hincmar maintains that 
Theodosius I has been exalted above all Roman emperors other than Constantine I. 
In the De civitate Dei Augustine dedicates two separate chapters (25 and 26 of 
Book V) to these Christian emperors. Hincmar expands on the incident when 
                                                
825 Et in sacra Regum historia scriptum est: Si peccaverit vir in virum, placari ei potest Dominus: si 
autem in Domino peccaverit vir, quis orabit pro eo? Mementote facti memorandi Theodosii, et 
memorabilis viri Ambrosii, et quia excessit ut homo Theodosius, corripuit eum ut verus sacerdos 
Ambrosius, et recepit patienter atque humiliter per illum divinam correctionem Theodosius. Et ideo 
exaltatus est, et merito et nomine, et sanctitatis insigne super omnes post Constantinum Romanos 
imperatores. Felix ille imperator qui suo tempore talem habuit sacerdotem, qui post dignam pro 
excessu satisfactionem fecit illi ponere, et confirmare legem, ut si moto animo severius vindicare in 
aliquos princeps quisque decerneret, ministri reipublicae usque ad triginta dies eamdem legem 
exsequi non auderent, donec refrigerato animo, et in se reverso, quid verum esset, videret, et exsequi 
quod iustum esset, decerneret. Nam impedit ira virum ne possit cernere verum, quia, ut quidam 
sapiens dixit, cogitationes iracundi vipereae sunt generationis; prius enim mentem comedunt, 
matrem suam. Et Apostolus: Ira, inquit, viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Et felix sacerdos Dei 
Ambrosius, qui in tempore talis fuit imperatoris. Scriptum est enim: Beatus qui enarrat iustitiam 
auri audienti. Felices quoque ambo, et sacerdos et imperator. Quia ne ira Dei pro excessu 
descenderet super imperatorem, habuit suo tempore sacerdotem, de quo non questus est Dominus 
[…]. PL 125, col. 1056C-1057A. 
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Ambrose and other bishops convinced Theodosius I to repent of his action of 
punishing the Thessalonians too harshly. This incident features in Book V of the 
De civitate Dei, in the chapter devoted to Theodosius I (26), where the emperor is 
held in very high regard for his humility and repentance. It becomes evident that 
Archbishop Hincmar, who is writing to King Charles, draws parallels between 
himself and Bishop Ambrose, and between King Charles and Emperor Theodosius 
I.826 In a cunning and very self-assured manner Hincmar criticises Charles the Bald 
for his prejudgment and rash decision to punish Bishop Hincmar of Laon in an 
unprecedented way and asks him to repent and correct his deed. At the formal level 
of the text one can see that Hincmar adopts Augustine’s use of felix and beatus by 
applying these terms to Emperor Theodosius I and Bishop Ambrose, who serve to 
represent King Charles and Archbishop Hincmar himself. Furthermore, one can 
find the concept of humilis/humilitas, which emerges as a key attribute of Christian 
rulers in the De civitate Dei, and as a particular virtue of Theodosius I. As far as 
Hincmar’s repeated associations of Carolingian rule with the Roman imperial 
tradition are concerned, it is worth taking a final glance at Alcuin’s Epistolae and 
considering Epist. 246, a letter which Alcuin sent to Archbishop Theodulf of 
Orléans in 801/802, following Charlemagne’s imperial coronation. In the epistle, 
Alcuin similarly promotes a Roman law to Charlemagne in the context of a legal 
dispute – a dispute in Tours, which involved Alcuin, Charlemagne, Theodulf of 
Orléans and the community. Likewise, Alcuin, then the abbot of the monastery of 
Saint-Martin, writes in defence of his territory, the Basilica of Saint-Martin de 
Tours, and the associated community. The Roman law in question concerns the 
                                                
826 This is not the only instance where Hincmar associates the Frankish episcopal authority with 
Bishop Ambrose. See De Jong 2009a), pp. 267-268. 
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right of sanctuary in sacred places and was effective under Christian Roman 
emperors such as Honorius. Epist. 246 is exceptional because it integrates 
Charlemagne into the Roman imperial tradition. Alcuin’s motive for referring to 
the Roman emperors in Epist. 246 corresponds to that of Hincmar in the 
Quaterniones: the linking of Charlemagne with the Roman imperial tradition is a 
strategy to put the Carolingian ruler under an obligation to acknowledge and 
uphold a particular law that was in force during the Roman imperial period. 
However, the nature of the connection between the Carolingian rulers and the 
Roman emperors, as well as the representations of both the Carolingian rulers and 
the Roman emperors, are different in the Quaterniones and in Epist. 246: while 
Hincmar admits that “[Theodosius I] has been exalted, by his merit as well as by 
his name, and by his honour of sanctity above all Roman emperors after 
Constantine”827, he is not explicit about the position of Charles the Bald in relation 
to these emperors. Since Hincmar parallels himself with Ambrose and parallels 
Charles the Bald with Theodosius I, it must be assumed that he views the two 
secular authorities as equals. They both have committed a violation of the law and 
now receive correction through the two religious authorities. Hincmar stresses 
Charles the Bald’s likeness to Theodosius I, in order to have him follow the legal 
advice he wants him to follow, which is rooted in the Roman legal tradition. In 
Epist. 246, however, Alcuin’s explanation as to why it is indispensable also for 
Charlemagne to endorse the law regarding the right of sanctuary in ‘churches’ is 
that “it is imperative that neither the dignity of the ‘church’, nor fear and reverence 
for it, should be smaller in the most excellent regnum and most powerful 
                                                
827 PL 125, col. 1056C-1056D. 
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imperium”. Rather, Alcuin says, they should continually grow for the praise and 
glory of Jesus Christ who honoured Charlemagne above all other kings and 
emperors with the beauty of sapientia and exalted him with the potentia regni. 
Although Alcuin relates Charlemagne to the Roman emperors with the aim of 
promoting this specific Roman law, he emphasises Charlemagne’s superiority as a 
Christian emperor over all his exemplary antecessores, in order to have him follow 
said law. 
 The findings from comparing these passages where Augustine, Hincmar 
and Alcuin reflect on worldly rule therefore are that not only Alcuin but also 
Hincmar makes use of Augustine’s De civitate Dei, both directly and indirectly at 
the level of content and at the formal level of the text. However, Hincmar is much 
more critical of worldly rule than Alcuin. As we have seen, by equalling the 
Carolingian rulers with the Roman emperors, Hincmar integrates Charlemagne and 
Charles the Bald smoothly into the Roman imperial tradition and contends together 
with examples of Old Testament kings that all these leaders did not have perfect 
moral integrity. Consequently, they all ultimately needed Christian guidelines and 
help (in the case of Charles the Bald the bishops’ guidelines and help) for moral 
improvement. Alcuin, on the other hand, as several of his epistles clearly express, 
places Charlemagne above all other exemplary worldly rulers – including emperors 
Constantine I and Theodosius I – and claims that he was the only one to have 
secular power capable of fulfilling Augustine’s condition of the implementation of 
God’s true iustitia (“justice”), which is the sole precondition for a civitas Dei. 
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 In each of the two last paragraphs of the Quaterniones there is one direct 
reference to Augustine. In the penultimate paragraph828 Hincmar makes one final 
attempt to explicate for Charles the Bald both the legal and the moral facets of the 
situation. He starts by elucidating the legal aspect. Hincmar quotes the beginning of 
a verse from St. Paul’s 1 Corinthians829 (which originally refers to Israel as an 
example of a people who have sinned), in order to introduce another example of an 
Old Testament king (Uzziah)830 whose pride and sins against God were the cause of 
his downfall. By using a verse from the Gospel of Matthew831, Hincmar declares 
that Uzziah’s punishment is in accordance with those through whom the Holy 
Spirit speaks and through whom the ecclesiastical canons are promulgated. He says 
that whoever voluntarily and with deliberation violates and overthrows the 
constituta divina (“divine constitutions”) is separated from the body of the ‘church’ 
and, unless he is reincorporated into the ‘church’ through penitence, will also be 
separated from the eternal ‘church’. By drawing on a verse in St. Paul’s 1 
Corinthians832, he adds that one should not even share a meal with the sort of 
person who pretends to be Christian but does not act accordingly. Moreover, 
Hincmar quotes from a verse spoken by St. Peter in the Acts of the Apostles833 with 
the aim of highlighting that because God does not consider the person but only 
whether someone fears Him and acts in a morally correct manner, everyone is 
equal before the law, including Charles the Bald. Hincmar then moves on to the 
moral facet of the case. He links the legal with the moral aspect by drawing on St. 
                                                
828 Ibid., col. 1058C-1059B. 
829 1 Cor 11. 
830 2 Kgs 14-15, 2 Chr 26. 
831 Mt 10:20. 
832 1 Cor 5:11. 
833 Acts 10:34. 
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Paul’s Ephesians834. He quotes the beginning of a verse that advises Christians not 
to partake in the fruitless deeds of darkness. The verse continues by saying that the 
misdeeds rather need to be exposed. Augustine tried to explain this verse 
(particularly the meaning of “exposing the misdeeds”), and Hincmar therefore 
turns to him and his exegesis. According to Augustine, there are two ways in which 
the evil does not stain you: firstly, in not consenting, and secondly, in actively 
contradicting. The first one means not communicating by not agreeing with the 
evil. The second one means disproving the evil. What Augustine says afterwards is 
concerned with the criticism of other people’s sins and errors. He says that if one 
corrects others, one must be careful not to do it too proudly and high-handedly. The 
penultimate paragraph reads: 
 
In this matter, since, just as the Scriptures say: although these things 
happened to them as an example, they have been written for our sake, it 
should be carefully noted that, as long as Uzziah worshipped the Lord, he 
held the realm peacefully and gained repeated victories against 
neighbouring and foreign races. But afterwards he did not take first his 
ceremonial service, and instead in his priestly office raised a presumptuous 
hand against divine law, and so until the day of his death he has remained 
cut off in his house, full of leprosy, and he has gained no victory: not even 
able to abide anymore with those others who waged the wars of the Lord 
for the enemies of Israel, that had held the image of the ‘church’, covered 
with leprosy he is, that is, beaten and ruined by grave sin. Because of this, 
and because of the judgment of those about whom the Lord says: It is not 
                                                
834 Eph 5:11. 
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you who speak, but rather the Spirit of your Father who speaks within you, 
and through whom, by means of the same Spirit, the sacred canons have 
been promulgated; because of this, since Peter teaches, God is not an 
accepter of assumed characters, whoever is voluntarily and with intention 
violating and overthrowing the divine constitutions is separated from the 
body of the ‘church’, and unless he is reincorporated into that same 
‘church’ through penitence and through the reconciliation of priestly 
benevolence, he will be separated also from the eternal ‘church’. After 
that, the Apostle also advises, With such a person do not even share a 
meal. And in the same way, as Christ speaks within him, he cautions 
everyone, saying: Do not partake in the fruitless deeds of darkness. 
Explaining this sentence, the blessed Augustine says: «There are two ways 
in which the evil does not stain you: if you do not agree, and if you 
contradict; this is, not to communicate, and not to agree. It is indeed 
communicated, when a fellowship of will or approbation is attached to his 
deed. Accordingly, the Apostle cautions us, saying: Do not partake in the 
fruitless deeds of darkness. And since it was not enough simply to not 
agree, if negligence of the principle then followed, rather, he says, you 
must go further and also contradict. Observe how he includes each one: do 
not partake: do not agree, do not praise, do not approve. But what is this, 
then, go further and contradict? Reprehend, attack, correct. Then in the 
reprehension itself or in the correction of the sins of others, care should be 
taken that he who corrects another should not extol himself; and whoever 
thinks that he stands tall should make sure that he does not fall; in public 
the rebuke should resound fearsomely, internally the love of gentleness 
should be retained. In this way you should neither be consent to the evil, so 
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that you approve it; nor should you neglect it, so that you do not contradict 
it; nor should you be haughty, so that you contradict rudely.»835 
 
In summary, Hincmar’s legal reasoning in the above passage is primarily supported 
by Old Testament examples of people who lost God’s favour by sin and by 
reference to the ecclesiastical canons which are inspired by the Holy Spirit. 
Morally, however, Hincmar uses Augustine as the highest instance. 
 In the last paragraph836 Hincmar focuses entirely on himself and his request 
to the king. He gives an explanation of his motive for sending this text to Charles 
the Bald. Furthermore, he feels a great urge to defend his position and justify why 
he has backed the ‘church’ and his nephew so vigorously with every available 
resource. He is assiduous in eliminating right away the three most plausible – and 
selfish – motives for defending Bishop Hincmar of Laon: a carnal fondness of 
                                                
835 In quo facto, quia sicut Scriptura dicit: Haec autem in figura contingebant illis, scripta sunt 
autem propter nos, diligenter attendendum est quandiu Ozias Dominum coluit, pacifice regnum 
tenuit, et contra vicinas et alienigenas gentes crebras victorias habuit. Postquam autem officium non 
suum praesumpsit, sed in sacerdotale ministerium contra fas manum praesumptionis extendit, usque 
ad diem mortis suae lepra plenus in domo separata permansit, et victoriam nullam fecit: nec cum 
aliis qui bellabant bella Domini pro inimicis Israel, qui Ecclesiae typum tenuerat, perfusus lepra, id 
est, gravi peccato percussus atque perculsus habitare praevaluit. Sic et eorum iudicio quibus dicit 
Dominus: Non vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis, et per quos 
eodem Spiritu sacri promulgati sunt canones; voluntarie atque ex deliberatione quiscunque violans 
et convellens constituta divina, quia docente Petro, Non est personarum acceptor Deus, ab Ecclesiae 
corpore separatus, nisi per poenitentiam et sacerdotalis indulgentiae reconciliationem eidem 
Ecclesiae fuerit reincorporatus, erit ab aeterna Ecclesia separatus. Unde et Apostolus praecipit, Cum 
huiusmodi nec cibum sumere. Et item omnibus, Christo in se loquente, denuntiat dicens: Nolite 
communicare operibus infructuosis tenebrarum. Quam sententiam exponens beatus Augustinus, 
dicit: «Duobus modis non te maculat malus: si non consentias, et si redarguas; hoc est non 
communicare, non consentire. Communicatur quippe, quando facto eius consortium voluntatis vel 
approbationis adiungitur. Hoc ergo nos admonens Apostolus, ait: Nolite communicare operibus 
infructuosis tenebrarum. Et quia parum non erat consentire, si sequeretur negligentia disciplinae, 
magis autem, inquit, et redarguite. Videte quemadmodum utrumque complexus est: nolite 
communicare: nolite consentire, nolite laudare, nolite approbare. Quid est autem, magis et 
redarguite? Reprehendite, corripite, coercete. Deinde in ipsa reprehensione vel coercitione aliorum 
peccatorum, cavendum est ne se extollat qui alterum corripit; et qui se putat stare, videat ne cadat; 
foris terribiliter personet increpatio, intus lenitatis teneatur dilectio. Neque ergo consentientes sitis 
malis, ut approbetis; neque negligentes, ut non arguatis; neque superbientes, ut insultanter arguatis.» 
PL 125, col. 1058C-1059B. 
836 Ibid., col. 1059C-1060A. 
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kinship, and self-defence as well as self interest – insofar as charges against a 
bishop from the province of Reims are at the same time an insult to Hincmar 
himself as archbishop of Reims. Instead, Hincmar introduces the true incentives for 
composing this text. Firstly, he mentions the zelus (“zeal”) promoted in the Psalms 
(and in the Gospel), where it says: “The zeal for your house consumes me.”837 What 
is meant here is the “zeal” for the universal ‘church’, which is the house of God, as 
well as for the sacred priestly order, to which that of the bishop belongs. By 
referring to the Second Book of the Maccabees, where people are praised who lost 
their lives in their fight for Christianity, he reconfirms the urgency to defend the 
‘church’.838 In other words, Hincmar, in his defence of ecclesiastical privileges, 
places himself on an equal footing with martyrs. Secondly, Hincmar speaks of his 
“zeal” for the welfare and prosperity of Charles the Bald himself. Here he 
introduces the theme of veritas (“truth”) in his address to the king. What he writes 
would be repeated in terms of content, language and references in the praefatio of 
the De regis persona et regio ministerio a few years later (ca 873). Hincmar asks 
the king to weigh modestly any words that may resound too sharply, since they are 
in fact friendly because their intent is well meaning, whereas the blandishments 
from a flatterer are actually unfriendly. He supports this statement with a quotation 
from the Book of Proverbs, saying that the wounds of a friend are better than the 
kisses of a loathing enemy.839 Concerning the theme of veritas (“truth”), Hincmar 
reproduces the well-known sentence from Terence that complaisance begets 
friends, truth hatred. Then he recites the verse “you shall know the truth, and the 
                                                
837 Ps 69:10. 
838 2 Mc 6-7. 
839 Prv 27:6. 
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truth shall make you free”840 from the Gospel of John. The final words of the 
Quaterniones include an explicit reference to Augustine and are in line with 
Hincmar’s affirmed concern to provide Charles the Bald with a truthful and well-
intentioned judgment. Hincmar insists that what Augustine says should stick in the 
king’s mind: that it is the way of a deceitful or inexperienced physician to put a 
plaster on a wound in a manner that it either does harm or does not help. What 
Hincmar intends to say is that he himself is firstly honest and secondly experienced 
and therefore, according to Augustine, his sincere and wise judgment must be taken 
into account. Hincmar therefore concludes that everything written above, which 
truth itself has brought forth through the mouths of truth-tellers without adulation 
and for the king’s own welfare, shall not displease Charles the Bald. The last 
paragraph is as follows: 
 
And do not think, dearest and most benign lord, that I have been provoked 
to write these things either because of some carnal fondness of kinship, or 
because those things have been done so outrageously against a bishop of 
Reims, my own entrusted province; rather I write because of a zeal, which 
has been written about both in the psalm and in the Gospel: The zeal for 
your house consumes me, the zeal, clearly, is for the universal ‘church’, 
which is the house of God, and for the sacred priestly order, in which that 
of the bishop is one among all, and for the office of my littleness, reading 
that, because of the father’s laws, God’s elected even longed for the death 
of the body, and that the Catholic ‘church’ sings of him in divine praises as 
a saint: He who has fought for the law of his God even until death. It is no 
                                                
840 Jn 8:32. 
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less a zeal for your welfare and prosperity, which we hope for, that I have 
written these things. Finally, I ask that you mark more carefully in this 
[letter] the obedience of my service, since, if anything at any point 
resounds rather sharply, this is not what is meant by my words: although 
they may pierce, your gentleness ought to weigh them temperately, since a 
flatterer is a seductive enemy. Which is indeed what the Scriptures say: 
Because the wounds of a friend are better than the kisses of a loathing 
enemy. Nor indeed does that well known sentence lay siege to your mind, 
although it holds captive the mind of some, which says: complaisance, that 
is, flattery, clearly adulation, begets friends, truth hatred: because, just as 
you love the truth as a friend of the truth, you know that it is said about the 
Truth: You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. 
Therefore, what the blessed Augustine says should stick in your mind, 
because it is the way of a deceitful or inexperienced physician to put a 
plaster on a wound so that it either does harm or does not help. And the 
things written above, which truth itself has brought forth through the 
mouths of truth-tellers without adulation for your welfare, shall not 
displease you.841 
                                                
841 Et nolite putare, domine charissime ac benignissime, quia quocunque carnalis propinquitatis 
affectu, vel quia tantum in episcopo Rhemensis provinciae indignitati meae commissae ista sunt 
acta, commotus haec scripserim; sed zelo, de quo et in psalmo et in Evangelio scriptum est: Zelus 
domus tuae comedit me, videlicet zelo universalis Ecclesiae, quae domus Dei est, et sacri ordinis 
sacerdotalis, quod unum in omnibus episcopis est, et officii meae exiguitatis, legens electos Dei 
propter leges paternas, etiam mortem corporis appetisse, et in laudibus divinis Ecclesiam catholicam 
cantare sanctum: Qui pro lege Dei sui certavit usque ad mortem. Vestrae nihilominus zelo salutis et 
optandae nobis prosperitatis haec scripsi. Tandem peto ut in hoc servitutis meae obsequio 
diligentius discernatis, quoniam si quaedam ibidem mordacius resonant, non mihi verba sunt sensus: 
quae etsi forent, mansuetudo vestra debet modeste perpendere, quoniam adulator blandus est 
inimicus. Quod Scriptura dicit: Quia meliora sunt vulnera amici, quam odientis inimici oscula. Non 
enim occupatam tenet vestram, sicut quorumdam captivatam mentem possidet vobis bene noti 
sententia, quae dicit: obsequium, id est, assentatio, videlicet adulatio, amicos, veritas odium parit: 
quia, ut veritatis amicus veritatem diligitis, scientes a Veritate dictum: Cognoscetis veritatem, et 
veritas liberabit vos. Inhaereat itaque menti vestrae quod beatus Augustinus dicit, quia dolosi vel 
imperiti medici est, sic vulneri emplastrum imponere, ut aut noceat, aut non prosit. Et supra posita 
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The last paragraph, in particular, shows how self-assured Hincmar is in his 
argument. Augustine appears again as the highest moral instance: the Quaterniones 
end with a direct reference to him. Nevertheless, the content reveals that Hincmar 
in all likelihood mainly availed himself of Augustine’s phrase because it seemed 
appropriate and suited the context. From this it can be concluded that, clearly in the 
Quaterniones, unlike in the De regis persona et regio ministerio, Augustine was 
not an authority to be used for answering the legal questions at hand. In the 
Quaterniones other material builds the corpus for the legal argument. Hincmar uses 
both ecclesiastical and secular texts as legal sources: from the Scriptures passages 
from the Old Testament with examples of kings prevail; papal decretals and, above 
all, the canons are also part of the ecclesiastical legal source material. Edicts issued 
by previous rulers as well as Carolingian capitularies make up the body of the 
secular source material. Augustine does not directly feature in the discussion 
concerned with the secular claims on ecclesiastical property. However, towards the 
end of the Quaterniones, Augustine emerges as an unchallenged religious authority 
and serves as proof that Hincmar’s reasoning is not only legally correct but also 
morally sound and in line with the Christian code of conduct. In this respect, 
Augustine is used both for the moral instruction of Charles the Bald as well as for 
the justification of Hincmar’s own opinion. Unlike Alcuin, Hincmar did not pose 
questions related to the Augustinian concept of an ideal civitas Dei. His awareness 
was built on the understanding that any Christian ‘state’ is in the spirit of God as 
long as it fulfils its obligations vis-à-vis the ‘church’: namely, that iustitia 
(“iustitia”) is institutionalised and pax (“peace”) is established. Hincmar was not a 
                                                                                                                                  
quae sine adulatione ad vestram salutem veritas per ora veridicorum protulit, vobis non 
displicebunt. PL 125, col. 1059C-1060A. 
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very original thinker in a theological sense, even though from a legal perspective 
his approach to the prejudgment made by the royal court (i.e. Charles the Bald) was 
ingenious. In the Quaterniones, Augustine was first and foremost a quotable moral 
authority. 
  
III. Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio ministerio 
  
Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio ministerio is a “mirror for princes” 
written for King Charles the Bald. Unfortunately, we do not have a manuscript 
tradition of this text.842 However, it is an especially interesting work as far as both 
the explicit and implicit influences of Augustine are concerned. 
 The historical scholarship843 tends to agree with Schrörs844 that the work 
must have been composed around 873. Already Schrörs holds that the time of 
writing cannot be determined with certainty. Together with Noorden he assumes 
873 to be the year of composition. In 873, Prince Carloman (in spite of an earlier 
pardon) raised the weapons against his father Charles the Bald for a second time 
and in consequence was sentenced to death. However, the sentence was finally 
mitigated to blinding.845 In line with E. Dümmler and Noorden, Schrörs finds that 
several passages in the De regis persona et regio ministerio may allude to this 
incident.846 His argument is plausible, since the following chapters may be 
indirectly or directly linked with the event: CAP. XVII., XVIII., XXV. and XXVII. 
                                                
842 Devisse 1976, p. 710. 
843 Ibid., p. 710 (in note 225 the dating of the De regis persona et regio ministerio is discussed). 
844 Schrörs 1884, p. 385 (in note 26 Schrörs on his part bases his argument on that of C. F. J. von 
Noorden). 
845 For further details see De Jong 2009a), pp. 264ff. 
846 Schrörs 1884, p. 385. 
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on the importance of laws and their observance in general; CAP. XXIII., XXIV. 
and XXVI. on the legitimacy of violence such as killing and capital punishment on 
the ruler’s authorisation; CAP. XIX., XX., XXVIII., XXXI. and XXXIII. on 
instances when forbearance and forgiveness are appropriate; CAP. XXIX. and 
XXX. on the particular case of judging relatives. However, Augustine hardly 
features in the last two groups of chapters, which may be more directly associated 
with the case of Carloman as a relative of the king who has already been pardoned 
once. Instead, Augustine is more prominent in the first two groups of chapters, 
which are concerned with the very fundamental legal questions of the ruler’s and 
the people’s obligations with regard to the implementation and observance of 
iustitia (“justice”) and of the legitimacy of violence (including killing and death 
penalty). 
Devisse admits that a substantial part of the content seems to relate to 
Carloman’s revolt. However, he does not deny that other circumstances may have 
led to the writing of the De regis persona et regio ministerio. He contends that, for 
the same reasons, one might also consider the years 868-871, when Charles the 
Bald experienced increasing difficulties with his son, or the winter of 858-859 
(since Hincmar seeks to rouse the king’s belligerent spirit). But according to 
Devisse the evidence to abandon the date proposed by Schrörs (873) does not seem 
sufficient for him to establish an alternative hypothesis.847 Elsewhere, Devisse 
infers that in the De regis persona et regio ministerio Hincmar – perhaps in 
memory of the consequences of too much indulgence on the part of Louis the Pious 
– tries to discourage cowardice (which would include, for instance, forgiving 
                                                
847 Devisse 1976, p. 710 (note 225). 
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relatives) to Charles the Bald. The relatives of the king cannot escape the general 
rule. The king must always be exemplary: God did not spare his son.848 The reasons 
for the composition of the treatise are thus open to speculation. However, Devisse 
raises some other points worthy of note with regard to the key function of this text. 
He argues that it sheds light on Hincmar’s attitude towards all the affairs on which 
he formerly had to judge or advise. These cases, which will be further explored 
here, include the conflict about the clerics ordained by Hincmar’s predecessor 
Ebbo of Reims, the controversy with Gottschalk, the divorce of King Lothar II, as 
well as the steps taken by the Bishop of Soissons against a priest.849 
Before Hincmar received the archdiocese of Reims from Charles the Bald 
in 845, Archbishop Ebbo of Reims had been dismissed from office at the Synod of 
Thionville (835) on the grounds of disloyalty to Louis the Pious. He had transferred 
to the party of Lothar I who had rebelled against his father Louis the Pious in 830 
and 833 (together with his brothers Louis the German and Pepin I of Aquitaine).850 
After the death of Louis the Pious in 840, Lothar I succeeded to the throne, and 
Ebbo was temporarily restored to office.851 But he was deposed again in 844, and 
Hincmar was appointed to the see. Since Hincmar regarded Ebbo’s acts from the 
period of reinstatement (for the most part the ordination of certain clerics) to be 
legally invalid, he saw to it that these acts were abrogated at the Council of 
Soissons (853).852 Hincmar’s stand in this affair is very clear: firstly, it is right that 
a man holding an office loses his position irrevocably if he breaks his oath of 
fidelity to his superior. Secondly, any actions performed by a morally corrupt 
                                                
848 Ibid., pp. 714-717. 
849 Ibid., p. 561; Ganz 1990, p. 285, 297, 300. 
850 Ganz 1990, p. 285. 
851 Ibid. 
852 Ibid., pp. 297, 300. 
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office-holder are invalid.853 Both judgments are further elaborated and placed in a 
wider context in the De regis persona et regio ministerio. They find expression in 
the following chapters: CAP. XXVII. “That laws from a just leader are to be 
officially acknowledged by anyone.” and CAP. XXXI. “Whether one should 
exercise forbearance with regard to the biggest and official crimes.” 
By presenting his doctrine of “double predestination”854 inspired by 
Augustine’s texts at the Synod of Mainz (848), where he countered his former 
abbot Rabanus Maurus (Archbishop of Mainz), Gottschalk started a debate in 
which Hincmar became involved.855 Gottschalk was found guilty of heresy, 
mistreated and transferred to the archbishop of Reims. His case was discussed at 
the following councils: Quierzy (853), Valence (855) and Savonnières (859). In the 
meantime, unwilling to renounce, he had been permanently excommunicated and 
incarcerated in the monastery of Hautvillers. Although Pope Nicholas I then took 
on Gottschalk’s case, the matter was never properly settled. When Gottschalk was 
ill and dying, Hincmar visited him but refused to give him the sacraments and had 
him buried without a Christian burial. This clearly shows that Hincmar himself had 
been exposed to the difficulty of establishing justice while demonstrating the right 
measure of forbearance (treated in CAP. XVIII., XIX., XX., XXVIII. and XXXI.) 
before writing the De regis persona et regio ministerio. 
In 860 Hincmar took part in the dispute that arose about the separation of 
King Lothar II from his first wife. Since Lothar II had remained childless after his 
                                                
853 See Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 125; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, p. 196; Nelson 1986, pp. 164-165, 167. 
854 The doctrine of “double predestination”, “two-fold predestination” or “absolute predestination” 
refers to a belief in predestination to salvation as well as predestination to condemnation. The most 
important doctrinal questions relating to the debate over predestination are outlined in Ganz 1990; 
Marenbon 1990. 
855 Ganz 1990, pp. 286-287. 
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marriage to Teutberga, daughter of Boso the Elder, in 855, he wanted to separate 
from her with the intention of marrying his mistress Waldrada (with whom he 
already had an illegitimate son, Hugh).856 At Aachen councils were convened 
several times (in January and February 860 and in April 862) to deal with the 
question of the separation.857 There were initially two parties involved in the 
dispute: the party surrounding Louis the German, which was in support of Lothar’s 
endeavours, and the one surrounding Charles the Bald, which opposed his 
efforts.858 Eventually, with the backing of Emperor Louis II of Italy (his brother), 
Lothar II received approval from the clergy to divorce Teutberga and marry 
Waldrada in 862.859 Hincmar, acting as an adviser to Charles the Bald, had 
criticised Lothar’s plan to obtain an annulment of the marriage in his De divortio 
Lotharii regis et Theutbergae reginae, written between March and 
September/October 860.860 In this memorandum Hincmar treats matters of 
procedural law and assesses the validity of ordeals, oaths of purgation as well as 
different forms of legal separation. At the same time, the separation of the king also 
prompts him to more specifically define the rights and duties of a ruler. These 
preliminary reflections undoubtedly formed part of the groundwork for the 
composition of the De regis persona et regio ministerio. 
The conflict of authority with Rothad, Bishop of Soissons, after 860 may 
also have compelled Hincmar to contemplate further legal questions such as 
usurpation.861 Rothad was a suffragan to Hincmar. He had removed a priest from 
                                                
856 Heidecker 2010, pp. 51ff., 54, 64ff. 
857 Ibid., p. 43. 
858 Ibid., pp. 100-104. 
859 Ibid., p. 109. 
860 On Hincmar’s treatise see ibid., pp. 46ff. 
861 On the case of Rothad of Soissons see Nelson 1986, pp. 157ff. 
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office, and the decision had been authorised by an episcopal council. Hincmar’s 
claim was that a suffragan bishop did not have the legal right either to depose a 
priest or to summon a council. He therefore demanded the reinstitution of that 
priest. However, due to a lack of compliance, Rothad himself was dismissed by 
Hincmar at a synod in Soissons (cloisters of St. Crispin) in 861. Thereupon, in 864, 
Rothad travelled to Rome equipped with the newly forged Pseudo-Isidorian 
Decretals, which attaches great weight to the papal authority. As a consequence, he 
was reinstated in 865 on the authorisation of Pope Nicholas I. A note in the 
Annales Bertiniani, claiming that the pope had decided “non regulariter sed 
potentialiter”862, conveys that, according to Hincmar, his judgment was the result of 
a confusion of ecclesiastical power with ecclesiastical law.863 
In a broader sense, Devisse maintains that in the De regis persona et regio 
ministerio Hincmar essentially wants Charles the Bald to be extremely rigorous in 
the implementation of the law. This, according to Hincmar, is one of the foremost 
duties of the royal ministry. Furthermore, Hincmar arrives at the judgment that a 
reasonable balance must be achieved between iustitia and caritas.864 
 An examination of the preface of Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio 
ministerio will provide more information about the motive for Hincmar’s writing 
as well as the nature, content and general structure of the text. Furthermore, it will 
show what can be expected from this work in terms of explicit and implicit 
references to other authors and sources. Hincmar writes: 
 
                                                
862 PL 125, col. 1222C. 
863 Tavard 1973, p. 596. 
864 Devisse 1976, pp. 714-717. 
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To the glorious master faithfully devoted and devotedly faithful. 
Obeying the precept of the Lord who orders through the prophet, ask the 
priests about my law, it has pleased you to consult me about certain 
capitula. About this, since Truth per se says, He who speaks of himself, 
seeks personal glory, I have considered it appropriate not to respond to 
you in my own bare speech, but through what the Holy Spirit in the Holy 
Scriptures and the Catholic doctors says, and to briefly bring together for 
you into a whole certain fragrant little flowers – actually, like flowers from 
the full field, that is, the field of the Scriptures, to which the Lord has 
given His blessing. And knowing the pledge, What you will have spent 
over and above, I will give back to you on my return, I have added above 
and beyond the things which I have seen to be adequate for the kingly 
ministry committed to you by God, a sort of twinkling spark to the light of 
your knowledge. Because truly, just as Comicus says: 
Complaisance begets friends, truth hatred, 
and assent, that is to say adulation, should not please a leader and master 
of the earth; also, not in the least does it behove a priest to follow it; if you 
will have found anything that is rather sharply said in the sentences about 
the person of the king and the kingly ministry collected by me, I beg that 
you do not believe that they have been collected against you, but rather for 
you, since I either know that you are of such a kind out of benignity and 
goodness and act in the way the sentences themselves describe, or I wish 
that you should be of such a kind and act in this way. Moreover, the 
sentences of this little book are separated in a triform collection. Firstly, 
about the person of the king and the kingly ministry in the general cause of 
the ‘state’. Then, about what should be the moderation in the 
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implementation of forbearance, and about the punishment of special 
persons, who, if acting fatally, cannot be corrected otherwise than being 
ordered to be punished with earthly death, which is said to be contradicted 
by some. Thereupon that the king because of the kingly ministry should 
also not spare on account of any relations of kinship those acting 
criminally against God and the Holy ‘church’ as well as against the ‘state’ 
by carnal affection.865 
 
The second sentence of the preface conveys that Charles the Bald has sought 
advice from Hincmar as a member of the clergy regarding certain capitula.866 
Putting forward a hypothesis based on G. Laehr, Devisse seeks to determine these 
capitula further.867 He indicates that Laehr has drawn attention to particularities in 
the structure and composition of Hincmar’s work and has noticed a close 
relationship between some capitula contained in a Paris manuscript and the De 
                                                
865 Domino glorioso fideliter devotus et devote fidelis. 
Obaudientes praeceptum Domini per prophetam iubentis, Interroga sacerdotes legem meam (Agg. 
II, 12), super quibusdam capitulis me consulere vobis placuit. De quibus quoniam per se Veritas 
dicit, Qui a semetipso loquitur, gloriam propriam quaerit (Joan. VII, 18), dignum duxi non nudo 
meo sermone vobis respondere, sed quid in Scripturis sacris et per catholicos doctores inde loquatur 
Spiritus sanctus, quosdam odoriferos flosculos, ut revera de agro pleno, Scripturarum scilicet 
campo, cui benedixit Dominus, breviter in unum vobis colligere. Et sciens pollicitum, Quod 
supererogaveris, ego cum rediero reddam tibi (Luc. X, 15), de his quae regio ministerio vobis a 
Deo commisso competere vidi, quasi scintillas micantes lumini scientiae vestrae superadieci. Quia 
vero, ut Comicus dicit (Ter. in Andr.): 
Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit, 
et non assentatio, videlicet adulatio, principi ac domino terrae placere debet, minime autem 
sacerdotem sectari eam oportet, si quiddam mordacius dictum in sententiis a me collectis de regis 
persona et regio ministerio inveneritis, non contra vos, quaeso, sed pro vobis eas me collegisse 
putetis, quoniam aut talem in benignitate ac bonitate, sicut ipsae describunt sententiae, vos esse et 
sic agere scio, aut talem esse et sic agere cupio. Huius autem libelli sententiae triformi sunt 
collectione distinctae. Primo quidem de persona regis et regio ministerio in generali reipublicae 
causa. Deinde quae debeat esse discretio in misericordia, et de ultione specialium personarum, quae 
si exitialiter agentes aliter non potuerint corrigi, temporali morte praecipiuntur multari, quod a 
quibusdam dicitur contradici. Tum quia rex propter ministerium regium, etiam nec quibuscunque 
propinquitatis necessitudinibus, contra Deum sanctamque Ecclesiam atque contra rempublicam 
agentibus criminaliter, affectu carnali parcere debeat. PL 125, col. 0833B-0834B. 
866 Anton righty sees in these capitula on the duties of the Christian ruler a culmination of the 
“political Augustinianism” in the ninth century. Anton 1968, pp. 230-231. 
867 Devisse 1976, pp. 710-713. 
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regis persona et regio ministerio. On the whole, Devisse rejects both Laehr’s 
proposition that these capitula constitute the preparatory draft of the De regis 
persona et regio ministerio, as well as the possibility that they were compiled in 
retrospect by a reader of Hincmar’s treatise. However, he sums up the argument by 
saying: “Les parentés sont cependant telles qu’il faut bien admettre que, pour une 
large part – mais pas pour la totalité du texte – ces capitula ont constitué l’armature 
du traité d’Hincmar.”868 Devisse asserts that there is clear evidence of Hincmar’s 
use of these capitula: the patristic texts of the Paris manuscript are borrowed in the 
same fragmented and simplified form and with the same gaps in the text. He adds 
that evidence also exists of careful work on these texts consulted and commented 
on: references often unclear in the collection are almost always vetted for accuracy 
and clarification; additional texts are quoted or mentioned; awkward wording is not 
reused but rather the same ideas expressed differently. Nevertheless, Devisse points 
out that, once the references had been clarified, Hincmar was mostly content to 
weld the title contained in the table of titles of the collection to the patristic text 
quoted in the main body of the collection: thus, for instance, bringing together two 
capitula while neglecting others. Hincmar’s work merely consisted of reprocessing 
and reclassifying the texts that had been sent to him.869 
In the third sentence of the De regis persona et regio ministerio, Hincmar 
states that he will not use his own words when responding to Charles the Bald, but 
will rather draw on the Scriptures and works of the Church Fathers. In the last 
sentence of the first part of the preface, he says that he will add to the necessary 
                                                
868 Ibid., p. 711. This view was already taken by Anton. See the scholarly debate in Anton 1968, pp. 
225, 230-231, 286ff. 
869 Devisse 1976, pp. 712-713. 
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guidelines for ‘state’ leadership some additional information in order to make 
Charles the Bald stand out as an illustrious, knowledgeable ruler. Hincmar gives a 
justification for relying heavily on the Scriptures and canonical ‘church’ literature. 
He argues that people who express their own thoughts only aim at personal 
recognition. Furthermore, he maintains that the Holy Spirit speaks from these 
sacred texts that have been blessed by God. The exact reason for choosing this 
style of writing in this work cannot be established. Since Hincmar writes regarding 
the advice he provides that he “briefly brought it together into a whole”, it may be 
that he did not have the time to treat the questions in a more detailed manner and 
expand on his own point of view. In light of what Hincmar says in the second part 
of the preface, however, it is also possible that he uses the Christian texts in order 
to legitimise his critical stance on the moral conduct of laymen and clergymen of 
any social rank. Hincmar then explains that his work is composed of three parts: 
the first part dealing with kingship as an office and the importance of morally 
correct governance (CAP. I-XVIII); the second part teaching moderation in the 
implementation of forbearance, the administration of the penal power and the 
imposition of the death penalty (CAP. XIX-XXVIII); the third part reminding the 
ruler not to spare his close ones on account of kinship if they acted criminally 
against God, the ‘church’ and the ‘state’ (CAP. XXIX-XXXIII). 
 With regard to the direct references to other authors and sources, it is 
noticeable that very long quotations permeate the De regis persona et regio 
ministerio. Compared to Alcuin, Hincmar’s quotations are clearly longer, and an 
independent processing of the matter is not readily perceptible. 
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 A more detailed examination of the structure of the De regis persona et 
regio ministerio will reveal, firstly, that of all the authors and sources cited and 
quoted, Augustine prevails, and, secondly, that of all of Augustine’s works cited 
and quoted, the De civitate Dei prevails. Here is a list of the chapters and of the 
authors treated in them:870 
 
Chapter Title Authors 
CAP. I. “That God makes good kings, permits bad 
ones.” 
Augustine; 
Gregory the Great 
CAP. II. “That a good king means happiness to the 
people, a bad king unhappiness.” 
Cyprian 
CAP. III. “Correct administration is the means of great 
power.” 
Gregory the Great 
CAP. IV. “To what kind of advisers the king should 
turn to.” 
Ambrose 
CAP. V. “Nothing is more favourable than if those 
who are ruling have the skill of ruling.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. VI. “That it is useful that good kings reign 
continually and far and wide.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. VII. “Necessity alone impels that good kings 
wage war and expand the realm.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
                                                
870 The authors’ works will not be mentioned, although quotations from Augustine’s De civitate Dei 
will be indicated. Quotations of the Scriptures will not be referred to at this point. 
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CAP. VIII. “The zeal of the king in the readiness for 
war, and the exhortation to the soldiers.” 
Augustine 
CAP. IX. “That those who have waged war under the 
authority of God did not sin.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. X. “That those who are at war, and serve under 
arms, do not displease God.” 
Augustine; 
Jerome 
CAP. XI. “That a soldier, obeying a power, does not 
sin if he kills a man.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. XII. “That victory in war is given by the 
Almighty to whom he wants it to have.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. XIII. “That God stands by when war is waged, 
and prepares the victory for the just party.” 
Augustine 
CAP. XIV. “That one must not despair of the small 
number if the Lord is with the soldiers.” 
Orosius 
CAP. XV. “That one has to make offerings for those 
who have died in war.” 
– 
CAP. XVI. “That kings serve the Lord of kings, also 
giving laws for him.” 
Augustine 
CAP. XVII. “That it is also compelled to the observance 
of justice.” 
Augustine; 
Gregory the Great 
CAP. XVIII. “That he serves Christ who reproves the 
wicked by love of justice.” 
Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
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CAP. XIX. “About the moderation in the 
implementation of forbearance.” 
Ambrose 
CAP. XX. “Whom the leader or judge should rightly be 
allowed to forgive.” 
Gregory the Great; 
Augustine 
CAP. XXI. “The leader should fear that he is deceived 
by gifts or adulation of any criminal.” 
– 
CAP. XXII. “It is to be avoided by the leaders that they 
are connected by friendships of criminals.” 
Gregory the Great 
CAP. XXIII. “That holy men have punished the accused 
with death by law in order to inflict fear.” 
Augustine 
CAP. XXIV. “That killing a man is not always criminal.” Augustine 
(De civitate Dei) 
CAP. XXV. “It is proper that the king is the corrector of 
the unjust.” 
Cyprian 
CAP. XXVI. “That for the punishment of the guilty the 





“That laws from a just leader are to be 






“That to those who are to be punished for 





CAP. XXIX. “That the king should not spare his relatives 
acting in a corrupted manner by carnal 
affection.” 
Gregory the Great; 
John Chrysostom; 
Jerome 
CAP. XXX. “To what extent children and relatives, if 
they have sinned, should be spared.” 
Gregory the Great 
CAP. XXXI. “Whether one should exercise forbearance 
with regard to the biggest and official 
crimes.” 
Celestine; 




“What is the rod of punishment of the good 




“On account of the difficulty in the instance 
of a plurality of the sinning the punishment 
to be overlooked or postponed.” 
Innocent 
 
It can be seen that the De regis persona et regio ministerio opens with 
Augustine and that he occurs eighteen times overall (i.e. in eighteen chapters), on 
eight of these occasions (i.e. in eight chapters) with reference to the De civitate 
Dei. Gregory the Great appears eight times; while we find Cyprian three times, 
Innocent three times, Ambrose twice, Jerome twice, Orosius once, Celestine once 
and John Chrysostom once. As far as the number of explicit references to 
Augustine in Hincmar’s texts is concerned, it can be said that the De regis persona 
et regio ministerio is the work in which Augustine’s De civitate Dei is most often 
quoted. Furthermore, it should be noted that in the De regis persona et regio 
ministerio Hincmar – like Alcuin generally – refers exclusively (with one 
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exception) to the first five books of the De civitate Dei: he quotes from Books I, 
IV, V and IX. Hincmar’s works considered as a whole, it seems that quotations 
from the first and the last books of the De civitate Dei are most frequent. However, 
as is shown in the analysis of Hincmar’s epistolae (devoted to locating direct 
evidence of Augustine), it appears that Hincmar was not influenced by Augustine 
to the extent Alcuin was. Gregory the Great and Cyprian (and in other works 
Bishop Remigius of Reims and Gelasius) are also prominent in Hincmar’s writing. 
What can be done in view of the fact that the De regis persona et regio 
ministerio is a compilation of quotations rather than an independent work, is to try 
to consider the composition as a whole and to ask the following questions: how 
does Hincmar understand the ideas he borrows from other authors and sources? 
What place does Augustine take among them? What is the meaning of these old 
ideas in the new context? What is Hincmar’s general statement? The subsequent 
analysis will focus on indirect evidence of Augustinian influence at both the level 
of content and the formal level of Hincmar’s text. The political terms 
imperare/imperium and gentes/gentilitas; the expressions dilatare and subiugare; 
the concepts of pax, iustus/iustitia, felix/felicitas and felicitas aeterna, 
beatus/beatitudo, misericors/misericordia and humilis/humilitas as well as the 
figures of the Old Testament kings David and Solomon will be considered (either 
independently or as part of certain fixed expressions). I will explore how some of 
these concepts – which have roots in both ancient Greek philosophy (Platonic, 
Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic) and the Old Testament and which were also 
absorbed in Christian thought before Augustine – are applied to social and political 
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ethics by Augustine, and in what shape they appear in the new context of 
Hincmar’s work. 
The following list contains themes that run through the De regis persona et 
regio ministerio. Discussion of them will illuminate how Hincmar understood and 
reused Augustinian political ethics and political thought: 
1. that political power and military success are always ordained by God and 
are always just; 
2. that a rex bonus is iustus and means felicitas to the people, while a rex 
malus is iniustus and means infelicitas to the people; 
3. that morally correct Christian governance requires humilitas on the part 
of the ruler as well as putting his power at the service of God, the ‘church’ and the 
people; 
4. the meaning of the term felicitas in the context of worldly Christian rule 
and its relation to beatitudo; 
5. belligerare as necessitas and its relation to felicitas; 
6. the value of belligerare and pax; 
7. the legitimation of violence – be it military violence or physical 
punishment including capital punishment – on the authorisation of God or the ruler 
who is divinely empowered (drawn and adapted from Augustine and St. Paul); 
8. that the Christian ruler serves God by enacting iustitia on God’s behalf, 
compelling its observance and reproving the wicked by amor iustitiae (how does 
Hincmar’s understanding of iustitia relate to Augustine’s and Cicero’s? in what 
way does it differ from Augustine’s notion of iustitia which is the precondition for 
a civitas Dei?); 
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9. that it is the ultimate aim of any Christian leader to apply the right 
measure of misericordia in order to achieve iustitia (drawn and adapted from 
Augustine and Cicero). 
The content of the De regis persona et regio ministerio will be explored in 
chronological order and with emphasis on the mentioned themes. In the treatment 
of the last two themes I will furthermore engage with the argument made by R. 
Dodaro in the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. iustitia.871 Dodaro claims that in some 
letters to public officials and authorities engaged in secular pursuits Augustine 
outlines an argument concerning the transformation of the four virtutes civiles 
beyond the fundamental level of virtue attained by pagan politicians who lack vera 
pietas. He maintains that, by allowing their conception of iustitia to be transformed 
by fides, spes and caritas, Christian politicians will fight wars in a more virtuous 
manner than that which is sustained by the Roman concept of bellum iustum, and 
that they will punish offenders with iustitia tempered with misericordia. I will 
investigate how Hincmar brings to bear this correspondence together with 
quotations from the De civitate Dei that relate either to the Christian Roman 
emperors or to Cicero’s model of a just social order. The question will be posed of 
what function is played by Hincmar’s resorting to Augustine’s discussion of 
Christian leadership. 
 As has been established, Augustinian influence is already present in CAP. I. 
Hincmar quotes a sentence from Augustine’s De dono perseverantiae: “Nothing is 
done that is not done or justly permitted to be done by God […].”872 The content of 
this sentence can also be found in Gregory the Great’s Moralia in Iob. Hincmar 
                                                
871 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 879. 
872 Nihil fit nisi quod aut Deus facit, aut fieri iuste permittit […]. PL 125, col. 0834B. 
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then expands on the meaning of the quote by saying that boni reges (“good kings”) 
are good because they have God’s grace, and they reign because God makes them 
reign, while mali reges (“bad kings”) are bad by their own misconduct, and they 
reign because they are permitted to reign by divine judgment, which is occasionally 
hidden but never unjust.873 By partly drawing on Gregory the Great, Hincmar adds 
that God permits the rule of bad kings in order to punish the people for their sins. 
Even though the work is not quoted here, the same ideas are put forward in 
the first books of the De civitate Dei, where Augustine takes a stand on the gradual 
decline of the Roman empire, embedding this process into salvation history and 
assessing the heathen and Christian Roman ‘states’ by expressing particular 
approval of the Christian emperors Constantine I and Theodosius I. Although 
Hincmar mentions neither of these emperors explicitly, he unmistakably alludes to 
the last chapters (24, 25 and 26) of Book V of the De civitate Dei by declaring that 
good kings reign by the grace of God, while bad kings reign merely because God 
permitted that they come to power. In chapters 12-17 of Book V Augustine 
expresses the idea that God rewarded the Romans’ love of glory by giving them 
earthly fame despite the fact that they worshipped false gods, while in chapter 34 
of Book IV he maintains that the Jewish people were punished by dispersal for not 
having recognised Christ, despite the fact that they initially worshipped the true 
God. In chapters 17, 21 and 33 of Book IV Augustine interjects that God 
nevertheless grants political power and success to good and bad people, since his 
iudicium is occultum, but always iustum. (Hincmar quotes chapter 17 of Book IV 
in CAP. XII., where he notes that God decides to whom he wants to give victory in 
                                                
873 See also Nelson 1986, p. 138. 
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war. In CAP. XIII. – again using Augustine – he asserts that victory is always 
given to the just party.) Augustine writes at the beginning of chapter 21 of Book V: 
“[...] the true God, who gives happiness in the realm of heavens only to the pious; 
but the earthly realm to both the pious and the impious, just as it seems right to 
him, to whom nothing seems right unjustly.”874 and at the end “These things the one 
and true God guides and governs entirely, as it seems right; and if the reasons are 
hidden, are they unjust?”875 The formula of the iudicium occultum, sed iustum, 
which resembles that of Hincmar in CAP. I., can be found in the crucial chapter 28 
of Book XII of the De civitate Dei. There, Augustine claims that the civitas Dei 
and the civitas terrena emerge like ‘states’ as two societies from the first man 
Adam “[...] by God’s hidden, but nevertheless just judgment.”876 In the Augustinus-
Lexikon s.v. iustitia877 it is noted that the concept of iustitia occulta or iudicium 
occultum is Augustinian. Throughout the De civitate Dei Augustine refers to God’s 
hidden justice and typically argues that God’s judgment and reasoning is beyond 
human comprehension. 
Hincmar’s central message to Charles the Bald in CAP. I. is that all secular 
power is ordained by God and is therefore just. Charles the Bald as a ruler is not 
privileged simply because power has been granted to him by God: he is subject to 
God’s judgment like any other human being, and in consequence is obliged to 
follow the Christian moral code. Hincmar tries to set out what Augustine defines in 
chapter 33 of Book IV: “And the earthly realms are therefore given by Him to both 
                                                
874 [...] De[us] ver[us], qui dat felicitatem in regno caelorum solis piis; regnum vero terrenum et piis 
et impiis, sicut ei placet, cui nihil iniuste placet. Civ. V 21, p. 232, ll. 25-27. 
875 Haec plane Deus unus et verus regit et gubernat, ut placet; et si occultis causis, numquid iniustis? 
Ibid., p. 233, ll. 25-27. 
876 [...] occulto Dei iudicio, sed tamen iusto. Civ. XII 28, p. 556, ll. 15-16. 
877 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, pp. 870-871, 877-878. 
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the good and the bad, in order that His worshippers, hitherto children in the 
development of their soul, should not desire these gifts from Him as something 
highly esteemed.”878 
 A next cluster of chapters thematically related in terms of Augustinian 
influence is CAP. V-VIII. CAP. V. contains the first lengthy quote from 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei – and it has to be noted again that, due to the 
intermediary source material Hincmar uses, most quotations are not verbatim. 
Firstly, they are generally abbreviated. Secondly, the concept of 
imperare/imperium/imperator – the key element of Augustinian political discourse 
which had been so ingeniously recycled by Alcuin – has mostly been replaced by 
regnare/regnum/rex. This expresses that there was no longer such stringent 
terminology attached to the function of secular rulership. In the De regis persona et 
regio ministerio it appears that, for Hincmar, a ruler was essentially a ruler. Kings 
as well as emperors could take Constantine I and Theodosius I as models of 
Christian rulership. To Augustine and Alcuin the title of imperator was much more 
clearly defined. It referred exclusively to a ruler who was ruling over multiple 
gentes and had the supremacy over other rulers in power. Alcuin used this concept 
of imperator based on Augustine in order to justify Carolingian rulership by an 
emperor in contrast with a king. With regard to Hincmar’s conception of empire, 
Nelson writes: “Churchmen tended to be preoccupied with politics at the level of 
the kingdom, and the idea of empire, like the collective responsibility of 
Carolingian brother-kings for the one Church, came to mean little to the aged 
Hincmar. It had been resurrected to legitimise Frankish imperialism. Frankish 
                                                
878 Et ideo regna terrena et bonis ab illo dantur et malis, ne eius cultores adhuc in provectu animi 
parvuli haec ab eo munera quasi magnum aliquid concupiscant. Civ. IV 33, p. 188, ll. 15-18. 
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divisions made it hard to sustain.”879 Devisse likewise thinks that the division of 
Francia at the Treaty of Verdun in 843, which brought into being the cores of three 
kingdoms,880 weekened the imperial idea established under Charlemagne. Devisse 
maintains: “Hincmar n’a attaché que très peu d’importance à la function et au titre 
impériaux: c’est un homme d’après Verdun […].”881 He says that “il semble bien 
que, pour lui [Hincmar], l’empereur, après la mort de Lothaire 1er, soit un roi local 
qui a reçu une dignité supplémentaire, rien de plus”882. Nelson, however, raises an 
additional point. She contends that in the case of Charles the Bald the title of 
imperator implied that “Charles was a ruler over more than one people”883. 
Furthermore, based on the label “so-called emperor of Italy”, which Hincmar uses 
with regard to Emperor Louis II in the Annales Bertiniani (written by Hincmar 
from 861 to 882) and which implies a narrow territorial circumscription, Nelson 
supposes that Hincmar was one of the promoters of this definition of Charles the 
Bald’s imperial title.884 Although Nelson points out that at the beginning of the 
seventh century the composer of a treatise on official posts had extracted Romanity 
from this hegemonial conception of empire, which C. Erdmann termed a “Rome-
free” imperial idea, she recognises the relation of this medieval conception to that 
of the Christian Roman empire, which also had a “multi-provincial” character.885 In 
conclusion, one may say that Augustine and Alcuin’s concept of imperator was not 
unfamiliar to Hincmar, but it was clearly diluted or simply less relevant to 
Hincmar’s concerns. 
                                                
879 Nelson 1994, pp. 71-72. 
880 Ibid., p. 64. 
881 Devisse 1976, p. 673. 
882 Ibid., p. 674. 
883 Nelson 1996a), p. 92. 
884 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
885 Nelson 1994, p. 69; Nelson 1996a), p. 93. 
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In CAP. V. Hincmar lays out the fundamental moral precepts of a Christian 
ruler by quoting from the eminent chapters 19 and 24 of Book V of the De civitate 
Dei, where Augustine expands on the characteristics of the Christianos 
imperatores felices (“happy Christian emperors”) – replaced in Hincmar’s text by 
Christianos reges felices (“happy Christian kings”). Good Christian kings who 
have the skill of ruling are thus associated with the idea of felicitas (“happiness”). 
The “happy kings”, it says, have to make their power serve God, the ‘church’ and 
the promotion of the Christian faith. They need to fear, love and worship God. 
They have to prefer the realm of God to the earthly realm. They ought to use their 
penal power exclusively for the necessity of the governance and maintenance of the 
‘state’. All this they must do, not because of any zeal for worthless glory, but 
because of their love for “eternal happiness” (felicitas aeterna). 
Two Christian virtues, which prove to be indispensable to rulership, since 
they occur repeatedly in the De regis persona et regio ministerio, are included in 
Augustine’s passage from chapter 24 of Book V: misericordia (“forbearance”) and 
humilitas (“humility”). Forms of misericordia and humilitas can also be found in 
the celebrated chapter 26 (on Theodosius I) of Book V of the De civitate Dei.886 In 
accordance with these chapters, Hincmar sets the moral standards for King Charles 
the Bald: a careful exercise of “forbearance”; to live in “humility”; to reject the 
gifts and flatteries of subordinates; to correct the evil as well as not to spare family 
members and close ones if they acted improperly. Hincmar reasons that 
“forbearance” and “humility” are essential virtues, since they grant the rulers the 
willpower to resist the dangerous temptations that worldly power implies (CAP. 
                                                
886 Civ. V 26, pp. 238-242. 
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III. V. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXVIII. XXX. and XXXI.). What is more, King David 
features as an exemplary king who represents these virtues (humilitas/humilis in 
CAP. III. and XXX.; misericors/misericordia in CAP. XXXI.). 
In CAP. VI. chapters 3-4 of Book IV of the De civitate Dei are quoted.887 
By using Augustine, Hincmar explains why and to whom – as soon as the true God 
is worshipped and the Christian code of conduct is observed – it is profitable when 
good rulers reign “continually and far and wide”. Augustine’s argument is that 
when they reign “continually and far and wide” it is less useful for the rulers 
themselves than it is for the people. For, as far as they are concerned, their piety 
and probity will do in order to gain vera felicitas (“true happiness”), which 
Augustine specifically defines as “spending this life well and one day attaining 
eternal life”.888 It is emphasised that the rulership of the good is beneficial to the 
conditions and human affairs on earth. While the rulership of the bad mainly 
affects the rulers themselves, it does not affect their subordinates, since righteous 
subordinates do not sin by obeying bad rulers (St. Paul). They themselves remain 
free. However, bad rulers are slaves to each of their own sins. Hincmar then 
attaches the rhetorical question “In the absence of justice, what are realms, 
therefore, but big bands of robbers?”889 – with which Augustine opens chapter 4 of 
Book IV – to the end of CAP. VI.890 
The central piece of information to Charles the Bald is: if those who hold a 
political office are bad, they will only harm themselves (as sons of the Christian 
God) by minimising their chances of attaining eternal life. For, as sons of God, 
                                                
887 Civ. IV 3-4, pp. 149-150. 
888 Civ. IV 3, p. 150, ll. 4-5. 
889 Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? Civ. IV 4, p. 150, ll. 19-20. 
890 On Hincmar’s use of Augustine in his discourse on justice see Anton 1968, p. 301. 
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they are equal with everyone else. This clearly shows that Hincmar assumes a 
separation of the political function and the person of the ruler.891 If the holders of 
power aim at reigning longe lateque (“far and wide”), i.e. by military expansion, 
they should not do so in their own interest, for it will not be them but the people 
who will profit. Likewise, the people will be judged by God solely on the basis of 
the quality of their personal relationship to Him. Only because all power derives 
from God, the people do not sin by following the orders of the holder of the 
governmental office but in fact owe obedience to him. This idea developed from 
St. Paul (Rom 13:1-7), together with the argument founded on Augustine and 
Gregory the Great in CAP. I. – that the unjust ruler comes to power because of 
disorder in society which is attributable to the people’s sins – bars any insurrection 
against those in political office. Tyrannicide and even deposition by force are 
unlawful, since the seizure of power by a tyrant is merely the result of a 
disturbance of the social order.892 The people must endure the tyrant they 
themselves have brought into existence. In general, Hincmar’s texts put forward for 
consideration the notion that obedience to a holder of a political office might find 
its limits when the holder goes against the teachings of Christ. This would mean 
that a ruler is only elevated above the other people in his function of holder of 
power as long as his governance is in line with Christian doctrine.893 However, 
according to Hincmar, it would be exclusively the clergy’s responsibility to take a 
                                                
891 This corresponds to ibid., pp. 285ff.; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 192-195; Devisse 1976, pp. 696-
697; Markus 1988, pp. 95-102. Nelson relates the distinction between person and office to 
Augustine. Nelson 1986, pp. 134-135. 
892 This important point is made clear by Devisse 1976, pp. 705-707; Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 
127-128; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 184-185, 195-197; Nelson 1986, pp. 134f. 
893 Devisse 1976, pp. 696-697. 
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stand against an unjust ruler.894 The extent to which Hincmar believes the clergy 
should be entitled to intervene has been investigated in the analysis of the 
Expositiones ad Carolum Regem. 
In CAP. VII. and VIII. the value of belligerare (“to wage war”), regnum 
dilatare (“to expand the realm”) and pax (“peace”)895 are debated with reference to 
Augustine. (CAP. VII. quotes from chapter 15 of Book IV of the De civitate Dei.) 
CAP. VII. contains the following statement from Augustine: “[…] to wage war and 
expand the realm by conquered races is perceived as happiness by the bad, as 
necessity by the good.”896 Afterwards Augustine adds nuance to this idea: “But 
since it would be worse if the unjust dominated the juster ones, also this is not 
unsuitably called happiness.”897 Then he continues by saying that beyond doubt it is 
a “greater happiness” (felicitas maior) to have a good neighbour than to subjugate a 
bad neighbour. For it is a bad desire to wish to have someone to hate or fear, in 
order to have someone to subjugate.898 It should be highlighted here that felicitas in 
this context seems to refer to something like a “happy state of affairs in this world” 
and necessitas to a “necessary state of affairs in this world”. Moreover, felicitas 
maior is used, in order to denote the preferred “state of peace on earth” with one’s 
neighbour as opposed to the “state of war on earth”, which may be called 
necessitas or even felicitas (in the case of an unjust neighbour). (Earlier in this 
chapter Augustine also uses the phrase feliciores res humanae899 to refer to the 
                                                
894 Nelson 1986, p. 139. 
895 Hincmar’s extensive treatment of pax (“peace”) is summarised in Kershaw 2011, pp. 221-223. 
896 […] belligerare, et perdomitis gentibus dilatare regnum, malis videtur felicitas, bonis necessitas. 
Civ. IV 15, p. 164, ll. 26-27. See also the brief discussion in Kershaw 2011, pp. 222-223. 
897 Sed quia peius esset, ut iniuriosi iustioribus dominarentur, ideo non incongrue dicitur etiam ista 
felicitas. Civ. IV 15, p. 164, ll. 27-29. 
898 Ibid., p. 164, ll. 29-31. 
899 Ibid., p. 164. 
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“happier human circumstances” of having small but peaceful realms.) CAP. VIII. 
has a similar content. Drawing on Augustine900, Hincmar proclaims: “Necessity 
should make war, in order that, after discord has been stilled, peace can be 
restored.”901 In other words, in CAP. VII. and VIII. Hincmar explains to Charles the 
Bald that war serves the purpose of peace. 
 The concept of felix/felicitas has so far occurred in various senses and 
combinations (e.g. felix as an attribute to the “good Christian ruler” in this world, 
felicitas as a “happy state of affairs in this world”, felicitas with complements such 
as in regno caelorum, aeterna and vera referring to “eternal life” and the instance 
of felicitas maior referring to the “state of peace on earth” which is preferred to the 
“state of war on earth”). Since felix/felicitas does not feature as a lemma in the 
Augustinus-Lexikon, it will be explored further. Its appearance in the De civitate 
Dei will be juxtaposed with its use by Hincmar. 
 As has been established in Chapter One, the correct English translation of 
the Latin adjective felix is “happy”. Correspondingly, the Latin noun felicitas 
translates as “happiness”. In the De civitate Dei Augustine confers the attribute of 
felix on the Christian Roman emperors. The concept of felix/felicitas occurs 
particularly in chapters 24 and 25 (on Constantine I) of Book V.902 Likewise, it has 
been confirmed that beatus signifies “blessed” or “made holy”, and, accordingly, 
beatitudo denotes “blessedness”. Beatus essentially means “happy” but in addition 
has the connotation of “being endowed with divine favour and protection”. All the 
                                                
900 For details on Augustine’s morality of warfare see Markus 1988, pp. 115-116. Although 
Augustine never developed systematic rules for the conditions under which wars might be just, I 
concur with Markus, who states: “It is clear from his [Augustine’s] scattered statements that 
relatively few wars, especially few wars which were not defensive, would have qualified.” Ibid., p. 
115. 
901 Bellum necessitas faciat, ut, sopita discordia, pax recuperari possit. PL 125, col. 0841A. 
902 Civ. V 24, pp. 236-237, V 25, pp. 237-238. 
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statements already discussed from the first five books of the De civitate Dei have 
shown that in the Augustinian political discourse felicitas is used exclusively with 
reference to worldly happiness – and in the cases where it does allude to “eternal 
life” it is, as we have seen, complemented by in regno caelorum, aeterna, vera and 
also plena903. Only by these complements felicitas becomes really synonymous 
with beatitudo (“blessedness”). At least in the first five books of the De civitate 
Dei, which focus on the Roman secular power, Augustine is consistent in his usage 
of these concepts. By being very precise in his application of this terminology, 
Augustine consciously avoids any potential association of worldly rulers – 
including Christian Roman emperors – with “divine privilege” in the sense of a 
prospect of “eternal life”. In this perspective, the concept of felix/felicitas 
(“happy/happiness”) stands in opposition to that of beatus/beatitudo 
(“blessed/blessedness”). 
If we return to Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio ministerio, we find that 
in CAP. X., concerned with the art of warfare according to Christian ethics, 
Hincmar recycles Augustine’s letter to Bonifacius in a manner that is not in 
agreement with the political discourse underlining the De civitate Dei: a long 
extract from Augustine’s epist. 205 ad Bonifacium features in CAP. X.904 The 
occurrence of the second person singular creates the impression that King Charles 
the Bald is the direct addressee of this writing. The central piece of instruction is at 
the end of the quotation, where Augustine writes: 
 
                                                
903 Civ. IV 33, p. 188. 
904 On Hincmar’s use of this extract in the De regis persona et regio ministerio see also Kershaw 
2011, pp. 222-223. 
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For if faith, once promised, is to be held even with the enemy against 
whom we wage war, by how much more then is it to be held with the 
friend for whose sake we go to war? The will demands to have peace, 
necessity to have war, so that God liberates us from necessity, and 
preserves us in peace. For peace is not striven for in order to revive war, 
but war is waged in order to get peace. Therefore, also by battling thou 
shalt be pacific, in order that you lead those whom you fight to the 
advantage of peace by vanquishing them. For blessed are the pacifists, 
says the Lord, since they are called sons of God.905 
 
The extract contains Mt 5:9 of the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount. The use 
of the attribute of beatus takes on a new meaning in this context where a Christian 
ruler is addressed. In Hincmar’s “mirror for princes” the concepts of felix/felicitas 
and beatus/beatitudo are not clearly separated in their use. They seem to be 
merged. 
Augustine, who uses this Latin terminology consistently in the first five 
books of the De civitate Dei, would not have integrated this Bible quotation into a 
discourse on secular rulership – in order to avoid associating a worldly ruler with 
“divine happiness” and “eternal life”. Nevertheless, regarding the question of the 
use of “happy”/”happiness” and “blessed”/”blessedness” in the De civitate Dei, 
there is one remarkable instance in chapter 13 of Book IX906, where Augustine is 
                                                
905 Fides enim quando promittitur, etiam hosti servanda est contra quem bellum geritur, quanto 
magis amico pro quo pugnatur? Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas, ut liberet Deus a 
necessitate, et conservet in pace. Non enim pax quaeritur ut bellum excitetur, sed bellum geritur ut 
pax acquiratur. Esto ergo etiam bellando pacificus, ut eos quos expugnas ad pacis utilitatem 
vincendo perducas. Beati enim pacifici, ait Dominus, quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur. PL 125, col. 
0842B. 
906 Civ. IX 13, pp. 384-386. 
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merging these two concepts in a similar manner to Hincmar. In this case, however, 
Greek terminology is involved. Chapter 13 of Book IX analyses the similarities 
between the daemones (“demons”) and the dii (“gods”), on the one hand, and the 
daemones and the homines (“men”), on the other. Augustine reflects on the 
Platonic definition of daemones provided by the Latin prose writer Apuleius, who 
placed the daemones in the middle between the dii and the homines and established 
the five characteristics of the daemones: “ensoulment” and “rationality” (two 
features that all three living beings have in common), the “aerial consistency of the 
body” (a feature pertaining to the daemones only), “eternality” (a feature borrowed 
from the dii) and “passion” (a feature borrowed from the homines). It is made 
apparent that the derivation of the latter two characteristics results in the middle 
position of the daemones between the dii and the homines. Augustine furthermore 
explains that these characteristics of “eternality” and “passion” – which the 
daemones have in common with the dii and the homines, respectively – bring about 
their “wretched eternality” or “eternal wretchedness”. Augustine states: “That is, 
however, the very wretched eternality or eternal wretchedness of the demons.”907 
Augustine goes on to say that, since Apuleius did address the passionate nature of 
the daemones, he should also have called it “wretched”. Because of the demon-
worshippers among the Platonists, however, he was reluctant to do so. In the 
following sentence, where Augustine highlights the polarity between the 
daemones, whom Augustine terms miseri (“wretched”) on account of their 
“passion”, and the dii, whom he terms beati (“blessed”) on account of their 
“blessedness”, the merging of the concepts of “happy”/”happiness” and 
                                                
907 Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Ibid., p. 385, ll. 22-23. 
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“blessed”/”blessedness” occurs. Augustine contends: “If, therefore, the blessed are 
correctly called happy, the demons are not happy, those who have been placed in 
the middle between the men and the gods.”908 The adjective eudaemon, -onis is 
derived from the Greek εὐδαίµων, -ονος, which means “blessed with a good 
genius”, “fortunate” or “happy”909 and which is the equivalent of the Latin adjective 
felix, -icis (and not beatus). The Greek noun εὐδαιµονία signifies “good fortune” or 
“true/full happiness”910 and is the equivalent of the Latin noun felicitas. This 
suggests that there must be another word in Greek that expresses the concept of 
“blessed”/”blessedness”. The Greek term that comes closest to the Latin term 
beatus is µακάριος. Both words, beatus and µακάριος, essentially mean “blessed” 
and may have a meaning similar to “excellent” when used as titles of the higher 
clergy (e.g. bishops).911 It thus seems that Augustine has merged the meanings of 
“happy”/”happiness” and “blessed”/”blessedness” in the sentence, where he says 
that “the blessed are correctly called happy”. There is a Greek work, which may 
also be seen as belonging to the genre of literature providing direction on how to 
lead a life according to certain ethical principles. It is the Epistula ad Menoeceum 
(“Letter to Menoeceus”) by Epicurus, dating from around 300 BC. In this manual 
of conduct, Epicurus in turn gives practical advice to Menoeceus on how to 
conduct his life by adhering to particular ethical prescripts. The text, which follows 
Aristotle (e.g. in ethics and logic), shows that Epicurus as well makes a clear 
distinction in his use of the concepts of “happy”/”happiness” (which appears as 
εὐδαίµων/εὐδαιµονία) and “blessed”/”blessedness” (which appears as 
                                                
908 Si igitur beati recte dicuntur eudaemones, non sunt eudaemones daemones, quos inter homines et 
deos isti in medio locaverunt. Ibid., p. 385, ll. 28-30. 
909 LSJ 1996 (s.v. εὐδαίµων), pp. 708-709. 
910 LSJ 1996 (s.v. εὐδαιµονία), p. 708. 
911 L&S 1969 (s.v. beatus), p. 90; LSJ 1996 (s.v. µακάριος), pp. 1073-1074. 
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µακάριος/µακαριότης). The most telling passages deal exactly with the temporal 
“happiness” achievable by men and the “blessedness” and “eternality” attributable 
to deity alone. Epicurus first maintains “But the one who either says that the right 
time to engage in philosophy has not yet begun or says that the right time has 
passed, is like someone who says that the right time for happiness is either not 
there or no longer there.”912, and then he carries on “[…] and so one must practise 
the things that bring about happiness, for if indeed it is present, we have 
everything, but if it is absent, we do everything to have it.”913 Further down, he 
exhorts: “First of all, on the one hand, acknowledge god as an eternal and blessed 
living being, just as the common understanding of god outlines, attach to him 
neither anything that is alien to eternality nor anything that is incongruous with 
blessedness […].”914 It remains to be said that in the De civitate Dei, for one reason 
or another, the concepts of “happy”/”happiness” and “blessed”/”blessedness” are 
evidently no longer enforced consistently in the passage915 where Augustine makes 
use of both Greek and Latin terminology. 
 Furthermore, there is the political term gentes that is worth consideration. 
When looking at the overall use of gentes in Hincmar’s writing, it is noticeable that 
the author does not have the same understanding of this word as Augustine or 
Alcuin. He also does not use gentes as often. Considered as a whole, the nouns 
gentiles and gentilitas as well as the adjective gentilis – which all have a 
                                                
912 ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ µήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, ὅµοιός ἐστιν τῷ 
λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιµονίαν ἢ µὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ µηκέτι εἶναι. Epistula ad Menoeceum, 122. 
913 […] µελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν, εἴπερ παρούσης µὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχοµεν, 
ἀπούσης δέ πάντα πράττοµεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν. Ibid. 
914 Πρῶτον µὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ µακάριον νοµίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις 
ὑπεγράφη, µηθὲν µήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον µήτε τῆς µακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε 
[…]. Ibid., 123. 
915 Civ. IX 13, pp. 384-386. 
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connotation of paganism (since from the fourth century onwards gentiles took the 
place of gentes in the language of the ‘church’ councils916) – are much more 
frequent in Hincmar’s works. Strikingly, there are only two instances in the De 
regis persona et regio ministerio in which gentes appears with Augustine’s specific 
meaning of “less influential groups of people who are to open up to conversion”. 
They can be found in CAP. V. and CAP. VII., which are dealing with the use of 
political power according to Christian ethics. In both cases, gentes is part of a quote 
from Augustine’s De civitate Dei. CAP. V. quotes from chapter 24 of Book V, 
while CAP. VII. quotes from chapter 15 of Book IV. In these passages from the De 
civitate Dei, gentes appears in clusters of words that have been established as 
characteristic of Augustine in contexts concerned with secular power and military 
expansion: chapter 24 of Book V contains the phrase gentes imperare (“to rule 
over races/tribes/nations”); in chapter 15 of Book IV. the formulas perdomitis 
gentibus dilatare regnum (“to expand the realm by conquered races/tribes/nations”) 
and vicinum subiugare (“to subjugate the neighbour”) are included. These findings 
show that in contexts where Hincmar reflects on secular and military power he 
makes use of passages from the De civitate Dei, and, moreover, those he selects 
contain the term gentes in Augustine’s particular sense. 
Apart from gentes, the only related word that can be found in the De regis 
persona et regio ministerio is gentilitas917. It occurs in CAP. IV. and is part of a 
quote from Ambrose’s De officiis. Ambrose here uses gentilitas in the sense of 
“paganism”. The sentence containing gentilitas reads: 
 
                                                
916 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 140. 
917 PL 125, col. 0839B. 
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If you assist the one who declares a severe fight against a widow and 
orphans, or attempts to seize their possessions by any force, the liberality 
is not proven, if someone tears what is granted to the one away from the 
other, desiring it unjustly, and believing it to be distributed justly: not 
before at some point, just as the well-known Zachaeus, you give back 
fourfold to the one you have cheated, and compensate for the vices of 
paganism with eagerness of faith, and with action of a believing man.918 
 
This quotation expresses that gentilitas, which explicitly refers to “paganism” 
(unlike gentes), is directly associated with iniustitia. For Ambrose (and for 
Augustine in his early texts, in cases where he applies iustitia to social and political 
ethics) the congruence of the Biblical-Christian and philosophical-juridical senses 
of iustitia means that, as a virtue, it can be practised in its most genuine form (as 
vera iustitia) only by those who practise vera pietas, which consists in the 
knowledge and love of the true God. In consequence, pagans (and other non-
Christians) are not able to practise vera iustitia.919 
 CAP. IX-XI. are influenced by Augustine largely on the basis of St. Paul’s 
political theology of the love of one’s neighbour. They define the cases in which 
and the conditions under which the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” is invalid. 
In CAP. IX. Hincmar chooses a passage from the De civitate Dei (chapter 21 of 
Book I) in which three important notions of Augustine’s understanding of iustitia 
are included: iustissimae rationis imperium (“order of the justest reasoning“), lex 
                                                
918 Si adiuves eum qui adversus viduam et pupillos gravi decernit iurgio, aut vi aliqua possessiones 
eorum eripere conatur, non probatur largitas, si quod alteri largitur, alteri quis extorqueat, si iniuste 
quaerat, et iuste dispensandum putet: nisi forte, ut ille Zachaeus (Luc. XIX), reddas prius ei 
quadruplum quem fraudaveris, et gentilitatis vitia fidei studio, et credentis operatione compenses. 
Ibid. 
919 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, pp. 878-879. 
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iusta (“just law”) and fons iustitiae Deus (“God as the source of justice”). First, 
Augustine maintains “[…] and therefore have these by no means acted against this 
precept, in which it says: Thou shalt not kill, who have waged war under the 
authority of God or have punished criminals with death, supporting a person of 
public power according to His laws, which is an order of the justest reasoning.”920, 
then he concludes “These therefore have been made the exception, when either a 
just law in general or God himself as the source of justice specifically commands 
the killing of anyone who has killed a man or himself, or whoever is entangled in 
the crime of homicide.”921 
According to the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. iustitia, Augustine makes 
reference to “a sense belonging to the inner man” by which reason is able to 
discriminate between iustitia and iniustitia.922 It is claimed that Augustine indicates 
in both the De civitate Dei and the De Trinitate that all humans are able to identify 
iustitia, even in the case that they themselves are not righteous. This explains the 
essence of iustissimae rationis imperium (“order of the justest reasoning“) and the 
ease with which Augustine uses the term lex iusta (“just law”) in the above 
quotations. Augustine’s argument is grounded on St. Paul, in whom, he argues, the 
people recognise the forma iustitiae (“form of justice”). By loving this form, their 
capability to comprehend and love iustitia grows and they become more righteous. 
This is how Augustine perceives the interaction between the mind’s knowledge and 
love of iustitia and their unity in the mind’s knowledge and love of God. In 
                                                
920 […] et ideo nequaquam contra hoc praeceptum fecerunt, quo dictum est: Non occides, qui Deo 
auctore bella gesserunt, aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis, secundum eius leges, hoc est 
iustissimae rationis imperium, sceleratos morte punierunt. PL 125, col. 0841B. 
921 His igitur exceptis, quos vel lex iusta generaliter, vel ipse fons iustitiae Deus specialiter occidi 
iubet, quisquis hominem, vel seipsum, vel quemlibet occiderit, homicidii crimine tenetur. Ibid., col. 
0841C. 
922 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 876. 
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alleging that God is fons iustitiae (“source of justice”), Augustine puts forward that 
iustitia is knowable only as far as God is known, and that God is only known 
insofar as He is loved. 
By relying on Augustine and the mentioned Augustinian terms and 
concepts, Hincmar proves that God’s and the ruler’s orders are recognised as “just” 
by all humans. They are recognised as “just” even to the extent that the love of 
neighbour and the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” take a subordinate position. 
This clause – that God’s and the ruler’s laws compel the people’s observance – 
holds throughout the De regis persona et regio ministerio. 
 In substance, CAP. XVI-XVIII. propose that the goal of legislation is the 
promotion of the Christian religion and moral code. This is achieved by the ruler 
who acts in the service of God (see CAP. XVI.) and can only be realised when law 
and order are enforced. If necessary, means of coercion may be applied in order to 
force to the iustitiae observatio (“observance of justice”) (see CAP. XVII.). The 
impetus for reproving the bad is amor iustitiae (“love of justice”) (see CAP. 
XVIII.). This is entirely in line with Augustinian social and political ethics, where 
amor iustitiae acquires the ethical function of being the motive behind the soul’s 
effort to overcome concupiscence and sin.923 Eventually, Hincmar draws the 
conclusion: the one who advocates iustitia (“justice”) and uses the penal power in 
the right way serves the Christian God. This statement is made in CAP. XVIII., 
which is arguably where Augustine’s political ethics and political thought show 
most clearly their impact on Hincmar’s perception of Charles the Bald’s realm as a 
Christian ‘state’. As will be subsequently displayed, the entire argument regarding 




the correct exercise of iustitia (“justice”) in the subsequent chapters, including the 
use of the penal power and death penalty, is based on this inference. 
 CAP. XX. is entitled “Whom the leader or judge should rightly be allowed 
to forgive”. It gives reasons by citing evidence from firstly Gregory the Great and 
secondly Augustine. At the beginning of the chapter Hincmar writes: “In the 
Gospel Homilies924 the blessed Gregory therefore shows whom the leader or judge 
should rightly be allowed to forgive, under a just and merciful decider, who 
forgives the converting and repenting.”925 The key point Hincmar makes in CAP. 
XX. is that the one who offers hope for moral improvement deserves to be forgiven 
by the leader or judge, while against the recidivist a strict judgment is necessary. In 
any case, Hincmar says by quoting from Augustine’s Sententiae926, a sinner will 
eventually be disciplined for his/her offense: “«Sins, whether minor or major, 
cannot go unpunished, since they are punished either by the repenting person or by 
the judging God. For godly vengeance ceases if human conversion precedes. For 
God indeed loves to spare the confessing and not to judge those who judge 
themselves.»“927 By combining forbearance with rational judgment, a decider acts 
in the service of the Christian God. 
 CAP. XXIII-XXIV. are concerned with the purpose and use of the penal 
power and death penalty. The question of the lawfulness of the death penalty is 
debated with reference to Augustine. The chapters are headed “That holy men have 
punished the accused with death by law in order to inflict fear” (CAP. XXIII.) and 
                                                
924 Hom. 32. 
925 Cui ergo licite ignoscere liceat principi vel iudici, sub iusto et misericordi iudice, qui convertenti 
et poenitenti ignoscit, beatus Gregorius in homilia Evangelii demonstrat. PL 125, col. 0847A. 
926 Sent. 210. 
927 «Peccata, sive parva, sive magna, impunita esse non possunt, quia aut homine poenitente, aut 
Deo iudicante plectuntur. Cessat autem vindicta divina, si conversio praecurrat humana. Amat enim 
Deus confitentibus parcere, et eos qui semetipsos iudicant non iudicare.» PL 125, col. 0847D. 
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“That killing a man is not always criminal” (CAP. XXIV.) In both cases Hincmar 
argues in favour of the death penalty. He contends that it is a ruler’s right to impose 
the death penalty. Besides the usual purpose of punishing the offender, the death 
penalty may have the function of serving as a deterrent against further serious 
violations of the law on the part of the people. The imposition of the death penalty 
by the Christian ruler is lawful because it compels to the iustitiae observatio 
(“observance of justice”) in the Christian society. 
 CAP. XXVII. and CAP. XXXI. are entitled “That laws from a just leader 
are to be officially acknowledged by anyone” and “Whether one should exercise 
forbearance with regard to the biggest and official crimes”. They both include 
quotations from Augustine. In CAP. XXVII. Hincmar’s reasoning is: a Christian 
‘state’ must serve the Christian God. If a Christian ruler, who advocates iustitia 
(“justice”) and uses the penal power in the right way, serves the Christian God, the 
people need to obey his command. Furthermore, by referring to Augustine’s De 
vera religione (the same passage Hincmar already quoted in 868 in the 
Quaterniones928 of the Expositiones ad Carolum Regem), Hincmar says about the 
Christian secular authorities who are in charge of enacting laws: even though men 
judge over the temporal laws when they legislate, once a law has been made, a 
judge is not allowed to judge over it, but only according to it. Hincmar insists that 
not only the Christian people but also their leaders must follow the law that is 
authorised by the Christian God. In CAP. XXXI. Hincmar discusses the procedure 
in the event of felonies and crimes against the ‘state’. Again, by using Augustine 
                                                
928 Ibid., col. 1055C-1055D. 
CHAPTER THREE 
 309 
inter alia, Hincmar advises that the repentant may be spared – however, only to the 
extent that peace and order in the Christian society are maintained. 
As we have seen (especially in the discussion of CAP. IX.), iustitia in the 
Biblical and Christian sense is a virtue that is closely linked with the love of God in 
the first instance and the love of neighbour (which is also reflected in the 
Decalogue) in the second instance. In his early works, Augustine started to apply 
this Christian notion of iustitia to social and political ethics. His reasoning was 
that, because the right love of God involves the right love of neighbour, the 
‘church’ instils the teaching that relations between family members, citizens as 
well as between subordinates and superiors (e.g. the people and their ruler) must be 
maintained by caritas, which iustitia compels.929 In early Christianity it was a 
matter of course that pietas and caritas form a pair. However, early Christianity 
was not in the first place concerned about the ‘state’. Caritas was considered to be 
a responsibility of the individual rather than the ‘state’. Only when Christianity was 
made the ‘state’ religion in the fourth century caritas started to become a public 
concern of ruler and citizen. Along these lines caritas gained importance in 
Augustinian political ethics as one of the foremost civic duties. The presence of 
caritas in the political sphere also brought a new, Christian dimension to the 
concept of iustitia. The merging of Biblical-Christian with philosophical-juridical 
senses of iustitia in Augustinian political thought resulted in the belief that vera 
iustitia presupposes vera pietas, whose essential feature is the knowledge and love 
of the true God (as we have seen in the instance where gentilitas is identified with 
iniustitia in CAP. IV. as part of a quote from Ambrose’s De officiis). 
                                                
929 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 878. 
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From this it follows that, throughout the De civitate Dei, Augustine argues 
that a societas iusta is one that worships God correctly. This societas is 
synonymous with the civitas Dei, since in the De civitate Dei Augustine – based on 
Cicero – establishes iustitia as the precondition for a civitas Dei. Already in the 
Confessiones Augustine says: “iusta est societas hominum, quae servit tibi” (conf. 
3,17).930 The content of CAP. XVI., XVII. and XVIII. of the De regis persona et 
regio ministerio essentially suggests that Hincmar wants Charles the Bald’s ‘state’ 
to be a “societas hominum, quae servit Deo”, i.e. a ‘state’ that obeys the divine will 
in all things. However, it has not yet been evaluated what – according to Hincmar – 
the notions of iustitia (and pax) imply, which form the basis of such a ‘state’. The 
next section will therefore elaborate on Hincmar’s concept of iustitia in 
comparison with Cicero’s, Augustine’s and Alcuin’s understanding of iustitia (and 
pax). The aim will be to ascertain what Hincmar’s perception of these ideas tells us 
about his view of Charles the Bald’s Christian ‘state’ and its particular association 
with God. 
  
IV. Hincmar’s Use of Augustinian Vocabulary 
  
‘Iustitia’ and ‘Pax’: Their Significance in the Evaluation of a ‘State’ and Its 
Association with God 
  
The concepts of iustitia (and pax) have emerged as most prominent in 
Hincmar’s reflections on the ‘state’, its order and its government. It has further 
                                                
930 Ibid., pp. 878-879. 
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turned out that in the De regis persona et regio ministerio Hincmar treats iustitia 
(and pax) predominantly in connection with Augustine or even the De civitate Dei. 
CAP. XVIII., where Cicero’s ideas of iustitia and misericordia are reflected in a 
quote from the De civitate Dei, has been defined as the most critical chapter in 
terms of influence of Augustinian political ethics and political thought. For this 
reason, we cannot escape analysing the differences in Cicero’s, Augustine’s, 
Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s notions of iustitia (and pax) and investigating how they 
affect the perception and valuation of a worldly ‘state’. A summary of each 




The concept of iustitia (“justice”) in the thought of Cicero is most 
prominent in his model of social organisation. His thinking is influenced by 
Aristotle’s maxim, “man is by nature a political animal”. In Cicero’s De re publica, 
Scipio holds: 
 
‘Consequently,’ says Africanus, ‘a ‘state’ is the affair of a people; 
however, a people is not any crowd of human beings united in any sort of 
way, but a crowd of great number associated in a consensus with respect to 
justice and welfare for the community. But its primary cause of assembling 
is not so much helplessness as a certain uniting of men as if produced by 
nature. [...]’931 
                                                
931 ‘Est igitur’ inquit Africanus ‘res publica res populi; populus autem non omnis hominum coetus 
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensus et utilitatis communione 
CHAPTER THREE 
 312 
The quotation from the De re publica shows that for Cicero justice is fundamental 
to the orderly organisation of the ‘state’. Cicero’s statement is the starting point for 
Augustine’s debate around the definition of the ‘state’ in the De civitate Dei and 
contains Cicero’s definitions of “people” and “state”. According to Cicero, a 
“state” is only the “affair” (res) of a people if someone governs it justly – be it a 
king, a few aristocrats or the people collectively.932 Cicero disapproves of the 
Romans’ loss of moral values over the years933 and promotes the legitimacy of 
certain people being in power and ruling over other members of the ‘state’.934 
Cicero presents a series of connected allegories, proceeding from God, who, being 
the supreme commander, rules over man, to the human spirit that is in charge of the 
human body, and, at last, to reason, which controls human desires as well as other 




In the De civitate Dei Augustine expatiates on Cicero’s example and 
determines that true iustitia (“justice”) in a ‘state’ can only be attained if God is the 
commander of all people; the human spirit is in charge of the human body, and 
reason controls human desires and other evil stirrings of the soul. By adopting 
                                                                                                                                  
sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas, quam naturalis quaedam 
hominum quasi congregatio. [...]’ Rep. I 39, p. 28; see also Civ. II 21, p. 81. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid., pp. 79, 81-82. 
934 Ibid., pp. 80-81, XIX 21, pp. 390-391. 
935 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391. 
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Cicero’s principle that justice is a prerequisite for a ‘state’, he professes that the 
Roman power is not and has never been a ‘state’.936 
Augustine then admits that from a certain point of view the Roman power is 
nevertheless a ‘state’937, and he therefore seeks to find a more appropriate definition 
for such an earthly community.938 Augustine retains Cicero’s idea of a “state” (res 
publica) as the “affair of a people” (res populi)939 but changes his definition of 
“people”: he argues that “a people is a rational union of a crowd associated in a 
concordant communion over things that it loves” (populus est coetus multitudinis 
rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus).940 Expressed in a 
different way, a “people” is not “associated in a consensus with respect to 
justice”941, but united by a mutual interest in whatever is loved. The Roman 
community is now a “people”, since it does not matter what the shared interest is 
that builds its common ground. Consequently, the “affair” of the Roman people is 
their “affair” and their “state”.942 Augustine concludes that, just as the Romans, 
other earthly communities – such as the Athenians and other Greeks, the Egyptians 
and the Babylonians – are a “people” who possess a “state”. Each of these 
Augustine calls a civitas impiorum (“state of the impious”).943 Because their 
members do not acknowledge the Christian God as their supreme commander, 
these “states” lack true justice.944 
                                                
936 Ibid., XIX 23, p. 399. 
937 Civ. II 21, p. 83. 
938 Civ. XIX 24. 
939 Ibid., p. 400. 
940 Ibid., p. 400, ll. 6-7. 
941 Civ. II 21, p. 81. 
942 Civ. XIX 24, p. 400. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid., pp. 400-401. 
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Having seen Augustine’s criticism of Cicero’s definition of “state” and the 
conclusion he provides in Book XIX945, it appears that Augustine considers all 
worldly ‘states’ to be equally unjust. However, following his new definition of 
“people” in Book XIX, Augustine recommends that some worldly ‘states’ are 
superior to others from a moral point of view, since people or ‘states’ may be 
judged according to the things they love as a community. A people or ‘state’ is the 
more virtuous, the more honourable the matter is that they value in common.946 A 
classification of worldly ‘states’ according to moral standards is possible for 
Augustine because he recognises a definition of the “state” based on natural law 
alongside the other definition based on divine law. That Augustine corrects his first 
definition of “state” in order to be able to rank some worldly ‘states’ higher than 
others reflects the conflict in the De civitate Dei between an acknowledgment and a 
denial of worldly power. 
 Augustine examines ‘states’ from an eschatological perspective and 
assesses different worldly ‘states’ according to their moral standards: he ranks the 
‘state’ of the monotheistic Jewish nation at the bottom of the hierarchy. Then, in 
some respects superior to the Jews with regard to moral standards are, according to 
Augustine, other worldly ‘states’ prior to the foundation of Rome. Augustine 
argues that divine providence has decreed that two temporal realms are rated even 
higher, namely the pagan ‘states’ of the Assyrians and the Romans.947 Augustine 
presents the polytheistic Assyrians in the East as the typos (“pre-image”) and the 
polytheistic/pre-Christian Romans in the West as the antitypos (“counter-
                                                
945 Civ. XIX 24. 
946 Ibid., p. 400. 




image”).948 Both ‘states’ are two large and, in their own way, good949 worldly 
‘states’ which parallel the civitas Dei.950 One of their functions for Christianity is 
that, due to their longevity, size and influence, they were able over a long period of 
time to secure pax (“peace”) among the earthly community.951 Besides safeguarding 
peace, their significance within the context of God’s providential plan is that the 
Assyrian empire as the typos is relevant for events pertaining to the Old 
Testament952, while the Roman empire as the antitypos is relevant for the New 
Testament.953 At the top of Augustine’s hierarchy of worldly ‘states’ are the 
Christian ‘states’. Augustine expands on the Christian Roman empire and 
emperors, which are mainly praised. Prime examples are emperors Constantine I 
and Theodosius I.954 However, Augustine’s praise of the Christian Roman emperors 
is restricted to deeds that are historically verifiable. The main focus lies on the 
Roman emperors’ achievements in the promotion of the Christian faith. 
Notwithstanding, in Augustine’s view, all members of a ‘state’, including its ruler, 
must place themselves completely under the authority of God in order to achieve 
true iustitia (“justice”), the essential precondition for a ‘state’ that can legitimately 
be called a civitas Dei. This, according to Augustine, cannot be achieved on earth. 
In Chapter One it has been observed that Arquillière, who has F. 
Dvornik’s955 support with regard to his theory of Augustinisme politique, was aware 
of the conflict manifested in the De civitate Dei. Arquillière asserted, contrary to 
                                                
948 Civ. XVIII 2, pp. 256-259, 22, p. 284, 27, p. 292, V 13, p. 217, IV 6-7, pp. 152-154. 
949 Civ. V 19, p. 230. 
950 Civ. XVIII 1, pp. 255-256, 2, p. 259. 
951 Civ. XVIII 2, p. 256, 22, p. 284, XV 4, p. 63. 
952 Civ. XVIII 2, p. 257, 3, pp. 259-260. 
953 Civ. XVIII 27, p. 292. 
954 Civ. V 25, 26. 
955 Dvornik 1966, p. 849. 
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Bernheim, that Augustine does attribute a legitimate power, in conformity with 
God’s providential plan, even to the ancient pagan realms before the emergence of 
Christianity. According to Arquillière, Augustine also pleads (in line with St. Paul 
and the patristic tradition) for obedience on the part of the people to any ruler – 
unless the ruler’s will is against Christian moral principles.956 Dvornik notes that 
some scholars, including Bernheim, assumed that Augustine considers the good 
deeds of the citizens of the civitas Dei alone to be legitimate virtues. While 
Dvornik admits that for Augustine the legitimate virtues which grant men eternal 
salvation are the deeds done by members of the civitas Dei, he emphasises that 
Augustine at the same time also accepts the existence of natural virtues, which 
prevailed among the heathen Romans and helped them to expand and protect their 
‘state’.957 In the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. iustitia Dodaro argues along these lines.958 
Arquillière, Dvornik and Dodaro rightly give prominence to the natural dimension 
of the concepts of iustitia and pax. Both concepts permeate the De civitate Dei and 
have the purpose of establishing true order in human society.959 They function in 
like manner in the civitas Dei as in the civitas terrena. Their double meaning – i.e. 
their natural vs. divine sense – can be defined as follows: the natural form of 
iustitia or pax960 is the iustitia or pax given by men to men; the divine form of 
                                                
956 Ibid., p. 841; Chadwick 1988, pp. 12-13. On the Carolingians see the discussions in Wallace-
Hadrill 1971, pp. 127-128; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 193-195. 
957 Dvornik 1966, pp. 846-847. 
958 AL vol. 3 2004-2010, p. 879. 
959 On Augustine’s concept of iustitia in the De civitate Dei see also Dodaro 1999, pp. 181-183; 
Markus 1970, pp. 64f., 99f., 208; Wilks 1967, pp. 496-499; Baynes 1936, pp. 16-17. The concept of 
pax is discussed by Schofield 2010, pp. 667-671; Martin 1972, p. 214ff.; Markus 1970, pp. 68f., 
83f., 95f. 




iustitia961 or pax962 is the iustitia and pax given by God to men. As soon as the 
concepts of iustitia and pax are spiritualised, they are determined by the Gospel’s 
main law of love of God and of one’s neighbour. Arquillière stated that Bernheim 
saw correctly the importance of the Augustinian concepts of iustitia and pax in 
later (medieval) political reflections. Bernheim seemed not to have realised that for 
Augustine their natural, worldly forms likewise have a substantial value for life on 
earth.963 Arquillière maintained that the devaluation of the natural forms of these 
goods started in Merovingian times when kingship gradually began to be seen as 
subservient to the ‘church’. Accordingly, earlier medieval thinkers, such as 
Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville, and later Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel and 
Jonas of Orléans, retained from Augustine merely the extreme statements that 
devalued the earthly ‘state’. Dvornik believes that in Isidore’s texts from the late 
seventh century the idea of the ‘state’ based on natural law had almost disappeared. 
He reasons that Isidore regards the ‘state’ as necessary only for the defence and 
protection of the ‘church’.964 This shift in focus, away from the recognition of the 
natural law of the ‘state’, Arquillière termed Augustinisme politique.965 What is 
most striking is that Arquillière saw exceptional circumstances under 
Charlemagne’s reign: he argued that under Charlemagne Catholicism did not exist 
as a separate entity because of the merging of political and religious affairs.966 
                                                
961 Arquillière states that Augustine’s divine iustitia basically corresponds to St. Paul’s evangelical 
justice. He claims, however, that Augustine was the first to apply it to the constitution of ‘states’. 
Arquillière 1934, p. 21. 
962 Dvornik’s translation of Augustine’s definition of divine pax in chapter 13 of Book XIX of the 
De civitate Dei is: “The peace of the heavenly city is a perfectly ordered and fully concordant 
fellowship in the enjoyment of God and in mutual enjoyment by union with God; the peace of all 
things is a tranquillity of order”. Dvornik 1966, p. 845. 
963 Arquillière 1934, pp. 151f. 
964 Dvornik 1966, p. 848. 
965 Arquillière 1934, p. 152. 
966 His argument is supported by Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 103; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 189, 193. 
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While Augustine had separated Catholicism from political affairs, Augustinisme 
politique did not. Under Charlemagne iustitia and pax were wholly safeguarded by 
the omnipotent emperor.967 The political and religious domains were both 
successfully dominated by Charlemagne. He was the one medieval emperor who, 
by taking on the task of implementing iustitia and pax, could give to these concepts 
the religious meanings they had adopted since Merovingian times under the 




As the research on Alcuin has conveyed, Arquillière presumably based his 
argument on Alcuin when he affirmed that Charlemagne, by implementing iustitia 
(“justice”) and pax (“peace”) in a certain way, could give to these concepts the 
religious contents they had adopted since Merovingian times under the so-called 
Augustinisme politique. A re-evaluation of relevant passages from Alcuin’s 
Epistolae will expose a relation in the texts between Alcuin’s use of the notions of 
pax, iustitia and civitas Dei as well as the figures of Old Testament kings. 
Epist. 41, written to the king, is the first letter in which Alcuin draws a 
parallel between Charlemagne and King David.969 In the text Alcuin puts forward 
that, similar to David, elected and loved by God970, Charlemagne conquered the 
neighbouring tribes and enlightened them about the true faith as well as the law of 
God. In Alcuin’s description both Charlemagne and David appear as kings of a 
                                                
967 Arquillière 1934, p. 128. 
968 Ibid., p. 131. 
969 Epist. 41, pp. 84-85. 
970 At the beginning of Epist. 148 in his address to Charlemagne, who is referred to as King David, 
Alcuin also presents the king as chosen and loved by God. Epist. 148, pp. 237-241. 
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people that have God as their leader. Alcuin portrays Charlemagne and David as 
two rulers who are ruling entirely in accordance with God’s will and are 
implementing the law of God. This parallel is then followed by another comparison 
drawn between Charlemagne and Christ. Alcuin evidently links Charlemagne and 
David with Christ by pointing out that Christ is of the house of David. Alcuin 
avails himself of the formula populus Christianus (“Christian people”) in order to 
make reference to Christ’s heavenly realm. 
Epist. 217, written to King Charles the Younger, supports the claim that 
Charlemagne and his heirs are higher in rank than all the former Christian rulers.971 
The main motive of Epist. 217 is the celebration of the royal coronation of the 
second son of Charlemagne. Charlemagne is again referred to as David when 
Alcuin declares that the coronation took place with Charlemagne’s consent. In the 
following, Alcuin indicates that, in order for his wishes to come true, Charles the 
Younger must first and foremost implement iustitia (“justice”) and exercise 
misericordia (“forbearance”) – the two essential components that constitute a God-
placating rule, according to King Solomon. Alcuin once more chooses the term 
populus Christianus, which is applied to Christ’s heavenly realm in Epist. 41. By 
availing himself of Solomon, Alcuin draws a comparison between Charles the 
Younger and Solomon and establishes a role model of a true Christian king. 
However, shortly afterwards Alcuin simply advises Charles the Younger to follow 
the example of his father Charlemagne. Charlemagne is then presented as rector et 
imperator populi christiani (“ruler and emperor of the Christian people”). 
                                                
971 Epist. 217, pp. 360-361. 
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In Epist. 177, where Alcuin exhorts Charlemagne to intercede on the side of 
Pope Leo III, he also makes use of the pseudonym David.972 Alcuin explains that 
Charlemagne is the only nominee who has the right to direct the judicial 
investigation. Alcuin addresses Charlemagne as decus populi christiani (“glory of 
the Christian people”). Besides the military defence of the Christianum imperium 
(“Christian empire”) and the protection of the Catholic faith, Alcuin mentions the 
spread of the principles of justice as a third core responsibility of the Christian ruler 
– which in the course of the letter becomes increasingly important when Alcuin 
portrays Charlemagne as the only man alive endowed with the power to fulfil what 
pleases God. The acts of performing justice and making law are repeated later on in 
the epistle among the other duties of the Christian ruler. As a reward for 
accomplishing these tasks, Alcuin maintains, God will bless Charlemagne’s sons 
richly and preserve the royal throne to all of his descendants, just as he did with his 
favourite, King David. 
In the De civitate Dei it is argued that true iustitia (“justice”) in a ‘state’ can 
only be achieved if God is the commander of all people and all of them obey 
Him.973 This, Augustine finds, cannot possibly be realised on earth, wherefore a 
worldly civitas Dei becomes inconceivable. However, Epist. 41, Epist. 217 and 
Epist. 177 propose that Alcuin thinks otherwise as far as the Carolingian ‘state’ is 
concerned: in Epist. 41 Alcuin describes both Charlemagne and Christ as 
descendants of King David. In Epist. 41, populus Christianus occurs with reference 
to the people of the kingdom of Christ, while in Epist. 217 and Epist. 177 the same 
formula stands for both the people of Charles the Younger and the people of 
                                                
972 Epist. 177, pp. 292-293. 
973 Civ. XIX 21, p. 391, XIX 23, p. 399. 
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Charlemagne. Epist. 41 contains a phrase that is extremely telling with regard to 
the profundity of Alcuin’s political statement in these epistles concerned with the 
status of the Carolingians as Christian rulers. Alcuin writes: “Blessed is the nation, 
whose master is their God”974. This attribution makes the Carolingian ‘state’ meet 
Augustine’s prime condition for being a godly ‘state’ on earth. It also takes the 
existence of indirect evidence of Augustinian influence in Alcuin’s correspondence 
to a new level, as it now stands to reason that Alcuin has very well grasped the 
terms set by Augustine in the De civitate Dei that render a ‘state’ worldly or godly. 
Alcuin’s goal is to show that the Carolingians are Christian rulers who are able to 
lead a people to the furthest extent possible under the divine commandments of the 
Christian God. Correspondingly, Alcuin maintains that the forms of iustitia 
(“justice”) and pax (“peace”) that exist in the Carolingian ‘state’ are not the 
worldly forms but are the justice and peace given to the Christian ruler and his 
Christian people by God. In Epist. 41 Charlemagne, just as David who had been 
instituted by Christ as leader of the people of God, is said to be “a chosen preacher 
of the law of God”975. In Epist. 174 to Charlemagne (of early summer 799), Alcuin 
says to the ruler (who is addressed as King David): “You are the judge of the 
crimes, you are the guide of the erring” (Tu vindex scelerum, tu rector 
errantium).976 
When looking at the occurrences of pax (“peace”) independently, it 
emerges that there is again no doubt as to the quality of this concept: the peace 
within the Carolingian realm is the peace granted by the Christian God. The most 
                                                
974 Beata gens, cuius est dominus Deus eorum. Epist. 41, p. 84, lin. 12. 
975 Ibid., p. 84, lin. 14. 
976 Epist. 174, pp. 288-289. 
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striking reference to peace can be found in the first lines of Epist. 198, after 
Charlemagne is greeted as King David.977 There Alcuin titles Charlemagne’s ‘state’ 
perpetuae pacis civitas (“city of eternal peace”), which comes very close to a city 
of God realised on earth. Furthermore, Charlemagne’s civitas is presented as 
superior to Jerusalem and the reign of the Old Testament kings, which are doomed 
to failure. 
Alcuin reused Augustine to suit his own purpose. He availed himself of the 
ideas of iustitia (“justice”) and pax (“peace”) in his correspondence with 
Charlemagne, and in Epist. 41 and Epist. 229 alluded to Psalms 32 and 143 
(including the verses Beata gens cuius est Dominus Deus eius and beatus populus 
cuius Dominus Deus eius), whose content Augustine had made the precondition for 
a civitas Dei. He concluded that, while even the Christian Roman emperors had not 
fully succeeded in meeting Augustine’s challenge, Charlemagne was the first ruler 





Devisse has dealt extensively with Hincmar’s understanding of justice. He 
comprehends Hincmar’s notion of “justice” (iustitia) as follows: Firstly, according 
to Hincmar, iustitia always belongs to God in the last instance. Secondly, iustitia is 
                                                
977 Epist. 198, p. 327, lin. 2. 
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administered by means of “laws” (leges). Devisse recognizes three different kinds 
of “law” (lex) in Hincmar’s oeuvre.978 
 The first one is the “law of God”, which is the foundation of the other 
“laws”. St. Paul refers to it as “enacted by angels and preached by a mediator979 due 
to transgressions”.980 Devisse adds that the oldest representations of this “law” are, 
according to Augustine, the Decalogue and the Pentateuch.981 
The second form is the “law” imparted by the Holy Spirit to the clergy 
assembled in ‘church’ councils. Hincmar’s line of reasoning is that popes, because 
they decided alone and not in an assembly of judges, initially established a number 
of venerable, yet imperfect, rules.982 The ecumenical councils, whose ecclesiastical 
canons are directly inspired by the Holy Spirit, then perfected these earlier drafts, 
since the councils are intangible due to the presence of the Holy Spirit.983 However, 
a brief remark is in order regarding this second category of “law”. Hincmar indeed 
uses the argument of the Holy Spirit taking part in councils in his Expositiones ad 
Carolum Regem, in order to lay stress on the authority of the mentioned canon law 
enacted at certain named councils;984 but at the same time, in the De regis persona 
et regio ministerio, Hincmar asserts that the Holy Spirit speaks through the Holy 
                                                
978 Devisse 1976, pp. 549-564. 
979 Moses takes the role of a mediator. 
980 Gal 3:19. See Devisse 1976, p. 550. 
981 Enarrationes in Psalmos LVII I. See ibid. 
982 Hincmar’s argument for the superiority of the many in judgment is remarkable in this context. 
His line of thought is surely influenced by Aristotle’s summation argument in the Πολιτικά, where 
Aristotle concludes: “For the many, of whom each one may not be an excellent man, it is 
nevertheless possible that when they have come together they are better than those [few best], not as 
each one but as all together […]. For when there are many, each one has a small piece of excellency 
and prudence, and when they have come together they may become just like one person […]. 
Therefore, the many also judge better the pieces of music as well as the writings of poets […].” 
(“τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν [1281b] οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὅµως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας 
εἶναι βελτίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον ἀλλ’ ὡς σύµπαντας […]· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον 
µόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων, ὥσπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον […]. διὸ καὶ 
κρίνουσιν ἄµεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς µουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν […].”) 
983 Devisse 1976, pp. 552-553. 
984 PL 125, col. 1038A, 1040D, 1044B, 1058D-1059A. 
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Scriptures as well as through the Church Fathers, and therefore he will refer to 
these sources rather than write freely.985 This shows that it cannot be the case that 
Hincmar sees canon law as a separate category of “law”, for the sole reason that he 
believes in the presence of the Holy Spirit at ‘church’ councils. 
The third kind of “law”, Devisse writes, is the “human law” (ius humane986) 
designed to govern human societies. It is envisaged by Hincmar – more than the 
other two forms of “law” – as an instrument for regulating the social life.987 
Furthermore, Devisse says: “[…] c’est en ce sens, très souvent dans son oeuvre, 
pour ne pas dire exclusivement, que le prélat utilise le mot lex […].”988 Devisse 
then expands on Hincmar’s historical understanding of this legislation. In his 
outline, Devisse distinguishes between the “law” made by men before Christ 
(which naturally does not always have the “law of God” as its foundation), the civil 
“law” established by laymen in accordance with the teachings of Christ and the 
“law” of the ‘church’ (established through ‘church’ councils and decretals), which 
evolved as a legislation complementary to and at times overlapping with the civil 
“law”. Devisse raises this difficulty of a shared responsibility.989 First he says about 
the “law” of the ‘church’: “La loi canonique a progressivement créé un domaine 
réservé où l’autorité civile ne doit ni juger ni pénétrer. Il n’y a cependant pas 
séparation radicale des deux mondes, l’un laïque, l’autre ecclésiastique, qui 
auraient, chacun, ses lois positives et qui n’obéiraient qu’à elles.”990 Then he 
explains: “Si elles sont conformes au christianisme, les lois civiles s’imposent à 
                                                
985 Ibid., col. 0833B. 
986 Ibid., col. 1051B. 
987 Devisse 1976, p. 551. 
988 Ibid. 
989 Ibid. 
990 Ibid., pp. 551-552. 
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tous, clercs et laïcs, au moins dans certaines de leurs prescriptions, dans tout le 
ressort politique où s’exerce leur autorité. La législation canonique s’adresse, par 
essence, essentiellement aux clercs. Mais elle déborde à son tour vers le monde des 
laïcs, quelle que soit leur origine. […] Nul clerc cependant ne peut s’abriter 
derrière le droit canon, nul laïc derrière le droit civil pour échapper aux sanctions 
que permet de lui appliquer «l’autre loi».”991 Moreover, with regard to Hincmar’s 
understanding of the civil “law” Devisse observes that, just as it was not ideal that 
the first popes established rules on their own, it is not advisable that kings make 
decisions alone, even though their authority over the civil “law” has never been 
contested.992 As stated by Devisse, Hincmar saw the notion of “justice” (iustitia) as 
composed of three different forms of “law” (lex). However, not least the finding 
that the argument of direct inspiration by the Holy Spirit is not unique to canon law 
calls for a reassessment of Hincmar’s concept of “justice” (iustitia) and “law” (lex) 




CAP. XVIII. of the De regis persona et regio ministerio, where not only 
Augustine’s but also Cicero’s ideas of iustitia and misericordia are represented in a 
quote from the De civitate Dei, will provide further insight into how these authors 
imagined iustitia could best be implemented in a worldly ‘state’. However, before 
scrutinising CAP. XVIII., the relation between iustitia and misericordia in 
Ciceronian thought, as well as the relevant chapter (chapter 5 of Book IX) in the 
                                                




De civitate Dei, will be introduced. Cicero as a thinker was a follower of the New 
Academy. This is to say, he adhered to the Platonic principles but at the same time 
refused the possibility of recognising an absolute truth.993 He tended towards 
Scepticism. As a philosopher, Cicero considered himself as a Stoic (like Seneca) or 
an Epicurean. Nevertheless, his way of seeking out the pros and cons – for instance 
of the different constituents of the doctrine of virtue – was unique. The concept of 
misericors/misericordia appears among the Stoics (including Seneca) in the 
doctrine of virtue as an equivalent of the Greek noun ἔλεος.994 Seneca, for example, 
distinguishes between clementia and misericordia and regards the former as a 
minor, the latter as a major, vitium. His argument is that, just as severitas may 
degenerate into crudelitas, clementia may decline into misericordia. Misericordia 
is first and foremost condemnable for the reason that it is prompted by pity felt on 
account of another person’s suffering without considering the cause of the person’s 
suffering. Hence, there is an aspect of irrationality to misericordia. In contrast, 
Cicero described the misericordia of Caesar as one of the ruler’s highest virtues. In 
the texts by Christian authors (including Augustine) misericordia then also features 
as a virtue. In the De civitate Dei, more precisely in chapter 5 of Book IX, 
Augustine endorses Cicero’s praise for Caesar’s misericordia, contrary to the 
general belief of the Stoics.995 The chapter is concerned with the Christian doctrine 
of virtue imparted by the Holy Scriptures and explains that the Christians are not 
seduced into sinning by passions. The teachings of the Bible as rendered by 
Augustine resemble Cicero’s model of a social order in which iustitia is 
                                                
993 See Atkins 2010, pp. 503-504. 
994 AL vol. 4, 1/2 2010-2013, p. 34. 
995 Civ. IX 5, pp. 374-376. 
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implemented. It includes a God, who, being the supreme commander, rules over 
man, the human spirit that is in charge of the human body, and finally reason, 
which controls human desires to the benefit of men. In this chapter Augustine 
relates Cicero’s idea of the moderation of human emotions and passions to 
Christianity and its teachings. He evaluates the human emotion of misericordia in a 
Christian context while taking into account the views of Cicero and the Stoics. 
Augustine emphasises that the Christian doctrine of virtue contained in the Holy 
Scriptures teaches that within Christians the human desires (for instance 
misericordia) are curbed by the Christian God as the highest authority in a manner 
that they are subservient to iustitia. In other words, this suggests that a Christian 
ruler, due to his ability to control his emotions and passions, is able to govern a 
‘state’ more justly than a non-Christian ruler. In this regard, Dodaro argues 
conclusively when he says that in the case of a Christian politician the four virtutes 
civiles are transformed beyond the fundamental level of virtue attained by a pagan 
secular leader and that, by allowing his conception of iustitia to be transformed by 
fides, spes and caritas, he punishes offenders with iustitia tempered with 
misericordia. A Christian ruler is capable of regulating his emotions in a way that 
they are useful to him in passing judgment. What Augustine writes next in chapter 
5 of Book IX (of the De civitate Dei) is quoted by Hincmar in CAP. XVIII. (of the 
De regis persona et regio ministerio). Augustine says that, according to Christian 
doctrine, having emotions per se is not necessarily an immoral act, but that the 
determining question is what these emotions are caused by. He carries on by 
claiming: “For to be angry with the sinner so that he may correct himself, to be sad 
on behalf of the miserable one so that he may be relieved, to fear for the 
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endangered so that he may not perish, I do not know whether anyone would 
reprove that by rational consideration.”996 Then Augustine mentions the Stoics and 
Cicero. He observes that Cicero, contrary to the opinion of the Stoics, already 
recognised the virtuous quality of misericordia in his praise of Caesar. What 
follows is a key statement on which Hincmar ends his CAP. XVIII.: containing not 
only a definition of misericordia but also an explanation of the relation of 
misericordia and iustitia to one another. Augustine writes: 
 
But what is forbearance if not compassion in our heart for a certain misery 
belonging to someone else, by which we are compelled to help by all 
means as much as we can? This emotion, namely, is in the service of 
reason if forbearance is granted to such an extent that justice is observed, 
be it when the one in need is presented, or when the repentant is 
forgiven.997 
 
The content of Augustine’s statement is the following: when governed by reason, 
misericordia is correctly administered and can thus help bring abut iustitia. But, 
according to Augustine, misericordia is only governed by a person’s ration if 
his/her highest authority is the Christian God. After this passage, which is 
contained in Hincmar’s CAP. XVIII., Augustine continues his argument in chapter 
5 of Book IX. He points out that Cicero’s view of misericordia as a virtue is in fact 
not as opposed to that of the Stoics than generally presumed. He mentions the Stoic 
                                                
996 Irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro adflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat 
nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Ibid., p. 375, ll. 4-7. 
997 Quid est autem misericordia nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique 
si possumus subvenire compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita praebetur 
misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti. 
Ibid., p. 375, ll. 13-18. 
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philosopher Epictetus who endorsed emotions such as misericordia in the wise 
men who are supposed to be free of vices. This shows, Augustine notes, that also 
the Stoics recognised human emotions as virtues if they occur in wise men in a 
manner that they neither affect the virtue of the mind nor reason. Here, Augustine’s 
reasoning in the process of relating Ciceronian and Stoic philosophy to Christianity 
and its teachings is revealed: Augustine observes that already in Ciceronian and 
Stoic thought emotions were granted to the wise man, and he argues that it would 
therefore be even more justified to grant them to a Christian man. Emotions such as 
misericordia are better administered by a Christian – and best by the Christian God 
himself who is the only one capable of achieving vera iustitia. It can be seen that, 
according to Augustine, it is the most favourable situation for the implementation 
of iustitia on earth if the ruler is a Christian. This is moreover the reason why for 
Augustine misericordia is first and foremost an attribute of a Christian secular 
leader. Hence, Dodaro is right when he alleges that in the case of Christian secular 
authorities Augustine considers iustitia to be transformed beyond the fundamental 
level of virtue, since Christian politicians alone are able to administer misericordia 
in a way that it benefits iustitia. The extract Hincmar quotes in CAP. XVIII. starts 
with the declaration that the Christian doctrine of virtue does not see emotions per 
se as immoral, because it primarily looks at their cause when evaluating their 
quality. Having thus established the virtuous quality of misericordia, Cicero’s 
approval of the misericordia of the pagan Roman ruler Caesar is mentioned. What 
follows is a definition of misericordia and a clarification of the relation between 
iustitia and misericordia. Hincmar must have selected this passage in order to 
claim that the Christian moral code of secular leadership is superior to heathen 
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political ethics. He differentiates between the vera iustitia of Christian rulers and 
the iustitia of pagan rulers. Unlike Augustine, who attributes a better 
administration of iustitia to rulers who are Christian but only attributes vera iustitia 
to the Christian God, Hincmar does not differentiate between the Christian iustitia 
of Christian politicians and vera iustitia. The reason is that – as the analysis of 
separate chapters of the De regis persona et regio ministerio has exposed – in 
Hincmar’s view iustitia is authorised by God and implemented by the ruler who 
gives laws on God’s behalf. On this basis, Hincmar calls for their observance by 
everyone. While for Augustine it is impossible that everyone in a ‘state’ lives 
according to Cicero’s and the Holy Scriptures’ model of a social order in which 
iustitia is implemented, Hincmar does not call into question the realisability of this 
ideal in a ‘state’ as a whole. By choosing this extract from chapter 5 of Book IX of 
the De civitate Dei, where misericordia features as an attribute of a secular leader 
(Caesar), Hincmar mainly considers the ruler’s perspective. He does not refer to 
Augustine’s argument in the De civitate Dei that in a social order misericordia can 
only be administered correctly – and hence bring about vera iustitia – if all 
members of the social order accept the Christian God as the highest authority. 
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CONCLUSION 
Contextualisation of the Findings on Augustinian Influence 
 
 
The main concern of this thesis has been to investigate how the political 
thought of Augustine of Hippo was understood and modified by Carolingian-era 
writers to serve their own distinctive purposes. The research focused on the two 
preeminent Carolingian authors and advisers Alcuin of York and Hincmar of 
Reims. It examined how these advisers used Augustinian political thought and 
ethics as manifested in the De civitate Dei in order to give more weight to their 
advice to the ruler. A philological-historical approach allowed the identification of 
coherences at multiple levels of the texts. 
Even though both authors were equally prolific and had an equally broad 
knowledge of Augustinian thought, each came away with a substantially different 
understanding of Augustine. In the concluding part of the thesis, I will attempt to 
shed some light on how Carolingian thought developed between the late eighth and 
the mid-ninth century, and to inquire into the causes of their different 
interpretations of Augustine. 
Besides living at different times of the Carolingian imperial period (Alcuin 
was adviser to Charlemagne, ruler of the first generation, Hincmar to Charles the 
Bald, ruler of the third generation), they also had slightly different statuses and 
functions as writers and advisers. Alcuin, born in the Northumbrian kingdom, 
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joined Charlemagne’s court as a foreigner around 782.998 He was slowly accepted 
into the king’s inner circle of scholars, since his authority had first to be 
established.999 Besides his extensive literary activity, Alcuin was also teaching at 
the Frankish court1000, and in his capacity as adviser guided Charlemagne in his 
decisions regarding the ‘state’ and the ‘church’.1001 As this thesis argues, Alcuin’s 
opinion gained authority from 794 onward (after Charlemagne’s move to Aachen) 
in the discourse leading up to Charlemagne’s imperial coronation. In 796 Alcuin 
reluctantly left the Aachen palace when Charlemagne installed him as abbot of the 
monastery of Saint-Martin, although he was merely a deacon and had never in fact 
been ordained priest.1002 He kept up a correspondence and continued to provide 
advice until his death. Hincmar, a native born into a noble family in Northern 
Francia, was appointed archbishop of Reims in 845. From 840 onwards, he 
supported Charles the Bald as an adviser. However, as archbishop of the most 
influential archdiocese in Western Francia, Hincmar expressed reservations about a 
secular power that he saw as too sovereign1003, and was critical of the imperial title 
conferred on Charles the Bald in 875.1004 As far as his literary activity was 
concerned, his work was limited to specific events that had relevance to him and 
his archdiocese: for instance, he wrote in response to legal disputes. 
In my survey of the main influences on the De civitate Dei and Augustine’s 
understanding and definitions of politically organised communities, it has emerged 
                                                
998 Bullough 2004, pp. 164-165, 331-337. 
999 Ibid., pp. 390, 401. 
1000 For details regarding Alcuin’s restructuring of the teaching system at the Frankish court see 
Brunhölzl 1967, pp. 32-41. 
1001 Bullough 2004, p. 372. 
1002 Ibid., pp. 306, 435. 
1003 On resistance to kings and emperors in the Carolingian age see Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 127-
128 and Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 184-185, 192-197. 
1004 See Anton 1968, p. 282. 
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that the Augustinian conception of God and the ruler underwent an intellectual 
development from a Greco-Roman to a Judaeo-Christian view via neo-Platonism 
and St. Paul. It has become evident that an important strand of the philosophical 
tradition comes via Cicero. Having evaluated the Augustinian influence in the 
works of both an earlier and a later Carolingian author, it is fair to claim that it 
seems to have been a trend to use Augustine in Carolingian literature – in particular 
in the event of political crises. There are, indeed, several other Carolingian authors 
who could have been included in the discussion. One example is Jonas of Orléans. 
He composed a “mirror for princes” entitled De institutione regia1005 for the 
instruction of Pepin I of Aquitaine. In this mirror work the De civitate Dei is 
prominent among the sources consulted by the author. The text ends with a 
quotation from chapter 24 of Book V, where Augustine defines the felicitas 
(“happiness”) of the Christian emperors. In terms of Alcuin’s and Hincmar’s 
common ground, it has been established that their views of Augustinianism are 
expressed particularly well in their ideas and political discourse on both the Roman 
emperors (Constantine I and Theodosius I) and the Old Testament kings (David 
and Solomon). 
As far as my first approach to the sources is concerned, which considered 
different kinds of direct references to Augustine, the findings on Augustinian 
influence in Alcuin and Hincmar are similar: Alcuin uses Augustine explicitly as 
the most distinguished authority and as a binding guideline in questions relating to 
Christian doctrine. Hincmar makes direct reference to Augustine as the prime 
authority in the struggle against heresy (in his epistles concerning Gottschalk’s 
                                                
1005 De inst. regia. 
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doctrine of predestination), and as a moral authority (in the Quaterniones of the 
Expositiones ad Carolum Regem and in the De regis persona et regio ministerio). 
Regarding the second approach to the sources, which explored the implicit 
evidence of Augustinian influence at the level of content and the formal level of the 
Carolingian texts, the findings on Augustinian influence in Alcuin and Hincmar are 
different. In the final analysis, Hincmar uses Augustine’s De civitate Dei in a 
decidedly more critical way than Alcuin. 
In the study of Alcuin’s Epistolae, the use of the terms imperium (“supreme 
power”) (or alternatively potestas or potentia) and sapientia (“wisdom”) with 
reference to Charlemagne has emerged as a recurring theme. This is not surprising, 
given that sapientia, together with its antithesis fortitudo (“strength”), had been an 
established topos among moral ideals since Virgil.1006 However, it has been shown 
that Alcuin borrows the term imperium, together with other terms, from Augustine. 
In the De civitate Dei, imperium primarily appears in the books concerned with 
                                                
1006 Curtius 1961, pp. 171-190. As far as the classical topoi of “wisdom” and “strength” are 
concerned, we of course find them represented in the ancient Greek epic poetry attributed to Homer. 
According to Homer, the optimal performance in war is achieved by a balance between “mind” and 
“strength”. Only in Odysseus, however, do “wisdom” and “strength” seem to be united in equal 
measure. Cicero, who reformulated the argument of Polybius by saying that according to Roman 
history the key element in the Romans’ rise was from the first the wisdom and moral superiority of 
individuals, contributed to the integration of these ideals into Roman political thinking. After 
Virgil’s Latin epic poem, the Aeneid, which is linked in many ways to Homer, sapientia (“wisdom”) 
and its antithesis fortitudo (“strength”) became an established topos among moral ideals in classical 
Latin literature. In the Early Middle Ages, Germanic epic poetry originating from the Ostrogoths 
existed in the form of heroic songs, which were, however, oral rather than literary. In late antique 
and early medieval Latin epic poetry, the novels about Troy by Dictys Cretensis (Ephemeris belli 
Troiani, fourth century) and Dares Phrygius (De excidio Troiae historia, fifth/sixth century) were 
important in shaping the medieval topoi of sapientia and fortitudo. Fulgentius was prominent in late 
antique Latin literary theory. According to his allegory, the topoi of sapientia and fortitudo were 
contained in the very opening words of Virgil’s Aeneid, namely in arma virumque cano (“I sing of 
arms and the man”): while arma was supposed to represent fortitudo, virum was supposed to 
represent sapientia. Isidore of Seville, an intermediary between the ancient and the Carolingian 
worlds, writes in his reflections on epic: “It is called heroic song, because it recounts the deeds of 
brave men. For heroes are men who are worthy of heaven on account of their wisdom and strength”. 
Cited in ibid., p. 184. The topoi of sapientia and fortitudo are henceforth used in medieval threnody, 
panegyric and epic. Ibid., pp. 176-184. 
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politics and the characteristics of Roman power. In many instances, imperium 
occurs in the sense of “empire” or “world power” and frequently refers to the 
Roman empire (imperium Romanum). Often imperium also means “supreme power 
(of Roman emperors)” and “command”. Consequently, for Augustine, imperium as 
a term for a ‘state’ is reserved for a power that has supremacy over other ‘states’ 
and is significant within God’s providential plan because it is meaningful for the 
development of Christianity. The title of imperator appears analogously and in 
similar contexts. Only once does imperium occur as a purely spiritual concept.1007 
Hence, for Augustine the civitas Dei is incompatible with any form of military 
power. 
Alcuin adopts the strong military connotation of imperium in the De civitate 
Dei by attributing to it an immediate political function. However, to Alcuin the 
notions of imperium and imperator, which gain prominence in the correspondence 
leading up to Charlemagne’s imperial coronation, refer to an actual people of God 
on earth. Alcuin imbues imperium with an additional spiritual meaning: it is not 
enough for him, when using the term imperium and the title of imperator with 
reference to Charlemagne and his ‘state’, to link Charlemagne’s empire with the 
eschatologically relevant empires of the Assyrians and Romans and to equate 
Charlemagne with the Roman imperatores. By asserting that God presented 
Charlemagne with the two gifts of imperium and sapientia to a higher degree than 
any other secular leader given the title of imperator, and by claiming that 
Charlemagne’s perpetuae pacis civitas ranks higher than David’s Old Testament 
Jerusalem, Alcuin portrays Charlemagne as superior to any past or present ruling 
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figure. Throughout Alcuin’s epistles, the attribute of imperium (or alternatively 
potestas or potentia) has a political function, that of sapientia a religious function. 
While imperium serves to express Charlemagne’s capacity for expanding, 
defending and safeguarding the empire, sapientia reflects Charlemagne’s capacity 
for learning, spreading and defending Catholic Christian doctrine. The consistency 
with which Alcuin applies these terms (imperium and imperator), as well as the 
other Augustinian terms under discussion in this thesis, allows the reader to 
attribute to them a new, clear-cut and well-defined meaning relating to Christian 
Carolingian political thought. 
 J. Devisse confirms that Alcuin may speak up in cases where cruel methods 
are applied in Charlemagne’s military campaigns. However, the dilatatio imperii as 
such is never questioned by Alcuin.1008 Military expansion that goes hand in hand 
with Christianisation is perfectly legitimate, and is celebrated as one of 
Charlemagne’s greatest and noblest achievements – in fact as the achievement that 
sets him apart from all previous and contemporary secular authorities. 
Charlemagne’s military success is seen as God’s reward for the Christian piety of 
the Franks. 
 While Alcuin does not question the legitimacy of war and military violence 
in this context, Hincmar (e.g. in the De regis persona et regio ministerio) 
thoroughly re-evaluates the lawfulness of war and violence in general; and he does 
this by drawing on Augustine’s De civitate Dei. Hincmar indicates to Charles the 
Bald that it is not morally just for a ruler to conquer other races merely for personal 
                                                
1008 Devisse 1976, p. 529. This is also well formulated in Wallace-Hadrill 1971, p. 105. 
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glory and profit. Peace should always be the ultimate aim of any Christian ruler.1009 
By the later ninth century, Vikings, Muslims and Magyars had attacked the borders 
and brought instability to the Frankish realm. Devisse argues plausibly that it is 
under these circumstances that the question of the Christian piety of the Frankish 
people arises for Hincmar. His view (based on St. Paul and developed by 
Augustine and Gregory the Great1010) that disorder in society is attributable to the 
people’s sins explains his fear of a decline in the Christian moral standards of the 
Franks. In consequence, Hincmar reflects on the lawfulness of military service, as 
well as of homicide in combat and as a punitive measure, by referring to 
Augustine.1011 Devisse reasons that, due to the realm’s political instability, Hincmar 
feels compelled to support not only military service but also stringent laws that are 
put into writing.1012 Both imply advocating a violence that is institutionalised (be it 
military violence or violence in the form of physical punishment) and authorised by 
the ruler on God’s behalf.1013 In contrast to violence that is governmentally 
approved, Hincmar condemns any form of private violence, since it is not divinely 
authorised.1014 For instance, it is striking that Hincmar attaches the rhetorical 
question, “In the absence of justice, what are realms, therefore, but big bands of 
robbers?”1015 – with which Augustine opens chapter 4 of Book IV of the De civitate 
Dei – to the end of CAP. VI of the De regis persona et regio ministerio. It leaves 
                                                
1009 See Devisse 1976, p. 530. 
1010 See CAP. I. of the De regis persona et regio ministerio. 
1011 See Devisse 1976, p. 531. 
1012 Devisse finds that written laws have a fundamental social value according to Hincmar, since 
they are immediately and easily coercive for the person who transgresses them and allow for the 
rapid restoration of justice in a disrupted society. Ibid., p. 560. 
1013 Ibid., pp. 531-534. 
1014 Ibid., p. 533. 
1015 Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? Civ. IV 4, p. 150, ll. 19-20. 
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the impression that Hincmar deliberately wants to lay stress on the importance of 
morally correct worldly rulership authorised by the Christian God. 
 As far as the example of the Christian Roman empire and emperors in 
Hincmar’s writing is concerned, Hincmar undeniably places more importance on 
Theodosius I than on Constantine I. This is, in all probability, due to Theodosius 
I’s legal-mindedness. For the Christian Roman empire Augustine lives under, 
Augustine himself evidently promotes a certain relationship between the ‘state’ and 
the ‘church’.1016 First and foremost, he recognises the imperfect worldly ‘state’ as 
an instrument of power for missionary purposes.1017 Hence, Augustine sees a 
functional relationship between the ‘state’ and the ‘church’, insofar as the ‘state’ 
may be used to serve the ‘church’.1018 Apart from that, however, he regards the 
‘state’ as a worldly system of power separate from the ‘church’.1019 In the ninth 
century Carolingian ‘state’ of Charles the Bald, Hincmar firstly also recognises a 
distinction between secular and ecclesiastical authority and power.1020 J. L. Nelson 
observes: “In a time of political crisis, the episcopate became increasingly 
conscious of its own unity and responsibility – a consciousness at once the cause 
and the effect of frequent synodal activity – and the archbishop of Rheims was 
using all his resources of political influence and canonical expertise to bring his 
                                                
1016 Flasch 2003, pp. 391, 393. 
1017 See Campenhausen von 1964, pp. 238-240. Regarding imperial repression see Dodaro 1999, 
pp.180-181. On Augustine and religious coercion under Theodosius I and his successors see Markus 
1988, pp. 113-115. 
1018 Flasch 2003, pp. 164, 391-393. This is confirmed by R. Dodaro who writes that with the reign 
of Emperor Constantine I “[...] and continuing into the early Middle Ages, the governing structures 
of the Christian church and of the Roman Empire developed closer relationships, even while 
retaining their separate identities.” Dodaro 1999, p. 176. See also Markus 1988, p. 86; Baynes 1936, 
pp. 14-15. 
1019 Flasch 2003, pp. 391-392; Dempf 1973, p. 134; Baynes 1936, p. 15. 
1020 This is supported by Anton 1968, pp. 311ff. 
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suffragans under firmer metropolitan control.”1021 Secondly, Hincmar also links the 
royal power in some ways with the priestly authority:1022 he fashions kingly 
professions for West Frankish royal consecrations on the model of already existing 
professions for episcopal ordinations.1023 In other words, he formulates an idea of 
kingly duty on an idea of episcopal duty.1024 However, on the basis of Gelasius’ 
notion of episcopal superiority in dignity1025 over royal power, Hincmar is able to 
determine the bishops’ role as consecrators in West Frankish royal 
consecrations.1026 The consecration-rites developed by Hincmar insist on the king’s 
promise “to keep the laws and statutes for the people committed by God’s mercy to 
me to rule”1027. This means that, beyond offering mere spiritual guidance, they point 
to the ‘church’s’ authority over the king as an individual Christian1028, and establish 
the bishops’ jurisdiction over the king’s comportment in a duty for which the 
bishops had consecrated him.1029 Even though Hincmar expresses this 
unequivocally in his texts – as has been seen in the Quaterniones of the 
                                                
1021 Nelson 1986, p. 144. 
1022 Hincmar probably played the leading role in the appropriation of the royal rite by West Frankish 
bishops. Ibid., pp. 137, 149. 
1023 Ibid., pp. 138, 145-146, 155; Nelson 1994, p. 66. 
1024 Four of the ordines, the texts written for Carolingian royal consecrations, were compiled by 
Hincmar: the ordo (V) for the marriage and coronation of Judith (daughter of Charles the Bald) at 
Verberie (Oise) on 1 October 856; the ordo (VI) for the anointing and coronation of Ermentrude 
(first wife of Charles the Bald) at Soissons on 25 August 866; the ordo (VII) for the coronation of 
Charles the Bald as king of Lorraine in the cathedral of St. Stephen in Metz on 9 September 869; the 
ordo (VIII) for the coronation of Louis the Stammerer as king of the West Franks at Compiègne on 
8 December 877. See Ord., pp. 73, 80, 87, 110; Nelson 1986, pp. 137-138. A more in-depth 
treatment of how the ordines may reflect the nature of royal power in the ninth century can be found 
in Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 133-135; Nelson 1986, pp. 142-171; Nelson 1996b), pp. 102ff. 
1025 Nelson argues that the consecrators’ maior dignitas implies superior governmental position in 
addition to superior sacramental powers. Nelson 1986, pp. 140, 142. 
1026 According to Gelasius, the authority of the ‘church’ is superior to secular authority. In his 
understanding, the ‘church’ will eventually be held accountable for the actions of the secular 
leaders, whose power has been given by the ‘church’. See also Anton 1968, pp. 307, 311ff. 
1027 Nelson 1994, p. 66; see also Nelson 1986, p. 153. 
1028 On the development of the principle that rulers as individual Christians are subject to 
ecclesiastical censure see Anton 1968, pp. 285ff.; Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 192-195; Nelson 1986, 
pp. 134-135; Markus 1988, pp. 95-102. 
1029 Nelson 1986, p. 169; Nelson 1994, p. 66. 
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Expositiones ad Carolum Regem – he makes no literal claim for legal authority on 
the part of the bishops to depose a West Frankish king.1030 Nelson in particular 
takes the view that in recent scholarship a tendency has remained to understand the 
limitations Hincmar places on kingship as fundamentally moral. According to her, 
however, the evidence rather indicates that Hincmar nevertheless demands, in 
addition to spiritual authority, a particular jurisdiction over the inaugurated king.1031 
It is in fact this statement that marks the contrast between Augustine’s and 
Hincmar’s perceived ‘state-church’ relationship. Augustine and Hincmar both 
envisage the ‘state’ and the ‘church’ as two separate bodies which are in a certain 
relationship with one another. In both instances, the relationship is characterised by 
a superiority of the ‘church’. However, the nature of this superiority is different in 
each case: according to Augustine, the ‘church’s’ superior role is not to be 
understood in a worldly sense at all.1032 For the ‘church’ has an immortal soul and 
an eternal mission, which the ‘state’ lacks.1033 The Augustinian ‘church’ firstly 
cannot be compared to any earthly systems of rule on account of its timelessness 
and secondly lacks a clear hierarchical structure in itself.1034 K. Flasch and M. De 
                                                
1030 This becomes evident, inter alia, in CAP. I. of the De regis persona et regio ministerio. The 
point also emerges from the discussions in Wallace-Hadrill 1971, pp. 99, 125, 127-128, 133-135; 
Wallace-Hadrill 1975, pp. 192-197. Nelson, however, in contrast to previous scholars (e.g. M. 
David, K. F. Morrison, J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, H. H. Anton), takes her argument one step further. 
She seems to attribute to Hincmar not only an elaborate reassessment of the royal office, but also a 
refined procedure for confronting “[...] the problem of controlling its exercise.” Nelson 1986, p. 
135. She argues convincingly that Hincmar claimed both sacramental powers and a specific 
episcopal jurisdiction over the consecrated king. Ibid., pp. 155-164, 169. However, it appears that 
Hincmar left the mechanics of earthly deposition unspecified. Ibid., pp. 164-171. Thus, it must be 
Hincmar’s refined treatment of law and liturgy that tempted Nelson to consider Hincmar as a 
“theorist” and attribute to him a “[...] theory of restraints on Christian kingship [...]”. Ibid., p. 134; 
Nelson 1992, p. 49. 
1031 Nelson 1986, p. 169. 
1032 Flasch 2003, p. 391; Baynes 1936, pp. 14-15. 
1033 Flasch 2003, p. 392. R. A. Markus uses the phrase “[...] an ‘otherworldly’ Church [...]” to render 
this meaning. Markus 1970, p. 133. 
1034 Flasch 2003, pp. 386-388. 
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Jong both note that Augustine’s ‘church’ is more a community than a hierarchically 
structured body.1035 Hincmar, however, when he frames the royal professions in 
terms analogous to the episcopal professions, shows that he considers the ‘church’ 
as part of the same category as the ‘state’. At the same time, he asserts the bishops’ 
role as consecrators in royal consecrations, which implies that the royal promise is 
guaranteed to the ‘church’. He ranks the ‘church’ above the ‘state’ within the same 
category. This shows that Hincmar assumes a superiority of the ‘church’ over the 
‘state’ that is obviously meant very much in a worldly sense. While there are, at 
least to some extent, correspondences between Augustine’s and Hincmar’s 
understanding of the relationship between ‘state’ and ‘church’, Hincmar never uses 
Augustine’s notion of the civitas Dei as Alcuin does in his attempt to establish a 
formal Carolingian ruler legitimation. Hincmar omits the idea of the civitas Dei on 
the basis of pragmatism. His aims are rather practical and revolve around solving 
political and legal problems. Nelson writes: “In the painful struggle towards a 
positive response to contemporary political change, Hincmar was forced to modify 
Western ideological tradition as evolved before, and especially during, the reign of 
Charlemagne, in order to cope with the new realities of the reign of Charles the 
Bald. For Hincmar’s interests as a politician were basically practical [...].”1036 She 
adds: “His own lifetime (805/6-882) spanned the Carolingian Empire from its 
heyday to its dissolution: his political thought forms a bridge between the 
ideologies of theocratic and feudal kingship.”1037 Hincmar is aware that during his 
lifetime the ‘church’ has lost property through war waged by the secular 
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1037 Ibid., p. 171. 
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authorities. He also realises that the ‘church’ is stronger as a moral institution 
separate from the secular power. A condition of this is that the royal office is 
subject to criticism by the ‘church’. 
Alcuin’s central goal as an adviser to the first Carolingian emperor, on the 
other hand, is to shape a formal legitimation of Carolingian rulership. He does this 
by using the notion of the civitas Dei as an analogy to Charlemagne’s ‘state’. In 
other words, Alcuin attempts to paint Charlemagne’s Carolingian ‘state’ as the 
realised Augustinian civitas Dei. Under the power of Charlemagne the spiritual and 
the secular are closely joined together. It has emerged that in Alcuin’s epistles 
Charlemagne is continuously represented as the unchallenged religious leader of 
his people. Nelson remarks that Charlemagne himself crowned his son, Louis the 
Pious, in 813, and Louis in turn crowned his own son, Charles, in 838.1038 By 866, 
when Charles assisted in the coronation of his first wife Ermentrude at Soissons, 
Nelson notes that the Frankish bishops had involved themselves in both 
coronations and anointings. Nelson points out that, from the mid-ninth century, 
“coronation became, alongside anointing, permanently part of the ecclesiastical 
procedures of king-making”1039. In contrast to Hincmar, Alcuin does not draw on 
the De civitate Dei in order to tell the ruler that, as a Christian leader, he must act 
according to the moral code of the Frankish ‘church’, and that, should he fail so to 
do, he must humbly repent of his sins, just as his exemplary antecessores 
Constantine I, Theodosius I and the Old Testament kings, who were praised for 
their humilitas, had done. Rather, Alcuin uses Augustine to tell Charlemagne that 
he is the first Christian ruler who can fulfil Augustine’s condition – namely to lead 
                                                




a people fully under the will of God by implementing God’s vera iustitia1040 – for a 
civitas Dei. 
 In the Augustinus-Lexikon s.v. iustitia Dodaro avers that Augustine in the 
De civitate Dei denies that, due to their lack of vera pietas, the Romans ever 
reached the status of a res publica in Cicero’s terms.1041 He remarks that, in 
Augustine’s view, the civitas Dei alone meets Cicero’s definition of a res publica. 
Moreover, he says that, based on a number of statements made by Augustine, the 
scholarship agrees that even though Augustine separates vera pietas from the 
virtues of the pagans, he regards the latter as sufficient for maintaining a limited 
pax (“peace”) and order in society. However, Dodaro also notes that the 
scholarship on the whole does not agree on the extent to which Augustine regards 
either the imperium Romanum (“Roman empire”) as a whole, whether Christian or 
heathen, or its individual politicians, as exhibiting anything more than a short-lived 
or even an Ersatz-virtue. Furthermore, he claims that in some letters to public 
officials and authorities engaged in secular pursuits (e.g. Augustine’s epist. 48 ad 
Vincentium, quoted in Hincmar’s De regis persona et regio ministerio), Augustine 
outlines an argument concerning the transformation of the four virtutes civiles 
(sapientia/prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo/magnitudo animi and iustitia) beyond 
the fundamental level of virtue attained by pagan politicians who lack vera pietas 
(which consists in the knowledge and love of the true God). By allowing their 
conception of iustitia (“justice”) to be transformed by fides, spes and caritas, 
Christian politicians will, according to Augustine, fight wars in a more virtuous 
manner than that which is sustained by the Roman concept of bellum iustum, and 
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they will punish offenders with iustitia tempered with misericordia 
(“forbearance”).1042 
 I have investigated how Hincmar utilises this correspondence together with 
the quotations from the De civitate Dei that relate either to the Christian Roman 
emperors or to Cicero’s model of a just social order. The question has been posed 
about the function performed by Hincmar’s resorting to Augustine’s discussion of 
Christian leadership. Considering the virtue of iustitia (“justice”) from Hincmar’s 
point of view, there is a clear distinction between iustitia and vera iustitia 
(achieved only by those who practise vera pietas, which consists in the knowledge 
and love of the true God). That a ruler practices vera pietas is the precondition for 
the people to obey him as well as the laws enforced by him. The Christian form of 
iustitia (i.e. vera iustitia) is therefore used by Hincmar as a means to compel the 
people to its observance and practice. Secondly, Hincmar differentiates between 
the vera iustitia of Christian rulers and the iustitia of pagan rulers, in order to 
dissociate the Germanic heathen idea of rulership from that of the Christian idea of 
rulership (e.g. the one held by the Christian Roman emperors). Hincmar aims to 
show that the Christian moral code of secular leadership, and Christian political 
ethics in general, are superior to the heathen one. It is therefore justified to say that, 
according to Hincmar’s understanding, the Christian iustitia (i.e. vera iustitia) is 
exalted. Hincmar does not, however, enquire whether this Christian form of iustitia 
enforced in Charles the Bald’s realm fulfils the criteria for that realm to be 
equivalent to a civitas Dei. This is chiefly because Hincmar looks at the Christian 
form of iustitia (i.e. vera iustitia) only from the ruler’s point of view, without 




reflecting on its realisation within a social order as a whole. Unlike in Alcuin’s 
epistles, in which vera iustitia or divina iustitia as well as pax appear as timeless, 
transcendent concepts, Hincmar’s pondering does not reach beyond the point where 
vera iustitia, from the ruler’s perspective, can compel the people to the observance 
of the law – on which basis pax is enforced – and where it can claim distinctness 
from the pagan (Germanic) iustitia. That is to say, Hincmar essentially 
institutionalises vera iustitia or divina iustitia and pax. According to Hincmar, vera 
iustitia or divina iustitia can solely be implemented by being put into writing. The 
law imposed and recorded by Charles the Bald’s predecessors, the Christian 
Roman emperors (Constantine I and, above all, Theodosius I), as well as by the 
‘church’ councils, is therefore part of the vera iustitia or divina iustitia. Hincmar 
instrumentalises the concept of vera iustitia or divina iustitia in order to alert 
Charles the Bald, together with the Frankish people, to the importance of observing 
the law which derives directly from God and is enforced by the ruler on God’s 
behalf. Hincmar argues along these lines with the primary aims of establishing 
peace and order and promoting the Christian faith in Carolingian society; his goal 
was that everyone should understand the urgency of participating in this affair. 
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